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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In an era of climate change, the process of and time frame for fostering new industries with 
the capacity of being innovative and able to diffuse a wide range of renewable energy 
technologies on a large scale has become a pressing issue. In the midst of the creation of 
such industries are the system builders―without such actors, new technologies and 
industries would not emerge. In this thesis, a novel conceptualisation of system builders is 
presented from a technological innovation system (TIS) perspective. The focus is on system 
builders with the intention of realising the potential of biomass gasification for the 
production of second-generation transportation fuels and other chemicals. The empirical 
work covers the historical development of biomass gasification in four countries―Austria, 
Germany, Sweden, and Finland―leading up to the nine most prominent technology 
development projects currently in Europe. This thesis analyses: a) who act as system builders 
in the different national contexts; b) how they learn and enable the emergence of the new 
system; and c) the limits to their capacity in creating the new and embryonic industry 
structures. With these insights, policymakers may d) set more realistic goals with respect to 
future targets and design policy interventions that address the actual system weaknesses of 
the emerging TIS. It is suggested that second-generation fuels from biomass can only play a 
very limited role in the fuel market until 2020 at the earliest. For realising the large but long-
term potential of the technology, actions must now be taken to shift some of the risks for 
investors to society at large by funding demonstrations and forming initial markets for fuels 
that are significantly more expensive than conventional alternatives. Without such markets, 
the system builders will have great difficulties attracting further actors with complementary 
competencies, as well as the additional resources necessary to resolve the remaining 
technical uncertainties and take the required steps towards commercial-scale plants. 
Keywords: biomass gasification, second-generation transportation fuels, technical change, 
system builders, technological innovation systems, technology policy. 
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Part I         
Setting the scene 
 
  
 
1 
 
Chapter I                                                                                       
Introduction 
 
 
Innovations, in terms of new products and services, have been identified as a key factor in 
the creation of new firms and industries, the re-vitalisation of existing industry structures, 
and as the main driver behind economic growth, at least since the time of Smith (1776), 
Marx (1887) and Schumpeter (1934; 1942). Entrepreneur(s), acting as system builder(s), 
have often (and rightfully) been placed at the heart of the innovation process, where they 
are forced to address many non-technical challenges (Hughes, 1987; Law, 1987b). Some of 
these challenges are associated with the creation of new organisations and institutions that 
can support the emergence of a capital goods industry with a capacity to produce innovative 
new products and services (Rosenberg, 1976; Nelson, 1994). 
Over the past few decades or so, innovation and economic development have been 
increasingly associated with achieving sustainable growth in the face of climate change and 
other environmental threats. The contemporary climate challenge has been defined as 
limiting the Earth’s temperature increase to two degrees Celsius over the long-term. 
According to the best available knowledge today, this would require reducing green house 
gas emissions in the developed world by 30-40 percent from 1990 levels by 2020, and by 80 
percent from 1990 levels by 2050 (IPCC, 2007; Stern, 2007).1 
“Limiting temperature rise to 2˚C requires a low carbon revolution” 
(IEA, 2009, p. 45) 
 
Such a radical change in emission levels would have a significant impact on all fossil-based, 
energy-intensive activities, and require profound socio-technical changes to current energy 
                                                      
1 Current policies and the pace of economic development will lead to CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere of 
1,000 ppm. The risk that human activities result in an increase of the global average temperature of more than six 
degrees Celsius is, in such a scenario, significant and would result in irreversible damage to the environment 
(IEA, 2009). 
2 
 
systems and consumption patterns. In this transformation, the mainly fossil-based energy 
system must be replaced by a wide range of carbon-neutral technologies. These 
technologies only exist on a very small scale today when compared to the global energy 
supply. 
Hence, in order to create a sustainable global economy in the face of climate change, we not 
only need to develop the most environmentally friendly technologies possible, but also take 
actions to diffuse them widely on a global scale within the given time frame of less than four 
decades. This requires the formation of a wide range of capital goods industries capable of 
developing and delivering carbon-neutral technologies on a large scale.  
This thesis sets out to analyse the role of the system builder in the emergence of an industry 
with the capacity to develop and diffuse such a technology: biomass gasification for the 
production of renewable transportation fuels and other chemicals. In addition, the thesis is 
concerned with identifying the challenges for policymakers and system builders interested in 
commercialising the process and, eventually, diffusing it widely.  
The process of gasification refers to the thermal conversion of any carbon-based fuel to a 
gas with a usable heating value (Higman and van der Burgt, 2003). It has previously been 
developed as a technology almost exclusively based on fossil resources, and an industry with 
the capacity to build and operate gasification plants for electricity production, various 
chemicals, nitrogenous fertilisers and transportation fuels already exists. However, the 
technology is still immature with regard to using biomass as the feed-stock for advanced 
applications such as the production of transportation fuels and other chemicals.2  
In total, 24 biomass gasification plants have been commissioned by European-based 
companies since the early-1980s.3 The plants have been made operational for less complex 
applications such as lime kilns, boilers, gas engines and when the biomass is co-fired with 
coal. On the other hand, actors pursuing the technology have, so far, failed to deliver 
                                                      
2 These fuels are distinctly different from first-generation fuels from food crops, produced through mechanical or 
biological processes. At times, the process of turning biomass to a liquid is referred to as BtL (biomass-to-
liquid), and the fuels are commonly referred to as second-generation renewable transportation fuels or, 
alternatively, simply second-generation fuels.  
3 The plants refer to large demonstration and commercially operating plants. Hence, small-scale pilots and fixed-
bed gasifiers are not included in the count. 
3 
 
biomass gasification systems for power generation through integrated gasification combined 
cycle (IGCC) technology, as well as for the production of second-generation renewable 
transportation fuels and other chemicals―all of which are more advanced applications. The 
market success of biomass gasification has, thus, so far been limited. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The empirical and analytical points of 
departure for the thesis will be explained in Sections 1.1 and 1.2, respectively. The purpose 
and the structure of the thesis will be outlined in Section 1.3. 
1.1 Empirical points of departure 
The time frame for fostering new industries with the capacity to be innovative and diffuse a 
wide range of renewable energy technologies has, in recent years, gained an importance 
beyond achieving just long-term growth and economic development. For the first time, a 
relatively well-defined time frame has been established for when a wide range of renewable 
technologies must be able to make a significant contribution to the world’s energy supply, 
instead of being marginally used as it is today. This thesis will illustrate that not only has it 
taken many decades to develop second-generation renewable transportation fuels, but also 
that the remaining challenges will be with us for many years to come.  
In an ideal world, targets and policies would reflect the challenges ahead in limiting global 
warming to two degrees Celsius in order to avoid the risk of severe and irreversible impacts 
on the environment (IPCC, 2007). While it is encouraging that many influential political 
leaders recognise that climate change is caused by human activity and that it is one of the 
most important challenges for national and international policymaking (G8, 2009; 
Meinshausen et al., 2009), so far there is no binding, overall agreement on how this target 
should be reached. 
For the European Union, green house gas (GHG) mitigation is mainly about limiting the 
emissions associated with energy use, which in 2008 accounted for approximately 80 
percent of all GHG emissions (Eurostat, 2010b). Although the overall amount of GHG 
emissions has decreased by 11 percent between 1990 and 2008, emissions related to modes 
4 
 
of transport have increased by approximately 24 percent since 1990,4 and contributed to 
approximately 20 percent of total GHG emissions within the EU-27 in 2008 (Eurostat, 
2010b). Hence, without reducing emissions from the transport sector, stringent GHG 
emissions targets in Europe will be difficult to meet.5 
When prescribing policies for targets as ambitious as limiting climate change to two degrees 
Celsius, there are also other societal goals and interests that must be taken into 
consideration and balanced against each other. It is thus important to consider energy 
policies in Europe not only in relation to the climate change debate, but also in relation to 
the increasing focus on energy and job security, “peak oil”, as well as the associated and 
expected increase in the price of liquid fuels in the future.6  
With regard to energy security, oil consumption in the USA, EU, China and Japan accounted 
for more than 56 percent of the global total, although the same countries only accounted for 
15 percent of the production of oil in 2008 (BP, 2009). This makes these four high 
consumption countries/regions heavily dependent on imports and vulnerable to the actions 
of a few oil producing countries. As for peak oil, and based on a survey of recently published 
papers, there appears to be an increasing consensus amongst oil exploration experts that 
peak production will be reached in the near future (de Almeida and Silva, 2009). 7 In the 
long-term, ever-increasing demand and diminishing supply will inevitably drive up the price 
of oil and increase incentives to develop both fossil-based and renewable unconventional 
liquid fuel sources.  
Fossil alternative liquids such as extra heavy oils, bitumen, oil shales, gas-to-liquid (GtL) and 
coal-to-liquid (CtL) conversion are abundant in supply, easy to scale up production-wise, and 
                                                      
4 GHG emissions from the transportation sector continue to increase, while emissions from the energy sector (not 
including transportation) have started to decline from high levels (60 percent of the total emissions 2007) 
(Eurostat, 2007, 2009).    
5 Increased use of public transportation, new habits in combination with more efficient engines and an 
electrification of the drive-train have the potential to substantially reduce the need for liquid fuels in the future, 
but not eliminate it completely. The challenge ahead can only be solved by simultaneous, and parallel 
development and diffusion of a wide range of measures.  
6 Liquids include not only oil but also renewable fuels and alternatives derived from fossil resources.  
7 Most of the uncertainty around the actual date of peak oil depends on the behaviour of Saudi Arabia. Its future 
production capacity is at present very uncertain; this number is absolutely critical for defining a more exact 
world peak oil date (de Almeida and Silva, 2009). However, the majority of the studies referred to in the paper 
indicate that peak oil could come as soon as around 2015. 
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generally cheaper to develop than renewable alternatives (IEA, 2008). Hence, without 
significant policy initiatives, it is primarily the fossil alternatives that will be developed and 
not the renewable ones. Consequently, the EIA (2007), IEA (2008), and Aleklett et al., (2010) 
estimate that by 2030 approximately 20-26 percent of world liquid fuels8 will originate from 
fossil alternative sources which emit significantly more GHG emissions than conventional oil 
(IES JRC, 2007). 
With EU Directive 2003/30/EC, which promotes the use of biofuels and other renewable 
fuels for use in transportation, a sizeable market has been created within the European 
Union for non-fossil alternatives (EC, 2003). The target set by the directive is that biofuels 
are to account for 5.75 percent share of all transportation fuels by 2010.9 This was followed 
up in 2009 with a new directive, 2009/28/EC, that sets a binding 10 percent target for 
renewable energy, vis-à-vis the final amount of energy consumed for transportation 
purposes by 2020 (EC, 2009a).10 The commercial availability of second-generation fuel has 
been identified as pivotal for realising this target and has become a priority (EC, 2009a). 
So far, the directive on renewable transportation fuels has stimulated the production of the 
so-called first-generation biofuels, which are primarily derived from food crops such as corn, 
wheat, sugar cane and soya. This has resulted in a public debate around the social and 
environmental desirability of the production and use of biofuels, not least in relation to its 
impact on food production and biodiversity, as well as its real CO2 savings potential (JRC, 
2008). Some of these objections have been taking into consideration when drafting the new 
directive, 2009/28/EC.  
With regard to second-generation fuels, studies have illustrated that they have a CO2-saving 
potential of approximately 90 percent, and that 45-70 percent of the energy content in 
                                                      
8 World liquids refer to the sum of conventional oil and unconventional liquids developed as a substitute for oil. 
9 This target will not be met since the share of biofuels in the transportation sector was only 3.3 percent in 2008 
(Eurostat, 2010c). 
10 The target for renewable transportation fuels should be viewed in the light of the overall target of the EU to 
increase the use of renewable energy to 20 percent of total energy use in the EU-27, and cut CO2 emissions by at 
least 20 percent by 2020, as compared to 1990 levels. It also involves improving energy efficiency by 20 percent 
by 2020 (EC, 2007). The directive states that the share of renewable energy in the transportation sector should be 
the same for all member states, since renewable transportation fuels can easily be traded. Meanwhile, the overall 
targets for renewable energy and emission reductions will be divided between the countries in accordance with 
their ability to comply (EC, 2008). 
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biomass can be converted into a usable fuel, which would be a significant improvement 
compared to first-generation biofuels based on food crops (IES JRC, 2007; RENEW, 2008; 
Thunman et al., 2008). Moreover, with gasification, a wide range of biomass can be used as 
feed-stocks. In the long run these may include low-cost waste streams. The total substitution 
potential of biomass gasification is, therefore, much higher than that of first-generation 
fuels.11 However, the cost of production is considerably higher compared to first-generation 
fuels due to the high investment costs of plant construction (DENA, 2006; JRC, 2008).  
The substitution potential of second-generation fuels based on the gasification of 
domestically produced biomass resources in Europe is difficult to assess for three main 
reasons. First, it depends on how much additional biomass can be produced and if, or when, 
lower grade biomass and waste sources can also be used for fuel production. Social and 
environmental aspects associated with increasing production are difficult to assess and make 
most estimates of biomass potential uncertain at best. It can, however, also be argued the 
increased use of biomass increases the potential, since actors discover new biomass 
resources to explore that had previously been unknown, underdeveloped and difficult to 
measure (Kåberger, 2009). Bearing these uncertainties in mind, the potential for increasing 
the supply of biomass in Europe has been assessed in several studies.  
In RENEW (2008), the current and unused potential of biomass for energy purposes in 
Europe was estimated to be 95Mtoe. With improved agricultural practices, primarily in 
Eastern Europe, it was deemed possible to increase this amount to approximately 172Mtoe 
by 2020. Ericsson and Nilsson (2006) estimated the long-term European potential to be 
approximately 410Mtoe, but their study also included the potential of biomass resources in 
Ukraine and Belarus. 
Second, assessing the substitution potential of second-generation fuels based on the 
gasification of biomass depends on what is perceived as a desirable allocation of biomass in 
the context of its other potential uses. Global system studies have concluded that the 
potential long-term supply of biomass is low compared to the required amount of climate-
                                                      
11 The RENEW report, conducted by advocates of biomass gasification, indicates that the substitution potential is 
2.5 times that of first-generation biodiesel production. However, actual potential will vary significantly with 
different set-ups of the technical systems.  
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neutral energy in a world aiming at limiting global warming to an increase of two degrees 
Celsius from pre-industrial levels (Azar et al., 2003). Since biomass scarcity will be a major 
constraint, it has further been argued that biomass would be used most cost efficiently by 
substituting coal in electricity and heat production rather than for producing transportation 
fuels (Azar et al., 2003; Grahn, 2009; Hansson, 2009). 
However, throughout this study the advocates of biomass gasification and liquefaction 
projects have emphasised that biomass is the only renewable feed-stock that can be used 
for producing renewable liquid fuels and chemicals, whereas for heat and electricity there 
are numerous cheap, renewable alternatives available12 that do not include the use of 
biomass. Accordingly, it would also make sense to allocate parts of this resource for the 
production of transportation fuels and other chemicals.  
Third, the potential of biomass depends on the thermal energy efficiency of turning biomass 
into fuel. In several of the current biomass gasification projects for the production of second-
generation fuels, the so-called Fischer–Tropsch (FT) diesel is seen as a preferred fuel (see 
Chapter III). It is, however, a complex molecule that takes more energy to synthesise than, 
for example, methanol, methane or dimethyl ether (DME). Whilst the exact conversion 
efficiency of the different alternatives are difficult to estimate―since the processes have not 
been commercialised for biomass―different studies point to conversion rates in the range 
of 45-70 percent, depending on the type of processes and fuels used (Ekbom et al., 2003; 
Zwart et al., 2006a; IES JRC, 2007; RENEW, 2008; Thunman et al., 2008). 
A simple example has been constructed to illustrate the impact of these three factors on the 
substitution potential of biomass (see Table 1.1). This is based on total EU-27 fuel 
consumption in 2007 (309Mtoe), which is held constant (Eurostat, 2010a). As mentioned 
above, current and unused biomass resources have been estimated as 95Mtoe (RENEW, 
2008). It has been argued that by 2020 these resources could be increased to 170Mtoe and 
perhaps as high as 410Mtoe over the longer term (Ericsson and Nilsson, 2006; RENEW, 
2008). A low and high allocation of overall biomass potential was set to 40 and 60 percent, 
whilst energy efficiency spans between 45 and 70 percent.  
                                                      
12 Including wind, solar, hydro, and geothermal for electricity production and better utilisation of waste heat.  
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Table 1.1: Substitution potential based on current fuel consumption in the EU-27 (2008). 
Biomass Potential (Mtoe) 95 170 410 
Low energy 
efficiency (45%) 
Low Allocation (40%) 6% 10% 24% 
High Allocation (60%) 11% 20% 48% 
High energy 
efficiency (70%) 
Low Allocation (40%) 9% 15% 37% 
High Allocation (60%) 13% 23% 56% 
 
The result from this simple example illustrates that the potential to produce transportation 
fuels from future biomass resources is highly uncertain, since the substitution potential 
varies between 6 and 56 percent depending on the choices made (see Table 1). 
Consequently, for maximising the substitution potential it is important that the advocates of 
renewable transportation fuels act to increase the overall amount of biomass resources 
available for energy purposes, secures a large share of the total, and act to maximise the 
thermal conversion efficiency of turning biomass into a usable transportation fuels. 
Although highly uncertain, it is not unrealistic to assume that 25 percent (77Mtoe) of current 
(2008) transportation fuel use could be substituted by domestically produced second-
generation fuels in the long run (2030-2050). To realise such a market, investments in plant 
construction of approximately €150-300 billion will have to be made (Chapter III). The direct 
employment effect would be substantial in Europe, with approximately 250,000–300,000 
people in biomass collection and plant operation, not including the employment associated 
with plant construction and the potential associated with an export market. In addition, if 
such a market can be realised, the EU would avoid oil imports of about $100 billion 
annually,13 which results in very few jobs within the European Union (Chapter III).  However, 
realising this potential requires the emergence of a new industry and a biofuel market that 
includes second-generation fuels.  
The embryo of such an industry already exists and has a long and fascinating history. The 
first experiments with biomass gasification for the production of transportation fuels and 
other chemicals started around the time of the first oil crises. The actors involved in its 
development could draw extensively on the general development of fossil gasification and 
pyrolysis, which has been ongoing for the past 250 years, as well as the more recent 
                                                      
13 77Mtoe is approximately 566 million barrels of oil equivalent (1toe=7.33boe). I  assume a nominal oil price of 
$190/bbl in accordance with EIA (2009, p.65) high price scenario. 
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development of fluidised bed combustion of biomass. Since the 1970s, various actions and 
events ultimately resulted in the formation of nine major gasification demonstration projects 
in four European countries:  Austria, Germany, Sweden, and Finland. 
If pursued successfully, each of these nine projects may significantly contribute to the 
formation of a capital goods industry that can deliver the production capacity needed to 
reach current EU targets and beyond. The analytical points of departure for studying the 
emergence of such an industry will now be provided. 
1.2 Analytical points of departure 
The theoretical strand of evolutionary economics has developed as a reaction to the 
dominance and shortcomings of neo-classical economic theory. From the outset, it has been 
based on the ideas of Marx (1887; 1888) and Schumpeter (1934; 1942) with regard to 
innovation and economic development (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi and Nelson, 1994). 
Schumpeter (1934) describes major and radical innovations as the central process for driving 
economic development.14 Such innovations induce disruptive technical, institutional and 
organisational changes that constantly move the economy away from equilibrium 
(Rosenberg, 1976). Evolutionary economics, thus, has a very different point of departure 
than neo-classical theory, which deals with how markets operate under conditions of 
equilibrium. In this respect, neo-classical theory has been described as “ … an inappropriate 
tool to analyze and prescribe policies that will induce development.” (North, 1994, p.359).15   
Based on evolutionary, institutional and industrial economics, an additional body of 
literature has evolved since the mid-1990s. It deals specifically with analysing the 
performance and dynamics of various systems of innovation. The basic question of the 
research has been why some countries have been much better at promoting, developing and 
profiting from innovation than others. The National Systems of Innovation (NSI) framework 
                                                      
14 Schumpeter doesn’t use the term “major innovations”, but it is major innovations such as electricity 
production, railways, automobiles, airplanes, etc. that involve the creation of the new production systems that he 
refers to. The point here is not to come up with some sort of classification of innovations and argue that biomass 
gasification is of a certain type. The point is that biomass gasification is a major innovation that would result in 
technical, organisational and institutional change, if diffused on a large scale for the production of renewable 
transportation fuels and other chemicals, and that this would require the emergence of an industry with such a 
production capacity.   
15 Using the same line of argument, neo-classic economics can also be assessed as inappropriate for analysing 
and prescribing policies that will stimulate innovation, technical change and diffusion. 
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(Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992) has dominated (Carlsson, 2006, 2007), but similar systems 
have been defined and analysed on regional (RSI), sectoral (SSI) and technological (TIS) 
levels. 
All four innovation system perspectives pay considerable attention to the relationship 
between technology, organisations, networks and institutions in the innovation process. 
According to North (1994), the institutions define the rules of the market. The alignment 
between the new technologies, organisations and the institutional framework is a key 
determinant for the successful introduction of new innovations. New institutions are, 
however, not created to be socially efficient, but rather “ … created to serve the interests of 
those with the bargaining power to create new rules” (North, 1994, p. 361). Mature and 
large technical systems—such as the energy and transportation systems—are dominated by 
a few large incumbent actors with considerable bargaining power (Hughes, 1987; Froggatt, 
2003; Hellsmark, 2005). The process of institutional alignment is, therefore, often a painful 
one marked by great uncertainty, conflicting interests between advocates of the old and 
new technologies and between proponents of various designs alternatives of the new 
technologies (Nelson, 1994; Utterback, 1994; Meijer, 2008). Without “re-alignment”, it 
would be impossible for new technological systems to reach what Hughes (1987) calls a 
“momentum of its own” and move into a phase marked by rapid growth. 
Studying this painstaking process of alignment involves unfolding the evolutionary 
interactions between institutions, technology, organisations, and their entrepreneurs. “It is 
the interaction between institutions and organizations that shapes the evolution of an 
economy. If institutions are the rules of the game, organizations and their entrepreneurs are 
the players” (North 1994, p.361) 
The principal actors in the innovation process are the entrepreneurs, who are often 
associated with strong, visionary individuals. However, entrepreneurship can also be the 
result of a collective effort, supported by an infrastructure that makes it possible (Van de 
Ven and Garud, 1989; Van de Ven, 1993; Summerton, 1994; Van de Ven, 2005). At the 
beginning of the “formative phase” (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004), these individuals are few 
in number, and they engage in system building activities that go beyond conventional 
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technology development (Hughes, 1987; Law, 1987b; Hellsmark and Jacobsson, 2009). In this 
thesis, they are referred to as system builders instead of entrepreneurs.16  
In this thesis, I will depart from the technological innovation systems (TIS) framework since it 
provides the tools necessary for analysing the emergence of an industry with the capacity to 
realise the potential of a specific technological field such as biomass gasification. From the 
outset, a TIS was defined as “ ... a network of agents interacting in a specific 
economic/industrial area under a particular institutional structure or set of infrastructures 
and involved in the generation, diffusion, and utilization of technology. Technological 
systems are defined in terms of knowledge/competence flows rather than flows of ordinary 
goods and services.” (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991, p. 111). 
The TIS framework has recently been used as an analytical tool for studying system dynamics 
in the emergence of new technological areas within the energy sector.17 For example, it has 
been used to analyse the emergence of new power production technologies based on wind, 
solar and biomass but also other technological areas such as biofuels, biomass digestion, 
gasified biomass, fuel cells and nanotechnology (Bergek, 2002; Jacobsson et al., 2004; Negro 
et al., 2007; Hillman and Sandén, 2008; Jacobsson, 2008; Negro et al., 2008; Nygaard, 2008; 
Perez Vico and Sandgren, 2008; Suurs, 2009). 
Throughout the thesis, I will focus on the formative phase of a system’s development, which 
extends from when the first actors―system builders―try to commercialise an invention, to 
the time when the new system18 reaches a “momentum of its own” and moves into a 
“growth phase” marked by rapid market expansion (Hughes, 1987; Jacobsson and Bergek, 
2004). The formative phase is dominated by great technical, organisational, market and 
institutional uncertainties that have to be resolved before the TIS can move into a growth 
phase. For most major innovations, it takes a long time to resolve these uncertainties and 
                                                      
16 The concept of entrepreneurs is primarily associated with starting companies, while the system builders 
referred to in this study may also focus on creating conditions that enable others to start new firms, or for 
incumbents to develop new business opportunities. 
17 The development of the framework actually started in the early-1990s within the context of Sweden’s 
Technological Systems programme led by Professor Bo Carlsson (1995, 1997). 
18 In this thesis, I view the development of biomass gasification technology as an emerging knowledge field, 
which consists of new combinations of already existing fields rather than as a “product innovation”. The 
distinctions will be further explained in Chapter II, in which the theoretical framework will be specified. 
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the outcome is highly uncertain. The time frame of the formative phase is often hugely 
underestimated; even if successful, it can extend to several decades (Utterback, 1994; 
Grubler, 1998; Lindmark, 2002; Chesbrough, 2003; Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004; Suurs, 2009; 
Wilson, 2009). 
Recent developments of the perspective (Hekkert et al., 2007; Bergek et al., 2008a; Bergek 
et al., 2008b; Bergek et al., 2008c; Markard and Truffer, 2008) contribute to an elevated 
understanding of the dynamics involving the interaction between the actors, other structural 
entities of the system and exogenous factors. As the system evolves, these interactions 
induce certain emergent properties (or attributes) of the system. These properties may vary 
significantly over time, across different TISs, as well across a given TIS in different countries. 
Various sets of key properties, “functions” of an innovation system, have been elaborated on 
since Johnson and Jacobsson (2001) and Bergek (2002).19  
The dynamics of a TIS can, thus, be analysed both in structural and functional terms. Based 
on such an analysis, the strengths and weaknesses of a system can be assessed and useful 
conclusions can be derived both for public and private policymakers interested in 
strengthening it in relation to competing TISs (Hekkert et al., 2007; Bergek et al., 2008b; 
Suurs, 2009). 
In this thesis, I set out to contribute to the TIS framework by strengthening the analytical link 
between the individual actor (or network of actors) and the dynamics of a TIS. This will be 
done by further conceptualising the role of the “system builder” (Hughes, 1987) as a key 
actor, or network of actors, in the formation of new industries who is equipped with a 
“transformative capacity” (Giddens, 1984a). The extent and limits of the system builders’ 
transformative capacity will be assessed from a technological innovation systems 
perspective, that is by the system builders’ ability to create and strengthen the structure as 
well as the functions of the TIS. 
                                                      
19 Exactly which key properties that should be considered have evolved over time, and there are some slight 
differences between different papers and authors.  
13 
 
1.3 Purpose and outline of the thesis  
The overall purpose of this thesis is to analyse the role of the system builders in the 
emergence of an industry with the capacity to realise the potential of gasified biomass for 
the production of second-generation transportation fuels and other chemicals within the 
European Union. This overall purpose will be broken down into a set of research questions in 
Chapter II. 
The thesis is divided into three main parts and twelve chapters. Part I includes this 
introduction (Chapter I), as well as the analytical framework (Chapter II). Chapter III outlines 
the evolution of gasification technologies and analyses the interrelated knowledge fields 
necessary for turning biomass into various products such as heat, electricity and 
transportation fuels. It also outlines the past and present biomass gasification market, as 
well as the current status of nine major projects in Austria, Germany, Sweden, and Finland 
undertaken by actors that hope to develop and capture the potential market for second-
generation renewable transportation fuels. The methods used for conducting the study are 
presented in Chapter IV.  
The second part of the thesis, Chapters V-VIII, analyses the evolution of biomass gasification 
leading up to the current main projects in each of the four case study countries. These 
chapters provided detailed case studies of the dynamics of the respective technological 
innovation system. 
The third and final part of the thesis consists of four chapters. In Chapter IX, a cross-country 
analysis is presented. It is followed by an analysis of contributions to system dynamics by 
other actors and elements of the structure than the system builders (Chapter X). Chapter XI 
provides an analysis of the main policy options for completing the formative phase and 
moving the TIS into a growth phase. The thesis is finalised with Chapter XII, which 
summarises the main contributions and draws implications for system builders, policymakers 
and for future research. 
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Chapter II                                                                                      
The emergence of new industries20 
 
“Human history is created by intentional activities, but is not an intended project.” 
(Giddens, 1984b, p.27) 
 
Technical change provides an encompassing stimulus to the economy and adds to the 
quality of our everyday lives. Ever since Marx (1887), Schumpeter (1934; 1942) and Hughes 
(1979; 1983; 1987, 1989), innovation, entrepreneurship and the emergence of new 
industries have been identified as main drivers of economic growth, where entrepreneurs, 
or system builders, are seen as key actors in the creation of such industries.  
Innovation is invention implemented and taken to market (Chesbrough, 2003). The process 
of biomass gasification for the production of second-generation fuels and other chemicals is 
an invention based on new combinations of existing knowledge that at a first glance may 
appear rather simple.21 The combinations, however, give rise to a knowledge field and 
specific technical challenges, which should not be underestimated. These will be outlined in 
Chapter III. 
The production of second-generation fuels and other chemicals based on biomass 
gasification has the potential to become a major innovation:  if implemented, it will create a 
new industry and influence current social practices. Other examples of major innovations 
that have given rise to new industries and influenced social practices are the production of 
electricity, the telephone, the automobile, the personal computer, and the Internet (cf. 
Chapter I). For example, according to Marx (1887), Schumpeter (1934; 1942) and Rosenberg 
(1976), such major innovations change not only the technology base and social practices, but 
also the organisational and institutional structure of society.  
                                                      
20 Parts of this chapter draw on Hellsmark and Jacobsson (2009). 
21 In some areas, biomass gasification is already an innovation because it is used commercially in simple 
applications. Realising biomass gasification for more advanced applications may appear to be a straight-forward 
task, as experience and knowledge can be combined from these simple biomass applications, from biomass 
combustion and from the commercial use of coal gasification (se Chapter III). 
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Major innovations implicate a technological, organisational and institutional change along an 
entire value chain, where a range of complementary products must be changed or created. 
Hence, in order to industrialise a new knowledge field, an industry needs to develop with the 
capacity to produce required capital goods (i.e., machinery and equipment) according to 
certain specifications along the entire value chain. Consequently, the emergence of a capital 
goods industry, with such a capacity, is identified as key factor in the innovation and 
diffusion process (Rosenberg, 1976).   
The challenge of transforming the energy sector from predominantly being based on fossil 
energy sources is one that involves the development, production and diffusion of new 
equipment for, for example, renewable power generation, increasing energy efficiency, and 
production of renewable transportation fuels and other chemicals. It requires, therefore, the 
emergence of an industry with the capacity to supply a broad range of capital goods on a 
global scale.  
As already mentioned in Chapter I, the time frame during which such a capacity is developed 
in an embryonic form has been defined as the formative phase of a TIS (technological 
innovation system) (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). It is dominated by technical, 
organisational and institutional uncertainties that may take many decades to resolve and 
where the outcome of the process is highly uncertain.22 The purpose of this chapter is to 
outline a framework that is suitable for analysing the process by which an industry emerges 
with the capacity to manufacture and diffuse the capital goods required for realising the 
potential of a new knowledge field. 
The process of innovation and industrial transformation has been the main topic of scholars 
from various disciplines for decades. To fulfil the above-mentioned purpose, I have chosen 
to depart from the technological innovation system framework. I will, however, also draw 
upon other innovation system frameworks and from insights in industrial dynamics, 
evolutionary and institutional economics, science and technology studies, as well as 
sociology. 
                                                      
22 Hence, for mitigating climate change, the capacity of the capital goods industry must already exist, or be 
developed within the next few years for large-scale diffusion to be possible within the given time frame. 
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The chapter is organised in the following manner. First, three complementary socio-technical 
system perspectives will be introduced. Based on the national, sectoral and technological 
innovation systems frameworks, the analytical scope of the thesis is outlined and initial steps 
towards delineating the system are taken. In the second, third and fourth sections, the 
dynamics of an emerging TIS will be conceptualised. In the fifth section, specific 
characteristics of system dynamics with regard to uncertainties and system weaknesses in 
the formative phase will be addressed. This section also includes an analysis of the role of 
system builders and policymakers in identifying and addressing such system weaknesses. In 
the sixth and final section, the purpose of the thesis will be restated and broken down into a 
set of research questions.  
2.1 Systems of innovation and the emergence of new industries 
Innovation systems studies have become an important tool for analysing the emergence of 
innovations, new industries and economic growth (Carlsson, 2006). These studies depart 
from evolutionary economics but have a history of drawing from other fields as well. In this 
first section of Chapter II, three such innovation systems frameworks will be outlined, 
namely National Systems of Innovation (NSI), Sectoral Systems of Innovation (SSI) and 
Technological Innovation Systems (TIS).  
A system is in the broadest possible definition “anything that is not chaos” (Boulding, 1985). 
“Somewhat more specifically, a system is constituted by a number of elements and by the 
relationships between these elements” (Lundvall, 1992, p.2). These systems do not 
necessarily exist “out-there” in a real sense, but they are used as analytical constructs to 
shed light on different aspects of the innovation process.  
The first system of innovation (SI) to be elaborated on was the National Systems of 
Innovation (Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992). Lundvall (1992, p. 2) first defined a SI and then a 
NSI as “ ... constituted by elements and relationships which interact in the production, 
diffusion and use of new, and economically useful, knowledge and that a national system 
encompasses elements and relationships, either located within or rooted inside the borders 
of a nation state.”  
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A NSI, thus, delineates the system in spatial terms.23 A system may be based on a nation as 
the name suggest but also on a larger region such as the European Union or a smaller region 
such as Malmö-Copenhagen or Baden-Württemberg (Regional Systems of Innovation, Cooke, 
1992). Policy is also formulated on both national and regional levels with the objective of 
stimulating innovation, job creation and overall economic growth. It is likely that the 
interplay between these different policy levels strongly influences the dynamics of a SI, as 
well as the emergence of new industries with innovative capabilities.24 
However, depending on the purpose of the inquiry, the definition of innovation systems may 
not be based on spatially defined boundaries. It has been proposed that different sectors 
develop a specific logic and relations between elements with respect to technological 
innovation. Malerba (2002) argued that an SSI25 framework can be a useful tool for analysing 
these inter-sectoral differences in patterns of innovation. 
Sectoral systems of innovation studies have illustrated that the sources and patterns of 
innovation vary greatly between different sectors.26 They also illustrate that fruitful 
relationships exist between small innovative firms and large incumbents, wherein both types 
of firms may profit from each other and where they fulfil distinctly different roles in the 
innovation process. For example, the role of the small entrepreneurial firm may be to 
explore new ideas and combine knowledge from various sectors into new profitable 
businesses, while the incumbents may take on the role of further developing these new 
businesses on the global market (Pavitt, 1984; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996; Tushman and 
O'Reilly, 1997; Malerba, 2002; Chesbrough, 2003).  
Patterns of innovation differ between sectors due to shared cognitive routines in 
engineering communities (Nelson and Winter, 1982), regulations and standards that may be 
                                                      
23 The NSI is a concept related to how Porter describes the competitiveness of nations and the importance of 
clusters for regional development (Porter, 1990b, a). 
24 In this study, I have limited the analysis to four countries: Austria, Germany, Sweden and Finland. However, 
policy of importance is also formulated on a local, regional and EU level. All four levels formulate policy that 
has the potential to greatly impact the emergence of new industries in the field of biomass gasification.  
25 A sectoral system of innovation has been defined as “ ... a set of new and established products for specific uses 
and the set of agents carrying out market and non-market interactions for the creation, production and sale of 
those products.” (Malerba, 2002, p. 248) 
26 In the current case of biomass gasification in Sweden, Finland, Austria, and Germany, there are numerous 
sectors that influence the dynamics of the system (see Chapter III). 
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sector specific, or sunk investments in knowledge, technological artifacts and infrastructures 
(Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Christensen, 1997). These patterns are reinforced by 
scientists, policymakers, users, and special interest groups affiliated with a certain sector. 
They give a direction to what can be defined as “normal” problem solving activities within a 
specific “technological paradigm”, selecting which problems to solve (Dosi, 1982; Geels and 
Schot, 2007).27  
For the given purpose, it was proposed (in Chapter I) that a technological innovation systems 
framework would be an advantageous starting point. Based on recent development, this 
system has been defined as “ … a set of networks of actors and institutions that jointly 
interact in a specific technological field and contribute to the generation, diffusion and 
utilization of variants of a new technology and/or new product” (Markard and Truffer, 2008, 
p. 611).28 
The dynamics involved in the formation of a new knowledge field includes the interaction, 
collaboration and competition between multiple actors from various sectors, new start-ups, 
established firms, university departments, institutes, etc. These actions and interactions give 
rise to a variety of new technological trajectories (Tr1..3) within a given knowledge field (TIS1) 
and competing knowledge fields (TIS2, Tr1..2), see Figure 2.1. The various new trajectories are 
an outcome of actors interpreting opportunities differently in relation to their capabilities, 
previous experiences, investments, and strategic goals.  
The actors are constantly experimenting and elaborating on the knowledge field of the TIS 
by exploring various new applications, which in turn may also create a capacity to explore 
yet further types of applications (Rosenberg, 1976). The field constantly undergoes an 
evolution during which the content, extent and depth of the knowledge field changes. It has 
previously been argued that the technology base in a TIS can be described in terms of 
                                                      
27 In the literature, the broader forces in play have been described as “socio-technical regimes”, as well as 
sectoral systems of innovation.  
28 Due to these recent developments, I have chosen not to use the commonly used definition of a TIS as “ ... a 
network of agents interacting in a specific economic/industrial area under a particular institutional structure or 
set of infrastructures and involved in the generation, diffusion, and utilization of technology. Technology 
systems are defined in terms of knowledge/competence flows rather than flows of ordinary goods and services.” 
(Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991, p.111). 
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“design space” (this concept will be further elaborated on in Section 2.2.1) (Carlsson et al., 
2002a).  
Figure 2.1: Delineation of two emerging TISs in terms of their national and sectoral boundaries, also 
illustrating the existence of various trajectories (Tr) and niche markets (N). Based on Markard and 
Truffer (2008). 
 
Since a TIS can transcend national borders, it does not have to be delineated in spatial terms. 
However, in the formative phase, the actors within a given TIS are few and they may be 
found in even fewer countries. In these countries, the TIS may be under the influence of a 
limited number of SSI that vary between countries. Therefore, the concepts of NSI and SSI 
can also be used for delineating an emerging TIS (see Figure 2.1) (Markard and Truffer, 
2008). The system of biomass gasification is delineated in Chapter IV. 
In summary, it has been argued here that an innovation system perspective is an appropriate 
framework for analysing the emergence of new industries. These arguments will be further 
strengthened and the complete dynamics of the emergence of a TIS will be conceptualised in 
the following sections. 
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2.2 The structural evolution of a TIS in the formative phase 
A TIS is composed of the following structural elements: technology, actors, institutions and 
networks (see Table 2.1). In this section, these structural elements will be defined. 
   Table 2.1: The structural elements of a TIS. 
Structural Elements Definition 
Technology is made up of artefacts (tools, plants, machinery), coded knowledge 
(patents, drawings, etc.), and knowledge embodied in, for example, 
engineers and scientists.  
Actors are individuals, private and public firms, and organisations that 
perform a task that contributes to the development of the 
technological field. 
Networks are defined by the relationship between the different actors in the 
system and include both learning and political networks.29 
Institutions 
 
are sets of norms, common habits, routines, established practices, 
rules or laws that regulate the relationships and interactions 
between individuals and firms. 
   Source: Bergek et al. (2008b). 
2.2.1 Technology 
Technology is defined here in line with Carlson et al.’s definition (2002a, p.13) “ ... the sum 
total of intellectual resources necessary for the production and distribution of goods and 
services”, but with a greater emphasis on artefacts. However, the essence of technology is 
still knowledge. This knowledge is not only embedded in the artefacts themselves, drawings 
and patents, but also in the operational experience of the personnel handling of the 
technology and in the engineers that design it (Layton, 1974).  
Carlsson et al. (2002a, p.13) refer to the technology base of a TIS as “ ... a set of 
combinatorial design spaces formed by clusters of complementary technological capabilities 
... ”. These spaces undergo constant evolution and are shaped by, for example, the addition 
of new capabilities and the accumulation of application-specific know-how. As the design 
spaces expand, they give rise to new technological and business opportunities. Indeed, in the 
“ … long run, the boundaries and characteristics of technological systems will reflect the 
structure and character of design spaces” (Carlsson et al., 2002a, p.14). 
                                                      
29 It may, sometimes, also be useful to include networks between artefacts. 
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Technology is seen here as both a structural element and an output of the system.30 It is 
brought into the TIS with the entering actors based on their previous experiences and by 
borrowing or copying from other potentially useful knowledge fields. It is also produced in 
the system as the actors learn more of the combinatorial opportunities and characters of the 
various design spaces.  
What is here referred to as the design space of biomass gasification is made up of sub-sets of 
design spaces formed by more narrow complementary technological capabilities. For the TIS 
to evolve, chains of these technological capabilities must be created to form complete value 
chains. Hence, for producing a new type of transportation fuel from a specific type of 
biomass, complementary technological capabilities may have to be created (extending the 
aggregated design space of the TIS) in terms of biomass production methods, collection, pre-
treatment, conversion, and turning it into the desired fuel. Further capabilities may also 
have to be created for distribution and use of the new fuel depending on the types of 
vehicles and potential end-users. 
2.2.2 Actors 
The firm is usually seen as a key actor in any innovation system and is normally the principal 
unit of analysis in evolutionary economics (Nelson, 1995b). However, the term “actor” also 
refers to individuals and different types of organisations, including industry associations and 
non-professional organisations that perform both market and non-market interactions along 
the entire value chain. The actors included in the system are restricted to those that 
dedicate resources to develop the field and exclude those entities that neglect the new 
technology or oppose it.   
These actors “ ... operate with different knowledge base and under different assumption 
concerning technology, markets etc.” (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991, p. 100). 
Consequently, they also react to and perceive opportunities differently from one another, 
even if they have equal access to information.  
                                                      
30 In some earlier work on TIS, technology was not explicitly treated as a part of the structure. 
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Actors may thus react differently to opportunities depending on which SSI or technological 
paradigm they may be associated with (Dosi, 1982; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Geels and 
Schot, 2007). Established actors with deeply rooted values and sets of well developed core 
capabilities within a certain paradigm run the risk of suffering from various cognitive inertia 
and lock-in effects, which may hinder them from discovering and acting upon new 
opportunities (Arthur, 1989; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). This is also 
why competence destroying innovations are usually carried out by new firms such as start-
ups, spin-offs or entrants from related industries, and not by the incumbents (Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986). 
However, we also know that incumbent firms are under pressure to be innovative outside 
their core areas. Even if these firms are faced with high development costs and the certainty 
that most major innovations will fail, some innovations will be successful and these may be 
necessary for the long-term survival of the firm (Chesbrough, 2003).31  
 
“Most innovation fail. Firms that do not innovate die.” 
(Chesbrough, 2003, p. xvii) 
 
In previous literature, the most important actors in the early phase of a TIS have been 
described as the prime movers, and can be entirely new firms or incumbents diversifying 
from related industries (Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000; Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001; 
Jacobsson et al., 2004).  
                                                      
31 Some incumbents are better than others with regard to profiting from major innovations, regardless of whether 
the development of these innovations occurs through strategic alliances with partners, acquisitions of new 
entrants or internal development. These firms have been described as “multi-technological”, which enable them 
to absorb new knowledge, develop new opportunities and profit from achievements in various unrelated 
knowledge areas (Granstrand et al., 1997). This ability to innovate has also been described as the firm having a 
set of “dynamic capabilities”, or it being “ambidextrous”, in the sense that they can profit from the existing 
business while developing new opportunities that pose a threat to the existing one (Teece et al., 1997; Tushman 
and O'Reilly, 1997). However, being ambidextrous, or having developed such dynamic capabilities, does not 
imply that the firms are free from their previous histories. On the contrary, the concept of dynamic capabilities 
has been defined as “ ... the firm’s ability to integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external competences ... 
and reflect an organization’s ability to achieve new and innovative forms ... given path dependencies and market 
positions …” (Teece et al., 1997, p.516). 
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The prime movers not only bring knowledge, capital and other resources, but also play a role 
in attracting further actors with additional resources. Such new entrants experiment with 
new combinations, become specialist suppliers or develop new applications. They also 
ensure that a “ … division of labour is formed and further knowledge formation is stimulated 
by specialization and accumulated experience (e.g. Smith, 1776; Rosenberg, 1976).” (Bergek 
et al., 2010a, p. 81). 
In this thesis, prime movers are conceptualised as system builders, and they will be argued 
to be of particular importance as they pursue specific and “intentional activities” that clearly 
contribute to developing the system, or influence the direction of its evolution (Giddens, 
1984a; Hughes, 1987; Summerton, 1994). This important role and capabilities of the system 
builder is elaborated on in Section 2.5.   
However, the actors in the system do not necessarily work towards the same goal, and if 
they do, they may be in stark conflict with each other as to the “best” way to get there. 
These conflicts may be so poisonous that any collaboration and intentional interaction 
between them may be impossible. Still, these actors can, from our point of view, be part of 
the same emerging system of innovation. Therefore, the general direction of the TIS is far 
from directed, or orchestrated, by a certain set of actors but is rather largely an unintended 
outcome of the evolutionary process.  
Nevertheless, there are often powerful actors or constellations of actors acting in alliances.  
An alliance is defined here, in accordance with Linnarsson (2005, p. 17), as: 
“ ... any voluntarily initiated cooperative agreement between two or more independent firms 
[or other organisation] that share compatible goals involving the exchange, sharing or co-
development, of products, technologies or services.”  
 
These alliances can be organised into anything from formal joint ventures to informal 
cooperative ventures. The definition is introduced as a complement to “networks” as a 
means of distinguishing between more or less purposeful relationships.  
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2.2.3 Networks  
With the entry of actors in the TIS, various types of networks can be formed. Networks are a 
third form of organisation (adding to the hierarchical structure of a firm and markets) in 
which information, knowledge and values32 are interchanged (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 
1991, p.103). Well-developed networks become increasingly important with more complex 
tasks and in situations where the future market requirements on the actor are both 
unknown and unpredictable.  
In the case of a formation of a TIS, it is fundamentally important to form knowledge 
networks and political networks. In knowledge networks, new ideas are elaborated on and 
new relationships are made. They also serve an important function of legitimising a new field 
by providing credible system studies in terms of the desirability of the new technology 
(Suurs, 2009), and can provide a base for creating political networks, or advocacy coalitions, 
with the objective of increasing the stability of the field by creating common standards and 
favourable framework conditions (Van de Ven, 2005). In a given TIS, there may be several 
advocacy coalitions, where each is typically associated with a specific technological 
trajectory. They consist of a range of actors with shared beliefs and compete to influence 
policy in line with these beliefs (Smith, 2000a). However, the raging conflicts that 
characterise the early phase of a TIS typically undermine efforts to form advocacy coalitions 
and, therefore, the possibility of institutional alignment.  
2.2.4 Institutions 
Institutions have been described as setting the rules of the game (North, 1990, 2005), and 
defined as “sets of common habits, routines, established practices, rules or laws that 
regulate the relations and interactions between individuals and groups” (Edquist and 
Johnson, 1997, p. 220).  
Institutions refer to both “hard” rule-based forms such as laws and regulations, as well as 
“soft” aspects in terms of informal rules, norms, culture, and cognition. Scott (2008) 
identifies three types of rules: a) regulative rules such as regulations, standards, laws; b) 
                                                      
32 Such values may, for example, be what the actors may regard as desirable images or expectations about the 
future (Jacobsson, 2008). 
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normative rules such as values, behavioural norms; and c) cognitive rules such as belief 
systems, agendas, guiding principles, etc. The rules are created, reproduced and changed 
through human actions and activities. Yet, these actions are, in turn, both constrained and 
enabled by the rules (duality of structure) (Giddens, 1984a). 
Therefore, actors should not be seen as mere “cultural dopes”, in the sense that they are 
only constrained by the rules. On the contrary, they “ ... use rules to interpret the world, 
make sense and come to decisions” (Geels and Schot, 2007, p. 403). The rules enable action 
(Giddens, 1984a).  
New institutions are not created to be socially efficient but are rather “ … created to serve 
the interests of those with the bargaining power to create new rules” (North 1994, p. 361). 
With the emergence of a new TIS, the struggle over defining the institutional order gives rise 
to three dominant conflicts. The first has already been touched on and plays out between 
groups of advocates within a given TIS. It involves their internal struggle to align the 
framework to a particular set of beliefs and technical solutions. The second conflict occurs 
within incumbent firms when they enter a new TIS, as they are forced to balance between 
preserving the existing rule structure, which is necessary to keep the existing business, and 
acting to align the institutional framework to the new knowledge field. The third conflict 
plays out between the advocates of the emerging TIS and competing mature or other 
emerging TIS.  
In conclusion, the formation of a new TIS involves four structural processes, wherein the 
system builders are the primary agent: accumulation of knowledge and artefacts, entry of 
firms and other organisations, formation of alliances and networks, and institutional 
alignment. These structural processes are mutually interdependent and intertwined with 
one another (Hughes, 1987). If a component is added or removed, it is likely to induce 
changes in other components, triggering a set of actions and reactions that may either 
propel the system forward or break it down (Carlsson et al., 2002b). Therefore, the 
formation of a TIS is a process of re-configuring, as the components co-evolve in an often 
painful process marked with great uncertainty (Nelson, 1994, 1995a; Hellsmark, 2005; 
Meijer, 2008; Nygaard, 2008).  
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2.3 Functions in a technological innovation system 
Analysing the dynamics and interdependencies of the structural elements as they emerge in 
a given TIS is, of course, possible to do and is often done (see Klein Woolthuis et al. (2005) 
for an overview). However, the explanation of what drives this dynamic or what obstructs it 
is often done in an ad hoc manner. In order to understand the causal mechanisms in the 
dynamics of a specific TIS, it has been suggested that a structural analysis needs to be 
supplemented with an analysis of a set of key innovation and diffusion related processes 
(Bergek et al., 2008b). These processes are labelled “functions” (see Table 2.2). 
By separating structures and functions, it becomes possible to assess what actually 
“happens” and what is being “ ... achieved in the system rather than on the dynamics in 
terms of the structural [elements] only” (Bergek et al., 2008b, p.409). It then becomes 
possible to assess the positive or negative impact of particular structural elements, or 
combination of elements, on a set of key innovation and diffusion processes (Bergek et al., 
2008b). Exactly which key process should be included in the analysis and how they should be 
defined has evolved over time. Arguably, which functions to be included can be somewhat 
flexible, depending on the purpose of the inquiry, the technological field in question and its 
context. 
In this thesis, the point of departure is the seven functions described in Bergek (2008b). 
However, the function of materialisation, specified in Bergek et al. (2008c), is added since it 
is identified as particularly important in this study (see Table 2.2 for a summary of the 
different functions). The following sections will briefly describe each function, including 
some examples of how a stronger function contributes by building and strengthening the 
structure, as well as other functions. In the final part of the section, a somewhat extended 
analysis will be presented on how the various functions relate to each another from a 
epistemological perspective. 
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   Table 2.2: Eight functions of a TIS. 
Functions  ... is the process of strengthening: 
Knowledge development 
and diffusion ... 
the breadth and depth of the knowledge base and how that 
knowledge is developed, diffused and combined in the system. 
Influence on the direction 
of search ... 
the incentives and/or pressures for organisations to enter the 
technological field. These may come in the form of visions, 
expectations of growth potential, regulation and policy, articulation 
of demand from leading customers, technical bottlenecks, crises in 
current business, etc. In a very early phase, it includes how prime 
movers (system builders) manage to define the technological 
opportunity and make it attractive for other actors to enter and 
further develop the field. 
Legitimation ... the social acceptance and compliance with relevant institutions. 
Legitimacy is not given but is formed through conscious actions by 
organisations and individuals.   
Resource mobilisation ... the extent to which actors within the TIS are able to mobilise human 
and financial capital, as well as complementary assets such as 
complementary products, services, network infrastructure, etc. 
Entrepreneurial 
experimentation ... 
the testing of new technologies, applications and markets whereby 
new opportunities are created and a learning process is unfolded. 
This includes the development and investments in artefacts such as 
products, production plants and physical infrastructure (i.e., the 
materialisation of new technology). 
Materialisation ... the development and investment in artefacts such as products, 
production plants and physical infrastructure. 
Market formation ... the factors driving market formation. These include the articulation 
of demand from customers, institutional change, and changes in 
price/performance. Market formation often runs through various 
stages (i.e., “nursing” or niche markets), in the form of 
demonstration projects, bridging markets and eventually mass 
markets.  
Development of positive 
externalities ... 
the collective dimension of the innovation and diffusion process 
(i.e., how investments by one firm may benefit other firms “free of 
charge”). It also indicates the dynamics of the system since 
externalities magnify the strength of the other functions. 
   Source: Bergek et al. (2008b; 2008c). 
2.3.1 Knowledge development and diffusion 
The function of knowledge development and diffusion refers to the process of strengthening 
the breadth and depth of the knowledge base and how that knowledge is developed, 
diffused and combined in the system (Bergek et al., 2008b). 
This function is “... normally placed at the heart of a TIS ... ” since it is concerned with the 
evolution of the knowledge base in the TIS and is intrinsically associated with how the actors 
learn (Bergek et al., 2008b, p. 414). Learning—the acquisition of knowledge—is the most 
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fundamental aspect of the innovation process and understanding how the actors learn about 
the new technology should, therefore, be the focus of the analysis of an emerging TIS 
(Lundvall, 1992).  
Knowledge is here divided into two well known and widely recognised epistemologically 
distinct categories “knowing about” and “knowing how” (Grant, 1996). Knowing about is an 
explicit type of knowledge that relatively easily can be codified and made transferable 
between humans as information across time and space. “This ease of communication .. [is a] 
.. fundamental property ... ” of the “knowing about” type of knowledge (Grant, 1996, p. 
111). The “knowing how” type of knowledge is associated with tacit knowledge, and it is 
thus costly and difficult to transfer between humans.33 
Two additional concepts are identified as important in relation to knowledge. The first, 
“absorptive capacity”, refers to the ability of actors to add new knowledge to their existing 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). This ability depends on the previous experience of the actors 
and is, thus, made up by both explicit and tacit knowledge that have accumulated over time. 
The second concept, “appropriability” of knowledge, refers to the actor’s ability to do 
something useful and economically valuable with knowledge they acquire over time (Teece, 
1986). 
These concepts are important since increasing the number of actors with an “expert level” of 
knowledge is seen as a key issue for any emerging TIS. In this study, it translates to 
increasing the number of actors that are able to appropriate on acquired knowledge 
necessary for building and diffusing commercial-scale biomass gasification plants for the 
production of second-generation fuels and other chemicals.  
Achieving this expert level of knowledge involves acquiring primarily the know-how type of 
knowledge (Dreyfus et al., 1986; Grant, 1996). Dreyfus et al. (1986) and Flyvbjerg (2001) 
emphasise that the core of human learning and achieving an expert level of knowledge lies 
in gaining real-life experience (learning by doing)―regardless if the learning process involves 
                                                      
33 One could also add knowing what, knowing why, knowing who, knowing when, and knowing where (Lundvall 
and Johnson, 1994). However, these types of knowledge are also explicit in nature and is here categorised as 
knowing about. 
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playing chess, performing brain surgery, constructing wind power mills, or gasification plants 
for the production of second-generation fuels.  
In terms the function’s impact on structural build-up it obviously strengthens the structural 
element technology. Previous literature has also emphasised that knowledge is developed 
and diffused through networks and that these networks are also likely to be strengthened by 
a strong function of knowledge development and diffusion (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991; 
Lundvall, 1992; Bergek et al., 2008b).  
In terms of the function’s relationships to other functions, the development of new 
knowledge may serve as a basis for strengthening entrepreneurial experimentation and 
materialisation, since new scientific discoveries may enable new types of experiments or the 
construction of new research infrastructures. It may also strengthen legitimation and 
influence on the direction of search, as new knowledge may prove the new technology more 
beneficial in some desirable and previously unknown aspects.  
2.3.2 Influence on the direction of search 
The function of influence on the direction of search34 refers to the process of strengthening 
the incentives and/or pressures for organisations to enter the technological field. These may 
come in the form of possible entrepreneurial or political visions, as well as investors’ and 
others expectations of growth potential. Such expectation may rise from personal beliefs but 
also from experiences and observation of growth in related TIS, or the same TIS in other 
countries (Bergek et al., 2008b). In a very early phase, the function includes how system 
builders manage to define the technological opportunity and make it attractive for other 
actors to enter and further develop the TIS (Hellsmark and Jacobsson, 2009).  
It also incorporates regulations and policies that create new opportunities and stimulate 
innovation (Porter, 1990b; Porter and Van der Linde, 1995), the articulation of demand from 
leading customers and their involvement in innovation processes (Von Hippel, 1986), as well 
as reverse salients that actors are forced to address (Hughes, 1983). 
                                                      
34 The shorter direction of search is commonly used throughout the text to replace influence on the direction of 
search.  
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In addition, crises or other factors exogenous to the TIS may be an important impetus for 
redirecting established search processes. Such crises can, for example, result from declining 
rates of return in certain firms or sectors, or general changes on a “landscape” level (Geels 
and Schot, 2007). Examples of such exogenous changes on a landscape level are the 
emergence of an oil crisis or other acute shortage of resources, the climate change debate, 
wars, and so on.  
In terms of the function’s relationships to other functions and its impact on structural build-
up, direction of search and the function of legitimation are strongly related to one another. 
Strengthening these functions is important for attracting new entrants into a field. For 
instance, an exogenous event on a landscape level―such as an oil crisis―may strengthen 
the function of legitimation of a certain TIS, which in turn may influence the direction of 
search for new opportunities by actors in other industries. Hence, when these two functions 
are strengthened, the structural element of actors is likely to be strengthened. 
2.3.3 Legitimation 
The function of legitimation refers to the process of strengthening social acceptance and 
compliance with relevant institutions (Bergek et al., 2008b).  
Legitimacy is viewed as a key strategic resource for firms in a given TIS, since it can be used 
to mobilise additional strategic resources (Suchman, 1995; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). 
Furthermore, it is a prerequisite for new actors to enter the TIS, which brings resources and 
legitimacy to the field. Legitimacy can be both granted to a given TIS by exogenous factors to 
the system, or created through intentional activities by the actors (Hellsmark and Jacobsson, 
2009). 
For example, the climate change debate has increased the legitimacy of the use of biomass 
as compared to coal, and the number of actors interested in pursuing opportunities with 
biomass as a feed-stock is increasing. Moreover, with the increased legitimacy of biomass, 
general schemes of funding have been made available for researchers and entrepreneurs 
interested in the field.  
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Nevertheless, a new field is seldom granted legitimacy from the start, and new industries 
have to overcome their “liability of newness” (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). In the early 
stages of a formative phase, legitimation mainly involves getting the technology accepted as 
a desirable and viable alternative to incumbent substitutes. It involves achieving favourable 
expert assessments in terms of system studies, cost-benefits analyses and various rational 
arguments. These actions are part of “the politics of shaping expectations and of defining 
desirability” (Bergek et al., 2008c, p. 581).  
In a later stage, when various knowledge networks have been formed and there is a base for 
creating “advocacy coalitions” between different actors, the “liability of newness” can be 
overcome (Van de Ven, 2005). The work of an advocacy coalition can involve attempts to 
align the institutional framework either through complying with or manipulating the existing, 
or the creation of new rules that support the development of the TIS.  
In terms of the function’s relationships to other functions and its impact on structural build-
up, legitimation and direction of search have already been argued to be strongly related and 
that they strengthen the actor structure. In addition, they are also identified as key 
processes for strengthening the structural element of institutions. 
2.3.4 Resource mobilisation 
The function of resource mobilisation refers to the process of strengthening the extent to 
which actors within the TIS are able to mobilise various types of resources, including 
technical experts, engineers, and other human resources. Human resources can be accessed 
through the educational system and from competing TISs or related sectoral systems of 
innovation. They can also be accessed through special research and development 
programmes that enhance the level of knowledge for people in a given field. Other types of 
resources include financial capital (from venture financiers, government, diversifying firms, 
etc.), complementary products, services, and network infrastructure (Bergek et al., 2008b; 
Bergek et al., 2008c).  
In terms of the function’s impact on structural build-up and its relationships to other 
functions, when resource mobilisation is strengthened the resources can be used as a basic 
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input for all activities in the system. Thus, strengthening resource mobilisation enables 
further development and can potentially strengthen all of the structural elements and 
functions of the TIS.   
2.3.5 Entrepreneurial experimentation 
The function of entrepreneurial experimentation refers to the process of testing new 
technologies, applications and markets, whereby new opportunities are created and a 
learning process is unfolded (Bergek et al., 2008b; Bergek et al., 2008c).  
By conducting various types, as well as many entrepreneurial experiments, the uncertainties 
surrounding a new TIS are reduced, as is the risk of failure for the TIS as a whole35 (Bergek et 
al., 2008b; Jacobsson, 2008). The strength of this process is highly dependent on the entry of 
many actors who undertake these experiments. A strong function would build (applied) 
knowledge and reduce uncertainties (e.g. market and technological) that may pave the way 
for new entrants.  
In terms of the function’s relationships to other functions and its impact on structural build-
up, it is strongly related to the functions of materialisation, knowledge development and 
diffusion, and ultimately strengthens the structural elements of technology and actors. In 
turn, entrepreneurial experimentation is enabled by a strong materialisation and knowledge 
development, since it provides a technology base upon which additional experiments can be 
conducted.   
2.3.6 Materialisation 
The function of materialisation refers to the process of strengthening the development and 
investment in artefacts such as products, production plants and physical infrastructure 
(Bergek et al., 2008c).  
In the early phase of a TIS, the technological elements may be severely underdeveloped. 
There may be a lack of instruments and other types of laboratory equipment that must be 
                                                      
35 The risk of failure for an individual actor may still remain high. 
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invented (Fogelberg and Sandén, 2008). In addition, there may be a lack of intermediate 
products, and physical infrastructure that must be developed or invested in.  
Demonstration projects are a particular type of materialisation that is important in the 
industrialisation of new knowledge fields (Karlström and Sandén, 2004). They play an 
important role for the formation of knowledge networks, reducing technical uncertainties, 
and facilitating learning that can be used to support decisions on technology choice. 
However, they may also raise public awareness of the technology, strengthen its legitimacy 
and expose system weaknesses such as various institutional barriers. Since a variety of actors 
with a common interest come together in demonstration projects, they can form a potential 
base for creating advocacy coalitions that can address these barriers (Karlström and Sandén, 
2004). 
In terms of the function’s impact on structural build-up, strengthening materialisation is key 
for strengthening the structural element of technology (Bergek et al., 2008c) and may be 
conducive to the formation of both knowledge and political networks. In terms of the 
function’s relationships to other functions, materialisation is, as argued above, strongly 
related to the functions of knowledge development and entrepreneurial experimentation, 
but can also impact on legitimation and direction of search.   
2.3.7 Market formation 
The function of market formation refers to the process of strengthening the factors driving 
the diffusion of the technology (Bergek et al., 2008b; Bergek et al., 2008c).  
For an emerging TIS, markets may not exist or be greatly underdeveloped, as the technology 
suffers from a poor price/performance ratio and uncertainties exist in many dimensions. 
These uncertainties are reduced and the price/performance ratio is improved when the 
function is strengthened through, for example, the articulation of demand from customers, 
institutional change and the realisation of economies of scale.  
It is also through this process, as well as the processes of entrepreneurial experimentation 
and materialisation, that society as a whole can learn about a new TIS and react to its 
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development. Furthermore, the advocates of a new TIS learn about its role in society and 
act/react upon the reactions from actors external to the TIS.  
The process of market formation often runs through various stages such as  “nursing” or 
“niche markets” (Erickson and Maitland, 1989; Kemp et al., 1998), possibly in the form of 
demonstration projects, bridging markets (Andersson and Jacobsson, 2000) and, eventually, 
mass markets. 
In terms of the function’s impact on structural build-up and its relationships to other 
functions, when market formation is strengthened resources are generated and these can be 
used as basic input to all activities in the system. Thus, market formation enables further 
development and can potentially strengthen all of the structural elements and functions of 
the TIS.  
2.3.8 Development of positive externalities 
The function of development of positive externalities refers to the process of strengthening 
the collective dimension of the innovation and diffusion process―such as how investments 
by one firm may benefit other firms “free of charge”. It also indicates the dynamics of the 
system, since externalities magnify the impact of the other functions (Bergek et al., 2008b; 
Bergek et al., 2008c). One can differentiate between externalities, which are primarily 
geographically bounded, and those available throughout a global TIS, i.e. across national 
boundaries.  
Positive externalities develop based on the common locality and clusters of industries within 
a nation or smaller geographically defined area were first elaborated on by Marshall (1962 
[1890]) and later by Porter (1990a). Three such sources of external economies, in line with 
Marshall, were specified by Bergek et al. (2008b, p. 418): 
• “Emergence of pooled labor markets, which strengthen the ‘knowledge development 
and diffusion’ function, in that subsequent entrants can access the knowledge of 
early entrants by recruiting their staff (and viceversa as time goes by).” 
• “Emergence of specialized intermediate goods and service providers; as a division of 
labor unfolds, costs are reduced and further ‘knowledge development and diffusion’ 
is stimulated by specialization and accumulated experience.” 
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• “Information flows and knowledge spill-overs, contributing to the dynamics of 
‘knowledge development and diffusion’.” 
 
When defining an innovation system in terms of its “knowledge and competence flows”, it 
has been argued that these flows “ ... may or may not coincide with national borders” 
(Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991, p.93). The external economies may then benefit firms 
throughout a “global” TIS. For example, when the functions legitimation and direction of 
search are strengthened, they may benefit all actors within the “global” TIS.  
Similarly, with a strong materialisation a new research infrastructure may become available 
for many actors throughout the global TIS. Based on the new infrastructure, new 
experiments can be conducted, and results from these experiments can also be shared with 
actors not directly involved in strengthening the function of materialisation in the first place. 
With a strengthened market formation, firms throughout the TIS may compete over the new 
contracts, even if some firms are favoured over others due to well-established networks or 
firm-specific industrial policies.   
The development of such positive externalities benefits late entrants, which eventually can 
catch up with the early entrants at a considerably lower cost, for example, by learning from 
the former’s mistakes and developing improved designs. In the end, such externalities may 
result in the fact that early entrants are out-competed by those who have entered at a later 
stage (cf. Olleros (1986), Lieberman and Montgomery (1988)).   
In terms of the function’s impact on structural build-up and its relationships to other 
functions, the development of positive externalities can potentially strengthen all the 
functions and structural elements of the TIS.  
2.3.9 The inter-relationships of the eight functions 
As previously mentioned, several of the functions are closely related to each other. One 
action or event, which strengthens one function, may therefore strengthen others, both 
directly and indirectly.  
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Here, an epistemological distinction between three sets of functions is made, as they are 
associated with the acquisition of the two different types of knowledges―”know how” and 
“know about”―and where a third set of functions enables the acquisition of such knowledge 
(see Table 2.3). 
Table 2.3: An epistemological distinction between three sets of functions. 
Set 1: acquisition of 
“know how” 
Knowledge development and diffusion, entrepreneurial 
experimentation and materialisation. 
Set 2: acquisition of 
“know about” 
Direction of search and legitimation. 
Set 3: enables the 
acquisition of knowledge 
Resource mobilisation, market formation and 
development of positive externalities. 
 
The first set of functions includes knowledge development and diffusion, entrepreneurial 
experimentation and materialisation. As previously mentioned, strengthening knowledge 
development and diffusion has often been placed at the heart of the innovation process (cf. 
Bergek et al. (2008b)). Strengthening the function is essential for the industrialisation of a 
new knowledge field, and it was previously argued that the actors would need to develop an 
expert level of “knowing how” in terms of, for example, building new types of plants. 
Acquiring that level and type of knowledge goes beyond conducting basic and applied 
research, associated primarily with the function of knowledge development and diffusion. 
Strengthening the level of “know how” involves acquiring real semi-commercial and 
commercial experience with the technology and must, therefore, include a process in which 
the functions of entrepreneurial experimentation and materialisation are also strengthened. 
Thus, it is only by strengthening all these three functions that the actors can fully benefit 
from “learning by doing” and with time acquire the primarily tacit skills necessary to 
construct competitive, commercial-scale biomass gasification plants, or other types of new 
equipments.  
The second set of functions, direction of search and legitimation, is primarily associated with 
“knowing about” the TIS. The successful construction of demonstration plants may 
strengthen these functions, as the technology becomes well-known. In addition, the system 
builders can undertake actions to consciously and strategically strengthen the functions by 
38 
 
publishing reports and statements, gain positive media attention, or by other means 
influence public perception―or the perception of certain stakeholders―of the field. This set 
of functions can also be strengthened by exogenous events occurring on a landscape level 
such as a debate on climate change, beyond the control of individual actors. Strengthening 
the “know about” functions of the TIS is crucial for the actors’ ability to form alliances or 
political networks with the objective of aligning the institutional framework to the TIS.   
The third set, resource mobilisation, market formation and the development of positive 
externalities are basic inputs to all activities in the system and works as a catalyst as the 
system matures. Without strengthening the three functions, the actors will not have the 
means to strengthen the above-mentioned “know how” or “know about” sets of functions. 
They are, thus, seen as the enablers in the system. The complete system dynamics of the TIS 
will now be outlined. 
2.4 Functional and structural dynamics 
Having explained the structural elements and functions of a TIS, as well as some of their 
interrelationships, the complete dynamics of a TIS can now be summarised by five main 
relationships (see Figure 2.2): (1) the dynamics between structural entities; (2) the influence 
of the structural entities on the functions; (3) the influence of exogenous factors on the 
functions; (4) the internal dynamics of the functions; and (5) the feedback from the functions 
to the structure. 
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Figure 2.2: A schematic representation of the dynamics of a technological innovation system. 
 
In Section 2.2, I briefly dealt with the dynamics between structural elements (1). The internal 
dynamics of the functions (4), and how the strengthening of the functions may feed-back 
and result in a structural build-up (5) were briefly discussed with respect to each of the eight 
functions in Section 2.3. The complete dynamics of a TIS will now be further described and 
analysed. 
To begin with, the characteristics of the structure impact on the strength of the functions 
(2). An example of a structural change that may strengthen the key innovation and diffusion 
processes is the entry of new firms. These bring various types of resources into the TIS that 
may strengthen not only resource mobilisation but also the processes of knowledge 
development and diffusion (as resources may be devoted to research and development), and 
legitimation (if the firm either has a good name and/or devotes resources to promote the 
legitimacy of the new technology). Of course, as and when new firms test new design 
concepts, build plants and infrastructure, the processes of entrepreneurial experimentation 
and materialisation are strengthened. However, the strength of the functions cannot be fully 
explained by the characteristics and impact of the TIS elements (1, 2). 
As emphasised in the original work on “functions of innovation systems”, the strength of the 
functions are also determined by factors found at other system levels (Johnson and 
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Jacobsson, 2001, p. 93): “In the context of an emerging technological system, these factors 
may be fully technology specific, but may also influence several technological systems 
simultaneously. Hence, they can be derived from a system perspective using different units 
of analysis: technology, industry, nation.”  
Hence, the driving forces behind system development are both endogenous and 
exogenous36  (see (3) in Figure 2.2). Examples of exogenous factors37 are accidents like that 
in Chernobyl, the climate change debate, and EU-wide legislation on air quality (see 
influence of direction of search in Section 2.3.2). Such changes may inflict pressure on the 
dominant TIS (Raven, 2005) and open up opportunities for a TIS with regard to market 
formation. They may also strengthen other functions, particularly legitimation and the 
influence on the direction of search and, thereby, if and how actors perceive opportunities in 
the new TIS.38 
As the functions are strengthened by endogenous (2) or exogenous (3) factors, they may 
feedback and further strengthen various elements of the structure (5). For instance, 
strengthened legitimation and influence on the direction of search would be expected to 
motivate even more actors to enter the TIS. Indirectly, this may affect the formation of 
networks. Strengthened legitimation may also induce an institutional alignment. With a 
stronger resource mobilisation, further materialisation of the technology may take place, 
which builds up the structural element of technology.  
                                                      
36 This means determining factors, found at the levels of “regimes” and “landscape” in Strategic Niche 
Management (see, Geels and Schot (2007) for a typology), are incorporated. 
37 A distinction between endogenous and exogenous factors begs the question of how the borders of the system 
in focus are set. In the original work on “functions of innovation systems”, the setting of borders was not a main 
concern simply because the focus was not primarily on the impact of the functions on structural dynamics. With 
a TIS framework, it is the knowledge base that is the starting point for defining the system in focus (i.e., the 
structural element “Technology”). This knowledge base is dynamic and the system borders are fluid. As the 
knowledge base (design space) is altered by, for example, the inclusion of a new element of knowledge, new 
actors may be incorporated into the system, new networks may be formed, and the range of relevant institutions 
may expand. In a formative phase, it is therefore argued that seeking to define strict borders of the TIS is a less 
meaningful exercise, and it is preferred to speak in terms of the focus on the analysis (Carlsson et al., 2002a; 
Carlsson et al., 2002b). Yet, the importance of defining the focus is acknowledged, and in this particular case the 
focus is on the structural elements that contribute to the development and diffusion of the technology of biomass 
gasification. Some of these may, of course, be shared with other TISs, which means that there may be important 
interactions with those TISs―challenging the usefulness of a narrow system delineation (Bergek et al., 2008b). 
For a useful discussion on system delineation, see also Markard and Truffer (2008). 
38 Exogenous factors may also reduce the strength of the functions. For instance, the development of a competing 
TIS may reduce market formation and entrepreneurial experiments simply by drawing the attention of main 
actors to another TIS. 
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The internal dynamics of the functions are another source of dynamics (4) that now can be 
further explained. Their interaction goes through elements of the structure, which either can 
be endogenous (5) or exogenous to the system (3). For analytical purposes, one can 
“shortcut” (5) and (2) and only focus on the internal dynamics of the functions.39 In a best-
case scenario, the inter-relatedness of the functions may cause a spiral of positive events. 
For example, with strengthened legitimation, resource mobilisation is simplified and more 
entrepreneurial experiments can be made. This may involve building a new plant 
(materialisation), which if run successfully may have a strong signalling effect, further 
increasing legitimation of the technology (complete loop). Hekkert et al. (2007) label such 
interactions as “motors” in the dynamics of a TIS and Suurs (2009) have identified various 
types of such motors.  
To summarise, a series of endogenous and exogenous events may strengthen the key 
innovation processes. Due to the functional inter-relationships, a positive development in 
one or several functions may spill over to and strengthen the others. A strengthened set of 
functions feeds back to the structural entities of the TIS. These positive feedback loops 
between structure to functions and back to structure may give rise to “virtuous cycles”.40 
When these self-reinforcing processes become strong enough, the development of the 
system no longer stands or falls on the positive or negative activities undertaken by a single 
or few actors inside or outside the system. It is at this point that the system can reach a 
“momentum of its own” (Hughes, 1987) and moves into a phase marked by rapid market 
growth. 
However, the opposite situation could also prevail, in which functions are never developed 
properly or where a weakened structure and functions give rise to vicious circles (Negro, 
2007). Therefore, from the perspective of an emerging TIS, it is vital to identify structural and 
functional system weaknesses, as well as exogenous factors, that obstruct the development 
of the TIS.41 For instance, an endogenous structural and functional system weakness may be 
                                                      
39 How the functions may impact structural elements that are exogenous to the system is not discussed further.  
40 By analogy with a cumulative causation (Myrdal, 1957) or increasing returns (Arthur, 1989). Myrdal (1957) 
has argued that studying this type of inter-dependency resulting in a cumulative causation is a main scientific 
task.  
41 See Johnson and Jacobsson, (2000); Unruh (2002); Bergek and Jacobsson (2004). 
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poorly developed learning and “political” networks that limit knowledge development and 
diffusion, as well as legitimation, while an exogenous factor may be a strong bias in the 
selection environment in favour of incumbent technologies. 
Weak functions and strong external factors inhibiting growth of the TIS also result in many 
uncertainties that may discourage investors and other actors from entering the new TIS. 
These various types of uncertainties, structural and functional weaknesses, as well as 
negative exogenous factors―which typically dominate the formative phase of a TIS―will 
now be explained and further elaborated on. A framework for identifying and addressing 
these types of weakness will also be developed.  
2.5 The role of system builders and policymakers for addressing system 
weaknesses 
It was previously argued that the complete system dynamics of the TIS should be described 
in both structural and functional terms and that an analysis of the five main relationships, 
outlined above, should be included in the description. The basis for conducting such an 
analysis has already been set out.  
In this section, the focus is turned to the specific characteristics of the dynamics during the 
formative phase, as well as the potential of using the approach as a guide for policy 
intervention. First, the characteristics of a TIS during the formative phase are described in 
terms of a set of dominant uncertainties, as well as structural and functional system 
weaknesses. Second, the rationale of using an approach in which the structural and 
functional system weaknesses are identified and used as guidance for policy intervention will 
be outlined. Third, the framework for identifying which system weaknesses should be 
addressed by policymakers is further developed based on the nature of and limits to the 
system builder(s’) capacity of identifying and acting upon such system weaknesses.  
2.5.1 Uncertainties and system weaknesses in the formative phase 
During the formative phase of a TIS, the system emerges from chaos to a more or less 
coherent structure (Hughes, 1987). During this time, it is likely to be characterised by various 
uncertainties, weak and fragmented links between the different weak structural elements 
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and weak functions, resulting in various system weaknesses of the TIS. Such uncertainties 
and system weaknesses will now be described. 
In the previous literature, three dominant uncertainties that influence investors, 
policymakers and other actors in the formative phase of a TIS have been mentioned: 
technical, market and institutional (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). However, one can also 
argue for the existence of organisational uncertainties. To begin with, technical uncertainties 
refer to the evolution of many competing technical designs, often with poor 
price/performance ratios. A series of “secondary innovation” are normally required for that 
ratio to improve, and as the market moves into a growth phase, the number of competing 
designs is reduced (Schmookler, 1966; Abernathy and Utterback, 1978).  
Organisational uncertainties are associated with uncertainties during the formation of a 
supply chain. In the formation of a new TIS, the role of various firms is often unclear and the 
willingness of new and old firms to perform certain tasks within that supply chain can be 
uncertain. 
Market uncertainties refer to the largely unknown size of the future markets. The size of 
future markets is largely unknown since it is next to impossible to foresee the possible 
success of substituting alternatives, future commodity prices, changes in customer 
preferences or the potential of secondary innovations, opening-up new and unexpected 
markets. Finally, institutional uncertainties refer to if and how regulatory changes are made 
to support the new technology, as well as if beliefs and values will be aligned to it.  
These uncertainties act, of course, as obstacles to firm entry and severely hinder the 
development of the system. The development of strong system functions would reduce 
these uncertainties, but this is often a very long and difficult process that last throughout the 
formative phase. Consequently, the system runs the risk of remaining weak also in structural 
terms.    
With regard to technology there may be no technological base and infrastructure or it may 
be severely underdeveloped. Thus, there may be a lack of instruments, demonstration 
facilities, clean rooms, or other types of science and technology infrastructure  for the 
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system to develop (Fogelberg and Sandén, 2008). There may also be few or weak actors with 
sets of underdeveloped or inadequate resources. The actors may also be too small to take 
on a large project or have the wrong competence for the task required.  
In addition, the institutional rule structure is normally not aligned to the TIS but favours the 
incumbent technologies. The lack of supporting institutions often serves as one of the main 
barriers for the development of a new TIS. To achieve such an alignment, it is often required 
that knowledge and political networks are well developed, i.e. there are several actors 
working together towards a common goal (Van de Ven, 2005). Such networks and 
institutional alignments take time to develop and accomplish, and requires that eventual 
conflicts in the TIS are addressed.  
Thus, the structural elements are often very weak in the formative phase of a TIS.  Analysing 
system weakness in structural terms is possible for any given IS. At least since Lundvall 
(1992), the analysis of such system weaknesses, for various IS, has been used as a tool for 
policy intervention. Various types of system weaknesses, also referred to as system failures, 
have been identified in the literature.42 However, the purpose here is not to provide a 
review of that literature.43 Instead, it is rather that such an analysis should be complemented 
with an analysis of the system weaknesses in functional terms to allow us to explain why the 
structure is weak and, thereby, improve the possibilities of suggesting appropriate policy 
measures (see Figure 2.2).  
Just like the structure, the functions can at best be expected to be weak during the 
formative phase. There may be a lack of ongoing activities that can strengthen knowledge 
                                                      
42 Please view Klein Woolthuis (2005) and Foray (2009) for an overview. In previous literature, reference is 
often made to “system failure” instead of “system weaknesses”, which will be used in this thesis. The reasons for 
using the concept of system weaknesses instead of system failure will be outlined in the subsequent section. 
43 In a literature overview by Klein Woolthuis et al. (2005), a sum of eight commonly discussed and general 
structural system “failures” were identified: (1) Infrastructure failures: the lack of physical infrastructure such as 
IT, roads, and science and technology infrastructure (Smith, 1996; Edquist et al., 1998). (2) Transition failures: 
the inability of firms to adapt to new technological developments (Smith, 1996). (3) Lock-in/path dependency 
failures: the inability of complete social systems to adapt to new technological paradigms (Smith, 1996). (4) 
Hard institutional failures: the failures in the framework of regulations and the general legal system (Smith, 
1996). (5) Soft institutional failures: the failures in the social institutions such as political, culture and values 
(Smith, 1996; Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997). (6) Strong network failures: the “blindness” that evolves if actors 
have close links and miss out on new outside developments (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997; Christensen, 1997). 
(7) Weak network failures: the lack of linkages between actors (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997). (8) Capabilities 
failure: the lack of absorptive capacity, specifically in small firms, to learn about new technologies (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Malerba, 1996; Smith, 1996).  
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development and diffusion, entrepreneurial experimentation and materialisation. If all these 
functions are weak, the “knowing how” type of knowledge required may, for example, not 
develop adequately. In addition, there may be a lack of basic research contributing by 
explaining certain phenomena and, thereby, strengthening the explicit knowledge base 
“knowing about”. The number of entrepreneurial experiments may be too few, which in turn 
may hamper further knowledge development and the generation of new ideas for the 
necessary secondary innovations. When the activities strengthening materialisation are few, 
knowledge development that requires the establishment of an infrastructure cannot be 
made. Markets are often small and underdeveloped, and potential customers are hesitant to 
take on the role of being first. Such lack of market formation hampers the very important 
and interactive type of learning made possible in the first supplier and customer relations 
(Von Hippel, 1986; Lundvall and Johnson, 1994).         
The remaining functions of resource mobilisation, direction of search, legitimation, and the 
development of positive externalities may also be weak and underdeveloped in the formative 
phase. There may not be enough financial or human resources for developing the field such 
as a lack of technology experts. All new technologies have been argued to suffer from a 
“liability of newness” (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). Therefore, the system may be 
characterised as weak in terms of its legitimacy (legitimation), which may result in, for 
example, difficulties obtaining necessary environmental and building permits, or other types 
of resources necessary for developing the field. If the system is weak because of its 
legitimacy, it is also weak in terms of direction of search and few actors can be expected to 
be attracted to enter the field.44 A weak function with regard to the development of positive 
externalities is a natural state in the formative phase of a TIS. There is, for example, usually a 
very limited pooled labour market, lack of specialised equipment manufacturers, and other 
actors that can transfer experience from one firm to another.  
                                                      
44 A TIS can, however, be seen as legitimate, but still suffer from a weak direction of search. For example, an oil 
price or regulatory framework in an ongoing state of flux may weaken the function and, thereby, discourage 
potential investors. 
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Hence, large technical, market, organisational, and institutional uncertainties discourage 
new actors from entering the TIS in its formative phase. This may lead to a continued 
presence of various system weaknesses in structural and functional terms. 
2.5.2 Policy intervention, system weaknesses and system builders 
The outcome of attempts aimed at resolving these uncertainties and system weaknesses are 
in themselves highly unpredictable, and the TIS may have to undergo several intermediate 
periods, or episodes, which are dominated by specific patterns of interaction between actors 
and the other elements of the structure before they can be resolved (Suurs et al., 2010).  The 
time frame for these episodes cannot be known before-hand, and forming an embryonic TIS 
is a process that can last for several decades (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997; Grubler, 1998; 
Breshanan et al., 2001; Wilson, 2009). 
Extensive arguments have been made that policy interventions based on the identification of 
system weaknesses45 provide an encompassing tool for stimulating innovation, the creation 
of new industries and economic growth, especially when compared with the conventional 
market failure approach (Lundvall, 1992; Lundvall and Johnson, 1994; Malerba, 1996; Smith, 
1996; Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997; Metcalfe and Georghiou, 1997; Smith, 2000b; Edquist, 
2002; Metcalfe, 2004; Smits and Kuhlmann, 2004; Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005; Lundvall, 
2007; Foray, 2009; Bergek et al., 2010b).46  
Yet, there are limits of the usefulness of policy intervention. One should not forget that most 
functions in modern societies are best fulfilled by the market mechanism and capitalist 
firms. This is also true in terms of identifying and acting upon system weaknesses, or as “ ... 
Smits and Kuhlmann (2004) put it: ‘[O]ne should not overestimate the instrumental power of 
public policy vis-à-vis other actors in complex policy making arenas.’ Individual firms, groups 
                                                      
45 It has been argued that using the concept of “failure” from a system perspective is misleading, since it is not 
used with respect to an optimal situation. Instead, it has been proposed that using the concept of “system 
weaknesses”, as rationale from policy intervention, is more in line with a system perspective (Malerba, 1996). 
46 For the purpose of this thesis, it is of no interest to go into the details concerning the shortcomings with the 
market failure approach. The main objection, from the above-mentioned authors, has been that it builds on a 
static (neoclassic) framework on how markets operate. Market failures are identified based on the divergence 
from what would be considered an optimal path towards perfect competition and equilibrium. 
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of entrepreneurs, industry association and other interest organization may very well identify 
and act upon system weaknesses in their own self-interest” (Bergek et al., 2010b, p. 120).47 
There is, therefore, a need to be able to distinguish between the role of policymakers and 
the other actors in addressing system weaknesses. There is, of course, no need for 
policymakers to engage in a costly search processes and target various structural and 
functional system weaknesses in the emergence of a new TIS if the system builders, and 
other actors, can identify and address these weaknesses themselves. However, for 
identifying which system weaknesses that can be addressed by system builders and which 
have to be addressed by policymakers, an improved conceptualisation of the system building 
role is called for.  
Previously, it has been emphasised that exogenous factors to the TIS dominate in the early 
phase of system formation simply because the structural components are weak and the 
actors’ ability to strengthen the key innovation and diffusion processes are necessarily 
limited (Raven, 2005; Bergek et al., 2008a). 
The role of the actor in the formative phase has therefore been downplayed in the empirical 
analyses, even though opportunities for system building activities by early entrants into a TIS 
have been identified. In the literature, the prime mover has been given an key role in the 
formation of a new TIS (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997). The prime mover acts on a perceived 
opportunity, fulfilling several important tasks in the evolution of the new system such as: “ … 
raise awareness, undertake investment in the new technology, give it legitimacy and diffuse 
it through various mechanisms to other actors” (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997, p. 305).   
The view on the actor in previous TIS studies is inherited from evolutionary theory, where 
the “ … firms are the key actor, not the individual human beings ... individuals are viewed as 
interchangeable and their actions determined by the firms they are in” (Nelson, 1995b, p. 
68). When reference is made to the prime mover, it is consequently a firm that is in focus 
(Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004, p. 1498; Jacobsson, 2008, p. 817). On some occasions, it is not 
a single firm but rather constellations of actors, networks or alliances that collectively act as 
                                                      
47 Cf. Van de Ven (1993). 
 
48 
 
prime movers, engaging in system building activities by addressing the various system 
weaknesses and uncertainties (Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000, p. 637). However, systematic 
analyses for identifying the range of system builders and their ability to strengthen the key 
innovation and diffusion processes have previously not been undertaken. 
The system builder is here defined as an individual actor, an alliance or a network of actors 
building and strengthening the structure, as well as several of the functions (if not all) in an 
emerging TIS. The system builder reduces the various types of uncertainties and addresses 
system weaknesses in a given TIS.  
Although the system builder can include an alliance of actors, it will not include all of the 
actors within the TIS. There will, most likely, be competing system builders working on 
alternative trajectories and projects within the TIS that can be in stark conflict with each 
other, requiring different types of institutional and organisational set-ups. 
An analysis of the system builder departs from the individual actor(s) and conceptualises 
these as being embedded in a general structure48 (cf. Giddens (1984a)). This structure both 
constrains and enables the system builder(s) to address system weaknesses, to reduce 
further uncertainties and to strengthen the TIS.  
Hughes (1987, p. 52) argues that such system builders possess a capacity “ … to construct or 
force unity from diversity, centralization in the face of pluralism, and coherence from 
chaos.” Such an agent may build artefacts but does not concern himself/herself with 
artefacts alone, but must also consider the way in which these relate to social, economic, 
political, and scientific factors (Law, 1987a, p. 112).  
Hellsmark and Jacobsson (2009) conceptualise such an actor as an individual equipped with 
a “transformative capacity”. When this agent acts, he or she intervenes in the world and 
makes a difference to a pre-existing state of affairs or course of events. (Giddens, 1984a, p. 
14-15).49 It is proposed that the transformative capacity can be analysed by the ability of the 
                                                      
48 From a system perspective, the general structure is made up of the various structural elements on NSI, RSI and 
SSI levels of analysis (see section 2.1).   
49 The content and limits of the transformative capacity can partly be explained by the ability of the agent to 
control and mobilise resources. Giddenns (1984a, p. 15) defines resources as “ ... structured properties of social 
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system builder(s) to strengthen the eight key processes (functions of a TIS) by building 
structure or by undertaking other types of activities, which strengthen the functions directly.  
The transformative capacity can thus be analysed by the actors’ ability to collude and create 
alliances with other actors50, creating networks, creating new firms and technology, and 
thereby strengthen the structural elements of the TIS directly. In addition, it can be analysed 
by the actors’ ability to strengthen the various function as they undertake a wide range of 
activities. For example, an academic who is a member of an advisory group to the 
government may speak in favour of a technology or he/she may point to risks associated 
with the very same technology. Similarly, a CEO may decide to diversify and invest in a new 
technology such as thin film solar cells. These activities are linked to the micro-level of 
discrete actors (Markard and Truffer, 2008) and contribute to the formation and 
strengthening of particular functions (in these cases legitimation and entrepreneurial 
experimentation).51  
Hence, it is not sufficient to focus on the system builder’s impact on the structural elements 
alone. Focus must instead be on what the system builders accomplish in terms of 
strengthening the key processes of innovation and diffusion, either directly or through 
forming structural elements. The transformative capacity, thus, involves the collective or 
individual ability to: 
a) create and diffuse new knowledge, access and combine new and conventional 
knowledge from different fields. 
b) influence the direction of search of would-be entrants, including defining 
opportunities within the field and making it attractive for new entrants. 
c) create legitimacy for the new technology and/or products. 
d) attract and form human and financial resources, as well as complementary assets. 
e) undertake entrepreneurial experimentations by testing new concepts, product 
designs and business models. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
systems … ”. This broad and general definition is, however, not particularly helpful when we would like to 
explain the content and limits of the transformative capacity of a system builder. 
50 These alliances may include not only other firms but also universities, institutes, governmental agencies, lobby 
organisations, and other policymakers.   
51 See Markard and Truffer (2008) for a useful discussion on the differences between “activities” and 
“functions”. 
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f) develop and invest in artefacts such as products, production plants and physical 
infrastructure. 
g) define and form first markets for the technology and/or products.  
h) act as a channel or create means by which positive external economies are 
generated, strengthening the impact of the other functions. 
 
Barbalet (1985) points out that it is not possible to understand the extent of the 
transformative capacity of an individual if the “intentional” and “frictional” resistance, which 
such an agent will encounter, is not taken into account. The intentional resistance is here 
interpreted as those obstacles that come out of deliberate actions by actors with opposing 
interests―in other words exogenous mechanisms that obstruct the formation of strong 
functions. Frictional resistance is interpreted as problems that are non-intentional in nature 
and these may be both endogenous to the system such as inadequate networks,52 but also 
exogenous such as built-in biases towards incumbent technologies into existing institutions 
(see e.g. Carlsson and Jacobsson (1997) and Unruh (2000)). Therefore, both types of 
resistance constitute mechanisms that increase uncertainties and weaken the system in both 
structural and functional terms, thereby obstructing the formation of a new TIS (Bergek and 
Jacobsson, 2003).  
In this thesis, the role of actors as system builder(s) is re-examined with an increased focus 
on the limits of the system builder(s’) abilities to influence the formation of a new TIS. It has 
been argued that the strength of the frictional and intentional resistance will limit the 
transformative capacity of the system builder. If the system builders can be identified and 
their transformative capacity analysed, it is possible to identify which system weaknesses 
and uncertainties the system builders can be expected to resolve by themselves and which 
system weaknesses and uncertainties need to be resolved through policy intervention on 
different levels. With this contribution to the TIS framework, the conceptualisation of the 
individual actor as a system builder and their ability to act upon various system weaknesses 
in a TIS (i.e. transformative capacity) is thereby improved. The conceptualisation paves the 
way for assessing what is possible to achieve within a certain time frame, given the current 
policy regimes and abilities of the actors. Furthermore, it helps to identify policy 
                                                      
52 Another type of frictional resistance may be a lack of interest by incumbents in the new technology. 
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interventions that may be necessary to reach various higher level goals associated with the 
development of a given TIS. 
2.6 Research Questions  
The overall purpose of this thesis was stated in the introduction as to: 
“ ...analyse the role of the system builders in the emergence of an industry with the capacity 
to realise the potential of gasified biomass for the production of second-generation 
transportation fuels and other chemicals within the European Union.” 
In this chapter, it has been argued that an improved conceptualisation of the system building 
role would provide a useful tool for policymakers in identifying system weaknesses that 
would require policy interventions for supporting TISs of strategic importance. 
For addressing the aforementioned purpose, it has been broken down into four research 
questions. The questions address the limits of the system builders’ transformative capacity 
as a means of identifying a set of system weaknesses on a national and an EU level. By 
elaborating on these weaknesses, the goal is to identify areas that require policy 
intervention in order for the TIS of biomass gasification to progress. 
However, the first question takes a step back and is more of an empirical one―addressing 
the somewhat ambiguous literature in which Schumpeter (1934) and Hughes (1983; 1987) 
emphasise the role of the individual in an emerging TIS, while others assign the system 
building role primarily to firms or networks of firms (Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000; 
Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). Hence, the first question is formulated as:  
1) Who act as system builders in the different national contexts? 
After establishing what type of actors take on the role of system builders in the case of 
biomass gasification and in the four different case study countries, the focus is turned to 
analysing the nature and extent of their transformative capacity. It was previously 
emphasised that actors are not only constrained but are also enabled by the structure in 
which they are embedded (Giddens, 1984a; Scott, 2008). It is central to further analyse how 
and to what extent these actors make use of the general structure to form or strengthen the 
52 
 
structure and the various functions of the TIS. Hence, the second research question is 
formulated as:  
2) What characterises the nature and extent of the system builders’ transformative 
capacity? 
a) How do the system builders make use of the general structure in which 
they are embedded to form or strengthen the structure and the various 
functions of the TIS? 
b) To which extent do the system builders manage to strengthen the 
structure and functions of the TIS?  
The third and fourth questions focus on explaining the eventual limits of the system builders’ 
transformative capacity. These limits are then used for the identification of system 
weaknesses that remain to be resolved by the system builders themselves, or through policy 
intervention in the various countries and on an EU level. Research questions three and four 
are formulated as:  
3) What are the limits to the system builders’ transformative capacity and how can 
these limits be explained? 
4) Given these limits, which system weaknesses remain to be resolved by system builders 
and policymakers on different levels (national and EU)? 
These research questions are analysed and answered for each case study country in Part II of 
this thesis (see Chapters V-VIII). A cross-country analysis is undertaken in Chapter IX (Part III 
of the thesis). On the basis of this analysis, the main remaining system weaknesses and 
uncertainties at the EU-level are specified, along with the main policy options for addressing 
these (see Chapter XI). Further implications for policymakers and system builders are 
specified in Chapter XII.  
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Chapter III                                                                                      
Dynamics of the design space, applications and markets 
 
“Many aspects of technological changes, in order to be adequately understood, must be 
examined in terms of particular historical sequences, for in technological change as in other 
aspects of human ingenuity, one thing often leads to another – not in a strictly deterministic 
sense, but in the more modest sense that doing something successfully creates a capacity for 
doing other things.”  (Rosenberg, 1976, p. 30) 
 
Gasification is, in the broadest sense, the thermal conversion of any carbon-based fuel to a 
gaseous product with a usable heating value. It includes pyrolysis, in which the carbon 
conversion is incomplete and occurs in the absence of oxygen. It also includes partial 
oxidation, in which an oxidant (gasification agent) reacts with a carbon-based fuel and where 
the oxidant may be a combination of air or oxygen and steam. Both processes result in a gas 
with a usable heating value, consisting of various proportions of carbon monoxide, methane 
and hydrogen (Higman and van der Burgt, 2003).  
The reaction temperature is of great importance to gasification. The lower the temperature, 
the less carbon is converted into a usable gas―leaving more residues in the gas. These 
residues are generally less desirable by-products consisting of CO2, H2O, CxHy aliphatic 
hydrocarbons, benzene, toluene and tars (Boerrigter et al., 2005).53 When the reaction 
temperature is higher, and in the presence of oxygen and steam, more of the carbon is 
converted and the gas contains less undesirable by-products. At temperatures above 1,000 
degrees, all the tars and hydrocarbons are destroyed and the raw gas consists mainly of 
carbon monoxide and hydrogen. At such high temperatures, however, more heat is 
produced and the total efficiency of the process may therefore be reduced. The treated 
version of the raw gas from high temperature gasification is usually referred to as a synthesis 
gas or syngas, since it can be used to synthesise (produce) a range of chemical products. The 
cleaned version of the raw gas originating from low temperature gasification is referred to as 
                                                      
53 When the gas is used for electricity production, the hydrocarbons also have fuel value (Higman, 2010). 
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a product gas. The amount of cleaning required depends on the application for which the 
product gas is intended. 
The design space of gasification has undergone constant evolution since it was first 
experimented with during the mid-seventeenth century, resulting in various applications and 
using many different types of carbon-based feed-stocks. In particular, the technology 
progressed extensively during the early phase of the industrial revolution in England and 
during the development of the modern chemical industry in the 1920s to 1940s. In addition, 
rapid technological development occurred during periods of war and crises. For example 
during the Second World War, initiatives such as Germany’s synthetic fuel programme and 
the development of a mobile gasification system, in for example Sweden, contributed to 
extending the design space and allowing for the commercialisation of new applications 
(based on gasification). Other periods of rapid technological development occurred during 
the South African trade embargo in order to develop synthetic diesel and during the oil 
crises when coal and biomass-based gasification systems replaced oil in lime kilns. 
Worldwide, the gasification of fossil fuels has played an important role for the production of 
nitrogenous fertilisers and methanol in the chemical industry since the 1920s with the 
innovation of the Winkler gasifier, for the production of synthetic diesel since the 1970s, and 
for power production through the Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) since the 
1990s. In the past, the choice of feed-stock has mainly been petroleum and coal, but this is 
changing rapidly in favour of coal, as well as natural gas if the extremely large gas-to-liquids 
plant currently under construction in Qatar is included in the statistics (GASIF, 2007). 
Since the start of the first oil crisis in 1973, biomass gasification has experienced periods of 
great interest for the production of chemicals, transportation fuels, electricity and heat. 
With the current threat of climate change, biomass gasification is once again atop many 
actors’ agenda. The expectation from different advocates of the technology is that 
gasification will provide a secure supply of relatively modest cost and resource-efficient 
renewable fuels, heat and electricity. For these expectations to be fulfilled, the design space 
of gasification must once again be extended to include biomass as a resource for these more 
advanced applications. Thus, the fundamental question is:  
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have the past 200 years of fossil fuel gasification, and the recent decades of experiments with 
biomass as a feed-stock for less advanced applications, created the industrial capacity 
necessary for commercialising the production of second-generation fuels based on biomass 
gasification? 
Answering that question will take the remainder of this thesis. To start with, however, this 
chapter will address the historical evolution of the design space, the current technical 
challenges of biomass gasification, the main strategic alliances and projects in Europe, 
various applications, and the rationale for realising a market for second-generation fuels. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section briefly unfolds the historical 
evolution of the design space of gasification between 1665 and 1950. It also includes an 
illustration of the case of Sweden and the use of producer gas as an emergency fuel leading 
up to and during the Second World War. The second section will describe the evolution, 
structure and current trends of the commercial gasification market. Section three describes 
the main trajectories for biomass gasification and the technical challenges for constructing 
commercial systems. The fourth section outlines and analyses the main strategic alliances in 
realising biomass gasification for advanced applications, as well as the rationale and the risks 
associated with developing a future market. 
3.1 The evolution of a design space 
The most recent rediscovery54 of the gasification process has been associated with Reverend 
John Clayton and his announcement that he discovered the “spirit of coal” in 1688 
(Hutchison, 1985, p. 245). What he had discovered was how to produce a combustible gas 
from coal through pyrolysis. The discovery was not commercialised, however, and 
disappeared until well over one hundred years later. 
It was then two inventors who initiated the process towards the commercialisation of coal 
gas―almost at the same time and completely unaware of each other’s efforts.55 In 1792, 
William Murdoch experimented with the technology in his house and garden in Redruth, 
England. He “ … designed to demonstrate how a viable plant could be constructed and 
                                                      
54 The use of pyrolysis gas had previously been known in ancient China.  
55 Other experiments with coal gas were conducted before Murdoch and Lebon but were never displayed or 
received attention (Falkus 1982).  
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operated to make, store and use coal as an illuminant” (Hutchison, 1985, p. 248-249). 
However, it was not until he heard about the other inventor’s (Phillip Lebon) experiments in 
Paris that he made serious attempts to commercialise the design. Philippe Lebon 
experimented with gas lighting and heating, and held the first public display of the new 
technology in Paris in October 1801. The display received much attention but did not result 
in a business for Lebon. Before he could continue with his new found invention he enlisted in 
the French army and was killed in 1804 (Falkus, 1982). 
Murdoch, on the other hand, was an engineer employed by the company Boulton & Watt. It 
was in their machine factory that the first version of the coal gas-based lighting system was 
installed in 1802. The owners of the company strongly believed in the technology and 
decided to bring the system to market. Their first customer, George August Lee, was partner 
in the firm Phillips & Lee, and played a key role in making the system commercially ready. 
Most importantly, he was willing to take great financial risks in developing the lighting 
system and implementing it on a full commercial-scale at Phillips & Lee’s cotton mill in 
Manchester. This commitment allowed several teething problems to be overcome and the 
new technical system to mature. Mr. Lee also suggested several improvements to the 
design, welcomed visitors―including many other factory owners―to witness the technology 
and contributed to calculating the cost of the system compared to that of using candles 
(Falkus, 1982). 
The technical system behind gas lighting consisted of several inter-related components, each 
of which needed to work properly before the system could be commercialised. At the heart 
of the system was an airtight furnace, which was heated from the outside by burning coal, 
while the coal inside was thermally decomposed. The high calorific gas appeared as a by-
product, since 70 percent of the coal remained in form of coke (Knoef, 2005).  
This was far from an environmentally friendly process of gas production. Tars appeared in 
the combustible gas as a by-product of the manufacturing. These tars were made up of 500 
to 3,000 different compounds that are toxic to humans and animal life (Hatheway, 2007). 
During production these tars were leaked, spilled or discarded into the environment and 
since they are not susceptible to natural degradation they did not simply disappear. Indeed, 
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the waste from old gas plants continues to present a problem in some areas even today 
(Hatheway, 2007). 
The technology experienced a commercial breakthrough and, with the foundation of London 
Gas, Light and Coke Company in 1812, moved into a phase characterised by rapid market 
growth (Higman and van der Burgt, 2003). Consequently, from 1812 onwards the use of 
combustible gas grew rapidly. By 1850, all major towns with more than 10,000 residents on 
the US east coast had their own gas works (Hatheway, 2007) as did most towns with as few 
as 3,000 inhabitants in the UK (Falkus, 1982). Hatheway (2007) estimates that there were 
approximately 52,000 gas plants in the US alone at the time.  
It was not until after the mid-nineteenth century that other applications for the gas were 
developed such as heat, cooking and power (Falkus, 1982). The gas was initially so expensive 
that it was only used for lighting and cooking, where it had major advantages over candles 
and coal (Higman and van der Burgt, 2003). Even if the production of the gas caused many 
environmental problems, it also solved the problem posed by hazardous smoke and the risk 
of fires started by candles, and indoor coal and wood fires. The main advantage, however, 
may have been that the cost of the gas was considerably lower than candles (Falkus, 1982). 
Based on the early development and use of pyrolysis gas, two different trajectories 
emerged. The first involved the development of the first gas engines; the second was the 
discovery of promising applications in the chemical industry. The developments within these 
two trajectories will be outlined in the following two sections. The case of Sweden will be 
used to capture the development of the technology for the gas engine, even though similar 
developments were common-place also elsewhere.   
3.1.1 The development of gas engines and the case of Sweden 
The positive experience from the use of producer gas gave rise to the development of the 
first gas-blown combustion engine, which was called an explosion engine at that time. The 
engine was first developed in 1881, at least ten years before the inventions of Daimler and 
Diesel. Modern phrases such as “gas pedal” and “step on the gas” come from this time 
period (Knoef, 2005).  
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The gas engine had a major disadvantage vis-à-vis the gasoline engine when it came to 
mobile applications such as transportation. The producer gas could not be stored in a 
feasible way and therefore had to be produced when it was used. This, together with all of 
the tars in the gas, which made the maintenance of the engine difficult, gave the gasoline 
and diesel-propelled vehicle a clear advantage. It goes without saying that the engines 
invented by Diesel and Daimler came to dominate the market, but the gas engine still 
continued to be developed.  
Around 1920, some 150 manufacturers of gas engines were active and a few useful gasifiers 
for mobile applications appeared on the market. Experiments were conducted with gasifiers 
on tractors, trucks and busses in Austria, Germany and France during this time period (IVA, 
1950; Knoef, 2005). 
In 1923 and 1924, a few coal gasifiers from Austria were imported to Sweden to be tested on 
various types of vehicles. The experience with the gasifiers was generally negative. The large 
amount of tars in the gas clogged up the engine, which then had to be dismantled and 
cleaned after only 300 kilometres of use (IVA, 1950). Despite this, the Swedish military 
decided to further investigate how gasifiers could be used as an emergency technology to 
secure means of transportation in case of war. First in 1932 but also later in 1939, the 
Swedish government introduced incentives in the form of tax breaks and loans for people 
who wanted to convert their vehicles to run on producer gas. These incentives resulted in an 
expansion of the number of gasifiers for vehicles to about 250 units (IVA, 1950). The fast 
expansion of the market was followed by a backlash, however, when the public discovered 
that the gasifiers were of low quality, required high maintenance and, above all, were more 
expensive to drive (during this time, gasoline was cheap compared to charcoal).  
The government reassessed the status of the programme in 1937 and found that while the 
quality of the gasifiers had improved considerably, there were only about 100 cars running 
on producer gas in Sweden. Everything changed during the Second World War, however. In 
1939-1940 the price of coal fell dramatically, making running vehicles on producer gas 
economical again. By the turn of the year 1939/1940, there were approximately 1,000 gas 
cars in Sweden (IVA, 1950). When the war intensified in April 1941, strict restrictions on the 
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use of gasoline were imposed and aggressive incentives were implemented to increase the 
number of cars running on gas.  
The long formative phase of the technology, which had started in 1881, paved the way for 
ensuing rapid expansion of the market for mobile gasifiers upon the introduction of these 
incentives. Already by March 1941, there were 40,000 gas vehicles running on the streets 
and the number of gas vehicles peaked in Sweden at 71,500 in December 1941.56 
It is still interesting to note the legitimacy that the producer gas car acquired during a very 
short period of time. The public’s first reaction to gasification in the early-1930s was 
scepticism. Less than 10 years later, public attitudes were very different and people 
appeared to embrace producer gas vehicles. This change of heart was illustrated in 1940 by 
the leading motoring magazine in Sweden, Biljournalen, which published an issue devoted to 
the great experience everyone was having with gas vehicles. According to the journal, 
people found them easy to use, cheap to run and they allowed great freedom during the 
war. The knowledge base being built up around the technology was seen as a guarantee that 
it would prevail even after the war, when cheap oil would re-enter the market. Some 
problems were mentioned such as the inconvenience of having the gasifier mounted on the 
car and the more time-consuming maintenance involved, but the advantages clearly 
outweighed the disadvantages (Hilding, 1940). Despite this, cheap oil re-entered the market 
soon after the war and producer gas cars disappeared. 
3.1.2 Gasification and the chemical industry 
The most successful and durable application of gasification so far was within the chemical 
industry. It commenced when the 18-year-old Englishman William Perkin discovered the first 
coal tar dyes in 1854, and his instructor Wilhelm Hoffmann returned to Germany with that 
knowledge (Hatheway, 2007). 
In 1900, gasification took a significant leap forward in terms of its ability to produce more 
complex products through the water gasification process. This was important for the 
                                                      
56 The success of mobile gasifiers was not just a Swedish phenomenon. Approximately one million gasifiers 
using wood or charcoal were also being used to drive cars, trucks, boats, trains, and electrical generators in 
Europe at the time (Knoef, 2005). 
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chemical industry since it enabled the production of ammonia and methanol. In this new 
gasification process, a gas containing equal amounts of hydrogen and carbon monoxide 
could be produced. The carbon monoxide could be converted into hydrogen through a CO 
shift reaction, and the hydrogen or synthesis gas could then be used for ammonia and 
methanol synthesis (Higman and van der Burgt, 2003). 
The process, however, was discontinuous. It was not until Carl von Linde commercialised the 
cryogenic separation of air during the 1920s that the process could be made into a 
continuous one. A flow of important innovations for improving the gasification process came 
after von Linde’s innovation. The first break-through was the Winkler fluid bed process in 
1926, which was followed by the Lurgi moving bed pressurised gasification process in 1931 
and the Koppers-Totzek high temperature entrained flow process in the 1940s (Higman and 
van der Burgt, 2003). These innovations benefited the chemical industry and enabled it to 
undertake large-scale and more efficient production. 
No major product innovations have been introduced for the gasification of solid fuels since 
the Second World War (Higman and van der Burgt, 2003). Nevertheless, gasification capacity 
has grown tremendously in the chemical industry. The growth of modern gasification for the 
production of various chemicals, transportation fuels and ammonia as a nitrogenous 
fertiliser started off with the wartime synthetic fuel programme in Germany and, later, the 
foundation of the South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation (Sasol). With the increasing 
availability of natural gas in the 1950s, the importance of coal as a feed-stock declined, 
although the need for synthesis gas did not. After the Second World War, the annual 
demand for ammonia as a nitrogenous fertiliser increased from 5.5Mt per year to 54.0Mt in 
1969 and has, until more recently, been the main driver for increasing gasification capacity 
worldwide (Higman and van der Burgt, 2008). 
It is along the trajectory of developing and producing chemical products that modern 
alternative fuel, heat and power from gasification has been and most likely will continue to 
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develop. The following section will outline and analyse the market for commercial 
gasification.57  
3.2 Commercial gasification, applications and markets 
The two main components in the synthesis gas, carbon monoxide and hydrogen are the 
main building blocks for producing a wide range of products within modern chemistry. 
Basically, any carbon-based feed-stock such as coal, oil, peat coke, natural gas, biomass, and 
waste can be converted into ammonia, methanol, hydrogen, Fischer-Tropsch (FT) products, 
synthetic natural gas (SNG), town gas, and electricity (see Figure 3.2.1). 
 Figure 3.2.1: Applications for synthesis gas. Source: Higman and van der Burgt (2008). 
                                                      
57 All of the commercial applications for combustible gas from pyrolysis or fixed bed gasification came to an end 
with the large-scale diffusion of electricity around 1900, and the oil and natural gas industry between 1910 and 
1920. Only for a short time, during the Second World War, was the technology brought back and developed as 
an emergency fuel for vehicles. There are, however, still uses for pyrolysis and fixed-bed gasification for various 
applications. Pyrolysis is also used for the liquefaction of biomass into a bio-oil, which some actors try to 
develop into a usable diesel and gasoline fuel. Fixed bed gasifiers of the type used in vehicles during the Second 
World War are now used for rice husk gasification. It is a commercial process for electricity production and 
cooking gas in Southeast Asia, but suffers from too much tars and low heating value (Knoef, 2005; Zhou, 2009). 
Development work is being carried out in many countries to make it commercially viable for small-scale 
electricity production in Europe. There are currently a few plants operating fairly well, but the reliability of the 
process is still quite low (Lettner, 2007; Bräkow and Oettel, 2008; Kurkela, 2008). I have excluded pyrolysis and 
fixed bed gasification from this thesis unless the technology is directly used for the pre-treatment of biomass for 
the production of second-generation renewable fuels. 
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For both technical and economical reasons, some of these alternatives may not be possible 
or desirable to combine. For example, it would make little sense to produce SNG from 
natural gas, even if that is, of course, possible. Moreover, biomass and waste gasification is 
both technically and economically difficult to accomplish for producing chemicals, 
transportation fuels and power generation through an integrated gasification combined 
cycle (IGCC). Biomass gasification is, therefore, not seen as a commercially available 
technology, except for less advanced applications with lower demands on gas purity and in 
some cases for co-firing with standard coal gasification technology.58 The specific challenges 
associated with biomass and waste gasification will be outlined and analysed in Section 3.3. 
Figure 3.2.2: Accumulated currently operating and planned capacity. Source: GASIF (2007). 
 
The total market for gasification plants has experienced strong growth since the 1950s and is 
projected to continue to grow in the near-term future (see Figure 3.2.2). During this time 
frame, three major trends can be discerned. 
The first concerns FT liquids, which have increased in production considerably since the 
beginning of the 1970s and is predicted to continue to do so. Around 1990, about half of the 
                                                      
58 There are good reasons for producing more than one product from the same source of syngas and for enabling 
its production from multiple feed-stocks (i.e., co-firing). With such a flexible set-up, the operator can shift to the 
cheapest feed-stock and increase production of the product with the highest market value at any given time. The 
security of supply would, thus, be improved for both the operator of such a plant and its customers (Higman and 
van der Burgt, 2008). 
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world’s gasification capacity constituted the production of FT liquids. The installed capacity 
originates from Sasol’s three facilities for converting coal to FT liquids in South Africa, and 
one plant in Malaysia based on natural gas, which was built by Shell. Sasol increased their 
production extensively in the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s and remains the largest 
gasification centre in the world (Higman and van der Burgt, 2003). In 2007, 50 percent of the 
total coal used for gasification was used for FT synthesis at the three facilities in South Africa, 
operated by and based on Sasol coal-to-liquids (CtL) technology. 
Figure 3.2.3: Product distribution, operating gasification plants and planned capacity. Source: GASIF 
(2007). 
 
The production of FT liquids is expected to increase dramatically sometime after 2010, when 
the extremely large (10,936MWth) Pearl Gas-to-Liquids (GtL) plant in Qatar may come online. 
The plant accounts for 27 percent of all planned capacity until 2012, according to GASIF 
(2007) (see Figure 3.2.3). When completed, it will be the single largest gasification plant ever 
constructed. With the completion of the plant, the share of FT liquids of the total output of 
products from gasification will be maintained at about 31 percent (see Figure 3.2.3).59 Not 
included in the GASIF (2007) statistics are an additional 18 projects that have been reported 
to be under development in China for the production of liquids through the gasification of 
coal. If these projects are realised, FT liquids production would increase by an additional 
                                                      
59 Calculated in terms of MWhth syngas used for the various applications. 
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2,755 thousand barrels per day by 2020 (Périneau, 2009). However, coals to liquids projects 
in China have become highly controversial, since coal is relatively scarce in China in relation 
to the current use and production requires large quantities of water, of which very little is 
available in the regions where the plants have been planned to be built. Consequently, the 
National Development and Reform Commission has approved only a few of the proposed 
projects, and is unlikely to approve more in the near future (Fang, 2009). 
The second trend concerns the increasing share of coal-based gasification for power 
production. The integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) turns coal into a syngas that 
can be passed through a combined cycle gas turbine for power production. The rationale for 
developing the technology has been to increase electrical efficiency and environmental 
performance compared to conventional coal boilers. With the technology, the flue gas can 
be cleaned of sulfur dioxide, particulates, mercury and other unwanted components in the 
coal at the pre-combustion stage at a lower cost than conventional post-combustion 
cleaning. The technology also allows for carbon capture, during which the CO2 can be 
separated, compressed and stored away (CCS).60 In total, 11,000MWth (27 percent) of coal-
based IGCC capacity is planned between 2007 and 2012 (GASIF, 2007) (see Figure 3.2.3).  
The third trend involves what is expected to be a rapid increase in the production of 
chemicals from coal in the period beyond 2007. According to GASIF (2007), 26 percent of the 
planned capacity will be new chemical plants. Of these chemical plants, 70 percent are 
planned to be built in China and almost 90 percent of these will be based on coal. The 
chemical plants in China mainly produce ammonia for nitrogenous fertiliser and methanol. In 
addition, there is at least one plant now in operation constructed by Shell for the Shenhua 
Coal Liquefaction Corporation in Inner Mongolia with a capacity of 4,000 tonnes per day 
(t/d) for the production of hydrogen used for liquefying coal in the production of 
transportation fuels and chemicals (Chhoa, 2005). 
                                                      
60 In the US, an increasing number of states require all new coal plants to be “carbon capture ready”. However, 
in reality few plants will use carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology, since there is currently no general 
legislative framework supporting the technology, and the available CCS technology would increase the cost of 
electricity production considerably (Holt, 2007; Renzenbrink et al., 2007). 
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The three applications of FT liquids, power and chemicals, constitute 90 percent of total 
operational and planned conversion capacity. Production of chemicals and FT products has 
been and continues to be the largest application, with 45 percent and 30 percent of the total 
capacity currently operating. Power production amounts to 19 percent of all installed and 
operating capacity. Currently, 32 percent of installed capacity is oil-based and 55 percent is 
coal-based. However, only 4 percent of the planned capacity will use oil as the primary feed-
stock. Instead, coal will strengthen its position and the use of natural gas will increases from 
8 to 16 percent, if all the currently planned capacity is realised by 2012. Seventy-five percent 
of the planned and currently operating capacity has been concentrated in four countries that 
are either rich in coal or off-grid gas: USA (27%), China (21%), South Africa (16%) and Qatar 
(11%). 
In total, there are 140 operating gasification plants and some 411 reactors in the world, with 
a total syngas output capacity of 54GWth. In addition, 31 plants with a total capacity of 
41GWth have been planned for coming online by 2012 (GASIF, 2007). The average size of a 
single gasification reactor is approximately 135MW. The average plant size varies 
significantly depending on which type of product produced. FT plants are considerably larger 
than both chemical and power plants. As mentioned above, there are only four FT plants 
operating in the world, three in South Africa and one in Malaysia. In total, these four plants 
use 103 gasifiers and the capacity of the plants range from 1,000MWth to 7,000MWth.
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There are 97 chemical plants currently operating with an average size of 250MWth. In 
comparison, there are currently 23 IGCC power plants operating with an average capacity of 
440MWth (GASIF, 2007). Plants that produce FT liquids are thus considerably more 
dependent on economies of scale to make their products competitive on the market. 
The capital goods sector supplying gasification technology is heavily concentrated in three 
actors, General Electric, Sasol Lurgi and Shell. Their combined market share increased from 
88 to 93 percent between 1999 and 2007. Roughly a dozen other technology suppliers 
provide gasifiers, but their combined share has been nearly halved over the same time 
period (GASIF, 2007).  Among the three main competitors, Shell was the smallest in 2007 but 
                                                      
61 The plant in Qatar will be the largest in the world and have a total thermal capacity of 11,000MWth. 
66 
 
was expected to experience the strongest growth in the near future, since it will supply 
gasification and downstream technology for the Pearl Qatar GtL project. In addition, in 2005 
Shell was reported to have signed another 12 contracts for coal gasification projects in China 
(Chhoa, 2005). As a result, it is expected to increase its market share from 28 percent in 
2007 to 45 percent by 2010, while Sasol Lurgi’s share is projected to decline from 34 to 25 
percent and GE’s from 31 to 24 percent.  
Of these major companies, it is only Sasol Lurgi that has some experience with processes 
dedicated for biomass and waste gasification. Shell and GE have, so far, only developed their 
gasification technologies for fossil fuels.62 Three of the actors with small market shares 
(TPS63, Foster Wheeler and Envirotherm) have experience in biomass or waste gasification, 
while the remaining actors primarily compete with the big three in coal gasification. Sasol 
Lurgi and Shell are also the only actors that have commercial experience with FT synthesis 
(GASIF, 2007).  
In conclusion, fossil gasification is a mature technology. It has proven to be both an 
attractive and versatile process through which virtually any carbon-based material can be 
turned into a valuable product such as chemicals, transportation fuels, town gas, and 
electricity. The market growth is, however, exclusively focused on fossil fuels, and the capital 
goods sectors supplying gasification technology have been heavily concentrated in three 
main actors. As of yet, these actors have shown very little interest in the gasification of 
renewable resources such as biomass and waste residues. The following section will outline 
the main technical challenges for realising such combinations. 
3.3 Technical challenges, past and potential markets of biomass gasification 
Given the debate on climate change, there has been a growing interest in developing 
alternative fuels using biomass as a feed-stock. To some extent, biomass gasification can 
draw upon the knowledge base of fossil fuel gasification.  
                                                      
62 However, Shell has demonstrated up to thirty percent biomass co-feeding in the Buggenum IGCC plant 
(Zwart, 2007). 
63 The company TPS has filed for bankruptcy and is no longer active.  
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However, the physical and chemical properties, as well as the availability and spatial 
concentration of biomass, are distinctly different from coal and oil. As such, fossil fuel 
gasification systems have been designed in such a way that they cannot be used for biomass 
gasification without major modifications of the entire system. For example, all fossil 
alternatives have considerably higher heating values and are chemically more homogenous, 
compared with the low heating value and chemically heterogeneous character of biomass. In 
addition, most coals can easily be ground into a fine powder or be made into a slurry and, 
just like oil or natural gas, can be easily fed into the gasification reactor at high pressures. In 
contrast, biomass consists of long wood fibres that are not well-suited to current reactor 
designs. The biomass resource is also different from fossil fuels in that it is geographically 
distributed, while fossil fuels can be found in large quantities in specific areas, making 
collection and distribution more efficient. The lower heating value of biomass also makes 
transportation of large volumes costly. However, this latter problem should not be over-
emphasised since there is a global trade of untreated biomass and it can be found processed 
in large quantities at paper mills. 
In order to turn biomass gasification into a commercially viable process for the production of 
chemicals, transportation fuels and electricity generation (IGCC), the development of the 
technology has progressed along three main trajectories (see Figure 3.3.1). To various 
extents, these trajectories draw upon existing knowledge of fossil gasification and biomass 
combustion. However, for the technology to succeed producers must also develop 
knowledge specific to the field of biomass gasification and the trajectory they have chosen 
. 
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Figure 3.3.1: Three trajectories toward biomass gasification (High Temperature (HT), Low Temperature (LT), Entrained Flow (EF), Fluidised Bed (FB), Fast 
Internal Circulating Fluidised Bed (FICFB))  
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The trajectory of Entrained Flow (EF) gasification draws primarily on technologies and 
competencies that have been developed for oil and coal gasification. The trajectory 
constitutes the ability to gasify biomass under high temperatures, high pressure and on a 
large-scale. The process results in a relatively clean syngas (consisting mainly of carbon 
monoxide and hydrogen), which after some modest downstream processing can be 
synthesised, based on existing coal technologies, into advanced chemicals or transportation 
fuels, or can be used to produce power in a combined steam and gas cycle (IGCC). In the case 
of biomass, the downstream processes can be more or less based on existing coal 
technologies.  
As previously mentioned, EF reactors were not developed for the physical or chemical 
properties of biomass, and as such it is necessary to develop a complementary pre-
treatment system. Such systems are currently not commercially available. A potential 
problem with the process is that high temperature gasification consumes more of the feed-
stock than low temperature gasification. As a result, the overall efficiency of the process may 
be lower, unless the syngas can be used for electricity production in a combined cycle. As 
illustrated in Chapter I, the efficiency of biomass conversion greatly influences the overall 
substitution potential of second-generation fuels. 
The two other trajectories originate from the field of combustion and operate at a lower 
temperature than EF gasification (<1000 degrees Celsius): pressurised fluidised bed (FB) and 
atmospheric fast internal circulating fluidised bed (FICFB).64 The pressurised FB system must 
be oxygen-blown, which significantly increases investment costs, and can be operated on a 
large-scale when the production of synthetic fuels is intended. For power production, an 
oxygen source is not necessary and the atmospheric process (FICFB) can possibly be 
operated on a smaller scale also without an external oxygen supply for the production of 
synthetic fuels. 
Since the fluidised bed technology has been extensively used for biomass combustion it is 
well-suited to the physical and chemical properties of biomass. Feeding biomass into the 
                                                      
64 This trajectory could also have been described as “steam gasification” to include the SilvaGas process from 
the US. However, the projects currently pursued in Europe are based on the FICFB technology developed in 
Austria (see Chapter V).   
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gasification reactor, therefore, poses no problem. However, these systems normally operate 
under atmospheric pressure and there is little experience with pressurised feeding 
systems.65 In addition, the gas is contaminated with varying levels of tars, alkaloids, 
hydrocarbons, benzene, nitrogen, toluene, and other contaminants. In less advanced 
applications for biomass gasification, such as co-firing with coal, gas purity requirements are 
moderate and the contaminants do not necessarily pose a problem. As the focus shifts to 
transportation fuels, an ultra clean gas is required of the same quality that is achieved from 
the high temperature route (Boerrigter and Rauch, 2006). As such, producing a 
transportation fuel means that a set of additional competencies related to the cleaning, and 
catalysis of the product gas is required. 
A basic gasification system can thus be divided and analysed based on sets of inter-related 
knowledge fields: (1) pre-treatment of the feed-stock, (2) the gasifier, (3) cleaning and 
conditioning of the raw gas, and (4) the application of the gas (see Figure 3.3.1). If 
gasification is to be successful, it is important to design the entire system as an integrated 
unit in which the inter-related knowledge fields are developed and applied, taking into 
careful consideration which type of biomass feed-stock is going to be used and the final 
product(s) of the process. Ultimately, it is the final application that determines the gas 
quality requirements.  
The different types of biomass resources available and the four inter-related knowledge 
fields in a biomass gasification process will now be described and analysed. The descriptions 
will be brief and describe only the most important inter-relationships. For more detailed 
descriptions of gasification see, for example, Knoef (2005) or Higman and van der Burgt 
(2008).  
3.3.1 Feed-stocks and pre-treatment 
The first part of the gasification system deals with the feed-stock and its eventual pre-
treatment before gasification. As a feed-stock, biomass resources are versatile in nature and 
                                                      
65 The experience from Värnamo in Sweden (Chapter VII) and Oulo, Finland (Chapter VIII) illustrates that it is 
possible.  
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consist of many different liquid, woody and non-woody resources, including wood and forest 
residues, black liquor, agricultural residues and waste streams (see Figure 3.3.1). 
Large volume residues are generated, for example, by the forestry and wood processing 
industries, in the form of thinnings, barks, roots, branches, and saw dust. The residues can 
easily be made into wood chips or pellets that are suitable for gasification.  
Another potentially important feed-stock suitable for gasification is black liquor, which is a 
by-product from the industrial process of chemically digesting pulpwood. Black liquor 
contains the inorganic chemicals used in the process but also half of the energy content of 
the wood fed into the digester, and can potentially become an important feed-stock for 
gasification.66 However, it is highly corrosive and involves very specific technical challenges 
for which a new type of reactor design has been developed (see Chapter VII). 
The above-mentioned biomass-based feed-stocks are, however, limited to a few countries 
with extensive forestry industries such as Sweden, Finland and Austria (Lehtinen et al., 
2004). For countries like Germany, agricultural residues such as straw and other types of 
non-woody biomass can potentially become important feed-stocks for gasification. 
Significant volumes of such residues are unused today, or have little economic value. 
However, straw has a very low energy density. It has been estimated to have in the range of 
only 13 to 33 percent the energy density of woody, solid types of biomass such as forest 
residues (Matsumura et al., 2005; Higman and van der Burgt, 2008). Straw’s low energy 
density makes it costly to transport.  
A third resource potential available for gasification in large quantities is various types of 
waste streams, commonly used for heat and electricity production. One such waste stream 
is referred to as refuse-derived fuel (RDF) and is produced by sorting, shredding, dehydrating 
and sometimes pelletising household and industrial waste. Depending on the actual content 
of the RDF and the legislative framework in different countries, these sources are classified 
as either a waste or a biomass resource. How they are classified is important for what type 
of incentive structures and regulations investors and plant operators have to comply with 
                                                      
66 The energy content removed from black liquor to make, for example, transportation fuels must be replaced 
elsewhere in a pulp and paper mill to keep the energy balance intact.  
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(Kivelä and Takala, 2009). For gasification, however, these types of fuel pose problems in 
terms of varying energy densities and the existence of different chemical compounds and 
metals that can be difficult for the gasification process to handle.  
A fourth and final type of biomass that could potentially be made available for the use of 
biomass gasification is various types of short rotation coppice (SRC) on unused farm land 
such as poplar and willow. This feed-stock poses similar challenges as other woody biomass 
fuels and is easily made into wood chips.67 Its overall biomass potential will be outlined in 
the subsequent section of this chapter. 
Depending on the type of gasification process used (EF or FB), the above-mentioned feed-
stocks need to undergo more or less pre-treatment before they can be fed into the gasifier. 
The most demanding type of gasifier in terms of specifications on the feed-stock is the 
entrained flow  reactor, since it can only handle slurries or powders with particle sizes of the 
order of magnitude of 500 μm (Higman and van der Burgt, 2008). 
It has been argued that traditional cutting and grinding of biomass to such small sizes is 
difficult and costly in terms of energy use (Knoef, 2005; Zwart et al., 2006b; Nordin, 2008). 
There are currently four main trajectories under development to solve this specific problem. 
The trajectories both complement each other and compete with each other, since some are 
better at processing one type of feed-stock than the other (although there are also 
overlaps). 
The first trajectory is based on existing experience with the large-scale grinding of biomass 
into a fine powder from the pulp and paper industry, which developed the technology during 
the 1970s. The technology is currently being further developed and tested in combination 
with EF gasification (Gebart, 2008; Persson, 2008; Energimyndigheten, 2009a).  
The second and third alternatives are torrefaction and fast pyrolysis, both of which are 
based on a mild thermal pre-treatment of the biomass. In torrefaction, biomass is heated to 
                                                      
67 In addition, peat can be harvested and used for biomass gasification in a few peat-rich countries such as 
Canada, USA, Finland, and Sweden (Spedding, 1988). However, since peat has often been described as “coal in 
the making” and is not replaced at the same rate at which it is used, there are genuine questions about whether 
peat should be counted as a renewable resource (Spedding, 1988; Schilstra, 2001). 
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a temperature in the range of 200-300 degrees Celsius, in the absence of oxygen. After such 
treatment it can―easily and at low energy costs―be turned into a coal-like powder with 
small particle sizes and still retain 83-97 percent of the energy in the fuel (Bergman et al., 
2005). Through fast pyrolysis, the biomass can be turned into a combustible liquid with high 
energy density―half of the energy density of oil but up to 10 times that of the original 
biomass. In the pyrolysis reaction, the biomass is decomposed to a liquid at a reaction 
temperature of 500 degrees Celsius, with a short vapour residence time (less than two 
seconds) and rapid cooling of the pyrolysis vapours to generate the slurry (Bridgwater et al., 
1999; Bridgwater, 2007).  
The fourth type of pre-treatment of the biomass currently under development in 
combination with an EF reactor is the use of fixed-bed gasification. The fixed-bed gasifier is 
used to heat the biomass to 400-500 degrees Celsius, at which point it is broken down into 
tar-rich volatiles and solid char before entering the EF reactor (Rudloff, 2008b). The fibrous 
structure of the biomass is destroyed in this process and the char can be milled 
conventionally.  
These types of pre-treatment systems have only been tested on a small-scale, and there is 
limited experience with integrating them in complete gasification systems. The systems can, 
therefore, not be considered commercially proven at this point. As a consequence, there is a 
lack of specialised suppliers for the above-mentioned technologies. The emergence of such 
suppliers is, however, essential for the emergence of an industry with a capacity for realising 
the potential of biomass gasification.  
3.3.2 Reactor processes and designs 
Fluidised bed (FB) and entrained flow (EF) are the two main reactor designs considered for 
the production of alternative fuels. The basics of these two processes will now be outlined 
(see Figure 3.3.1). 
The basic principle of the FB is that the gasifying agent, which can be steam, air or oxygen, 
enters the bottom of the gasifier at a velocity of 2-10 m/s and at a low temperature (<1,000 
degrees Celsius) (see Figure 3.3.2). The process is also referred to as low temperature 
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gasification. As noted earlier, the lower temperature increases the contamination of the gas, 
particularly through the higher concentration of tars, but also with CO2, H2O, CxHy aliphatic 
hydrocarbons, benzene, and toluene (Boerrigter et al., 2005). Even if the higher 
concentration of tars is measured in as little as tens of grams per cubic metre of gas, 
together with other contaminants they pose a problem in the gas cleaning and conditioning 
processes if the gas has to be upgraded to a syngas and used for advanced applications.  
In the fluidisation process, the velocity of the entering agent is adjusted so that the fuel, in 
combination with a bed material (usually sand), becomes suspended over the bottom of the 
gasifier. In this suspended state the fuel behaves as a fluid, hence the name fluidised bed. 
There are two basic types of fluidised bed gasifiers: bubbling fluidised bed (BFB) and 
circulating fluidised bed (CFB) (see Figure 3.2.2). 
In the BFB, the oxidant enters the bottom of the gasifier through a bed of sand. The speed of 
the oxidant is important since it influences the size and speed of the bubbles which, in turn, 
influence the mixing and heat exchange between the fuel particles (Olofsson et al., 2005). 
The raw gas exits at the top of the gasifier through a cyclone that separates sand and fly ash 
from the raw gas. The same basic principle is applied in the CFB, with the difference being 
that the oxidant enters through the bottom of the bed at a higher velocity. This higher 
velocity reduces the bubbling character of the bed and creates more flying sand and feed-
stock, which in turn allows for greater mixing. The fly ash, sand and particles captured in the 
cyclone are, therefore, circulated to the gasifier at much greater quantities than in the BFB.  
Figure 3.3.2: Schematics of a bubbling and a circulating fluidised bed. Source: Olofsson et al. (2005). 
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In the fluidised bed process, heat can be supplied to the gasification process either directly 
or indirectly. During direct gasification, part of the feed-stock is combusted to provide the 
necessary amount of heat. This is the most commonly used approach: an alternative is to 
transfer the heat from an external source, such as steam, through the gasification agents. 
This process is called indirect gasification, or the fast internal circulating fluidised bed 
process (FICFB). It operates at atmospheric pressure and the design eliminates the levels of 
nitrogen in the product gas, increases the amount of methane68 and, thus, also the energy 
content.69 It is an alternative design that excludes oxygen as a gasification agent for 
advanced applications, reducing the cost of construction and operation. 
The two fluidised processes mentioned above are well adapted to the physical and chemical 
properties of various types of biomass and advanced pre-treatment is generally not 
necessary. However, pressurising the feed-stock may pose a challenge depending on its 
target application.70 There has been some experience with various designs of lock-hopper 
and screw-based systems, which have achieved pressure of between 10 and 20 bars 
(Blackadder et al., 1992; Sydkraft, 1997, 2000; Salo, 2008).  
The other type of reactor is the Entrained Flow (EF) gasifier. In the EF gasifier, fuel in the 
form of slurry or pneumatically transported fine particles is injected into the top of the 
gasifier, normally at high pressure (see Figure 3.3.3). The feed-stock is mixed with oxygen 
                                                      
68 The high content of methane in the gas makes the FICFB process attractive for SNG production, which unlike 
most other synthesis processes can be operated at atmospheric pressure (Zwart et al., 2006a; Hofbauer, 2007). 
69 Depending on the desired application, the gasification agent can be either steam in a combination with oxygen 
or air. If air is used, the amount of nitrogen in the gas increases and it cannot be used in synthesis applications 
such as for Fischer-Tropsch diesel, methanol, DME or SNG. Using pure oxygen enhances gas quality, 
eliminating the nitrogen component, but oxygen is costly to produce. 
70 The gasification process can be performed under different pressures ranging from 1-80 bars. Pressurising the 
feed-stocks before injecting the gasifier has several benefits. Firstly, with increased pressure, the size of the plant 
(number of MW) can be increased in relation to the amount of material that is needed to construct it. The 
benefits of compact design are reached at a maximum of 15-25 bars of pressure. With higher pressure, little 
additional reduction of plant size in relation to costs can be achieved (Higman and van der Burgt 2003 p.17). It 
may, however, be beneficial to pressurise the feed-stock even further since it uses significantly less energy than 
pressurising the gas exiting the gasifier. The optimal gasification pressure also depends on which gas cleaning, 
conditioning and final application the plant is optimised for. For example, the synthesis process for producing 
DME, Methanol or FT diesel requires the gas to be at a pressure of about 60 bars. Ammonia synthesis requires a 
pressure of about 200 bars. Gasturbines run at 20-40 bars of pressure (Higman and van der Burgt 2003 p. 17-18). 
For other applications such as SNG production, it has been argued that the methane synthesis can operate at 
atmospheric pressure and pressurised gasifier may therefore be a disadvantage (Hofbauer 2007) (see Chapter V). 
However, it still needs to be proven, since the only currently operating SNG plant in North Dakota operates at 
high pressure (Higman, 2010).  
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and steam and converted in a turbulent flame. The reactor operates at high temperature 
(>1,200 degrees Celsius) and with a very short reaction time of less than ten seconds. The 
high temperature gasification results in a gas that primarily contains the two combustible 
components hydrogen (H2) and carbon monoxide (CO), as well as low levels of tars, nitrogen 
or other contaminants. Since it operates at a very high temperature, a lot of sensible heat71 
is produced. This heat needs to be used in power applications if the efficiency of the process 
is not to be decreased (Higman and van der Burgt, 2003).  
Figure 3.3.3: The GSP and Chemrec entrained flow reactors. Source: Siemens and Chemrec. 
 
So far, only two types of EF reactors have been tested with biomass-based feed-stocks 
(however, see also FZK/Lurgi in Chapter VI). The first reactor, called GSP, was specially 
developed and designed for the corrosive type of lignite available in the eastern part of 
Germany, a corrosive character that it shares with the bioslurries produced through fast 
pyrolysis. The reactor is equipped with a screen that protects it from the extensive corrosion 
that would otherwise occur. Extensive pilot tests based on the GSP have been undertaken 
                                                      
71 The quantity or magnitude of sensible heat is the product of the body’s mass, its specific heat capacity and its 
temperature above a reference temperature. 
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with various type of pre-treated biomass, but the entire chain from feed-stock to end 
product has so far not been demonstrated.  
The Swedish company Chemrec has developed a reactor with a ceramic lining that is 
specially designed to withstand the extremely corrosive character of black liquor. Both types 
of gasifiers can be operated under high pressure and should be able to be integrated with 
the standard downstream process developed for commercial fossil gasification, even if this 
has not yet been demonstrated on a large-scale. 
In conclusion, compared to fluidised beds, EF gasifiers produce a superior quality of gas in 
terms of the amount of tars and contaminants within. However, with the exception of black 
liquor gasification, there are no commercial pre-treatment systems available. In addition, 
they consume more energy and the efficiency can therefore be hampered if the gas is used 
for producing synthetic fuels. The fluidised bed gasifiers have, on the other hand, more 
contaminants in the gas but also a higher usable heating value. The higher methane content 
in the gas makes it suitable for SNG and electricity applications. The gasifier is easy to feed at 
atmospheric pressure with a wide variety of biomass feeds. The down-side of fluidised bed 
gasifiers is that gas cleaning can become costly and pressurising the feed-stock is difficult. 
The basic problems of gas cleaning will now be expanded on. 
3.3.3 Cleaning and conditioning of the raw gas 
The raw gas from all type of gasifiers needs to be cleaned and conditioned before it is used 
in any type of application (see Figure 3.3.1). The process involves getting rid of impurities 
such as tars, particles, halogens, alkali metals, S-compounds, N-compounds, heavy metals, 
and calcium, processing to adjust the H2/CO ratio, reforming methane (except for SNG 
application) and, in some cases, reducing the fraction of CO2 (Olofsson et al., 2005). As 
already mentioned, gas cleaning associated with high temperature gasification is a relatively 
straight-forward process and commercial technologies are available on an industrial scale.72 
This section focuses on the problems associated with low temperature gasification for 
                                                      
72 For an overview of the commercially available techniques and processes that are used for cleaning the raw gas 
from high temperature gasification, see Higman and van der Burgt (2008). 
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advanced applications such as FT liquids, methanol, DME, SNG synthesis and, perhaps to a 
lesser extent, IGCC.  
The technologies used for tar removal can be divided into two categories: primary and 
secondary methods (Devi et al., 2003). Primary methods deal with lowering the tar content 
of the gas exiting the gasifier through the proper selection of operating parameters, the use 
of bed additives/catalysts and gasifier modifications. According to Devi et al. (2003), it is 
possible to reduce the dependency on downstream cleaning with primary methods, which 
still can be developed further.  
All gasification processes for advanced applications use extensive downstream, secondary 
cleaning methods. These methods consist of the physical removal of tars with wet scrubbers, 
electrostatic precipitators, barrier filters, and cyclones, as well as the catalytic or thermal 
destruction of tars (Devi et al., 2003; Iversen and Gøbel, 2005). The secondary methods can 
be applied successfully to clean the gas of tars, but the cost of gas cleaning increases with 
the number of secondary methods that are used.  
The low temperature gasification projects analysed in this thesis (an overview of the project 
will be provided in Chapter 3.4) use both primary and secondary methods to produce a clean 
gas from low temperature gasification for advanced applications. One such project is the 
Güssing plant in Austria where a clean synthesis gas has been produced from an indirect, low 
temperature, atmospheric fluidised bed gasifier. Through synthesis the gas has been 
converted to SNG and FT diesel. It has also been tested to run a fuel cell (Aichernig et al., 
2004; Hofbauer, 2007).  
Although the production of a synthesis gas can be accomplished on the scale of a pilot or in a 
small demonstration plant, this does not imply that the processes can easily be replicated on 
a larger scale. When the biosyngas from low temperature gasification is intended for 
synthesis applications, the integrated process, which includes gas cleaning and synthesising, 
has not been proven on a commercial-scale. Some of the projects studied in this thesis 
attempt to solve this problem by experimenting with a range of methods for both improving 
gas quality and adopting conventional synthesis technologies. Various technology suppliers 
may exist for some of the individual components needed. However, a much larger problem 
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is that there are currently no suppliers with industrial experience in combining the necessary 
cleaning systems for low temperature gasification with the required synthesis technologies. 
3.3.4 Past and potential applications for biomass gasification73 
Syngas from biomass can potentially provide value in the same type of applications as syngas 
derived from fossil fuels. However, the technology can only be considered ready for use in a 
few less advanced applications and perhaps even in fewer where it currently makes 
economical sense. 
Biomass gasification can be seen as a stand-alone process, but the product gas or syngas 
derived from biomass could also be co-fired in combination with gas from fossil resources in 
some of the applications. In such an application, renewable and fossil-based feed-stocks can 
be mixed prior to gasification, or the gases can be mixed following the gasification but 
consumed in an application. The amount of gas cleaning is determined by the requirements 
of the end-application. As the gas requirement becomes increasingly strict, the application 
becomes more advanced. This section presents the existing co-firing and stand-alone 
applications. Their actual market potential will be presented in the subsequent section.  
Boiler, Cement and Lime Kilns 
The least advanced use of the product gas from biomass gasification is to fire it in a boiler or 
in a kiln used in the cement or pulp and paper industry. The kiln application was developed 
for oil substitution in the early-1980s largely by two major and competing technology 
suppliers to the pulp and paper industry: Götaverken from Sweden and Ahlström from 
Finland. In total, eight plants were installed between 1983 and 1987, and most of them are 
still in operation (see Table 3.3.1).  
                                                      
73 “In order to create an overview of all capital goods suppliers and applications for biomass gasification, a 
database was constructed, including the major pilot, demonstration and commercial gasification plants that had 
been constructed or were commenced between 1970 and 2007. The database was compiled from data made 
available in various publications and online databases. The main data sources were IEA task 33: Thermal 
Gasification of Biomass - Babu (1995, 2005, 2006) and IEA (2001). Additional data came from GASIF (2004), 
Knoef (2005), Kurkela (1989, 2002), Palonen (2006), Larson et al. (2003; 2006), Olofsson et al. (2005), Marbe 
(2005), and the online database: gasifiers.org. As a result, a relatively comprehensive database with 123 entries 
could be constructed with what is believed to be the major plants aimed for technology development and 
commercial operation that have been constructed in the world. It also includes a large number of fixed bed 
gasifiers excluded from this study, as well as small pilot plants. However, the data is obviously skewed towards 
Europe and USA, since almost all data has been published by European and American authors with a focus on 
their contexts” (see Chapter IV). The entries concerning the main biomass gasification demonstrations and 
commercial projects are presented in Tables 3.3.1-3.3.5 and Figure 3.3.4. 
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Table 3.3.1: CFB lime kiln gasifiers. 
Located in   Supplier Operational MWth 
Pietarsaari Finland Ahlstrom/FW 1983 34 
Jakobstad Finland Ahlstrom/FW 1983 35 
Norrsundet Sweden Ahlstrom/FW 1985 25 
Pöls Austria Lurgi 1985 27 
Iberian Peninsula Portugal Ahlstrom/FW 1986 17 
Karlsborg Sweden Ahlstrom/FW 1986 27 
Rodao Portugal Ahlstrom/FW 1986 15 
Värö Sweden Götaverken/Metso 1987 30 
Rüdersdorf Germany Lurgi 1996 100 
 
However, after the oil crises ended in 1986, interest in oil substitution disappeared. Since 
then, only one additional plant was built, by Lurgi in 1996 (Hofbauer and Knoef, 2005). The 
technology can be considered commercial and profitable at an oil price of approximately 
$70-80 per barrel (2009) (Saarivirta, 2008; Isaksson, 2009).  
Boiler and Co-fire 
One step up the scale towards increasingly advanced applications involves firing the gas in a 
boiler for heat and electricity production. If the gas undergoes some cleaning before 
entering the boiler, it is possible to produce energy at higher steam temperatures and 
pressure values. This will result in higher electrical efficiency than in units based on direct 
combustion technologies (Palonen et al., 2006). The increased electrical efficiency compared 
to combustion is, however, modest unless it involves more difficult fuels such as RDF and 
household waste; the alternative process is waste incineration.  
So far, two stand-alone plants have been built, one in Varkaus, Finland by Foster Wheeler, 
and the other in Chinati, Italy by TPS. The plant in Finland operates on industrial waste 
containing polyethylene plastics and aluminum, which would be very difficult to incinerate 
using conventional technology (Palonen et al., 2006). The plant in Italy operates on 
pelletised RDF, containing 60 percent paper and 40 percent plastics (Knoef, 2005). 
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Table 3.3.2: Boiler, stand alone and co-fire gasifiers. 
Located in Supplier Operational MWth 
Greve, Chinati Italy TPS 1992/1998 30 
Varkaus Finland Foster Wheeler 2000 40 
Lahti Finland Foster Wheeler 1998 60 
Geertruidenberg Netherlands Lurgi 2000 85 
Ruien Belgium Foster Wheeler 2002 50 
 
An additional three plants of this type have been built, but with co-firing of coal (see Table 
3.3.2). In the co-firing application, the product gas is cleaned before entering a coal-fired 
boiler where it is co-combusted. It is a potentially attractive application since existing coal 
plants can be complemented with a gasification unit and decrease their CO2 emissions 
without the cost of completely new infrastructure (Hansson, 2009). Today, these types of 
plants can be constructed on a large-scale, commercial basis, but interest in the technology 
from customers has been modest (Palonen, 2008). Recently, there has been renewed 
interest in the technology based on waste gasification; in 2009 Metso Power was awarded 
two large contracts, in Lathi and Västerås, worth €150-200 million (Metso, 2009; 
MälarEnergi, 2009). If constructed, the waste gasification plant in Västerås will be the largest 
ever built, with a thermal fuel capacity of 200MW.74 
Combined heat and power (CHP) with gas engine 
A technically successful application for biomass gasification is combined electricity and heat 
production (CHP) with a gas engine. The application has been considered to be suitable 
when connected to a small- to medium-scale district heating system, where conventional 
combustion plants have considerably lower electrical efficiency.   
Each gas engine has a size of approximately 1.5MWth and can be connected into a series for 
increased capacity. They can normally handle different types of gas qualities and reasonable 
amount of contaminants. However, some specifications are stricter if an engine exhaust 
catalyst is used (Iversen and Gøbel, 2005). 
 
                                                      
74 The project was, however, discontinued in February 2010 (MälarEnergi, 2010).  
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Table 3.3.3: Combined heat and power generation with gas engine. 
Located in    Supplier Operational MWth 
Güssing Austria Repotec 2002 8 
Skive Denmark Carbona 2008 28 
Oberwart Austria Ortner 2009 10 
 
So far, only three plants have been constructed (see Table 3.3.3) and it has been argued that 
the price of electricity, in light of the additional investment costs, reduced availability of the 
plant and the increased cost of raw material for gasification over combustion, makes most of 
these plants uneconomical at the moment (Bolhàr-Nordenkampf 2007). Nevertheless, in 
Germany and other countries that have adopted special support schemes for biomass 
electricity, there are added incentives for innovative biomass-based technologies, which 
motivates further investment in the technology. Although no plants have yet been 
constructed in Germany there are several currently being negotiated (Aichernig, 2007; Vitek 
and Sommer, 2008).  
Biomass integrated gasifier combined cycle, BIGCC and co-fire 
The next step up in complexity is the Biomass Integrated Gasifier Combined Cycle (BIGCC) for 
combined heat and power production. The benefit of the combined cycle over a gas engine 
is that larger plants can be constructed with even higher electrical efficiency.  
Several attempts were made to demonstrate the technology between 1991 and 2003, but 
they have all more or less failed (see Table 3.3.4). The most successful attempt was in 
Värnamo, Sweden, where a fully integrated BIGCC was demonstrated and was operational 
between 1993 and 1999 for a total of 8,500 hours based on various biomass feed-stocks. The 
plant was operated by Sydkraft (now owned by E.ON) with pressurised CFB technology from 
Foster Wheeler. The demonstration was completed in 1999 and the plant was then 
decommissioned.  
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Table 3.3.4: Biomass Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle for combined heat and power 
production.  
Located in    Supplier Commissioned MWth 
Arbre, Yorkshire United Kingdom TPS 2003 30 
Värnamo Sweden Foster Wheeler 1993 18 
Tampere Finland IGT/Carbona 1991 20 
Hawaii United States Renugas 1994 20 
 
With a pressurised gasification reactor a BIGCC plant could, in principle, have a capacity of 
several hundred MWth. The average size of the 23 currently operating coal-based IGCC is 
440MWth, and they have an electrical efficiency in the range of 38 to 43 percent (GASIF, 
2007; Higman and van der Burgt, 2008). For biomass, plant size would be limited by the 
amount of available biomass and the size of the district heating (DH) systems. There are few 
DH systems capable of receiving hundreds of megawatts of heat.  
Further technology development is required to commercialise the application, particularly 
with regard to turbine designs. Gas turbines with high efficiency and low NOx emissions are 
developed either for coal-based syngas or natural gas. The biomass-based product gas has a 
lower calorific value than coal-based syngas and entirely different gas properties than 
natural gas (which mainly contains methane). With some development efforts it would 
probably be possible to redesign the burners for coal-based syngas to be used with syngas 
from biomass (Horazak, 2007a). In addition, the turbines would have to operate at a lower 
inlet temperature and pressure, which would increase the investment cost and lower the 
operational efficiency of such a plant compared to a combined cycle running on natural gas 
or a coal-based IGCC (Rodrigues et al., 2003). 
Co-firing has been proposed as a solution to these technical problems. One type of co-fire 
system has already been demonstrated on a commercial-scale by the plant operator Nuon in 
Buggenum, the Netherlands. In this plant, coal and biomass is mixed and fed into a standard 
Shell EF gasifier. The plant has a 600MW thermal input and is co-fired with up to 34 percent 
thermal input of biomass (Zwart, 2007). It is not included in Table 3.3.4 since it is based on 
conventional coal gasification technology without any modification and has thus been 
excluded from the study.  
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A second type of co-fire application is discussed in Rodrigues et al. (2003) and Marbe (2005), 
but has never been demonstrated. They argue that it is possible to mix 28-50 percent natural 
gas with biomass-based product gas in an NGCC (Natural Gas Combined Cycle) without any 
major changes in turbine design or significant losses in efficiency.  
Industry representatives disagree, however, and argue that only three percent of product 
gas can be used without modifications (Nyström et al., 2007).75 This co-fire application 
appears to be promising for extending the design space towards realising BIGCC. However, 
as long as there are no actors making serious attempt to develop the technology, it is 
difficult to assess what the “minor” modifications suggested by Rodrigues et al. (2003), 
Marbe (2005) and Horazak (2007a) may actually be comprised of.  
Chemicals and Transportation Fuels 
Since the establishment of the EU directive on renewable fuels (EC, 2003), there has been 
renewed industrial interest in producing chemicals and alternative fuels from biomass.  Past 
experience of biomass gasification for synthesising various chemicals and transportation 
fuels is, however, quite limited. There have been a few entrepreneurial experiments on a 
laboratory- and pilot-scale, based on both low and high temperature gasification.  
In terms of industrial experience, no dedicated systems for biomass gasification for the 
production of second-generation fuels have been made operational. However, some lessons 
could probably be drawn from two major projects based on high temperature gasification 
using standard coal technologies. The first is an ammonia plant in Oulo, Finland based on 
peat, and the other is in Germany (Schwarze Pumpe), where methanol and power was 
produced from household and industrial waste from fossil resources. The peat used in Oulo 
and the waste at Schwarze Pumpe should not be seen as a renewable resource such as 
biomass, but they share some of the problematic physical and chemical properties that also 
have to be addressed for biomass gasification.  
                                                      
75 The standard NG burners are, however, dry low NOx burners that are exclusively designed for natural gas. 
The issue is that dry low NOx burners are pre-mix burners and the syngas from whatever source contains 
hydrogen.  The danger is that hydrogen under these conditions could pre-ignite (auto-ignition), causing at best 
overheating and damage to the burner. Industry’s reluctance is therefore understandable (Higman, 2010). 
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The plant in Oulo, Finland was converted from oil at the end of the second oil crisis, and 
operated based on peat for a total of 258 days before it was shut down when the oil price 
dropped again (Koljonen et al., 1993). The plant had a thermal capacity of 80MWth, operated 
at 10 bars of pressure and was based on the High Temperature Winkler, which is a coal 
technology supplied by the German capital goods manufacturer and engineering firm Uhde 
(see Chapter VIII).  Schwarze Pumpe (SVZ) has a long history of coal gasification in the DDR 
but was converted to a facility for methanol and power production based on a mixture of 
processed coal and waste in 1996.  
The technology originally used at SVZ was the GSP gasifier developed at the former 
Deutscher Brennstoff Institut (German Combustion Institute), which now is owned by 
Siemens, as well as fixed bed coal gasifiers for production of town gas (see Chapter VI). In 
2000, a coal gasification technology called British Gas Lurgi (BGL), now owned by 
Envirotherm, was also installed to handle solid waste and coal together with the existing 
fixed bed gasifiers. The GSP technology was modified for handling oil slurries, pastes, fuel 
mixtures from tar, and sewage sludge. All operations at Schwarze Pumpe have been shut 
down since 2008 due to poor economics of the operation (Knoef, 2005; Picard, 2008b).  
There are currently at least nine major projects within the European Union attempting to 
realise both high and low temperature biomass gasification along the three technological 
trajectories described above. These projects and their alliances will be described in Section 
3.4. They draw on previous experience with biomass gasification for less advanced 
applications such as for lime kilns, boilers and co-fire, as well as from lessons from the 
previous attempts to realise BIGCC and the limited experience from Oulo and SVZ. 
86 
 
Figure 3.3.4: Accumulated experience in biomass gasification in terms of number of projects and MW 
installed capacity. Not all projects have been successful. Source: Tables 3.3.1-3.3.4.  
 
In total, 24 biomass gasification plants have been constructed and supplied by ten major 
actors from four countries (Sweden, Finland, Germany and Austria) (see Figure 3.3.4 and 
Table 3.3.5). If future development draws on past experience, these ten actors would 
naturally be at the centre of any future development projects. However, their past 
experience will not be sufficient for developing future advanced applications for biomass 
gasification. In addition to existing knowledge, new advanced pre-treatment systems will 
have to be developed for high temperature gasification. The development of such pre-
treatment systems may, in addition to feeding the gasifier, enable a global trade in low 
energy density biomass-based materials such as straw. For low temperature gasification, the 
challenge consists of developing efficient gas cleaning systems and adopting existing 
synthesis process (and eventually also gas turbines) to the low temperature biomass-derived 
synthesis gas. Hence, the catalyst developers would also have to take part in the 
development projects with their specialist competencies. There are potentially many 
suppliers of catalysts for methanol and DME synthesis who could take part in such a 
development, while there are only two suppliers of catalysts with industrial experience in FT 
synthesis (Sasol and Shell) (GASIF, 2007). 
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Table 3.3.5: Firms with some to extensive experience in biomass gasification, installed MW and 
number of projects. Source: Tables 3.3.1-3.3.4. 
Experienced firms Plants MW 
Foster Wheeler 10 321 
Lurgi 4 212 
TPS 2 60 
Carbona 2 48 
Uhde 1 80 
Metso 1 30 
Ortner 1 10 
Repotec 1 8 
Siemens 1 - 
Envirotherm 1 - 
Total 24 769 
 
Hence, even if biomass gasification can draw upon the existing and fossil-based design 
space, there remain great technical challenges to realising more advanced applications. In 
order to successfully do so, new knowledge must be developed and combined with existing 
knowledge on fully integrated systems. The following section will outline the strategic 
alliances that have been formed to overcome this challenge along the three technological 
trajectories outlined.    
3.4 Biomass gasification alliances in Europe and competing alternatives 
This part is divided into three sections. The first section outlines the main projects and 
alliances for realising biomass gasification in Europe. Each project will be presented with a 
brief overview of which trajectory they have chosen, the alliance of organisations involved in 
its development, which development stage the project is at, and its demand for capital 
resources during the construction of the first pilot, demonstration and semi-commercial 
plants. The following two sections will outline the main arguments for the desirability of 
realising a market for second-generation fuels.  
3.4.1 Major projects and alliances 
The development of second-generation fuels and other chemicals is manifested through the 
construction of various demonstration plants. These projects are pursued by various types of 
organisations acting in different alliances. 
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These alliances include capital goods suppliers and catalyst developers for the coal and petro 
chemical-industry, pulp and paper firms, energy utilities, and equipment manufacturers from 
the transport sector. In addition, we find actors such as integrated gas and electrical utilities, 
refineries and fuel distributors, but also firms from the agricultural and forestry industries 
that handle large quantities of feed-stock. For some of these actors, the technology may be 
integrated into its existing operations, such as in the case of pulp and paper mills. These 
possibilities also exist for refineries, first-generation biofuels production facilities, and in 
district heating networks. In addition, the various alliances also include universities and 
institutes. 
These alliances each focus on one of the three trajectories outlined in the previous section 
(EF, FB or FICFB) and a set of pilot, demonstration and semi-commercial plants have been 
built to advance the technology towards commercialisation for various applications, all of 
which can be classified as second-generation fuels. Nine of these alliances are found in 
Figure 3.4.1, and they will now be briefly described. 
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Figure 3.4.1: Major alliances for the production of second-generation fuels in Europe. Not all partners in the alliances are mentioned in the figure. 
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Figure 3.4.2: From the upper left-hand corner: The BioDME processing unit of Chemrec’s 
demonstration plant in Piteå and a close-up of black liquor (Photo: Chemrec); the tower of FZK bioliq 
pilot plant in Karlsruhe (Photo: FZK); Choren’s demonstration plant in Freiberg and a close-up of one 
of its biomass pre-treatment units (Photo: Choren).  
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Figure 3.4.3 From the upper left-hand corner: A close-up on Chalmer’s FICFB gasifier (Photo: Henrik 
Thunman); a close-up of the pilot-scale gasification unit at VTT (Photo: VTT); the BIGCC 
demonstration plant in Värnamo (Photo: VVBGC); the commercially operating FICFB plant and 
demonstration facility in Güssing (Photo: Biomasse Kraftwerk Güssing).  
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In Austria (see Chapter V), the Technical University of Vienna and the engineering firm 
Repotec76 developed the FICFB technology at the Güssing plant with, foremost, Conzepte 
Technik Umwelt (CTU) and the Paul Scherrer Institute from Switzerland77 for the poly-
generation of BioSNG, electricity and heat. The demonstration plant in Güssing is an 8MWth 
gasification plant, in which 1MW gas is converted to BioSNG. The plant has been in 
operation since 2002 for heat and electricity, and the synthesis unit started to produce 
BioSNG in autumn 2009. The cost of constructing the facility was approximately €10 million, 
not including the synthesis plant (Hofbauer, 2007). The Austrian-Swiss alliance is currently 
seeking partnerships with capital goods suppliers for the construction of semi-commercial 
and commercial-scale plants in Europe (Hellsmark and Jacobsson, 2009). The technology is 
also being further developed in both Germany and Sweden. Since economies of scale for 
SNG production can be reached even in a relatively small plant, a typical future plant has 
been set at 100MWth. The investment cost for such a plant is approximately €150 million. 
The cost of BioSNG has been estimated to be approximately €0.7 per litre diesel equivalent 
(lde) (see Table 3.4.1) (Thunman et al., 2008). 
In Germany (see Chapter VI) two alliances have been formed with actors in the chemical, oil, 
coal and automotive industries, and a third is based on the FICFB technology developed in 
Austria. The first alliance was initiated by Choren, which is a start-up company from Freiberg. 
It has been developing the GSP gasifier for biomass gasification since the early-1990s and 
has formed an alliance with Daimler, Volkswagen and Shell for the construction of a fully 
integrated BtL demonstration facility, including FT synthesis technology supplied by Shell. If 
the plant can be made operational it will have an annual production capacity of 15,000 
tonnes of fuel. The construction cost of the plant was over €100 million and it was 
inaugurated in April 2008. As of November 2009, the plant was not in operation and Shell 
had decided to sell its shares to the remaining shareholders in the company (Choren, 2009). 
When the demonstration is validated, Choren plans to move on to construct a commercial-
scale demonstration facility with a production capacity of 200,000 tonnes of FT diesel. The 
                                                      
76 Repotec is a spin-off company from the capital goods supplier Austrian Energy & Environment. 
77 Many other partners have been involved in the technology development, but it appears as if it is the 
commercial actors Repotec and CTU who will appropriate on the technology development. 
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estimated cost for such a plant is €800 million and the cost of the fuel will be in the range of 
€0.8-1.2/lde (see Tables 3.4.1) (Seyfried, 2008b).  
Table 3.4.1 Estimates of cost and time plan for the major development projects. 
Sources: Representatives from the different projects, as well as (Atrax Energi, 2002; Zwart et al., 
2006a; Zwart et al., 2006b; Leible et al., 2007; Zwart, 2007; McKeough and Kurkela, 2008; RENEW, 
2008; Thunman et al., 2008).78 
 
The research institute Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe (FZK) has been the principal actor in the 
second alliance, in which they are attempting to develop a distributed solution for the 
gasification of agricultural residues. The idea is for the residues to be collected and turned 
into a slurry through fast pyrolysis, which is then transported from multiple locations to a 
single site for large-scale gasification with a high temperature EF reactor similar to the GSP 
marketed by Siemens and Choren. The demonstration of the technology is being pursued in 
collaboration with Lurgi, Volkswagen and Südchemie, but in the end Lurgi will be the sole 
owner of the complete process. The goal is to produce methanol that can then be turned 
into diesel, gasoline and other chemical products. In this project, the complete chain will be 
demonstrated separately and not in an integrated facility.  
The demonstration facility for slurry production was inaugurated in 2008, and the advocates 
of the project hope to demonstrate the remaining steps before 2012, at a cost of 
approximately €60-80 million.79 The cost of producing FT diesel from a very large 
commercial-scale facility with a capacity of 1.16 million tonnes has been estimated at 
approximately €1.0/lde (Leible et al., 2007). Large plants are attractive since FT synthesis 
                                                      
78 The intentions and time frames of the representatives of the different projects change quite frequently and the 
figures in Table 11.1 are often updated.  
79 This is the author’s estimate. 
Cost
Year Cost (M€) Year Size Cost (M€) Year Size Cost (M€) Year Size Cost (M€) €/lde
TU-Vienna/Repotec 1995 2002 8+1MW 10 2013 160GWh 75 2015< 0.07Mtoe 150 0,7
Chalmers/Metso 2008 1.1 2008 6MW 1.1 2015< 0.07Mtoe 150 0,7
ZSW/EVF 2002 2.4 2010 10MW 18 2013< 10MW 2015< 0.07Mtoe 150 0,7
Chemrec 2005 7 2010 5MW/1.5kt 28 2012/13 0.1Mtoe 300 2015< 0.2Mtoe 400 0,5
Värnamo 18MW 45 2015< 0.2Mtoe 400 0,7
Carbona/UPM 2005 10 2011/12 0.2Mtoe 400 2015< 0.2Mtoe 500 0,5
FW/SE/Nesté 2009 12/5MW 40 2011/12 0.1Mtoe 400 2015< 0.2Mtoe 500 0,5
Choren 1998 NA 2008 45MW/15kt 100 2015< 0.2Mtoe 800 0,85
FZK/Lurgi 2005 2008 5MW 4 2011 5MW 70 2015< 0.2Mtoe 900 1
Total 245 1245 1.41Mtoe 3950
Pilot Pre-Commercial Demo Commercial demoDemo
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benefits greatly from economies of scale. The production cost could eventually be decreased 
to approximately €0.55/lde if plants in the range of 8GWth are built (Zwart et al., 2006b; 
Zwart, 2007). On the other hand, if plants of the size of the Choren technology would be 
built (0.2 million tonnes), production cost would be as high as €1.8/lde (RENEW, 2008). This 
type of plant is a possible intermediate step before the large-scale plants can be 
constructed, and through integration with, for example, the production of first-generation 
fuels, the production cost of the fuel could be reduced (Zwiefelhofer, 2007; Berger, 2008). 
The investment cost of a similar but smaller plant would still be around €900 million 
(RENEW, 2008), but a good estimate of the production cost of the fuel has not been made 
official. It would, however, be less than 1.8€/lde but more than €0.5/lde previously 
mentioned. Hence, even if not verified in the literature, a production cost of €1/lde is used as 
a reference in Table 3.4.1.  
The Repotec/Güssing FICFB technology has served as the basis for a third German alliance. 
The ZSW institute in Baden-Württemberg is seeking to further develop the technology for 
BioSNG production and has formed an alliance with a consortium consisting of more than 10 
actors. They began elaborating with CO2-absorbing bed materials for increasing the yield of 
hydrogen in the product gas. The attempts were carried out at the Güssing facility and 
received funding of approximately €2.4 million through the EU projects “AER-Gas I” and 
“AER-Gas II”. In the next phase, ZSW and their allies will build a commercial-scale research 
and development facility for electricity production in the town of Göppingen. Through the 
EEG Act, which guarantees a fixed price for the electricity that is produced, the plant will 
carry its own operating costs and become a research facility for developing the process of 
BioSNG synthesis.  
In Sweden (see Chapter VII) there are currently three alliances for realising biomass 
gasification for the production of transport fuels and chemicals. The first centres on FB 
gasification for the production of synthetic fuels based on the former BIGCC plant in 
Värnamo. The cost of reconstructing the 18MWth facility has been estimated as 
approximately €45-50 million; reconstruction has not yet taken place and the project is 
currently on hold. The cost of constructing a commercial-scale facility integrated into a 
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district heating network and having an annual production capacity of 0.2 tonnes of DME has 
been estimated as approximately €400 million. The production cost of the fuel from such a 
plant has been estimated to be in the range of €0.49-0.55/lde (Atrax Energi, 2002) or €0.7-
1.0/lde (see Table 3.4.1) (Thunman et al., 2008). 
The second alliance in Sweden was initiated by Chemrec, which has developed the black 
liquor gasification technology. The alliance aspires to produce DME using the black liquor 
from chemical pulp mills. A pilot facility for black liquor gasification was inaugurated in 2005, 
costing €7 million to construct; this is currently being rebuilt for €28 million as a 
demonstration facility for a continuous and annual production of 1,500 tonnes of DME. 
Inauguration of the facility is being planned for 2010 and will cover the fuel demand for a 
small test fleet of DME vehicles supplied by Volvo. Preem, Total, Delphi and other actors are 
also taking part in the project to develop the entire value chain―from black liquor to the use 
of DME vehicles in commercial traffic. The next step has already been initiated for the 
construction of a first semi-commercial-scale demonstration facility in Örnsköldsvik, Sweden. 
Chemrec, together with the pulp and paper mill Domsjö Fabriker, have been granted €50 
million from the Swedish Energy Agency for the construction of a pre-commercial 
demonstration plant of approximately 100,000 tonnes annually at their mill site. The cost of 
the plant construction has been estimated as approximately €300 million (Domsjö, 2009). 
The cost of a commercial-scale plant in the range of about 200,000 tonnes of annual 
production has been estimated as roughly €400 million, when integrated into an existing 
chemical pulp and paper mill. Depending on the price and supply of raw material, the cost of 
liquids would be in the range of €0.5-0.7/lde (see Tables 3.4.1 and 3.4.4) (McKeough and 
Kurkela, 2008; Seyfried, 2008b).  
Biomass gasification is planned to be demonstrated in a third Swedish project, in which the 
local utility Göteborg Energy has teamed-up with the Austrian-Swiss alliance of Repotec, CTU 
and the Finnish capital goods supplier Metso Power for building the first semi-commercial 20 
MW BioSNG plant. The construction cost of the plant will be approximately €75 million and 
the Swedish Energy Agency has decided to support the project with €22 million 
(Energimyndigheten, 2009c). The pre-commercial demonstration may be completed by 
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2013. In addition, Metso power and Göteborg Energy are involved in developing a new 
design of the FICFB technology, developed in Gussing, based on proposals by researchers at 
Chalmers University of Technology in Göteborg, Sweden. The new design enables most 
existing biomass CFB boilers to be retrofitted and turned into FCIFB units for, as an example, 
BioSNG production. A 6 MW pilot plant has been constructed at Chalmers for approximately 
€1.1 million. The technology will be ready to scale up with synthesis technology provided by 
CTU (see Table 3.4.1).  
The capital goods suppliers in Finland (see Chapter VIII) significantly strengthened their 
ability to produce boilers and equipment for the pulp and paper industry over the past three 
decades. It is a process that is still ongoing with the recent entry of the Austrian machinery 
producer Andritz into that cluster. On the basis of a successful capital goods track record and 
a large pulp and paper industry, two competing strategic alliances have emerged. Both 
alliances develop fluidised bed gasification of forest residues for the production of FT liquids 
integrated into the infrastructure of the pulp and paper mills. The first alliance consists of 
Stora Enso (pulp and paper) and Néste oil, which have formed a joint venture; they are 
pursuing technology development together with Foster Wheeler (capital goods) and the 
Finnish research institute VTT. Together with the Finnish government, Stora Enso and Néste 
oil have invested more than €40 million to demonstrate the production of an ultra clean gas 
in an oxygen-blown, pressurised 12MWth lime kiln gasifier, in which 5MW of the gas will be 
sufficiently cleaned for FT synthesis. The demonstration facility was inaugurated in 2009 (see 
Table 3.4.1).  
The second Finnish alliance is composed of UPM (pulp and paper) and Andritz/Carbona 
(capital goods), in collaboration with the Chicago-based Gas Technology Institute (GTI). 
Chicago is also where all the technology development has occurred since 2005. Their 
development is based on a 6MW oxygen-blown, pressurised BFB reactor and a gas cleaning 
system developed by GTI and Carbona. So far, UPM has funded all the development at a cost 
of approximately €10 million, and have declared that they are willing to take the lead in an 
investment for a full-scale demonstration plant after all tests in the Chicago pilot plant have 
been completed (see Table 3.4.1). 
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FT production is currently not included in any of the demonstration projects in Finland. Nor 
is it clear which actors will supply the necessary FT technology in the future. Both alliances 
aim at integrating the technology in existing pulp and paper mills where there are sufficient 
residues and hope to have a first commercial demonstration of 100-200 tonnes of liquids 
ready sometime before 2015. Depending on the price and supply of raw material, the cost of 
liquids would be in the range of €0.5-0.7/lde (see Table 3.4.1) (McKeough and Kurkela, 2008). 
Except for Värnamo, all of these nine projects are sufficiently funded to complete the 
demonstration phase, which is estimated to cost approximately €250 million by 2010 (see 
Table 3.4.1). Additional funding will most likely be necessary as the projects run into 
unforeseen technical difficulties. Even if demonstration has already begun or is expected to 
begin during 2010, given the complexity of the task and various uncertainties, most alliances 
cannot be expected to start pre-commercial demonstration before 2012-2013.  
The cost of pre-commercial demonstration of five of the above-mentioned nine projects will 
be no less than €1,300 million. This figure can be compared with what has been considered a 
significant funding scheme in Sweden: a budget of more than €80 million for realising these 
type of projects (Energimyndigheten, 2008). It is also from this scheme that Göteborg Energy 
and Chemrec have managed to secure a total of €72 million for pre-commercial 
demonstration (Energimyndigheten, 2009c).  
Hence, if pre-commercial demonstration projects are technically successful, there is a slight 
chance that the construction of the first commercial-scale plants can start sometime after 
2015. Supposing that nine such plants are constructed by 2020, it would involve an 
investment of about €4 billion and result in the production of approximately 1.41 Mtoe of 
fuel―equivalent to 5 percent of the 10 percent directive for 2020 (0.5 percent of the total 
fuel market, if consumption is kept constant at 300Mtoe annually).  
The nine different projects propose three main alternative fuels (FT diesel, DME and SNG) 
and three different technology trajectories to achieve them. These alternatives are 
simultaneously complementary and in direct competition with each other and other 
alternative fuels. The two following sections will outline the main arguments in terms of the 
desirability of realising a market for second-generation transportation fuels based on 
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biomass gasification. First, the focus will be on the main substitutes and the main arguments 
for and against the different options.80 Second, the focus will shift to the various costs, and 
the potential social and economic benefits of realising a market for second-generation 
biofuels. 
3.4.2 Alternative fuels competing to substitute oil 
The main fuel alternatives from biomass gasification pursued by the nine alliances are 
Fischer Troops diesel, synthetic natural gas and dimethylether. The advocates for FT diesel 
argue that it is the most environmentally friendly alternative, which can be blended directly 
with ordinary diesel at any quantity and is, therefore, a preferred choice. In addition, they 
argue that diesel engines are the most energy-efficient engines available and that there is an 
increasing shortage of diesel on the world market. As diesel and gasoline are produced at a 
fixed ratio at refineries, it would make more sense to produce a diesel substitute from 
biomass than a gasoline substitute (Keppeler, 2007; Kaikkonen, 2008; Picard, 2008a; 
Seyfried, 2008a).  
The advocates of DME and SNG argue that the construction of new infrastructure is a 
comparatively minor cost since there are also costs associated with maintaining existing 
infrastructure. The construction of new infrastructure can, according to the advocates, be 
attractive since DME and SNG can be converted from biomass at a higher level of energy 
efficiency than FT diesel. In addition, with further engine development, both DME and SNG 
can be used as a diesel fuel with the same high level of engine efficiency as FT diesel 
(Danielsson, 2008; Röj, 2009). 
There is a conflict between SNG and DME. The advocates of SNG argue that it is a flexible 
fuel that also can be used in many industrial processes, and that there already exists 
infrastructure for natural gas on which one can continue to build (Gunnarsson, 2009; 
Sjöström, 2009). The advocates of DME, on the other hand, argue that the DME catalysts are 
commercially available and widely used. Moreover, production is seen as flexible since it can 
                                                      
80 Excluded from the analysis are potential energy savings, lifestyle changes, increased use of public transport or 
rapid increase of electrical vehicles, as well as other more elaborative fuel alternatives such as using algae for 
fuel production. 
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easily be shifted between methanol and DME and the end products have many other 
industrial uses besides transportation fuel (Gebart, 2008; Rudberg, 2008).  
Second-generation fuels from biomass gasification compete with other alternative fuels 
based on both fossil and renewable resources. This competition will be discussed here with 
regards to their potential to replace conventional oil, reduce CO2 emissions, and the cost of 
producing second-generation fuels. The replacement potential of the second-generation 
fuels was illustrated in Chapter I, which concluded that the uncertainty concerning the 
substitution potential is great81 (6-56 percent) and that only a limited share of the current 
fuel market can be substituted with second-generation fuels from biomass.  
The substitution potential is even less for first-generation biofuels, since their well-to-wheel 
energy efficiency is considerably lower than that of gasification (see Figure 3.4.4). In 
addition, they continue to be controversial since they compete directly with food 
production. Depending on the production method, the CO2 reduction potential varies 
extensively―from being almost on par with the gasification of biomass to even worse than 
oil-based fuels (see Figure 3.4.4).82 
                                                      
81 Depending on the well-to-wheel efficiency and the allocation of biomass for fuel production. 
82 Please note that SNG is not included in the figure, but that it is, however, on par with DME. The only fossil 
alternatives mentioned in the figure are conventional diesel and diesel, as well as gas-to-liquids (GtL) and coal-
to-liquids (CtL). The remaining alternatives outlined in 3.4.5 have an environmental performance somewhere 
between conventional diesel and coal-based diesel. Their exact environmental performance is not of interest to 
this study, only that they are worse than the existing alternatives and potentially abundant in supply. 
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Figure 3.4.4: Total WTW GHG emissions and the total WTW energy for common alternative fuels (IES 
JRC, 2007). 
 
The substitution potential of the fossil-based alternatives is considerably higher than the 
renewable alternatives, and they can, in general, be produced at a lower cost. Based on 
current global liquids consumption of approximately 31 billion barrels per year (BP, 2009), 
the remaining known fossil resources (8,000 billion barrels) would last for at least the next 
258 years. Nearly 1.1 trillion barrels have already been produced at a cost of up to $30 per 
barrel (in 2008 dollars) (see Figure 3.4.5). The production cost of these fossil alternatives 
varies between $10-120 per barrel (bbl), while second-generation fuels can be produced for 
approximately $80 to $165/bbl (see Table 3.4.2). On the other hand, CO2 emissions from the 
fossil alternatives are up 2.3 times higher than from conventional fossil fuels (IES JRC, 2007). 
The environmental consequences of utilising this potential would, therefore, be 
devastating.83 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
83 The future legitimacy of fossil gasification will most likely depend on how well the advocates of coal 
gasification manage to integrate CCS technology into their future projects. However, CCS technology increases 
energy consumption and increases the rate of coal depletion (Holt, 2007).  
101 
 
Figure 3.4.5: The long-term supply of liquids from conventional and unconventional resources. In the 
figure, “Produced” refers to the amount of oil already recovered and used. Source:  IEA (2008, p. 
218).84 
 
If climate change is a prioritised goal and energy security is added into the equation, 
renewable alternative fuels will have to be developed to limit the amount of fossil-based 
alternative fuels made available on the market. 
In sum, the gasification of biomass appears to be an attractive and desirable option. It can 
potentially be produced from domestic resources in relatively large quantities, and 
substitute 6-56 percent of the current demand for oil in the long run while significantly 
reducing CO2 emissions. The actual substitution potential depends on the choices made; 
however, none of the upcoming renewable alternatives can be expected to substitute all of 
the oil currently used.  
The following section outlines the desirability of biomass gasification in terms of the cost of 
realising it, as well as possible social and economic benefits beyond CO2 reduction. 
                                                      
84 Note: The curve shows the availability of oil resources as a function of the estimated production cost. Cost 
associated with CO2 emissions is not included. There is also a significant uncertainty on oil shale production cost 
as technology is not yet commercial. MENA refers to the Middle East and North Africa. The shading and 
overlapping of the gas-to-liquids and coal-to-liquids segments indicate the range of uncertainty surrounding the 
size of these resources, with 2.4 trillion shown as a best estimate of the likely potential for the two combined” 
(IEA, 2008, p.218). 
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3.4.3 The cost, desirability and risks of realising a market 
In the introductory chapter, the potential of biomass was assessed and it was concluded that 
it would be realistic, from a European resource perspective, to realise a 25 percent market 
(or 77Mtoe) share based on current fuel consumption. To realise this potential, it must be 
created in competition with other uses of biomass and by choosing the conversion 
technologies with the highest possible well-to-wheel efficiency. Even if the potential is highly 
uncertain, it is used as a point of departure for investigating the cost and desirability of 
realising a market for second-generation fuels.  
Based on the figures in Table 3.4.1, the investment cost in a commercial plant with a 
production capacity of 1Mtoe of fuels is in the range of €2-4 billion.85 The total investment 
cost includes all equipment necessary for biomass treatment, gasification and fuel synthesis. 
To realise a production infrastructure (not including distribution and consumption) with a 
capacity of producing 77Mtoe of renewable fuels, it would require a total investment in the 
range of €150-300 billion86 in the years to come.  
The long-term employment effects in terms of plant operation, biomass production and 
collection would be significant if such a market would be realised. Based on data supplied by 
the interviewees, a plant with a production capacity of 0.2Mtoe of fuel would employ in the 
range of 600-850 people (Jokela, 2008; Rudloff, 2008a). To realise an annual European 
market of 77Mtoe, an equivalent of 385 plants would have to be built and be in full 
operation. The employment effect of growing and collecting biomass, as well as operating 
these plants, would, therefore, be in the range of 230,000-330,000 people.87  The short-term 
employment effects in the sector associated with building the plants and the potential of an 
export market would, of course, also be considerable. However, these figures are not 
quantified here. 
                                                      
85 The estimates for the Chemrec/Värnamo/Carbona/FW and Choren technologies in table 3.4.1 indicate that the 
investment cost of building a plant with the production capacity of 0.2Mtoe equals approximately €400-800 
MEUR. Therefore, the specific investment cost in plants with a production capacity of 1Mtoe of fuel equals €2-4 
billion.  
86 77*2=154 and 77*4=308 
87 77Mtoe divided by an average plant size of 0.2Mtoe equals 385 production facilities. If each facility employ 
600-850 people, it creates 231,000 – 327,250 jobs.    
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If the EU would realise such a market based on domestically grown biomass, 77Mtoe of oil 
imports would be avoided.88 Depending on future oil prices, these avoided costs could be 
substantial. The IEA (2009) World Energy Outlook refers to two main scenarios, one in which 
the nominal price of oil will reach $150/bbl by 2030 and another in which it will reach 
$190/bbl. If a 25 percent market (77Mtoe) would be realised by 2030, the EU would avoid oil 
imports in the range of €60-80 billion ($80-100 billion) annually.89 Hence, in addition to CO2 
reductions, a 25 percent share of second-generation fuels from biomass would generate 
substantial benefits. 
Uncertainty about the future price of oil is, however, practically guaranteed. From having 
been relatively stable around an historic average of $38/bbl (EIA, 2009)―except for 
temporary peaks during the oil crises in 1973 and 1978―the price of oil has recently 
increased rapidly. In the last week of January 2007, it went above $50/bbl and continued to 
increase until it peaked at $137/bbl during the first week of July 2008. Since then, it has 
dropped to $36/bbl during the last week of December 2008 only to increase again. During 
the first two months of 2010, it fluctuated around $70-80/bbl. These fluctuations in price 
levels can also be seen in the future projections of oil prices. In their 2007 reference 
scenario, the IEA predicted that the price of oil in 2030 would be $62/bbl (IEA, 2007). And 
only two years later, in their 2009 edition, the price of oil was expected to be $150-190/bbl 
by 2030 (IEA, 2009).  
Bearing this price volatility in mind, Table 3.4.2 summarises the estimated production cost of 
second-generation transportation fuels from the various demonstration projects. The 
demonstration facilities that plan to integrate fuel production in the pulp and paper industry 
are found in the lower end of the range. They could possibly be competitive at an oil price of 
approximately $80/bbl, while the most expensive solution, provided by FZK/Lurgi, would 
only be competitive at an oil price of about $165/bbl (see column 2 in Table 3.4.2). 
                                                      
88 It has previously been mentioned by the European Commission that importing oil has very limited 
employment effect compared to utilising domestically grown biomass for substituting oil (EC, 2008).  
89 1Mtoe=7.3Mbbl, 77Mtoe=563Mbbl. At a future oil price of $190/bbl, the import savings would be $107 
billion. At $150/bbl it would be $84 billion. Hence, €60-80 billion at an exchange rate of 1 USD = 0.73 EUR 
(2010-10-04) 
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However, if the cost of CO2 emissions is set and the renewable alternatives are excluded 
from such costs, their competitiveness would naturally increase. Since there is no general EU 
framework associating CO2 emissions from the transport sector with a cost, the question is: 
what would a reasonable price for future CO2 emissions from the transport sector be? If the 
cost of emitting CO2 would be set in the range of the Swedish CO2 fuel tax (equivalent to 
approximately $50/bbl of gasoline),90 the pulp and paper solution would be competitive at 
about $32/bbl, while the FZK/Lurgi solution would be competitive at about $114/bbl (see 
column 3 in Table 3.4.2).91  
The Swedish CO2 fuel tax is, however, relatively high compared to the price of CO2 emissions 
set at the European Climate Exchange (ECX) for sectors included in the European CO2 
emissions trading scheme (currently not including the transportation sector). In the period 
between January 2008 and December 2009, the average price was €19.6/ton CO2 (ECX, 
2010). Assuming that the combustion of 1 barrel (159 litres) of diesel emits 0.414 tonnes of 
CO2, it would cost €8.11/bbl or approximately $10/bbl depending on the exchange rate. If 
the cost of emitting CO2 was equivalent to $10/bbl, second-generation fuels would be 
competitive if the price of oil was higher than $72-155/bbl, depending on the production 
method (see column 4 in Table 3.4.2). 
From the perspective of an investor in a future commercial-scale BtL plant, it should by now 
be quite obvious that such an investment is associated with high risk. First, a large amount of 
money is put at risk, about €400-800 million depending on the type of plant. Second, the 
competitiveness of the plant is completely dependent on an uncertain future with regard to 
the price of oil and the level of CO2 rebates.  
 
 
                                                      
90 The price was set in Swedish krona per litre of gasoline. As of January 1, 2010, it was SEK 2.40/litre 
(Skatteverket, 2010). 
91 The price at which the different cases are competitive was calculated by multiplying the expected production 
price, litre per diesel equivalent with the number of litres in a barrel of oil (159 litres). Refinery losses, equaling 
10 percent, which occurs when upgrading crude oil to diesel, has been deducted by multiplying the figure by 0.9. 
The conversion from Euro to Dollar has been based on the historic average exchange rate between 1998 and 
2008 (1 EUR = 1.15 USD).  
105 
 
Table 3.4.2: The production cost of BtL and its competitiveness in relation to the price of oil when no, 
a high and a low CO2 tax is included in the calculation. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Projects €/lde $/bbl $/bblHigh-CO2tax $/bblLow-CO2tax 
TU-Vienna/Repotec 0,7 115 64 105 
Chalmers/Metso 0,7 115 64 105 
ZSW/EVF 0,7 115 64 105 
Chemrec 0,5 82 32 72 
Värnamo/Chrisgas 0,7 115 64 105 
Carbona/UPM 0,5 82 32 72 
FW/SE/Nesté 0,5 82 32 72 
Choren 0,85 140 89 130 
FZK/Lurgi 1 165 114 155 
 
If sufficient incentives are provided and the risks to investors are absorbed by various EU 
governments or through a common legislative framework, there is a chance that a 25 
percent (77Mtoe) market for second-generation fuels can be realised (see Chapter XI for an 
extended analysis). Absorbing this risk, however, may entail a significant cost depending on 
the future price of oil, the price of CO2 emissions, and the average cost of producing BtL (see 
Figure 3.4.6).  
The X-axis in Figure 3.4.6 represents the price of oil. At an historic oil price of $38/bbl, the 
cost of realising the market by providing sufficient incentives for investors would be nearly 
$70 billion annually,92 if the average BtL cost is $165/bbl. At an oil price of $190/bbl, the 
annual savings would, however, be approximately $80 billion, if the average cost of 
producing BtL would be as low as $30/bbl.  
                                                      
92 This is considered to be high, since the EU budget for 2008 was €116.5 billion. If taken from the budget 
(which would be unrealistic) it would be the largest part in the budget. Agricultural subsidies in the EU budget 
for 2008 totaled €43 billion (EC, 2009b).  
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Figure 3.4.6: The cost of realising 25 percent BtL market at an average BtL production cost of $30-
165/bbl at various oil prices. 
 
In sum, without any mechanisms to absorb the risk for investors that are expected to make 
investments in the range of €150-300 billion, it is unlikely that a 77Mtoe BtL market will ever 
be realised. Yet, in addition to improving the security of supply, job security and reducing 
CO2 emissions, the economic benefits for society in providing such incentives may outweigh 
the costs, if the oil price remains high and production costs of second-generation fuels can 
be kept down.  
3.5 Summary 
Over the past 200 years, the design space of pyrolysis and gasification has evolved through 
many different applications and where the capacity of making one has led to another (cf. 
Rosenberg (1976)). The technology has evolved from being used for lighting and cooking 
during the industrial revolution into a cornerstone of the modern chemical industry in the 
production of various chemicals, nitrogenous fertilisers, and FT liquids and power.  
The preferred feed-stock throughout the history of gasification has been coal, although 
during the abundance of cheap oil such plants were also built. Since the 1970s, coal has once 
again increased in importance, and off-grid natural gas fields have been identified as a 
potential resource for increasing production and for securing the future supply of liquid 
transportation fuels. The use of coal for such purposes could potentially be devastating to 
the environment, as it emits 2.3 times more CO2 than do conventional fuels.  
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Given increasing concern about climate change, interest in extending the design space of 
gasification to also include biomass, peat, black liquor and low-value waste resources has 
picked up. The first experiments with biomass since the Second World War were conducted 
as early as the 1970s. Since that time the field has evolved along three main trajectories. 
These include two low temperature routes: pressurised fluidised bed and atmospheric fast 
internal fluidised bed, both of which were offshoots from the existing knowledge base in 
fluidised bed combustion. The third trajectory is a high temperature route, which is an 
offshoot of existing reactor designs for coal and oil gasification based on the entrained flow 
reactor.  
The various types of biomass are different from fossil fuels, both in their physical 
characteristics and chemical composition. To use it in any of the three routes for the 
purposes of producing transportation fuels requires major adaptations to and development 
of the processes. In general, the low temperature routes based on fluidised beds are 
relatively easy to feed with biomass, while the main problem lies in the downstream gas 
cleaning equipment and the catalysts for synthesising the gas. On the other hand, if the high 
temperature route is applied, the same downstream process used for fossil gasification can 
probably be used with only minor modifications. However, the physical characteristics of 
biomass make feeding troublesome and new methods for pre-treatment have to be 
developed. Hence, regardless of which route is chosen, there are further technical problems 
that need to be solved. Solving these problems involves adapting, developing and 
demonstrating the entire system from feed to fuel—not just the individual steps of the 
process. 
In order to realise biomass gasification for the production of transportation fuels and other 
chemicals, an industry with the capacity to construct large-scale gasification systems has to 
emerge. The embryo for such an industry has been in development since the 1970s, 
experimenting with less advanced applications from low temperature gasification. The first 
experiments took place without gas cleaning, where the gas was substituted for oil in the 
lime kilns. It continued later with experiments on various boiler applications and in gas 
engines for CHP production, which required only modest gas cleaning. Attempts have also 
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been made to develop the BIGCC application for CHP generation, but without much success. 
Based on previous experience from biomass gasification in combination with experience in 
fossil gasification, nine prominent alliances have been formed for realising the production of 
renewable transportation fuels and other chemicals based on the three routes outlined 
above.  
These alliances offer solutions that complement each other and compete with each other in 
the realisation of a market for renewable transportation fuels. From a resource perspective, 
the potential has been assessed as somewhere between 6-56 percent. If a 25 percent 
market is realised, CO2 emission would be reduced, energy security would be improved as 
imported oil to a value of €60-80 billion ($80-100 billion) would be substituted for. In 
addition, job security could be improved by generating economic activities that would not be 
otherwise possible. For example, approximately 230,000 to 330,000 jobs could be created in 
biomass cultivation, collection and fuel production, not to mention additional jobs in the 
capital goods industry for plant construction, both domestically and for export. 
However, even if the production of second-generation fuels is a socially desirable process 
compared to the fossil alternatives and first-generation biofuels, it is more expensive. For 
realising a potential market of 25 percent over the longer term, investments in the range of 
€150-300 billion must be made. Without any further incentives, the risk to investors will be 
too large and the potential will not be realised. How such incentives may be constructed will 
be discussed in Chapter XI of the thesis. 
Part II of the thesis will describe the history of biomass gasification leading up to the 
emergence of the nine projects mentioned above. It will also outline the main challenges for 
realising them from a national perspective (Austria, Germany, Sweden and Finland). Part III 
of the thesis will draw upon these chapters and analyse what will be necessary at a 
European level to realise an industry with the capacity to supply plants for the production of 
second-generation fuels on a commercial-scale. 
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Chapter IV                                                                                      
Method 
 
“… economics is essentially a unique process in historic time.” 
(Schumpeter, 1954, p.12) 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the methods used for the TIS analysis conducted in 
this thesis. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first starts by outlining the basic 
virtues of performing a TIS analysis and what its possible contributions can be. The second 
section describes the case study methodology and delineates the field of study. The third 
section describes the evolution of the research process and the methods used for data 
collection and analysis. 
4.1 The virtue of a TIS analysis of biomass gasification  
The world we live in is a “non-ergodic” one, “… a world of continuous novel change” (North, 
2005, p.16). In the long run, institutional, market, organisational, and technological 
uncertainties are almost complete in such a world. For these reasons, it is next to impossible 
for individual actors to be well-informed and be able to take sensible actions in developing 
new technologies today based on beliefs about the future decades from now.  
Genuine uncertainty inhibits actions and provides weak incentives to develop and 
experiment with technical solutions with a high-potential over the long-term. Since the 
development of new knowledge fields and the creation of an industrial capacity for large-
scale diffusion take decades, an important role of policy in the face of climate change is to 
reduce such uncertainties and thereby stimulate the emergence of new industries with 
potential solutions for addressing the emerging threat.   
However, we also know that humans are rationally bounded and may act anyway. We learn 
and make decisions based on our individual contexts, rather than doing so free from 
110 
 
previous constraints based on equally available and well-developed information. We also 
know that knowledge, institutions and other parts of the structure are cumulative, and that 
by analysing and understanding the structural context in which the actors are embedded, it 
becomes possible to understand how choices made in the past influence choices in the 
future (Rosenberg, 1976; Simon, 1979; North, 2005).  
For research to matter to policymaking, context-specific analysis is pivotal as it givens an 
understanding of how and why different actors decide to learn and develop a new 
knowledge field, as well as which uncertainties have to be reduced in order for these actors 
to continue making choices that, in the long run, may progress the field towards 
commercialisation. 
The value of this thesis is not in making predictions about the future. Rather, it is to provide 
a highly context-dependent analysis on what it takes for a range of actors, from both the 
public and private sectors within the European Union, to realise an emerging TIS with 
potential to contribute to abating climate change.  
The virtue of such an analysis may be viewed as fundamentally different from what is 
expected from research originating at a technical university, which normally has a 
positivistic-oriented science base. With such an epistemological point of departure, the 
theoretical abstractions which are free from context-dependent assessments are held in 
highest esteem (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 1994; Flyvbjerg, 2001).   
However, as many researchers have pointed out before, social systems are not the same as 
those governed by natural laws (cf. Giddens (1984b), Månson (2000)). The primary reason 
for this is that the main object of analysis in social science―the actor―is also a subject that 
makes choices based on his/her specific context, history and personal values (Rosenberg, 
1976). Hence, in order to understand the agency of the actor one also has to focus on the 
context within which this actor operates. It is thus not possible to achieve a deep 
understanding of the emergence of an industry that is very much dependent on the 
decisions made by individual actors (see Chapter II), without also providing context-
dependent observations and conclusions.   
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Flyvbjerg (2001, 2006) argues that social science is strongest where natural science is 
weakest and that it has its true virtue in addressing such highly context-dependent 
phenomena. This is not to say, however, that context independent and general theories are 
not possible, or not valuable, in social science. By addressing such phenomena, valuable 
questions can be answered where natural science methods are clearly limited. According to 
Flyvbjerg (2006), social science has a clear advantage in contributing by providing answers to 
at least the following questions: 
a) Where are we going? 
b) Is this development desirable? 
c) What, if anything, should we do about it?  
d) Who gains and who loses, and by which mechanisms of power? 
 
Even though no single researcher can be expected to fully answer all of the above questions 
for any given purpose, one can at least make partial contributions. Furthermore, the 
perspective here is that a final and definitive answer cannot be given, but that one can 
contribute by providing a complementary or a better explanation than those provided in the 
past.   
In this thesis, the first question is analysed by unfolding the recent history of biomass 
gasification, leading up to the nine most prominent gasification projects in Europe. This 
includes an analysis of which specific technological trajectories the different actors have 
embarked on, and which claims that are made with regard to their ability to provide 
renewable liquids for the future.  
Since knowledge is cumulative (Dosi, 1982) and current development can be expected to 
follow the technological trajectories outlined in Chapter III, it is possible to provide a 
relatively credible answer to the question about the direction in which we are heading, at 
least in a technical sense. However, there remains a high risk of failure in both the individual 
projects studied and for the entire TIS. The question concerning direction is addressed in 
Chapter III, based on the technical evolution of the field and its relationship to fossil 
gasification and fluidised biomass combustion. In Chapters V-VIII, the specific evolution of 
the knowledge field in four different countries are outlined, and Chapter XI looks forward 
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and analyses what it takes to realise the field on a large-scale by addressing the existing 
system weaknesses and uncertainties. 
The second question posed by Flyvbjerg (2006) concerning the desirability of current 
development is from my point of view by far the most difficult one to make a contribution 
to. Being a student of the development of a specific technological field entrenches you in 
that field; the values and reasoning of actors in that field soon become your own and making 
any type of “objective” assessment concerning desirability becomes next to impossible. I 
have always believed that it would disqualify me from any discussions on the future 
desirability of second-generation fuels. 
However, during the project it has become obvious that most studies claiming to make 
objective assessments concerning the desirability of various renewable alternatives are, 
more or less, entrenched in one technological regime over another. These studies play an 
important role in either legitimising the TIS or discrediting it. Such studies, therefore, take 
part in the reproduction of these belief and value systems over others (Bergek et al., 2008c). 
Since most assessments concerning desirability can be seen as more or less skewed, I see no 
good reasons for not contributing my own perspective on the desirability of the technology. 
An overview of the main arguments for supporting the formation of an industry with the 
capacity to realise the potential of biomass gasification was presented in Chapter I, as well as 
in the two final sections of Chapter III. 
The fourth question, “Who gains and loses, and by which mechanisms of power?”, addresses 
changes in the underlying power structure of, in this case, the given TIS. The question is 
explicitly addressed when analysing the nature, extent and limits to the transformative 
capacity of the system builders (RQ 2 and 3). With such an analysis, it becomes possible to 
understand what the actors are able to do given the existing institutional structure, but also 
what types of intentional and frictional resistance they encounter from, for example, 
incumbent actors when attempting to strengthen the TIS, and which type of weaknesses and 
uncertainties they are unable to address. Answering that type of question is necessary for 
being able to address the third of Flyvbjerg’s four questions: “What, if anything, should we 
do about it?” 
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In this thesis, this corresponds to the fourth research question: “Given these limits, which 
system weaknesses remain to be resolved by system builders and policymakers on different 
levels (national and EU)?” Such policy lessons are presented for each case study country 
(Chapters V-VIII) in Part II, as well for the entire EU in Part III (Chapters IX-XII).   
4.2 Case study methodology and defining the case 
Case studies have been described as an appropriate method for studying contemporary 
phenomena (Yin, 2009), where context-dependent knowledge can be expected to be 
important (Flyvbjerg, 2001), and in areas where little theory has been developed 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  
The phenomenon of this thesis is clearly contemporary and the actors are likely to make 
context-dependent decisions that are important to understand for the given purpose. 
However, this is not a field where there is a lack of existing theory or where little has been 
developed. If this were the case, it may have called for an inductive, grounded theory, case 
study approach such as that outlined in Strauss (1987) and Miles and Huberman (1994). On 
the contrary, however, the field of evolutionary economics and industrial dynamics has—
since the 1970s—been the main topic for many researchers, and the question of the 
industrialisation of new knowledge fields has been on the agenda of innovation systems 
research since the early-1990s. 
Instead, a methodological approach based on “systematic combining” has been adopted to 
maximise use of existing theory. The methodology has been defined as a “ … process where 
theoretical framework, empirical field work and case analysis evolve simultaneously … ” 
(Dubois and Gadde, 2002, p. 554). With systematic combining, it is possible to depart from 
what has been described as “tight and pre-structured” theoretical framework such as the TIS 
framework (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Dubois and Gadde, 2002).93 According to Dubois 
and Gadde (2002), the proposed methodology makes it is possible to “confront” existing 
theory with an empirical reality, continuously move back and forth between empirical 
                                                      
93 Rather than a “loose and emergent” framework as described in Miles and Huberman (1994). 
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observations and the framework, and thereby expand the understanding of both the 
evolving framework and the empirical observations.94 
One of the major challenges of case study research is defining the case―what the case is a 
case of―and deciding whether a single or multiple case study approach should be adopted 
(Yin, 2009). In this thesis, deciding on the case study is the same as deciding on the TIS and 
delineating the system. In Chapter II it was illustrated that the TIS should be delineated in 
terms of the scope and extent of the knowledge field, its relationships in terms of being part 
of or adjacent to one or several sectoral innovation systems (SSI), and in spatial terms as part 
of a one or several national and/or regional innovation systems (NSI, RSI) (Carlsson et al., 
2002a; Carlsson et al., 2002b; Markard and Truffer, 2008). 
In terms of the scope and extent of the knowledge field, the dynamic concept of “design 
space” was introduced to capture the constant evolution of the knowledge field (Carlsson et 
al., 2002a). The design space is, therefore, not fixed over time, but evolves as it is confronted 
with new problems, allowing new solutions to be developed. Hence, as an industry 
successfully experiments with a given design space and extends it into new areas, they also 
develop a capacity for new applications (Rosenberg, 1976). Chapters III and V-VIII  therefore 
illustrate how the design space of biomass gasification has evolved along three main 
trajectories and how the industrial capacity to realise biomass gasification for various 
applications has evolved by moving back and forth between more and less advanced 
applications of the gas. The scope and extent of the knowledge field has thus been limited to 
the development of the design space along the three mentioned trajectories (see Figure 
3.3.1 in Chapter III, and Figure 4.1 in this chapter).95  
                                                      
94 By analogy with abduction, see Alvesson and Sköldberg (1994) for an overview of induction, deduction and 
abduction.  
95 While there are several other biomass-based technologies that evolved in parallel to the three dominating ones, 
they have been excluded from the analysis. Progress within these technologies would eventually also strengthen 
the capacity of the actors in the TIS to realise renewable fuels. For example, advancements in the cleaning 
systems for fixed bed systems could also benefit FB systems. Conventional large-scale coal technologies such as 
the Nuon plant in Buggenum, which uses biomass by mixing it with coal, are also excluded from the TIS. It is 
excluded since only relatively small volumes of biomass can be used without changing the design of the plant. If 
such a set-up would be used to produce synthetic liquids, it would also increase the CO2 emissions considerably 
compared to conventional diesel and gasoline, even if mixed with biomass. 
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An overview of the delineation of the TIS, in sectoral and in spatial terms, is presented in 
Figure 4.1. The TIS has evolved through the interaction of different types of actors (capital 
goods suppliers, customers, research institutes, etc.) originating from the coal, 
petrochemical, oil, pulp and paper, automotive, forest, agriculture and energy sectors, each 
making a contribution to the evolution of the design space. In terms of spatial delimitation, 
the case of analysing the role of system builders for the emergence of an industry with the 
capacity to realise the potential of biomass gasification in EU is, naturally, a single case 
study.  
Figure 4.1: The delineation of the TIS in Europe and the four case study countries. 
 
However, for operationalising a single case study on biomass gasification at European level, 
a breakdown into four country-specific case studies was, for two main reasons. First, the EU 
level has not been the dominant institutional context influencing the evolution of the field 
until 2003; rather, it has been led by various different national or even regional contexts. The 
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dominant structure in which the actors are embedded and forced to interact would, 
therefore, be national rather than European. Second, when reviewing the technology (see 
Chapter III), it became obvious that the development leading up to the most advanced 
biomass gasification projects in existence today was concentrated in four countries: Sweden, 
Finland, Germany and Austria. In total, nine pilot or demonstration plants in Europe are 
under construction in these countries.  
Chapters V-VIII will, therefore, focus on the evolution of the TIS in the four above-mentioned 
countries (see Figure 4.1). Within each national context, research questions 1-4 will be 
addressed, providing an opportunity to analyse current system weaknesses and limits to 
realising the TIS within a national framework. This will be followed by a cross-country 
analysis in Chapter IX. 
For analysing the evolution of the TIS in the four case study countries, a historical narrative 
has been constructed for each case. Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that such a narrative should 
focus on the evolution of the relationship between actors and other structural elements. 
Such a focus makes it possible to trace the emergence of the key processes for innovation 
and diffusion (functions), the role of exogenous factors, and the role of system builders and 
other actors in the emergence of the TIS. 
As appropriate, each country narrative was divided into one or several episodes―where 
each episode is dominated by specific patterns of interaction between the structure and the 
functions (Suurs et al., 2010). Due to the long history of biomass gasification in Sweden and 
Finland, it was possible to distinguish several episodes that have been important in leading 
up to the development of the current projects. In Germany and Austria, only one major 
episode specific to biomass gasification could be discerned in each country, as the history of 
biomass gasification is relatively short there. Additionally, in Germany the current projects 
either have a history in fossil gasification (as outlined in Chapter III) or stem from previous 
developments in the other countries.  
The downside of restricting the analysis to four countries is that important research and 
development work that may be ongoing in several other countries in Europe risk being 
downplayed or even missed. However, a thorough analysis of ongoing research and 
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commercialisation activities in the field of biomass gasification was performed at the start of 
the project. As such, the risk that there would currently be other and more relevant projects 
than the nine outlined in Chapter III is viewed as minimal.96 The possibility of new projects 
“popping up” is of course possible, but such projects take considerable time to develop and 
are not likely to progress further than the nine I have selected within the time frame of this 
research project. 
4.3 The evolution of the research project: Data collection, selecting and 
identifying the projects 
Writing a book is a significant and time-consuming task. In this specific case, it has taken 
almost four years. The time spent researching and writing can be divided into three major 
phases, including the final phase, in which all the material was edited and re-written into 
what constitutes this book. 
The first phase began in March 2007, when I visited an industrial conference in Stockholm on 
the topic of biomass and the poly-generation of fuels, electricity and other chemicals. In this 
phase, I focused my efforts on understanding the technology of biomass gasification. Giving 
my background in electrical engineering rather than chemistry, this was a significant and 
difficult task. In order to overcome this initial barrier, an extensive technical literature review 
was conducted in combination with two formal interviews with Christopher Higman (2007), 
who is an independent consultant and co-author of the book “Gasification”97, and Ekbom 
(2007), who is Technical Director at a consultancy firm (Nykomb Synergetics) in the field of 
gasification, thus both are well-known and reputable gasification experts.98 In addition, I 
attended a total of seven industry conferences between March and August 2007 on the 
topic of both fossil and biomass gasification. The conferences became an important part of 
the method for understanding past and current developments in biomass gasification, and 
enabled me to make sense of the literature I had read. They also allowed me to discuss 
                                                      
96 In addition, if the activities in other countries are important to the commercialisation of the field, they are 
likely to collaborate with at least one or several of the nine commercialisation projects and would therefore also 
be covered. 
97 Higman, C., van der Burgt, M., 2003. Gasification. Elsevier Science, Burlington., and Higman, C., van der 
Burgt, M., 2008. Gasification. Gulf Professional Publishing, Burlington, USA. 
98 The technical review focused on the evolution of the design space of biomass gasification, its relationship to 
fossil gasification, and past, present and potential applications and markets, as described in Chapter III. 
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technical aspects of biomass and fossil gasification systems with experts and to make initial 
contacts for future interviews (see Table 4.1 for a list of conferences attended during the 
entire project). 
Table 4.1: Conferences and seminars. 
1 Elforsk Seminarium Biokombinat 2007, February 28, Stockholm, Sweden. 
2 Energitinget 2007, March 20-21, Stockholm, Sweden. 
3 15th European Biomass Conference & Exhibition 2007, May-8, Berlin, Germany.  
4 2nd International Freiberg Conference on IGCC & XtL Technologies 2007, May 8-12, Freiberg, 
Germany. 
5 SYNBIOS II 2007, May 23-24, Stockholm, Sweden. 
6 Nordic Bioenergy 2007, June 11-13, Stockholm, Sweden. 
7 2nd European Summer School on Renewable Motor Fuels 2007, August 29-31, Agricultural 
University of Warsaw (SGGW), Poland. 
8 12th REFORM Group Meeting, Schloss Leopoldskron 2007, September 24-28, Salzburg, 
Austria. 
9 DIME International Conference, “Innovation, sustainability and policy” 2008, September 11-
13, GREThA, University Montesquieu Bordeaux IV, France. 
10 Seminar at the Swedish Energy Agency 2008, October 27, Eskilstuna, Sweden. 
11 Seminar at the Swedish Energy Agency 2009, April 27, Eskilstuna, Sweden. 
12 AES Conference 2009, May 6-7, Katrineholm, Sweden. 
13 SYNBIOS III Chalmers 2009, May 28-29, Göteborg, Sweden. 
14 2nd Stakeholder Plenary Meeting of the European Biofuels Technology Platform 2009, 
January 22, Diamant Conference Centre, Brussels, Belgium. 
 
At the outset of the project, I had decided to include only Sweden and Finland in the study. 
An additional objective of the technology review was to identify which projects in Sweden 
and Finland should be included. It was also of interest to gain, at least tentatively, an 
overview of how the projects in Sweden and Finland related to other biomass gasification 
activities in the world. 
In order to generate such an overview and select projects, a database was constructed to 
include all of the major pilot, demonstration and commercial gasification plants that had 
been constructed between 1970 and 2007. The database was compiled from data made 
available in various publications and online databases. The main data sources were IEA task 
33: Thermal Gasification of Biomass, in Babu (1995, 2005, 2006) and IEA (2001). Additional 
data came from GASIF (2004), Knoef (2005), Kurkela (1989, 2002), Palonen (2006), Larson et 
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al. (2003; 2006), Olofsson et al. (2005), Marbe (2005) and the online database: 
www.gasifiers.org. As a result, a relatively comprehensive database with 123 entries could 
be constructed using what is believed to be the major plants aimed at technology 
development and commercial operation that have been constructed around the world. 
However, the data is obviously skewed towards Europe and the USA, since almost all data 
has been published by European and American authors with a focus on their context.99 
The analysis of the database revealed that few of the 123 plants had been constructed or 
were under construction for realising synthetic fuels from biomass gasification.100 The 
activities that had taken place and were currently under development in Europe, were 
concentrated to Sweden, Finland, Germany and Austria. In total nine prominent projects 
could be identified in these four countries and the study was consequently enlarged to 
include also Germany and Austria to capture the development of the field for the entire 
European Union (see Chapter III). The nine projects were verified as the most advanced 
demonstration projects for commercialising biomass gasification via the two initial 
interviews with gasification experts, as well as through informal interviews at the above-
mentioned industry conferences. In addition, the relevance of the selected projects has been 
verified through-out the project as interviews have been conducted. I am therefore 
confident that the European development of the commercialisation of biomass gasification 
is well captured by studying the nine projects outlined in Chapter III.101  
When an analysis of the knowledge field of biomass gasification was made and the database 
was constructed, it was relatively easy to identify which initial actors needed to be 
interviewed in the various cases. Two sets of actors were identified as important to 
interview.  
                                                      
99 In addition to the 123 entries, there are thousands of rice husk gasifiers operating in Southeast Asia and an 
unknown numbers of other small-scale, fixed bed gasifiers all over the world, which have not been reported in 
the above-mentioned articles and sources (Knoef, 2005). These are, however, of little interest for the purpose of 
this thesis and no further efforts have been made to make the database complete with respect to fixed bed 
gasification. 
100 Other alternative designs for biomass gasification were thus considered when constructing the database such 
as fixed bed gasification systems for electricity generation. It was decided later to exclude these designs from the 
study since it would have made it too broad. 
101 In addition to the nine projects, there are highly interesting activities taking place at many universities and 
technical institutes around Europe. My impression is that the primary focus of these is not to demonstrate the 
complete process of biomass-to-liquids production, but rather some of the specific technical aspects that may 
also be necessary. 
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The principal actors in the nine projects were targeted first. These were typically capital 
goods suppliers, start-up firms, technical research institutes or universities who pursued 
project development in alliance with other actors. The method of “snowballing” (Kvale, 
1997) was used as a complementary method for generating interviews with additional actors 
involved in the project and other actors whose support was identified as pivotal for 
achieving commercial success of the technology. Hence, for each project and country, a 
range of interviews were conducted with actual and potential capital goods suppliers, 
customers, consultants, universities, institutes, lobbying organisations and governmental 
agencies with an interest in developing the technology. 
Second, a number of additional European actors were identified from a “knowledge 
perspective”, even if they were not currently involved in any biomass gasification project. 
These actors were typically incumbent capital goods suppliers with previous experience in 
biomass gasification, or with proprietary rights over coal-based gasification technology that 
could potentially be used for biomass along the three trajectories already outlined in 
Chapter III. They were possible to identify from the database, which had been constructed 
based on biomass gasification plants, as well from the GASIF database (2004, 2007) and 
through attending industry conferences such as the 2nd International Freiberg Conference on 
IGCC & XtL Technologies in Freiberg, Germany, May 8-12, 2007. Interviews were also set up 
with these actors to explore their perspectives on biomass gasification.  
The second phase was initiated already as early as September 2007, when the first 
interviews for the first case study were initiated. In total, 89 interviews102 were conducted in 
the four countries (see Table 4.2), not counting numerous shorter informal interviews during 
conferences. The number of interviews has primarily been determined by the number of key 
actors contributing to the development of the TIS in each country and when a reasonable 
saturation of information was reached (cf. Kvale (1997)). To a lesser extent, the number of 
interviews was limited by the time and resources available and the willingness of individuals 
to participate in the study. In only a few instances, individuals were impossible to reach or 
refused to participate in the study. In such cases, it was possible to compensate by 
                                                      
102 In addition, I refer to interviews conducted by Staffan Jacobsson and Anna Bergek in previous projects, and 
interviews conducted while being a guest researcher at Zhejiang University, Hangzhou in November 2009.  
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interviewing others from the same organisation or those who had access to similar 
information.  
Table 4.2: Number of formal interviews conducted in the four case study countries.  
  Sweden Finland Austria Germany Total 
Interviewees 27 21 12 29 89 
 
All of the interviews were semi-structured, and the interviewees were given ample time to 
tell their stories, based on a set of questions. The questions were derived from the purpose 
of the thesis, based on the emerging framework (which later became Chapter II), but were 
also adapted to the type of actors that was being interviewed (e.g., capital goods supplier, 
potential customer, university) and their role in the innovation process. The questions were 
also based on information derived from previous interviews and other questions that may 
have emerged during the study. The overarching focus, however, was ensuring that each 
interviewee could contribute to telling the story of biomass gasification in the different 
countries, and could verify important statements that other actors had made. As such, the 
interview guide has been a dynamic document and has therefore not been appended to the 
thesis.  
Almost all interviews were recorded and careful notes were always taken. In most cases, the 
recording was checked against the notes, which were improved where necessary. Covering 
all topics during the interviews usually required 1.5-2 hours, but in many cases it took even 
longer. Hence, three-hour interviews were quite common. In a few cases, the interviewees 
were pressed for time or not very talkative, and only a few questions could be asked in a 
time frame of approximately 30-40 minutes. 
Initially, the interviewees were not offered the chance to identify themselves as anonymous; 
this was accepted by all interviewees except two. Instead, all interviewees were offered to 
review and comment on the information and statements made during their interviews 
before the publication of this thesis. This proved to be a very good method for the first 
paper, Hellsmark and Jacobsson (2009), since we received many helpful comments from the 
interviewees, on both general and specific issues. Since the interviewees were not 
122 
 
anonymous, I believe that this method motivated them to read the material more carefully 
than they otherwise might have done. 
The method has, therefore, also been used for the chapters covering the case study 
countries, Chapters V-VIII, and has generated broad responses from the interviewees in all 
the countries (from approximately 25 individuals). With only one exception (referring to the 
early history of biomass gasification in Finland), no major critique has been raised. All 
comments have been addressed and it has been possible to make the required corrections 
without any substantial editing.      
In addition, Chapters VII-VIII on Sweden and Finland were sent to three experts with a long 
history within the field for comments. They had previously not been interviewed since 
interviews had been made with others with similar knowledge and experience (but are now 
counted among the 89 interviewees above). Chapter III was carefully reviewed by 
Christopher Higman. These four experts have contributed to this study with detailed and 
general comments on its content, which have increased the quality and reliability of the 
study. 
In order to be able to construct the different cases, it was necessary to use various data 
sources beyond interviews (cf. triangulation (Yin, 2009)). Additional information was thus 
collected on four different levels. First, additional background data on the interviewees 
themselves were gathered before each interview, including his or her relationship to the 
project in question and related activities which may have been of direct interest. Second, 
data were collected on the specific projects and technologies with regard to their 
desirability, potential cost efficiency, well-to-wheel analysis or other assessments made on 
the project itself or the trajectory as a whole. Third, for each case study country, I surveyed 
reports, papers and other legal documents on the specific institutional framework 
concerning the electricity and fuel markets, policy strategies and assessments thereon, and 
the countries’ performance in relation to EU biofuel targets. Fourth, various documents 
published by the EU such as the EU directives on renewables were used.  
The first case study conducted was in Austria. It was a logical starting point, because it is the 
smallest of the case studies; it only includes one project, relatively few actors, and the 
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country has a relatively short history in terms of biomass gasification for the production of 
transportation fuels. Since it is small, hypotheses and ideas for the other countries could 
relatively quickly be generated.  
When the TIS framework was confronted with the empirical reality in Austria―which was 
dominated by a strong individual acting as a system builder―it became obvious that the 
framework had to be strengthened with respect to the role of the individual acting as the 
system builder. The concept of “transformative capacity” was borrowed from Giddens 
(1984a) as a means of analysing the nature of and limits to the system builder’s ability to 
contribute to the formation of a TIS. In the paper, it was argued that “If the limits to an 
individual’s transformative capacity are adequately identified, we can make a clearer 
separation between the role of individual system builders and that of public policymakers 
and specify when the latter need to step in to address system weaknesses that are beyond 
the individual’s sphere of influence.” (Hellsmark and Jacobsson, 2009, p. 5597). 
The Austrian case is very much an extreme case, where one individual had a significant 
impact on the development of the TIS. Nevertheless, it illustrates the value of having a 
distinctive, actor-oriented point of departure, and that such a point of departure can 
contribute to the analysis of the formation a TIS and the potential role of policy in 
stimulating what may be considered a strategically important field of knowledge. The 
observations made in Austria have thus strongly influenced the rest of the study and the 
formulation of the specific research questions presented in Chapter II. 
Following the Austrian case, it was important to start with Germany as soon as possible since 
it was the largest case of them all. It included the largest number of actors and several 
pivotal projects for developing the TIS of biomass gasification. The German case was also 
dominated by several actors not currently part of the TIS, but with extensive experience in 
fossil gasification―which may also prove important for the development of biomass 
gasification. 
The Swedish and Finnish cases were initiated as the interviews for the German case study 
were nearing completion. The interviews for Sweden and Finland were done very much in 
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parallel, since the history of the development of the TIS in the two countries has largely been 
mutually dependent.  
Each case study required many back-and-forth trips to these countries, since each trip 
(except the last) generated new insights, questions and actors that should be interviewed. 
The observations made in each case have been continuously summarised in non-published 
case study reports to keep track of the evolution of the history in each country and to be 
able to construct the stories as they unfolded. These reports have served as the basis for 
writing Chapters V-VIII. 
Preliminary versions of the chapters in the thesis were presented and commented on in 
various fora. The first version of the technology chapter was presented at the 12th Reform 
Group meeting in Salzburg, Austria, in September 2007. The Austrian case was presented 
twice, first as a conference paper at the Dime Conference in September 2008, in Bordeaux, 
France, and the policy conclusions from the case were discussed with policymakers at the 
Swedish Energy Agency at a seminar in October 2008. A synthesis of tentative conclusions 
for all four countries was presented at yet another (and larger) seminar for policymakers at 
the Swedish Energy Agency in April 2009. The preliminary policy conclusions for the 
European Union outlined in Chapter XI were presented and commented on during a 
conference arranged by the Swedish Energy Agency in May 2009 (see Table 4.1). Comments 
received were incorporated into this thesis alongside those made from reviewers. These 
comments have significantly contributed to the final version of thesis.  
Of course, it would have been ideal to discuss the preliminary conclusions in closer 
cooperation with policymakers in the three other countries and at the European Union level. 
However, such meetings were not set up due to lack of time. Nevertheless, it is still argued 
that the method used increased the reliability and validity of the study as a whole. 
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Chapter V103                                                                                    
Austria 
 
 
The Austrian history of biomass gasification is a long one in which extensive experimentation 
has taken place since the early-1900s. These experiments have been directed towards 
developing mobile gasifiers such as those developed in Sweden during the Second World 
War (see Chapter III), as well as stationary applications. If developed, the stationary small-
scale technologies could play an important role in Austria since there are many small district 
heating (DH) networks that are not currently being utilised for power production, as 
conventional CHP technologies cannot be made competitive in small sizes.104  
During the 1990s, there was renewed interest in increasing electricity production from 
various new renewable resources such as wind, solar, small-scale hydro, and biomass. This 
interest was followed up by a wide range of development incentives provided by Austria’s 
provinces. 
In the light of the desire to increase electricity production from renewable resources, the 
Technical University of Vienna (TU Vienna) developed the fast internal circulating fluidised 
bed (FICFB) gasification process to enable electricity production based on small DH networks 
in the early-1990s. At the centre of this development, and of this case, is the individual and 
academic system builder in focus, Professor Hermann Hofbauer from TU-Vienna. Largely due 
to his efforts, a network of advocates for the technology could be formed and a 
demonstration plant was built in the town of Güssing in 2001.  
Over time, further incentives to continue experimenting with the technology were provided 
by the EU biofuel Directive 2003/20/EC, and the actors began exploring the technology for 
                                                      
103 Most of this chapter was previously published in Hellsmark and Jacobsson (2009). 
104 Even if fixed bed gasification has been of historic importance in Austria, it has little to do with what is 
currently happening there and will, therefore, not be further be dealt with in this section. 
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the poly-generation of transportation fuels, electricity and heat.105 Since then, this has 
developed into one of the nine most promising projects for realising biomass gasification for 
the production of second-generation transportation fuels and other chemicals in Europe.  
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section focuses on the interactions 
between actors and the characteristics of the emerging technological innovation system 
(TIS). The focus is on how the system builders act to create the emerging structure of the TIS, 
both by building the structure directly and by strengthening the various functions outlined in 
Chapter II. 
The second section provides answers to the research questions (as specified in Chapter II). 
The discussion will start with discussing who have acted as the system builder and describe 
the nature and extent of his transformative capacity. The focus then shifts to analysing and 
explaining the limits of the system builder’s transformative capacity, identifying main system 
weaknesses, and discussing the potential role of the system builder and policymakers in 
addressing these weaknesses. The third section of this chapter presents the main 
conclusions. 
5.1 The formation of a biomass TIS in Austria 
This section contains a descriptive analysis of the first 15 years of the emergence of an 
Austrian TIS centred on fast internal circulating fluidised bed (FICFB) biomass gasification. 
The analysis is divided into three parts. The first part covers the early network formation 
leading to the construction of the first plant in 2001. The second covers knowledge 
development centred on this first materialisation of the technology. The third covers the 
processes by which a second plant was constructed, as well as changes in the institutional 
context that impeded further market formation. 
                                                      
105 Domestic production of first-generation biodiesel from food crops has existed since the early-1990s 
(Wörgetter et al., 2002; EC, 2003). However, the directive mandates all member states to increase their share of 
biofuels or other renewable fuels in the transportation sector by 2 percent by 2005 and 5.75 percent by 2010 (EC, 
2003). Austria has been one of the few countries in Europe to have significantly increased their production and 
consumption of first-generation fuels. In 2007, the share of transportation fuels was 2.77 percent, compared to 
the EU average of 2.6 percent, and where almost all fuels consumed were domestically produced from 
agricultural crops (Eurostat, 2009). Austria is, however, far from reaching the 5.75 target by 2010. The new 
directive 2009/28/EC, which mandates a 10 percent share by 2020, will increase the incentives for renewable 
transportation fuels even further. 
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5.1.1 The formation of a network and the construction of the Güssing plant 
This story begins with Hermann Hofbauer, Professor of Chemical Process Engineering and 
Fluidisation at the Department of Chemical Engineering, Technical University in Vienna. 
Hofbauer finished his PhD thesis on fluidised bed coal gasification in 1983. Ten years later, 
his curiosity drove him back to this technology but this time using biomass as a feed-stock, 
since he was convinced of its usefulness for environmental reasons (influence on the 
direction of search). He employed a PhD student who built a laboratory-scale (10kW) 
gasification process for biomass, drawing on Hofbauer’s previous work (knowledge 
development) (Hofbauer, 2007).  
Christian Aichernig was the head of research and development at the leading capital goods 
producer Austrian Energy & Environment (AE&E) in the 1990s. AE&E mainly provided gas 
cleaning, waste incineration equipment, and fluidised bed boilers for biomass and coal, and 
was successful at the European and global levels. AE&E collaborated with Professor 
Hofbauer in flue gas cleaning technology, and also co-funded his research on biomass 
fluidised bed gasification. With support from AE&E (resource mobilisation), the 10kW gasifier 
was scaled up to a 100kW plant (entrepreneurial experimentation) for the purposes of 
supplying heat and power on a small scale.106  
At the end of the 1990s, Professor Hofbauer went to an annual biomass conference held in 
the town of Güssing. He gave a lecture on the novel technology he was working on and 
argued that it was ready to be scaled up. This was timely, as the Mayor of Güssing was 
looking for a novel technology to supply heat and power to the town. Güssing had well 
developed norms (informal institution) about being self-sufficient when it came to its energy 
supply and that the supply should be based on renewable energy sources. It had already 
built a biodiesel plant as well as a district heating system, and lacked only a supply of 
renewable power to become independent.107 The Mayor and the chief technician, Reinhard 
                                                      
106 There is a small scale trajectory for district heating in Austria. There are about 1,000 small DH systems (2-4 
MW heat), each of which could provide the base for an installed capacity of 200-400 kWel of electricity (Kopetz, 
2007). These systems are situated in villages that are distant from the natural gas grid (Lauber, 2007). 
107 Two Swedish pioneers (the district councils of Enköping and Växjö in Sweden) in conventional biomass CHP 
had a similar driving force (Hellsmark, 2005; McCormick and Kåberger, 2007). 
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Koch, liked Professor Hofbauer’s technical solution and decided to build such a plant in 
Güssing. 
Professor Hofbauer then approached Aichernig at AE&E to determine if they could deliver 
the plant. Aichernig was happy to undertake the industrial project but had to overcome a 
significant obstacle―convincing AE&E’s management to supply a technology at a scale that 
was much smaller than their normal plants (which started at 30MW fuel power). 
Management, however, eventually agreed to construct the plant as a research and 
development project. At that time, management saw biomass as the future for fluidised bed 
technology but there were still uncertainties regarding exactly how biomass would be used. 
Gasifying the biomass was one of several options. It was, in principle, an attractive 
technology, as it promised high efficiency electricity production and a good heat supply. 
Furtheremore, AE&E had a good relationship with Professor Hofbauer. As a result, it was 
seen as an interesting technology to experiment with, particularly since demand for 
conventional boilers was low at the time. The decisive factor, however, was that Güssing was 
a real project and they could receive substantial subsidies for the engineering work (Kaiser, 
2008) (through RENET, see below). After two years of work, TU Vienna and AE&E had 
defined the project and the contract was signed in 2000. 
Another major hurdle was financing the project, although it was eventually possible to 
mobilise the financial resources required. The most important source was a government risk 
absorption scheme that made it possible for Güssing to secure a bank loan where the risk 
was absorbed by the lender.108 The loan amounted to about 45 percent of the total funding 
(Aichernig, 2007). The rest was largely provided by the EU and Austrian regional 
development funds. These were accessible because Güssing was considered to be in an 
underdeveloped region.109 As a result, large subsidies were awarded for the construction of 
this demonstration plant (resource mobilisation). 
                                                      
108 As the lender, FFG absorbed the risks and the bank did not need to add a risk premium. Additionally, if the 
project failed, the loan would not have to be repaid. 
109 Güssing is located in Burgenland, which is a small province in southeastern Austria. With the fall of the Iron 
Curtain and access to EU regional development funds, Burgenland has invested heavily in bringing people and 
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Parallel to his work in defining the project with AE&E, Hofbauer was also the driving force in 
the organisation of a “Competence Network for Energy and Biomass” consisting of Güssing, 
AE&E, TU Vienna and the regional electrical utility Energie Versorgung Niederösterreich. The 
network received funding for seven years from the Ministry of Economics and Labour to 
establish a competence centre called RENET, which became the first of its kind in Austria 
(institutional change). Professor Hofbauer was appointed its spokesman and scientific 
director. 
The formation of RENET was important not only for providing funding for AE&E, but for two 
additional reasons as well. First, Professor Hofbauer was able to expand his group from one 
PhD student to over ten PhD students and one to two senior researchers working full-time 
on biomass gasification. In addition, many Master students were given the opportunity to 
write their diploma theses on biomass gasification. Therefore, RENET enhanced knowledge 
development considerably and provided a base from which human resources could later be 
mobilised (resource mobilisation).  
Second, an organisational structure was established within the RENET programme that 
enabled the work to progress very quickly (Hofbauer, 2007), in which the plant operator at 
Güssing collaborates with the scientific staff and industrial partners. This structure allow the 
three partners to test ideas and learn from each other in unique ways, and has been one of 
the most important factors for the fast progression of the work at Güssing (Hofbauer, 2007) 
(see more below). 
At the beginning of 2001, it became evident to Christian Aichernig that the owners of AE&E, 
Babcock would go bankrupt. In response, the gasification network, along with its key 
individuals Professor Hermann Hofbauer, Reinhard Koch, the mayor of Güssing, and 
Christian Aichernig, met to decide what to do to secure the survival of the project. They 
decided to form a new company, Repotec. When Babcock went bankrupt in mid-2001, 
Repotec had, therefore, already been formed. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
companies to the region. Renewable energy, coupled with the wish to become self-reliant, has been one method 
for developing the region.  
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After the bankruptcy, AE&E was acquired by an Austrian investor (Mirko Kovats) who chose 
not to renew the contract with the Güssing plant. AE&E was thus deliberately de-linked from 
the Güssing plant. Instead, Repotec received the Güssing contract and a number of 
engineers formerly at AE&E went to work for Repotec.110 The Güssing plant was finished in 
2002 and, with its completion, the first major entrepreneurial experimentation for biomass 
gasification based on fluidised bed technology in Austria had been carried out. 
5.1.2 Stalling markets despite good incentives, and extensive knowledge 
formation 
Austria implemented a national feed-in law in 2002 to promote the diffusion of technologies 
using renewable energy sources. Rapid diffusion followed for conventional biomass-fuelled 
plants (CHP and condense) as well as wind turbines and solar cells.111 With the new law, 
electricity generated from biomass was granted a fixed price of up to €0.16/kWh for 13 years 
of operation. The highest rates were issued to plants of up to 2MW of electricity and that 
were running on wood chips or straw. The Güssing plant benefited from this since it was 
designed for 2MW of electricity, which led to an additional source of revenue. 
With the new high feed-in rates for electricity from biomass and the higher electrical 
efficiency that was expected with the Güssing technology (as compared to conventional CHP 
plants), the future for the technology looked promising and it received significant attention. 
Indeed, following the construction of the plant (materialisation) Güssing received a very 
large number of visitors (Koch, 2007), some of whom explored the option of building a 
similar plant (Aichernig, 2007; Hofbauer, 2007). However, only one eventually materialised 
in Austria (so far, writing in 2010), while a few plants are planned in Germany,112 France and 
Sweden (see Chapter VII).   
The market has been very slow to materialise in Austria and elsewhere for a number of 
reasons. The first reason is likely the relative immaturity of the new technology when 
                                                      
110 The intellectual property rights were owned by TU Vienna and AE&E. Repotec has access to the part owned 
by TU Vienna. The part owned by AE&E went into reconstruction following the bankruptcy. Repotec has a 
licence agreement with AE&E. 
111 Production rose from 0.6TWh in 2002 to close to 4TWh in 2006 (E-control, 2007). 
112 At least one plant in Germany is under construction in the city of Ulm by the regional utility Stadtwerke Ulm 
for combined heat and electricity production (Vitek and Sommer, 2008). 
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marketed in 2002. It had low availability, high operating costs due to the need to use high 
quality and expensive feed-stock, and the need to optimise, change or adjust several of the 
plant’s components to obtain stable and cost efficient operations―which in turn required 
more and increasingly specialised staff. These initial deficiencies resulted in a high price for 
the electricity in relation to conventional technologies.  
However, the price-performance ratio of new technologies is often poor initially but 
improves with accumulated experience. At this time, at least two techno-economic 
assessments pointed to biomass gasification as “ … sufficiently advanced to justify [...] pre-
commercial plant(s)” (Bridgwater and Bohlár-Nordenkampf, 2005, p. 341). It was also argued 
that the erection of such plants was the only way to resolve the remaining uncertainties 
(Bolhàr-Nordenkampf, 2004; Bridgwater and Bolhàr-Nordenkampf, 2005).113 Still, there were 
disagreements about whether these uncertainties could be resolved or not, and AE&E’s 
standpoint was a very cautious one.  
The second―and more fundamental―reason was the absence of a larger company that was 
prepared to tackle these uncertainties and commercialise the technology. Although it is 
common for new technology-based firms to drive discontinuous technical changes 
(Utterback, 1994) they sometimes need to enter alliances with incumbents that possess 
complementary assets; such alliances are common in the biotechnology industry. Similarly, 
but for partly different reasons, new technology-based firms cannot “go it alone” in the 
power plant industry. In this industry, financial guarantees are given to back up a contract 
where the technology supplier assures a certain level of plant availability. If the technology is 
not available at the specified rate, the technology supplier must pay a fine specified in the 
contract, which usually corresponds to the losses associated with the lower level of 
availability (or part of these losses). Repotec is a small firm with five employees and cannot, 
therefore, provide such financial guarantees. Nor does it have the manpower to build a 
complete plant.  
                                                      
113 As described later in this section, extensive research and development has addressed many of these 
immaturities, improving the overall price-performance ratio and allowing for the exploration of new and more 
valuable products than heat and electricity such as BioSNG. 
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For these reasons, Repotec needed a partner. According to Bohlàr-Nordenkampf (2007) and 
Kaiser (2008) at AE&E, as well as Aichernig (2007) at Repotec, the original agreement was 
that Repotec would find the customers, design the plants and be the technology supplier, 
while a reconstructed AE&E would be the general contractor who provided financial 
guarantees and built the plants.114 For AE&E, such an agreement would be a way to stay in 
contact with a technology for which they had competencies and a patent (Kaiser, 2008). 
As yet, the agreement has not led anywhere, for two main reasons. First, there was a 
perceived lack of clear demand for gasification plants from customers (Kaiser, 2008). 
However, a contributing factor to the poor demand may have been the recommendations by 
AE&E to potential customers to build a conventional combustion plant instead of a 
gasification plant (Hofbauer, 2007). Contrary to earlier expectations, AE&E had come to view 
gasification technology as less suitable for CHP purposes than steam boilers. Boiler 
performance had improved (e.g., through flue gas condensation and higher pressure), they 
were cheaper, and were a proven technology option, which allowed AE&E to provide 
guarantees for it that would be very risky in the case of gasification technology (Kaiser, 
2008). The technical risk, therefore, would have had to be shifted from the potential 
customer and technology supplier to society at large.  
The second reason was the now booming market for conventional boilers, which meant that 
AE&E, as opposed to the time when the Güssing plant was built, had no spare capacity to 
work with gasification projects. As a consequence, the direction of search for AE&E was 
firmly set on improving conventional steam cycle technology as a way to use biomass as a 
means to reduce CO2 emissions (Kaiser, 2008). AE&E did not, therefore, become the 
industrial partner that could help commercialise and further develop the Austrian 
gasification knowledge base. 
The strong economic incentives provided by the feed-in law and a general interest in the 
technology from investors did not result in market formation, due at least in part to AE&E’s 
strategic decision to keep a distance from the technology. It is, of course, very common for 
                                                      
114 Kaiser (2008) also meant that if AE&E was not interested in building a plant, Repotec could do it but had to 
pay a fee to use the patent. 
137 
 
incumbents to make such strategic choices early in a technology’s development. Whereas 
the literature points to a set of reasons connected to mental filters and various sources of 
inertia as explanations (e.g., Utterback, 1994; Christensson, 1997; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2004), 
such a choice may be quite reasonable―why invest in a risky and poorly performing new 
technology when the market for conventional combustion plants is booming? Being the 
leading capital goods supplier in Austria, however, this strategic choice most likely weakened 
the legitimacy of the technology and obstructed the development of the TIS (legitimation). 
Even if market formation was poor, knowledge development and diffusion was strengthened. 
Knowledge development of the FICFB technology in Europe is centred on the Güssing plant, 
which is used as an experimental plant in addition to being a commercial one.115 Based on 
the RENET programme and complementary projects, advancements have been made in two 
main areas of research: plant availability and the costs associated with plant operation, and 
new and more advanced applications.  
In the first area of research, plant availability has been greatly improved116 and the work on 
reducing costs has involved minimising the amounts of waste heat, using cheaper feed-stock 
and improving gas cleaning (Koch, 2007). The second area of research involves different 
methods to upgrade the product gas from the current use of electricity and heat generation 
to more advanced applications that require a cleaner synthetic gas. The ultimate goal of the 
research is to develop a poly-generating plant that produces heat, electricity and a third high 
value product such as FT-diesel or BioSNG (Hofbauer, 2007).  
The main source of funding for the project is the EU, RENEW, Demo BioSNG, and a national 
programme called “Energy Systems of Tomorrow” (Institute of Chemical Engineering, 2006, 
30). The various research experiments are largely conducted as part of various international 
research and development projects.117 Indeed, the Güssing plant, with TU Vienna as a 
                                                      
115 More recent experiments with the technology have been initiated at the technical research institute ZSW in 
Stuttgart (see Chapter VI) and at Chalmers University of Technology in Göteborg (see Chapter VII).   
116 Operating experience as of mid-2007 surpassed 29,000 hours for the gas engine and 33,000 hours for the 
gasification process, and total plant availability has been established at well over 90 percent. 
117 The projects that are running at the plant are (autumn 2007): BioFiT – an EU-project within which the 
coordinator is VW and includes partners such as Shell, Daimler and Volvo. The objective in BioFiT is to 
develop the FT-synthesis from biomass gasification. Since 2006, they have had a pilot facility at Güssing where 
they are testing a range of different catalysts to produce FT-diesel (Koch, 2007). BioSNG – The work with 
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partner, has been put at the centre of a European research and development network in 
gasification technology. The boundaries of the technology at Güssing are continuously tested 
as a result of this constant knowledge development. And a third and high value BioSNG 
product was demonstrated by the end of 2009. With the establishment of RENET and the 
different international partners, this knowledge development has been diffused to a large 
number of actors. However, most of these are located in other parts of the EU, and a critical 
question for Austria is the ability of the Austrian TIS to benefit from this knowledge 
development. 
5.1.3 Construction of a new plant in Oberwart and changes to the feed-in 
law 
Repotec completed the pre-engineering process and managed to obtain all of the necessary 
permits to build a second plant in Oberwart, 30km from Güssing, just before the feed-in law 
expired at the end of 2004. The work was to be undertaken on behalf of the local utility 
BEGAS. When it was time to negotiate the contract, BEGAS wanted a guarantee of 7,500 
operating hours (Hofbauer, 2007). Repotec felt this was slightly high and only wanted to 
guarantee 7,300 hours (Aichernig, 2007). Ultimately, they did not reach an agreement.118 
Instead, another company, Ortner, was awarded the contract. This appears to have come as 
a surprise for most people in the gasification network in Austria, since Ortner had not been 
                                                                                                                                                                         
developing a SNG from the producer gas at the plant commenced around 2003. It started with a small test rig in 
the 2kW scale (Aichernig et. al. 2004). In 2007, they began building a 1MW BioSNG demo plant at Güssing, 
where they will produce a SNG with 97 percent methane content (Koch, 2007; Hofbauer, 2007). The main 
scientific partner is Paul-Scherrer Institute (PSI) in Switzerland and the main industrial partners are Swiss 
Electric and Conzepte Technik Umwelt AG (CTU). AER – The objective with the Absorption Enhanced 
Reforming (AER) project is to increase the hydrogen content in the gas to approximately 70 percent (Marquard-
Möllenstedt et al., 2004). The project is funded partly by the EU and is a co-operation between the Centre for 
Solar Energy and Hydrogen Research Baden-Württemberg (ZSW) in Germany and TU Vienna. The cooperation 
started around 2003 and since 2005, the Güssing plant has been involved as a large scale test bed for the process. 
ZSW is the patent owner of the technology and is now aiming to build a 10 MW plant in the town of Göppingen 
(Specht and Zuberbuhler, 2007). BioSOFC – An advanced application of the producer gas in solid oxide fuel 
cell (SOFC) is researched in cooperation with Austrian Bioenergy Center (ABC) in Graz and the department of 
Energy and Process Engineering, NTNU, in Trondheim (Aichernig et. al. 2004). The idea is to use the gas in a 
SOFC to achieve a high electrical efficiency, above 43 percent, with a high total efficiency of above 80 percent. 
The SOFC can only be used if advances in high temperature removal of dust, chlorine and sulphur components 
can also be accomplished (cf. (Stanghelle et al., 2007)). 
118 Repotec argued that these types of discussions should not be central to a contract when the plant is based on 
gasification technology. They prefer the clients to be deeply involved with the technology and understand the 
risks. The technology of the Oberwart plant is not developed to the stage of, say, that of a steam turbine CHP. 
However, they guaranteed 7.300 hours, limited by conditions such as them performing the maintenance and that 
it could be reached within six months of operations (Aichernig, 2007).  
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involved in the technology development at Güssing and had no prior track record in 
gasification. 
Ortner is an engineering company that normally does layout and design of large commercial 
buildings (including infrastructure such as piping). It has also developed expertise in 
environmental technologies such as waste-water treatment (Madl and Daxer, 2007). When 
its normal business was not performing well, however, it decided to diversify into power 
generation and constructed five plants between 2005 and 2007, four of which are based on 
biomass combustion of wood chips for CHP. It initially purchased all of the necessary 
equipment but has recently started producing the combustion chambers itself. In addition to 
biomass CHP, Ortner investigated the possibility of starting businesses in the field of 
alternative fuel. Consequently, it considered biomass gasification as a promising technology 
but moved into it more or less by accident when it was asked to construct the plant (Madl 
and Daxer, 2007).  
For the construction of the plant, BEGAS provided the basic design to Ortner119 but without 
first requesting Repotec’s co-operation (Aichernig, 2007). From an outsider’s perspective, 
this co-operation would appear to have been ideal, since Ortner is a general contractor that 
can build plants and have the engineering capacity and financial muscle for large projects 
but lack Repotec’s experience in biomass gasification. By excluding Repotec from further 
work in connection with the Oberwart plant, the biomass gasification network was 
disrupted. 
Ortner has high expectations for future business in the field. In 2007, it had three to four 
potential customers for similar plants, but need Oberwart as a show-case. In addition, it 
hoped to have a research and development project at the plant and build up its own 
knowledge on gasification. It is thus imperative for Ortner to succeed with the plant to be 
able to continue within the field. 
                                                      
119 At the beginning of the project, Ortner was unaware that there was a patent pending on the technology held 
by AE&E. Ortner was then granted a licence for one plant using the patented technology (Bolhàr-Nordenkampf, 
2008). 
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While Ortner is aware that it is taking a large risk, it is also taking action to minimise the risk 
of failure. The most important action is the collaboration (learning network) it has 
established with Professor Hofbauer at TU-Vienna, which has been formalised with meetings 
every two or three weeks during the early phase of plant construction. Professor Hofbauer 
has thus come to play a central role for ensuring the success of Oberwart, compensating, at 
least in part, for the above-mentioned disruption of the network. The significance of this 
goes far beyond the success or failure of the Oberwart plant―Professor Hofbauer is well 
aware of the powerful negative effects that failed experiments can have on the legitimation 
of a new technology. Two such experiments are Arbre in the UK and Värnamo in Sweden 
(see Chapter VII), which involved BIGCC120 technology in the late-1990s and which have 
obstructed further financing and development of that technology (Hofbauer, 2007). 
Efforts to build the TIS for gasified biomass in Austria, however, ran into a new obstacle in 
2006 when the feed-in law was revised. The initial national feed-in law of 2002 was 
successful in that it promoted a rapid diffusion of a range of technologies (Kopetz, 2007; 
Lauber, 2007). Yet, the feed-in rates were high and there was a strong back-lash from heavy 
industry, in particular the pulp and paper industry,121 which aligned itself to other 
organisations in an attempt to revise the law (Kopetz, 2007; Lauber, 2007). The back-lash 
was quite understandable and predictable, since the pulp and paper industry was excluded 
from receiving feed-in tariffs (despite a large production of biopower) but still had to pay the 
higher rates (Dworak and Zettl, 2008). The subsequent revision led not only to institutional 
uncertainty but, most importantly, to obstructed market formation.  
The main change has been the introduction of a cap on the funding.122 The annual additional 
support for the 2007−2011 period is only €17 million, of which 30 percent is for biomass-
                                                      
120 BIGCC (Biomass Integrated Gasifier Combined Cycle), which is a technology that potentially can increase 
the electrical net output (see Chapter III).  
121 The pulp and paper industry lobbied very hard against the feed-in law and succeeded in changing the 
regulations (Dworak and Zettl, 2008). The industry felt that the feed-in law was discriminating against the high 
level of bioenergy utilisation and the high energy efficiency efforts of the companies. In addition, an increased 
use of bioenergy was perceived as a threat to their wood supply (Dworak and Zettl, 2008).  
122 Even the Director of the Austrian Biomass Association, Heinz Kopetz, is in favour of a cap, except for 
smaller CHP plants, since there is no good technology for such applications and there is a worldwide market for 
those who develop it. For larger CHP plants, he suggests an annual cap of 20-40MW. The key reason for this is 
that there is a paucity of district heating grids and many new plants waste heat. He argues, convincingly, that 
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related technologies. Moreover, the number of years for which an investment is eligible for 
support was reduced.123 Since the change in the law, business for gasification has stopped 
completely (Aichernig, 2007; Madl and Daxer, 2007) and has slowed down considerably for 
all other types of renewable power generation (Lauber, 2007). Instead, Ortner expects 
Germany and Italy to be its main future markets for the technology (Madl and Daxer, 2007). 
Repotec has also written off Austria as a possible future market and instead is hoping for the 
French, German and Swedish markets to materialise (Aichernig, 2007). 
5.2 The system builders’ transformative capacity, system weaknesses and 
the potential role of policy 
In this section, the four research questions specified in Chapter II will be revisited. Answers 
to each question will be provided for the case of Austria by analysing the previously outlined 
history. The research questions were formulated as: 
1) Who act as system builders in the different national contexts? 
2) What characterises the nature and extent of the system builders’ transformative 
capacity? 
a) How do the system builders make use of the general structure in which they are 
embedded to form or strengthen the structure and the various functions of the 
TIS? 
b) To which extent do the system builders manage to strengthen the structure and 
functions of the TIS?   
3) What are the limits to the system builders’ transformative capacity and how can 
these be explained? 
4) Given these limits, which system weaknesses remain to be resolved by system builders 
and policymakers on different levels (national and EU)? 
 
This section is divided into two parts. Research questions one and two will be analysed in the 
first, and research questions three and four in the second. The discussion will begin by 
                                                                                                                                                                         
heat should be the main product and that power production should follow from heat production (Kopetz, 2007). 
However, a cap blocks the market for the novel technology of gasified biomass. 
123 The projects are awarded on a first-come, first-served basis, and a cap means that a project may not be 
funded. This is problematic, as the work to generate an application costs about 10 percent of the total budget for 
the project. Additionally, it takes longer and is more expensive to put together an application for a novel 
technology such as gasification than for one based on combustion. The new system, therefore, discriminates 
against new technologies (Achernig, 2007). 
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briefly discussing who has been acting as the system builders, and describing the nature and 
extent of their transformative capacity. The focus then shifts towards analysing and 
explaining the limits of the system builders’ transformative capacity, identifying the main 
system weaknesses, and discussing the potential role of system builders and policymakers 
for addressing this weakness. 
5.2.1 The nature and extent of the system builders’ transformative capacity 
With respect to RQ1, it has been illustrated that it is primarily Professor Hofbauer who acts 
as the system builder. Although the network that he has been instrumental in forming has 
conducted some system building activities, the focus of the analysis will be Professor 
Hofbauer. He not only initiated the formation of the TIS but remains very important to its 
further development.   
As explained in Chapter II, the nature of the transformative capacity of the system builder is 
revealed by his/her ability to build and strengthen the structure and different functions in 
the formation of a new TIS. The limit to his/her capacity is, however, determined not only by 
the actions of the system builder but also by endogenous and exogenous forces at work that 
either pave his/her way or restrict his/her impact. The transformative capacity of Professor 
Hofbauer is far-reaching, and to some extent he has managed to strengthen all the key 
processes. There are, however, significant counter-forces that, at least temporarily, limit his 
transformative capacity by weakening some of the functions.  
The nature and extent of Professor Hofbauers transformative capacity will be analysed by 
first describing how he has managed to strengthen the various functions of the TIS by 
making use of the general structure in which he is embedded. The analysis will then turn to 
describing the specific system dynamics between the functions and structure of the TIS, i.e. 
the motor of the TIS (Hekkert et al., 2007; Suurs, 2009), which has emerged as a result of his 
transformative capacity. 
Influence on the direction of search 
Professor Hofbauer is the dominant agenda-setting force with regards to technology choice, 
plant design and choice of application to be developed. Indeed, it was on his research that 
the plant concept and design was based. He has thereby set the general direction 
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(technology trajectory) to which others also contribute. By defining the opportunity in the 
field, he has also made it attractive for firms to enter the TIS, both as customers (market 
formation) and as suppliers (entrepreneurial experimentation).124 
His impact has been facilitated by the external factor “climate change debate” and the 
associated increased importance of the efficient utilisation of biomass. At the same time, the 
political debate in Austria has created controversy around using biomass for electricity 
production and the feed-in system was recently changed, such that it now discourages 
investors from entering the field. Additionally, combustion is the dominant substitute for 
gasification, and there remains very high demand for boilers and other such equipment. The 
strong demand in the conventional business has, of course, made the search for new and 
alternative technologies less attractive to the incumbent actors (Bolhàr-Nordenkampf, 
2007). 
Resource mobilisation 
Professor Hofbauer has managed to attract several crucial resources for the further 
development of the TIS. Due to his longstanding cooperation with AE&E, he managed to 
secure funding for the first entrepreneurial experiments. Working with his contacts in AE&E, 
he helped convince management at the company to sign the contract for the first large-scale 
demonstration plant in Güssing, despite scepticism surrounding the new technology.  
In terms of financing the knowledge development at the Güssing plant, he established RENET 
and became its scientific director. With the long-term financing provided through RENET, he 
substantially expanded his research in the field. With the RENET platform, together with the 
Güssing plant that is now part of the TIS structure, he attracted many European research 
programmes and partners that provided funding to further the technology development at 
Güssing.  
His ability to create RENET was facilitated by a strong trend in public research and 
development policy (not just in Austria) to establish competence centres. This exogenous 
                                                      
124 In an early phase, new problem and possible solutions are loosely defined, which means that no distinct 
“technology style” (cf. Hughes (1987)) or “dominant design” (cf. Utterback (1994)) is set. One of Professor 
Hofbauer’s contributions has been to define one of three trajectories (see Chapter III) and to organise a 
knowledge network for the further development of this alternative. 
144 
 
factor strengthened the key process and enabled him to mobilise resources that, 
presumably, may not otherwise have been available.  
Along with other actors, Professor Hofbauer also played a direct role in finding financing for 
the Güssing plant. The process of mobilising the financial resources for plant construction 
was facilitated by the location of Güssing in what is considered an underdeveloped region—
allowing them to obtain funds for regional development that may not otherwise have been 
accessible. 
There are also exogenous factor that weaken this key process and thereby counteract the 
efforts undertaken by Professor Hofbauer. In particular, the strong demand in AE&E’s core 
business has made it very difficult for Professor Hofbauer to persuade it to contribute 
resources to the development of the TIS after the restructuring of the company. Instead, it 
has left the TIS for biomass gasification. 
Entrepreneurial experimentation and materialisation 
With the resources that Professor Hofbauer has managed to attract, he has considerably 
strengthened the processes of entrepreneurial experimentation and materialisation in 
Austria. He has played a significant role by directly or indirectly enabling all of the 
entrepreneurial experimentation that have taken place in the country. 
Working with PhD students, he built the first 10kW and 100kW pilot plants, and was also 
highly involved in the design of the 10MW plant in Güssing. During construction of the 
second plant of the same type in Austria, he was active as the technical adviser to the plant 
constructor Ortner.  
Since its completion, the Güssing plant has become a resource to which additional 
experiments can be connected. For example, there have been experiments with 1MW 
BioSNG, FT synthesis and advanced gas cleaning. 
An exogenous factor that he could not influence was the acquisition of AE&E by the US-
based company Babcock, which later went bankrupt. The network managed these events, 
however, by setting up a new company, Repotec, which took over the contract from AE&E 
and completed the plant construction. 
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Knowledge development and diffusion 
Since he started with biomass gasification at the beginning of the 1990s, Professor Hofbauer 
has been able to significantly strengthen the process of knowledge development and 
diffusion. He started with one PhD student and has now about 20. Between 1991 and 2008, 
he supervised over 50 PhD students and 115 diploma theses. He has written, either by 
himself or in collaboration with others, 170 scientific reports, papers and book contributions, 
and has given more than 120 presentations on gasification or related subjects. All of these 
activities, as well as some consulting work, have diffused knowledge on gasification within 
academia and industry.  
Market formation  
Professor Hofbauer’s impact on market formation has been limited to providing an 
investment opportunity for the mayor of Güssing. Two favourable exogenous factors have 
influenced this function: the willingness to become self-reliant in terms of energy in the 
town of Güssing, and the generous feed-in tariffs. As a result of political processes, the tariffs 
have been changed and have significantly weakened the process of market formation. These 
political processes clearly lie beyond the capacity of Professor Hofbauer’s influence alone.  
Legitimation  
Professor Hofbauer strengthened the process of legitimation when he spoke in favour of the 
technology. However, the absence of a strategic decision by the leading capital goods 
supplier AE&E to promote the technology after its reconstruction presumably counteracted 
his influence. By recommending conventional combustion technology instead of gasification 
technology, AE&E probably also weakened the process of market formation before the 
change in the feed-in law. Moreover, the revised feed-in law reflects the deteriorating 
legitimacy of renewable fuels in general and biomass-based power production in particular. 
Development of positive externalities 
The main function that appears to have been strengthened through positive external 
economies is knowledge diffusion. This has been achieved in two ways. First, by being 
instrumental in setting up a learning network, Professor Hofbauer has facilitated the sharing 
and diffusion of information within Austria, as well as with parties in the EU. Second, by 
being involved in a continuous learning process in both Güssing and Oberwart, Professor 
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Hofbauer is the node through which experiences are shared between the two plants. This 
node is of particular importance after the disruption in the biomass gasification network 
following the exclusion of Repotec from the construction of the Oberwart plant. 
A strong motor of the TIS 
A strong motor was initiated when Professor Hofbauer managed to mobilise resources 
(resource mobilisation) from AE&E. Based on his previous knowledge in coal gasification, he 
managed to materialise the technology in the form of various pilot plants and thereby 
conduct the first entrepreneurial experiments for realising small-scale CHP production based 
on biomass gasification. These plants were important for advancing knowledge development 
to a stage where he felt that the technology was ready to be scaled up to a commercial-sized 
plant.  
By making use of the general structure―in terms of the EEG (Erneubare-Energien-Gesetz), a 
risk absorption scheme, EU regional development funding and the interest of the town of 
Güssing to become independent of fossil resources―he was able to set up a network of 
actors with an interest to pursue the technology and the Güssing facility could be 
materialised. The Güssing plant then became a very important resource in itself, as further 
knowledge networks could be setup and further resources mobilised (RENET and several EU 
projects) for even more entrepreneurial experiments, strengthening knowledge 
development.  
These positive interconnections between functions and structure have resulted in the 
materialisation of a science and technology infrastructure, carrying its own operating costs, 
and enabling a very rapid technology development. The actors within the TIS were able to 
develop the technology from laboratory-scale in 1994, and simple heat and power 
production at the Güssing plant in 2002 to a plant showcasing many advanced experiments 
and operations. The cost of operations has been reduced, efficiency has increased, 
advancements have been made in gas cleaning, and a BioSNG demonstration has been 
constructed along with pilot projects for FT diesel production, fuel cells, and so on.  
By strengthening the technology structure, he also became attractive for other actors with 
similar interests to collaborate with (strengthening the actor structure). As a result, he could 
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build strong knowledge networks around the plant and the plant became a collective 
resource in the network, enabling further resource mobilisation, knowledge development, 
entrepreneurial experimentation and materialisation. The strong motor is, thus, primarily 
based on the positive interactions between the processes of resource mobilisation, 
entrepreneurial experimentation, materialisation and knowledge development and diffusion 
and the structural elements of technology, actor and knowledge networks. 
To conclude, Professor Hofbauer made use of the general structure by:  
1) Utilising existing technology structure by drawing on coal gasification and combining 
it with knowledge of biomass for creating small-scale systems. 
2) Mobilising resources by attracting a) incumbent capital goods manufacturer AEE 
through personal contacts to explore the small-scale CHP application, and b) 
international collaborations to develop the technology by offering a research 
platform. 
3) Mobilising resources available due to a) the town of Güssing, being situated in an 
underdeveloped region and with an interest to become independent on imported 
resources, b) the existence of EU and Austrian regional development funds, and c) 
the EEG and a risk absorption scheme. 
 
As a result, he has been able to strengthen all of the functions of the TIS, but has been 
particularly successful in strengthening resource mobilisation, entrepreneurial 
experimentation, materialisation, and knowledge development and diffusion. He has, 
furthermore, been able to add to the actor structure by attracting further actors to the field, 
strengthening networks by setting up various knowledge networks, strengthening the 
technology structure of the TIS by constructing pilot and demonstration plants, and enabling 
a second commercial CHP plant in Oberwart.  
5.2.2 Limits of the system builders’ transformative capacity, system 
weaknesses and the potential role of policy 
Although it was previously argued that the system builder has been able to strengthen all of 
the functions, there are still limits to his transformative capacity. These limits have resulted 
in a weak motor and weak structural elements of the TIS. In this section, the limits of the 
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system builder will be identified. The resulting system weaknesses and the potential role of 
system builders and policymakers for resolving these are also discussed. 
Beyond the influence of Professor Hofbauer, the weak motor in the TIS started when AE&E 
chose to exit and focus on conventional combustion technology. AE&E, being the leading 
capital goods supplier in Austria, probably weakened both market formation and the 
legitimation of the technology by its strategic choice. The legitimacy of the technology was 
further weakened when the use of biomass for electricity purposes was strongly questioned 
and capped. The subsequent change in the feed-in law blocked market formation for gasified 
biomass and weakened the function influence on the direction of search. 
The weak motor negatively influenced the structural development of the TIS, primarily since 
new Austrian actors have been discouraged from entering the TIS. Without a strong actor 
base, influential political networks cannot be formed. To date, mainly international partners 
have been attracted to join the knowledge network and―save for the customer of the 
second plant, BEGAS, and its constructor Ortner―there is a lack of financially solid Austrian 
actors that are ready to back up the technology and develop the TIS. The troublesome 
relationship between some key Austrian actors has also obstructed the formation of political 
networks. These networks are, however, essential in forming influential political coalitions 
that can align the necessary institutions. In the prevailing situation, where the legitimacy of 
biomass in electricity production has been weakened, a strong coalition is needed to address 
this issue and induce the required institutional alignment. Otherwise, Austria may well find 
itself in a position where the benefits of the encompassing knowledge development are 
appropriated on by other actors elsewhere in the EU. Hence:  
The main system weakness is lack of actors and political networks with an interest in 
aligning the institutional framework in support of the technology.  
The Austrian government has been very active in supporting the build-up of knowledge 
through the competence centre RENET and other sources of funding. The system builder and 
the larger network of actors have also been able to access considerable amounts of EU 
funding for furthering knowledge and technology development. The actors that are needed 
to develop the technology appear to be there. Naturally, the Güssing facility is of particular 
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importance since it provides the researchers with the necessary infrastructure for 
conducting further experiments, while the facility itselves carries its own operating costs. 
With time and continued research and development support from the EU and the national 
government, a breakthrough in the poly-generation of heat, electricity and BioSNG clearly 
appears to be possible in Austria. 
Yet, despite this impressive Austrian achievement in gasified biomass, the Austrian 
government has obstructed the exploitation of that knowledge base. In particular, it has not 
implemented a market formation policy that differentiates gasification technology from 
conventional biomass technologies and has, thus, not provided the technology with the 
necessary preconditions for becoming an attractive field for new customers and suppliers. A 
case in point is AE&E, which could have re-entered the TIS after the reconstruction had there 
been a clear demand that could have balanced the huge demand for biomass usage with 
fluidised bed combustion.  
As specified above, main structural weakness concerns the lack of necessary political 
networks for biomass gasification in Austria. Such a network would, for instance, push for 
special feed-in conditions for innovative power technologies and/or special conditions for 
BioSNG and biomass-to-liquid technologies. Extending the current knowledge network into a 
strong political network is, arguably, beyond the capacity of the system builder Professor 
Hofbauer; further support must come from policy. 
In order to form a strong political network, some or all of the major technology suppliers 
(such as AE&E, Ortner and Andritz) must be included in it. Andritz is a world leader in 
supplying equipment to the pulp and paper industry and recently bought the Finnish firm 
Carbona, which has strong competencies in biomass gasification (Salo, 2008; see Chapter 
VIII). This acquisition is part of a movement among dominant actors in the Swedish and 
Finnish pulp and paper industries to integrate gasification technology at some of their sites 
for BtL production. With integration, the industry can benefit from additional renewable 
production of electricity, the production of biofuels or BioSNG, and access to process heat. 
Paper mills involve a vast flow of biomass resources, including residues that cannot be used 
in the production process. This flow of biomass can be expanded at a considerably lower 
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cost in the mills than at a competing standalone site (see Chapter III).125 With the integration 
of the Güssing technology, the Austrian pulp and paper industry may thus have the potential 
of adding additional streams of income. 
The political network would, of course, be considerably strengthened if it included the pulp 
and paper industry.126 However, up until recently, there has been little awareness of the 
potential for biofuel production in the industry and it is not part of the Austrian network for 
biomass gasification (Dworak and Zettl, 2008). Indeed, for reasons mentioned above, the 
industry was instrumental in altering the design of the feed-in law that blocks market 
formation for the technology and induces Repotec to exploit its technology abroad, together 
with foreign partners.127 
The position of the pulp and paper industry in Austria is, however, probably not set in stone. 
Attention is now being given to this issue in the industry (Dworak and Zettl, 2008),128  and an 
opening now exists for “governance on the inside” which understands policy as politics 
rather than management (Smith and Stirling, 2007, p. 364): 
“In ‘governance on the inside’, processes of engagement, dialogue and deliberation 
require explicit and careful attention to questions of power, authority, consent, 
dissent and, above all, legitimacy.” 
 
Arguably, a policy actor in such a process could seek to align the interests of the pulp and 
paper industry (including its equipment suppliers) with those of the emerging TIS for gasified 
biomass. We acknowledge that the transformative capacity of policymakers is “ ... 
structurally constrained by historically established commitments, embodied in 
infrastructures, networks, institutions, practices and discourses” (Smith and Stirling, 2007, p. 
355). Yet policymakers may attempt to use its constrained agency to provide incentives that 
                                                      
125 There have been many studies pointing to an integrative approach as being less costly than in using 
standalone plants for BioSNG and BtL production cf. (Ekbom et al., 2003; Larson et al., 2003; DENA, 2006; 
Larson et al., 2006; McKeough and Kurkela, 2008). 
126 The pulp and paper  industry is a dominant one in Austria, with an annual turnover of €3,769 million in 2007 
http://www.austropapier.at/. 
127 These include Conzepte Technik Umwelt from Switzerland and the Stuttgart-based company M+W Zander 
FE GmbH. 
128 Indeed, Dworak (2008) suggests that biofuel will be an important issue for the industry. 
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enlarge the knowledge network to include the pulp and paper industry and its equipment 
suppliers and eventually transform it into a political network.  
These incentives may be varied, but two opportunities for policymakers will be described 
here. First, they could take the lead in funding and designing a biorefinery129 programme. 
Biorefineries are one of the key innovation issues for the European pulp and paper industry. 
Although pilot plants are being built in mills owned by international firms that also have 
plants in Austria, they are located elsewhere (such as in Finland and Sweden) and thus utilise 
non-Austrian competencies. An Austrian programme could form a platform for exploiting 
and enhancing the strong Austrian knowledge base, and for expanding the TIS network.  
Enhancing the Austrian knowledge base would include strengthening the capabilities 
connected to fuel production. This is particularly important for AE&E, which remains 
prepared to re-enter the TIS as long as there is a reasonable market with clear projects. 
However, the core competence of AE&E lies in boilers and power plants, and not fuel 
production and the associated knowledge fields of catalysis and synthesis processes. As was 
explained in Chapter III, making transport fuel from gasified biomass involves advanced 
competencies that are normally found in the chemical industry; the design space has 
changed. As AE&E chose to delink itself from the Güssing plant and its experiments with 
transport fuel production, it has not participated in the knowledge formation with respect to 
fuel production and would, therefore, need a project partner if and when it wish to re-enter 
the market (Kaiser, 2008).  
Second, the feed-in law would need to be revised to provide a market space for the Austrian 
technology, while accommodating the needs of the pulp and paper industry. Special 
incentives such as investment subsidies also need to be established to induce the building of 
demonstration plants for BtL production in the pulp and paper industry. The funding of these 
demonstration plants would need to be organised in a manner that either fully shifts the 
risks from investors and technology suppliers to society or shares the risks. Ultimately, 
                                                      
129 There are many definitions of the concept of “biorefinery”, but we make reference to future production sites 
that may co-produce liquid or gaseous transportation fuels and other advanced, high value chemicals through 
gasification, within conventional pulp and paper mills.  
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however, it is the potential members of the political network who are responsible for 
formulating the conditions that are necessary for making further investments.130  
5.3 Conclusions 
This chapter illustrated that an individual, in this case an academic, can take on the role of a 
system builder, especially in the early phase of the formation of a TIS. The transformative 
capacity of Professor Hofbauer was analysed by addressing his ability to, through a range of 
activities, strengthen a set of key innovation and diffusion processes, or functions, and the 
structural elements of the TIS. With time, a network of actors has taken over the system 
building role although Professor Hofbauer has remained influential in the TIS. 
It was illustrated that the system builder managed to strengthen the structure and functions 
by drawing upon the general structure in which he is embedded by:  
1) Utilising existing technology structures by drawing on coal gasification and combining 
it with knowledge of biomass for creating small-scale systems. 
2) Mobilising resources by attracting a) incumbent capital goods manufacturer AEE 
through personal contacts to explore the small-scale CHP application, and b) 
international collaborations to develop the technology by offering a research 
platform. 
3) Mobilising resources available due to a) the town of Güssing, being situated in an 
underdeveloped region and with an interest to become independent on imported 
resources, b) the existence of EU and Austrian regional development funds, and c) 
the EEG and a risk absorption scheme. 
As a result, he was able to strengthen all functions of the TIS, but his capacity had the 
strongest influence on the processes of resource mobilisation, knowledge development and 
diffusion, entrepreneurial experimentation, and materialisation. A part of his capacity was 
used to overcome the frictional resistance in the form of troublesome network relationships 
(Repotec being delinked from the Oberwart plant). He was also able to add to the actor 
                                                      
130 Timing is essential here. The TIS in other countries are currently being built up and Andritz is already tied up 
in an alliance with a Finnish company (Carbona) that is not very different from Repotec, as well as with a 
Finnish partnering pulp and paper actor (UPM).  
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structure by attracting further actors to the field; strengthening networks by setting up 
various knowledge networks; and strengthening the technology structure of the TIS by 
constructing pilot and demonstration plants, and by enabling a second commercial CHP 
plant in Oberwart. The interactions between these four functions and the structure are 
extensive and positive. This is, thus, a strong motor in the TIS that has, in turn, resulted in a 
rapid structural build-up. 
The system builder has been much more limited in his ability to strengthen influence of the 
direction of search, legitimation and market formation. Indeed, these functions interact in a 
pattern that generates a weak motor. The motor is clearly not strong enough to attract 
incumbent Austrian actors to the TIS and the subsequent formation of a political network 
that could, in turn, be used to align the institutional framework. As a result, the Austrian-
based actor structure consists of relative small firms with problems to appropriate on the 
knowledge development taking place.  
The main system weakness is, therefore, actors and political networks with an interest in 
aligning the institutional framework in support of the technology.  
This motor and system weakness is also exceptionally difficult for a single individual to 
influence, since it is driven by neglect of or by intentional resistance from powerful actors. It 
is shaped primarily by the dominant capital goods supplier’s (AE&E) strategic decision to 
avoid taking initiatives in the area, and the revision of the regulatory framework (the feed-in 
law), which has ruined the economics of building new gasification plants in Austria. In sum, 
the system builder has strongly contributed to creating an opportunity for Austria, but 
factors beyond his influence currently obstruct the realisation of this option. 
There is, however, strong external pressure on Austria from the EU to provide new 
incentives for actors to produce more renewable electricity and renewable transportation 
fuels. If Austrian policymakers identify biomass gasification as a key technology in reaching 
such targets, there appears to be a solid industry structure and knowledge base that can 
enable such an expansion. While they are currently failing in providing the technology with 
the necessary preconditions for becoming an attractive field for new customers and 
suppliers, policymakers clearly have options available to them. These options would aim to 
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not only enhance market and knowledge formation, but also to include actors that have 
hitherto generated both frictional (AE&E) and intentional (the pulp and paper industry) 
resistance in the knowledge network, and turning it into a political network. Policymakers, 
therefore, need to add a strong element of system building activities that interact with and 
supplement those pursued by Professor Hofbauer and his network. 
 
  
 
 
Germany 
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Chapter VI                                                                                      
Germany 
 
 
The history of gasification in Germany has been long and closely related to the general 
development of knowledge in the field of gasification itself (as described in Chapter III). 
During the Second World War, the Nazi regime put forth great efforts into developing coal 
liquefaction technologies such as the Fischer-Tropsch synthesis for producing liquid 
transportation fuels that could replace conventional oil. When cheap oil re-entered the 
market after the war, the need for domestic production of coal-based transportation fuels 
disappeared. However, the industrial knowledge base of using coal for the production of 
various chemical and transportation fuels had been advanced, thereby making German 
industry even more capable of supplying gasification and various types of chemical plants.131 
Today, the capital goods industry in Germany consists of firms such as Lurgi, Siemens, Uhde, 
Envirotherm, Lindé, Südchemi, and Reinbraun. These companies are some of the world’s 
leading capital goods suppliers and engineering firms for chemical plants based on the 
gasification of fossil resources. They are capable of delivering solutions for the production of 
ammonia, methanol and SNG, as well as, more recently, the IGCC process for power 
production (Chapter III). 
The development of Fischer-Tropsch liquids was taken over by the South African firm Sasol. 
This development work continued under the apartheid regime and large-scale commercially 
operating plants were launched in the 1970s. Recently, Sasol entered into a technology joint 
                                                      
131 Coal gasification competencies were also further developed for the production of town gas in the former 
DDR. Capital goods suppliers in Germany today benefitted from the technology development at that time. 
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venture with Lurgi to further develop gasification and downstream technologies (Turna, 
2007).132  
The capital goods industry in Germany is highly capable with respect to coal gasification. 
However, their interest in developing the technology for biomass has, until recently, been 
relatively modest even though some experiments have taken place. For instance, to date 
Lurgi has developed and sold the world’s largest atmospheric CFB (100MW) cement kiln 
gasifiers to a factory in Rudensdorf (in 1995). A second unit was sold for co-firing biomass-
derived gas in a 600MW coal boiler in the Netherlands.133 Another major engineering firm, 
Uhde, supplied a high temperature Winkler (HTW) reactor to the Finnish company Kemira 
for methanol production based on peat at the end of the 1980s (see Chapter VIII). However, 
neither Uhde nor Lurgi continued to develop biomass gasification as a new business based 
on these experiences. 
It was not until more recently that three major and two minor projects were initiated with 
the purpose of turning various types of biomass into transportation fuels and other 
chemicals. Hence, the history describing the evolution of the five projects in the subsequent 
sections will start no earlier than the beginning of the 1990s.134  
At the centre of each project, there is an actor performing system building activities. The 
role of these various actors has, naturally evolved over time in the individual cases. 
Nevertheless, four system builders have been identified: the start-up company Choren, and 
the research institutes Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe (FZK), Zentrum für Sonnenenergie-und 
Wasserstoff-Forschung (ZSW) and Clausthaler Umwelttechnik-Institut (CUTEC). An important 
                                                      
132 Since August 2007, Lurgi has been fully owned by the Air Liquide Group from France. Sasol-Lurgi are not 
the only actors with competence in FT synthesis. The Dutch company Shell has also developed the technology 
and used it to produce diesel from stranded natural gas fields. 
133 In 2002, Lurgi decided to sell their CFB technology used with biomass, as well as the British Gas Lurgi 
(BGL) fixed-bed coal technology. The BGL had previously been demonstrated at SVZ pump with coal and 
waste by the company Envirotherm (Hirchfelder, 2008). No new installations based on biomass have been made 
by Envirotherm, although there have been a few based on coal. Biomass gasification has not been ruled out by 
Envirotherm, but they do not see a big market in this area, as compared to coal gasification.  
134 As in Austria, there have been numerous experiments conducted at research institutes, universities, small 
private companies, and in people’s garages on fixed-bed gasification for biomass. Most of these experiments 
have been geared towards very small-scale (<1MW) gasification for combined heat and power production. Some 
of them have resulted in the establishment of firms that have managed to install a few plants where poor 
operational performance has been a major issue (Bräkow and Oettel, 2008). As mentioned in Chapter IV, these 
experiments have been excluded from the study. 
159 
 
actor within fossil gasification, which also could have played a role in strengthening biomass 
gasification, is the University of Freiberg. However, it will be argued that it does not 
undertake system building activities of any particular importance.  
The structure of this chapter is built around the three main system builders—Choren, FZK 
and ZSW. Their respective histories will be described in the first section of this chapter, while 
the histories of CUTEC and the University of Freiberg will be summarised in boxes. Thus, this 
first section focuses on describing the interactions between actors and the characteristics of 
the emerging technological innovation system (TIS). The focus is on how the system builders 
act to create the emerging structure of the TIS, both by building the structure directly and by 
strengthening the various functions outlined in Chapter II. Also included in the three main 
histories is a description of what the system builders consider to be necessary for realising 
their technology option on a commercial-scale. 
The second section of this chapter provides answers to the research questions (as specified 
in Chapter II). The discussion starts with identifying who have been acting as the system 
builders, and describes the nature and extent of their transformative capacities. The focus 
then shifts to analysing and explaining the limits of the system builders’ transformative 
capacity, identifying main system weaknesses, and discussing the potential role of system 
builders and policymakers in addressing these weaknesses. The third section of this chapter 
presents the main conclusions. 
6.1 The evolution and prospects for biomass gasification in Germany 
In this section, the five main projects and alliances will be presented from the perspective of 
the system builder of each project. The first sub-section focuses on the start-up company 
Choren, which has managed to create an alliance consisting of a large group of investors, 
technology suppliers and other stakeholders for the realisation of a concept for a two-stage 
gasifier for the production of FT liquids. A box in this sub-section summarises the Technical 
University Bergakademie Freiberg’s plans for realising a modified HTW reactor. The second 
sub-section presents the endeavours of FZK, a technical institute that has entered into an 
alliance with the capital goods supplier Lurgi for the purpose of commercialising a large-
scale, three-stage and distributed gasification concept. The third sub-section discusses the 
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alliance created by institute ZSW, which works on a smaller-scale concept based on the 
FICFB gasifier that has been demonstrated in Güssing (Austria) with the goal of BioSNG 
production. A box in this sub-section summarises the efforts of a third institute, CUTEC, in 
commercialising a CFB gasification technology for FT diesel production. 
6.1.2 The emergence of Choren Industries and the Carbo-V technology    
The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 paved the way for German reunification, which 
formally took place on October 3, 1990. Reunification resulted in a major reorientation of 
German society as a whole; most importantly for this story, however, it led to the 
dismantling of the major research institutes in the former East Germany (DDR) and the 
establishment of major development funds for stimulating economic growth and 
employment in the eastern parts of reunified Germany. 
One of the dismantled institutes was the Deutscher Brennstoff Institut (German Combustion 
Institute), or DBI, which carried out major research on lignite, brown coal, combustion, and 
gasification. Lignite extraction and use was at the heart of East Germany’s economy and 
energy supply, employing 130,000 people and accounting for approximately 70 percent of its 
primary energy supply (Hansen, 1996).  
DBI’s technical director, Bodo Wolf, had been responsible for a number of gasification 
projects, of which Schwarze Pumpe is the most well known. In 1969, Schwarze Pumpe was 
the world’s largest lignite gasification plant for the production of town gas and produced 85 
percent of the gas used in the former DDR (Picard, 2008b).  
After reunification and the dismantling of DBI, Mr. Wolf formed the company Umwelt- und 
Energietechnik Freiberg (UET) GmbH, and convinced four former DBI colleagues to work with 
him in the new company. At the start, they performed mostly classic engineering work, but 
Mr. Wolf’s goal was to further the extensive gasification experience they already had with 
lignite, and use it to produce liquid transportation fuels from biomass (Rudloff, 2008b).135 
                                                      
135 Unfortunately, we could not arrange an interview with Mr. Wolf. As a result, we do not know why he became 
involved in using biomass. 
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From his position at DBI, he had gained extensive experience with both fixed-bed and 
entrained flow gasification. Based on his experience, he ruled out fixed bed and fluidised bed 
gasification for producing a tar-free gas that could be transformed into transportation fuels. 
Instead, he invented the Carbo-V process which combines the low temperature fixed bed 
and high temperature entrained flow gasification technologies into a continuous flow. It can, 
therefore, handle the physical properties of biomass (i.e., its heterogeneity and large size), 
while producing a clean gas using a high temperature process (Rudloff, 2008). By leveraging 
his experience with coal gasification he expanded the design space of fossil gasification to 
include biomass by redesigning the process.136  
When Mr. Wolf presented the idea for the first time in 1995, it was not well received. No 
one at the time was particularly interested in the production of liquid fuels from biomass; 
rather, the focus was on hydrogen production (direction of search). Despite this general 
scepticism, Mr. Wolf managed to raise the funds necessary for constructing a first pilot 
plant. The primary source of funding, about 60 percent, came from the state of Saxony. The 
remainder came from his friends and his own savings (resource mobilisation) (Rudloff, 
2008b).137  
In 1997, UET changed its name to Choren138 to reflect the new direction that the company 
was taking. With the funding Mr. Wolf received, a pilot plant could be constructed 
(materialisation) and it was completed by 1998. It became the first entrepreneurial 
experiment based on the Carbo-V process. The pilot plant was able to gasify 250kg of 
biomass per hour, equivalent to approximately 1MW.  
Three elements of the structure at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, created 
the necessary preconditions for Mr. Wolf to develop its own technology construct the first 
pilot plant. First, DBI and Schwarze Pumpe (SVP) permitted Mr. Wolf and his co-workers at 
Choren to draw on the technology already developed and tested. Second, the dismantling of 
the institute and ongoing downsizing of SVP (which was finally shut-down in 2008) had 
                                                      
136 In the Carbo-V concept, biomass can be co-gasified with coal if desired. 
137 Ample funding from the federal government (through the state of Saxony) was available for technology start-
ups such as UET in the eastern part of Germany through a special development fund (Rudloff, 2008b). 
138 C-Carbon, H-hydrogen, O-Oxygen, REN-Renewable (Bienert, 2007). 
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provided Choren with excellent opportunities for hiring experienced personnel who continue 
to be an important resource for the company. Third, the availability of funding through the 
East German development funds enabled the system builder to mobilise financial resources.  
These resources made it possible for the system builder to further advance knowledge 
development and entrepreneurial experimentation, which eventually resulted in the 
materialisation of a first pilot plant. In addition, Mr. Wolf and the first employees of Choren 
were driven by a vision: with the completion of the pilot plant, they managed to strengthen 
the direction of search for liquid synthetic fuels, for which there had been no apparent 
demand.  
Finding partners and scaling up plans, 1998−2008   
Following plant construction between 1998 and 2001, the pilot plant was optimised for gas 
production and numerous tests were conducted using different types of fuels to improve the 
overall process (entrepreneurial experimentation and knowledge development). With the 
pilot plant completed and several patents granted on process, the technical uncertainties of 
the new concept were reduced and the legitimacy of the process—and of Choren as a 
company—was increased (legitimation). Hence, favourable conditions for finding additional 
partners had been created. 
Mr. Wolf realised early on that strong partners would be critical to his company’s success. 
He firmly believed that a small technology company could not manage to build and market 
large-scale gasification systems by itself (Rudloff, 2005, 2008b). By chance, he came into 
contact with some key individuals that could help him take the next steps towards realising 
his biomass gasification concept.  
One of these individuals was Dr. Hanns Arnt Vogels, who was a member of the board for the 
vehicle manufacture Daimler and the director of the board for the Swedish-German joint 
venture Vasa Energy GmbH in Hamburg. At the time, Vasa Energy was owned (50 percent) 
by Michael Saalfeld, whom Mr. Vogels knew very well. Mr. Wolf was introduced to Mr. 
Saalfeld and, when Mr. Saalfeld later sold his shares in Vasa to Vattenfall, he invested some 
of the money in Choren and became its lead investor. In 2003, he followed up on this 
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investment by bringing in nine other private investors from within and around the Hamburg 
area (resource mobilisation) (Rudloff, 2008b).139 
It was probably due to their contacts with Dr. Vogels that, shortly thereafter, Choren was 
awarded a project with Daimler to produce methanol for fuel cells (since that was the 
primary interest of Daimler at the time). However, Daimler was not the only German 
automobile manufacture with an interest in alternative fuels. Their main competitor in 
Germany, Volkswagen (VW), had created a new department for biofuels and appointed Dr. 
Wolfgang Steiger to lead it. This organisation had been investigating different alternative 
biofuel options and had already been in contact with Choren between 1996 and 1998 
(Seyfried, 2008a).  
Due largely to the persistent work of Dr. Steiger, BtL was put on Volkswagen’s agenda and a 
cooperation agreement was signed between Daimler, VW and Choren in 2002. The goal of 
this project was to promote BtL fuel and, for Choren, to supply synthetic fuels for motor 
tests at the two companies (Seyfried, 2008a). All three companies strongly felt that a 
common strategy for the promotion of BtL would be important and of mutual interest, even 
if VW and Daimler otherwise view each other as competitors.   
Cooperation was possible since Daimler and VW had no interest in becoming fuel suppliers 
but did have an interest in achieving a common fuel standard. They both preferred FT diesel 
over other renewable alternatives, since it is considered to be “infrastructure ready” and can 
be blended with ordinary diesel at any quantity without any engine modifications. It even 
enables cleaner and more efficient combustion compared to conventional diesel. By 
collaborating with Choren, they were able to influence the fuel quality resulting from the 
process (Drescher, 2008; Seyfried, 2008a).140 
                                                      
139 http://www.lichtblick.de/lichtblick/unternehmen.php?lbid=7DrybjEEUKJv&v=4&&s=2 Accessed 2008-05-
20 
140 Both VW and Daimler have been working with all types of fuels available on the market. They do, however, 
prefer a moderate level of blending (5-10%) in the diesel from first-generation biodiesel, since it has been 
considered to have inferior fuel properties. Natural gas has a high cetane number (i.e., a high combustion quality) 
and is possible to use in some models. It has also been considered as an inferior option since it has a 
considerably lower energy density, it is not infrastructure ready, and it is not a diesel fuel. Similar arguments 
have been used against dimethyl ether, promoted by various actors in Sweden (Chapter VII), which is a diesel 
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Thus, Choren, offered hope (direction of search) of creating a renewable fuel alternative, 
which would be infrastructure ready and could be blended at any quantity with conventional 
fuel. It was thus comparable, or even superior, to fossil alternatives and much preferred over 
an increased blending of first-generation diesel fuels from food crops. The promise of 
Choren’s technology made them an attractive partner to collaborate with. In addition, the 
involvement of the two major automobile manufacturers in Germany strengthened the TIS, 
and the collaboration granted Choren new and considerably increased legitimacy 
(legitimation). 
At this point, with the backing of its partners, Choren was ready to apply for more money 
from the government. It applied for approximately €4.6 million from the Ministry of Trade 
and Economics to construct a methanol and Fischer-Tropsch synthesis unit. The application 
was granted and the new equipment was installed at the pilot plant (resource mobilisation, 
materialisation) (Rudloff, 2008b). The first methanol was manufactured in April 2003 and the 
first FT product in June of the same year (entrepreneurial experimentation, knowledge 
development). With this new equipment, the entire production process, from biomass-to-
liquid production, could be demonstrated, as could the quality of the fuel itself (Baitz et al., 
2004; Rudloff, 2005, 2008b). This was of course a very important step for Choren. However, 
the scale of the pilot was too small to prove the viability of the process, and a larger 
demonstration plant had to be constructed to further reduce technical uncertainties. 
The demonstration plant 
The general idea of the new plant was to demonstrate the stand-alone and continuous 
production of FT liquids. It would have to be done on a scale that was large enough to 
reduce the technical risk to an acceptable level for potential customers and investors in 
future commercial-scale plants. Commercial size was estimated to be an annual production 
rate of 200,000 tonnes of liquid fuel (Bienert, 2007).141  
To reduce the risk to a reasonable level it was therefore judged that the demonstration 
should be in the range of 45MWth, consuming 65,000 tonnes of dried biomass and being able 
                                                                                                                                                                         
fuel but has a lower energy density and is also not infrastructure ready (Keppeler, 2007; Drescher, 2008; Picard, 
2008a; Seyfried, 2008a). 
141 Such a plant would require about 1 million tonnes of biomass annually, and the gasification units in this plant 
would have to have a combined capacity of approximately 700MW (Bienert, 2007). 
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to produce 18 million litres of FT diesel annually. The plant would be based on the same two-
stage gasification concept as the pilot plant and constructed in Freiberg, next to the pilot 
plant. Even if liquid production in the demonstration plant would be considerably more 
expensive than in a commercial-scale plant, it was thought to have a commercial value 
(Rudloff, 2008b). 
The two main challenges in constructing a demonstration plant were a) raising more than 
€100 million and b) finding a partner that could supply the FT synthesis unit at the required 
scale.142 The key to raising €100 million was identified as finding a customer that could agree 
to leaving an “offtake guarantee”143 on the demonstration plant’s future production. The 
guarantee was seen as necessary to reduce the market and financial risks for investors and 
offer some return on the project (Rudloff 2008).  
The first steps in financing the project had already been taken when Choren was granted 
€4.6 million from the Ministry of Trade and Economics in 2002, allowing the construction of 
the first components of the plant. However, at least €95.5 million of the required funds still 
had to be raised.  
In January 2004, the 6th EU Framework Programme, RENEW, was initiated with Volkswagen 
as the coordinator. A network was set up with 32 partners from nine countries. The 
programme ran for 48 months and had a budget of €19.8 million (€10 million in EU funding 
and €10 million in partnership funding), of which Choren was allocated about €5 million144 
(resource mobilisation) (RENEW, 2008; Seyfried, 2008b).145  
The benefits provided by the RENEW project were much more than financial. First, and 
perhaps foremost, it contributed to strengthening the legitimation of the entire knowledge 
field. It did so by demonstrating that a significant share of the diesel being consumed in EU-
                                                      
142 FT units are normally built on a much larger scale, and developing the technology on their own was judged to 
be impossible (Rudloff, 2008b). 
143 An offtake guarantee, or offtake agreement, is a purchasing agreement between a buyer and a supplier on the 
price and volumes of the future production. These agreements are made prior to construction and make it easier 
to obtain financing for the construction, but they are usually difficult to obtain when dealing with non-
commercial technologies. 
144 €2.5 from the EU and €2.5 was equity financing (Choren, 2010). 
145 Without the solid connections to VW, it was judged unlikely that the allocation of funds to Choren would 
have been as significant (Rudloff, 2008b). 
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27 could be substituted by liquids produced from domestically grown biomass at a cost of 
approximately €1/litre diesel equivalent, depending on which technology was used. 
Second, the project considerably strengthened the legitimacy of Choren as a company.  The 
RENEW project examined seven different gasification technological trajectories; only two of 
them, however, including one from Choren, were considered ready for large-scale 
demonstration (RENEW, 2008). Third, the study illustrated that the Choren process was the 
most cost competitive and energy efficient solution among the German trajectories, which 
was especially important for Choren vis-à-vis their main German competitor FZK/Lurgi. 
Among the six participating trajectories, only the Swedish company Chemrec showed better 
results than Choren.146  
The major step for securing the remaining and required funding for the demonstration plant 
was taken when Shell became involved in the project. Choren’s Mr. Rudloff (2008b) 
described that he was under the impression that the intention of Volkswagen from the start 
was to bring them into partnership with a major oil company. After 18 months of 
negotiations with both BP and Shell, an agreement was reached with Shell and a contract 
was signed in August 2005 (Shell, 2005; Rudloff, 2008b). 
According to the agreement, Shell would buy 25 percent of Choren shares, provide their FT 
technology and know-how in support of the construction of the demonstration plant and 
commit to a long-term, offtake contract for the entire production from the demonstration 
plant. The offtake guarantee was, thus, a key part of reducing the financial and market risks 
for other investors, and making investing more attractive for them (Rudloff, 2008). 
The legitimacy of biomass gasification in general and Choren in particular was boosted by 
Shell’s entry into the TIS. Shell was expected to reduce the technical risk of the project by 
supplying their FT technology and know-how from fossil gasification.147 Shell’s entry also 
further increased the financial, human and complementary technical resources (resource 
                                                      
146 Chemrec, however, focuses on DME production and not diesel, which is not a preferred transportation fuel 
according to Volkswagen and Daimler (Keppeler, 2007; Seyfried, 2008a). It is also important to observe that the 
potential Finnish FT-liquid production plants were not included in the study. Based on preliminary calculations 
made by VTT, they show similar performance to Chemrec and, thus, a significantly lower cost level than any of 
the German development tracks (McKeough and Kurkela, 2008). 
147 Shell is one of only two companies that has commercially operating FT technology (Chapter III). 
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mobilisation). All these factors played an important role for raising the remaining funds for 
the construction of the demonstration plant. 
Choren was thus able to secure a total €25 million with loan guarantees through KfW 
Bankengruppe148, a Federal- and Länder-owned financial organisation (resource 
mobilisation). The loan guarantees were granted to the lending banks and they can cover up 
to 80 percent of the total debt financing. The guarantees were seen as a critical success 
factor for the project since no external power contractor (EPC) would have been willing to 
supply the demonstration plant for at a fixed price and with guarantees concerning its 
operation (since the technology had not been proven). Without such guarantees from an 
EPC, or the guarantees provided by the KfW, ordinary banks would not have been expected 
to grant Choren a loan for the demonstration plant, regardless of the agreement with Shell 
(Rudloff, 2008). 
Plant construction was initiated in 2005, and further financial resources were mobilised in 
2007 when Volkswagen and Daimler decided to buy a minority share of Choren (Choren, 
2007a). The mechanical completion of the plant took place in April 2008. Following 
inauguration, however, Choren estimated that it would take 8 to 12 months to begin the 
individual plant sub-systems before any BtL could be produced (Choren, 2008). For various 
reasons, start-up has been further delayed and as of November 2009, no diesel had yet been 
produced at the plant.149 In addition, Shell has since decided to sell their shares in Choren 
(Choren, 2009). It is too early to say what this ultimately means. 
In sum, the very capable system builder Choren and its founder Bodo Wolf have 
demonstrated a capacity to considerably strengthen the functions of knowledge 
development, entrepreneurial experimentation, materialisation, resource mobilisation, 
direction of search and legitimation. This has been achieved by successfully building a first 
                                                      
148 KfW Bankengruppe is a public organisation that is 80 percent owned by the federal government and 20 
percent by the Länder. http://www.kfw.de/. Loan guarantees are specific instruments available in Germany and 
Austria but not in Sweden and Finland. 
149 In the demonstration plant, the entire production chain, from biomass-to-liquids, is integrated in a new way 
and on a scale that has never before been attempted. It involves the start-up of several hundred different sub-
systems that have never been operated in combination before. It is expected to take time before everything works 
properly. One can, for example, compare this with the Värnamo plant, which has a considerably simpler process 
than liquid production from biomass. Still, it took approximately three years before the plant had accumulated 
600 operating hours (Chapter VII). 
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pilot plant and creating strong alliances with leading firms from the automotive and petro-
chemical industries. 
However, the continuous production of FT diesel on the scale of a demonstration plant 
remains to be proven. In order to succeed, it will probably be necessary to further 
strengthen knowledge development and to mobilise additional capital to operationalise the 
process (further resource mobilisation). If the demonstration can be made operational, 
Choren would significantly strengthen the function of market formation. If it fails, it risks 
weakening the legitimacy of the entire knowledge field. 
The future of the Choren technology 
If the demonstration is successful, yet another and perhaps even greater challenge lays 
ahead: creating the preconditions and raising the funds for the first commercial-scale plant. 
An investment of approximately €800 million must be made in order to realise the vision of a 
first full-scale plant with a capacity of producing 200,000 tonnes of FT diesel annually.  
The planning and preparation of such a plant is well advanced, even if the first results from 
the demonstration plant have not yet been obtained. If constructed, the plant would be 
located in Schwedt in northeast Germany, which borders on Poland (Kiener, 2008). Choren 
believes that equity could provide approximately 40 percent of the capital for such a plant 
and that they would therefore need to raise about €480 million. The amount needed will be 
much higher than the current limits for loan guarantees. Direct subsidies will probably play a 
role but strict EU regulations control the amounts allowed. Even with the best East German 
subsidies, Choren estimates that direct subsidies from the current funds would take care of a 
maximum 10-12 percent of the entire investment (Rudloff, 2008b). 
Choren’s business plan includes constructing and operating the first large commercial-scale 
gasification plant, even if the latter is not their long-term strategic goal. With this type of 
plant, Choren argues that there will be great organisational uncertainties around who the 
first customers will be. Owning and operating this type of plant will be perceived as risky for 
these first customers, even after successful demonstrations. By taking ownership and 
responsibility for operating the first large-scale plant, Choren will reduce the risk for 
subsequent customers. This would also buy some time for potential customers to determine 
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whether these types of plants can become a part of their current business. This could be 
important since there are several potential sectors (i.e., chemical, mineral oil and pulp and 
paper) with which the technology would relate to current competencies, even if the firms 
are not currently involved in fuel production or the handling of biomass (Rudloff, 2008b).150  
For the commercial plant to become a reality, Choren will depend on the general framework 
in Germany and the EU to provide stable and sufficient financial conditions for the investor. 
The agreement between Shell and Choren, in which Shell provides an off-take guarantee, 
may not be possible to replicate for a large-scale, semi-commercial plant. The volumes in 
such a plant would be too large and without a general framework, one cannot expect that 
the market risk would be absorbed (Rudloff, 2008b). 
Within the current legislative framework, we cannot, therefore, expect to see any 
investments in a commercial-scale plant, even if the technology is successfully 
demonstrated. This problem was raised at the inauguration of the demonstration plant by 
the former CEO of Choren, Tom Blades: 
“The statutory framework created for first-generation biofuels has only been defined until 
2015, which is not long enough for investors to plan for the first sigma plant with any 
certainty [...] Nevertheless, we are very confident that the politicians will shortly introduce 
economic policy framework enabling second-generation biofuels, and thus the synthetic 
biofuel made by Choren, to be a key contributor towards achieving the ambitious climate 
targets of the future.” (Choren, 2008). 
Finding a solution whereby both first-generation fuels and more expensive but perhaps also 
more socially desirable second-generation fuels can compete on an “equal” basis will not be 
easy (see Chapter XI for a longer discussion). However, Choren has advocated a separate, 
mandatory blending requirement for second-generation fuels, starting in 2016. According to 
Choren (Choren, 2007b),151 incorporating its suggestion would help avoid competition 
                                                      
150 As of today, however, there are quite a few actors that have declared significant interest in the Choren 
technology. For example, the Finnish utility and biofuel suppliers Vapo and the Norwegian pulp and paper 
manufacture Norske Skog have expressed an interest once the technology is demonstrated. 
151 Choren emphasises that the current proposal from the German government on a revised biofuel blending law: 
“biofuel blending obligation for mineral oil companies”, starting in 2015 will be insufficient to meet the 
demands from investors for a commercial-scale plant. The German proposal follows the same logic as the 
current EU proposal on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (2008/0016 (COD)), where 
the CO2 reduction potential should be the basis for how much biofuels will be necessary to blend with 
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between second- and first-generation fuels, and could provide a reasonably stable 
framework that would support long-term investments in large-scale plants. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
conventional transportation fuels. The main objection against the proposed framework has been that the second-
generation fuels (BtL) will compete directly with first-generation fuels. 
171 
 
Box 6.1: Coal and biomass gasification at the Technical University Bergakademie Freiberg152 
During the time of the DDR, the Technical University (TU) of Freiberg developed a prominent position 
for its research on the thermal conversion of coal. Together with the Deutscher Brennstoff Institut 
(DBI) and Schwarze Pumpe (SVP), they were one of the core actors for developing energy 
technologies for utilising brown coal. Of the three actors, DBI focused on managing and developing 
larger projects including process development, while TU Freiberg focused on solving isolated 
problems and understanding the basic science. TU Freiberg and DBI could test, experiment and install 
the new processes on an industrial-scale at SVP. Hence, one can see the three actors as the pillars of 
a local cluster in which the interaction between the functions of knowledge development, 
entrepreneurial experimentation, materialisation and market formation formed a strong motor and 
strengthened the technology structure for the utilisation of brown coal. 
 
When DBI was dismantled, TU Freiberg kept its scientific role but did so in the larger context of 
innovation in Germany and the rest of the world. Based on extensive industry collaboration in 
combination with the additional funding available for universities in the former DDR, TU Freiberg has 
become one of the top universities in the world for research on the thermal conversion of brown 
coal. As a result, it has been able to equip its laboratories with the latest and most advanced science 
and technology infrastructure, and recruit a highly reputable staff and talented engineering students. 
This has made it even more attractive as a scientific partner to industry.  
 
Only 30-40 students out of a population of nearly 5,000 graduate every year with some special 
training in the thermal conversion of biomass. The faculty has argued that biomass conversion is 
interesting from a scientific point of view, but that there is very little demand from industry for 
students with such a specialisation. Consequently, there has also been little research on the 
utilisation of biomass until more recently. In 2000, TU Freiberg initiated a project along with their 
industrial partners to further develop the pressurised High Temperature Winkler (HTW) for biomass 
gasification. The HTW is a fluidised bed gasifier that was developed in the 1920s for atmospheric coal 
gasification. It has since been modified for higher pressures (30 bars) and temperatures. TU Freiberg 
developed a modified and patented reactor design. The “new” PHTW was expected to produce an 
almost tar-free gas from biomass in a reactor well suited for the heterogeneous character and 
physical properties of biomass. 
 
Plans were also made to build a large-scale (10MW) pilot plant near the campus, as well as a facility 
for oxygen production. It was argued that the pilot had to be at least 10MWth, otherwise the 
thermodynamics of the process would change in a subsequent scale-up of the technology. This is, of 
course, a valid argument, but given the high cost of constructing this plant and in conducting tests 
and experiments, industry partners have not been willing to contribute sufficient financing. Hence, 
the project is arguably insufficiently aligned with the interests of TU Freiberg’s industry partners. 
They are mainly interested in coal gasification and not in biomass. The interest of the incumbents can 
eventually change and the project may still be realised in the future. However, at the current levels 
of demand for coal gasification, this does not seem likely in the near future. With regard to TU 
Freiberg, they did not act (or were unable to act) to align the technology to the interests of others. 
Therefore, it is argued that they do not fulfil the necessary requirements, as outlined in Chapter II, 
for being defined as “system builders”. 
                                                      
152 The analysis outlined here is based on an interview with Krazack and Brüggemann (2008), as well as a five-
day visit to the university when several informal interviews were conducted in 2007. 
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6.1.2 Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe and the development of the Bioliq 
process 
Since Choren started its activities at the beginning of the 1990s, a competing alliance has 
been formed by the Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe (FZK) institute in Baden-Wuerttemberg. 
The institute was founded by the West German federal government and the state of Baden-
Wuerttemberg, and has since become one of the largest research institutes in Germany.153 
Until the end of the 1980s, FZK was a major institute for nuclear research and nuclear waste 
reprocessing. When Germany’s nuclear programmes were dismantled, FZK began searching 
for new areas of research and started restructuring its entire operation (FZK, 2004). In 1996, 
as part of this restructuring and to strengthen its competencies in the field of chemistry, FZK 
recruited Professor Eckhard Dinjus into its Institute for Technical Chemistry, in the Division of 
Chemical-Physical Processing (ITC-CPV) (Dinjus, 2007).154 
The search process was influenced by several factors (direction of search). Since Baden-
Württemberg is one of the owners of FZK, the institute is expected to contribute to the 
development of industry within the state. With the experience they had in pyrolysis, and 
since Baden-Württemberg is a strong agricultural region, they began to consider what could 
be done with farm residues in a way that could increase the added value of the agricultural 
industry (Dinjus, 2007). According to Professor Dinjus (2007), they approached the challenge 
with two basic questions. First, what could be done with all the agriculture residues? Second, 
how would it be possible to use these residues in an industrial process at the scale of a 
refinery? 
Straw is a residue from agriculture with little or no economic value to farmers and is 
generated in large volumes. The total volume of surplus cereal straw in the world has been 
                                                      
153 In total, they employ 3,800 people and have an annual budget of approximately €294 million (FZK, 2004). 
154 Professor Dinjus obtained his doctorate degree in 1973 from the Institute of Inorganic Chemistry at the 
Friedrich-Schiller-University in Jena. In 1996, he was appointed Professor at the Institute of Technical 
Chemistry at the University of Heidelberg. When he started his work at the FZK, he found little work relating to 
chemistry. Twelve years later, the institution is well grounded in the field of technical chemistry and respected 
all over the world for its scientific and applied research (Dinjus, 2007). 
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estimated to be approximately 1Gt/a, which corresponds to approximately 5 percent of the 
world’s primary energy consumption (Henrich et al., 2007).   
From the perspective of the FZK researchers, there are two main problems with using straw 
in an industrial process for green chemistry and producing transportation fuels. First, it has 
an energy density of approximately 1.5GJ/m3, which is low and makes it costly to transport 
over long distances. Second, it has high contents of ash, hydrochlorides (HCL) and K-salts 
such as KCL and KOH, which cause downstream problems due to poisoning of catalysts and 
the sticking and plugging of technical components during thermo-chemical processes 
(Dahmen et al., 2007; Henrich et al., 2007). According to Professor Dinjus (2007), the carbon 
content of the feed-stock is best converted in an entrained flow gasifier into a syngas that 
can be used for green chemistry and producing transportation fuels (direction of search). 
However, the physical properties and low energy density of straw make it unusable in such a 
reactor. 
FZK researchers identified a possible solution to these problems based on the process of fast 
pyrolysis. Using fast pyrolysis, it appeared possible to produce a liquid with 10-15 times 
more energy density than straw. Although the chemical compositions would vary with the 
type of feed-stock used and would be highly corrosive, the liquid would resemble oil in its 
physical properties and would be easy to transport, pump and pressurise in an EF reactor 
that also could withstand its corrosive properties. 
Consequently, they evaluated different existing pyrolysis technologies and concluded that 
the Lurgi-Ruhrgas screw reactor was the best option available and that it could be adopted 
for making the liquid (Dinjus, 2007). Based on the original design of the Lurgi-Ruhrgas screw 
reactor,155 they developed a small laboratory-scale plant for producing the first pyrolysis 
slurry (materialisation). The pilot plant has a maximum capacity of 20kg of straw chops, 
sawdust, paper, cardboard pieces, etc. per hour (Dinjus, 2007; Henrich et al., 2007). 
From the beginning, FZK intended to form an alliance with companies that have the capacity 
to bring this technology to market. By changing the properties of farm residues to something 
                                                      
155 The reactor was developed during the 1950s for producing raw gas. 
174 
 
resembling oil in its physical properties, they also increased the attractiveness of biomass 
and, thereby, the possibilities of engaging the petrochemical industry (legitimation).  
In sum, the crisis at FZK gave the researchers a reason to begin looking for more valuable 
areas to work in. It also provided the initial funding and motivated the recruitment of new 
personnel with a different competence profile than before. It thus strengthened the 
direction of search and resource mobilisation of the TIS. The actors could draw further 
resources from the structure and their work clearly strengthened knowledge development 
and entrepreneurial experimentation, which resulted in the materialisation of a pilot plant.  
Finding a partner and demonstrating the concept 
When the pilot plant was working and the first pyrolysis oil was being produced, FZK 
researchers began looking for interested partners. They could not, however, partner with a 
company using an entrained flow reactor. The liquid produced from straw is considerably 
more corrosive than conventional oil and conventional hard coal, and thus a reactor 
developed for those purposes would not suffice. Rather, a suitable reactor design would 
have to be based on low-grade coal and lignite, which had been used in the former DDR and 
shared the corrosive properties of pyrolysis oil (Dinjus, 2007). 
The GSP reactor—the same type of gasifier that Choren based their design on—was seen as 
the ideal type of EF reactor. It had been developed by the former Deutscher Brennstoff 
Institut, which specialised in coal gasification. The GSP had also been demonstrated and 
been in commercial operation at Schwarze Pumpe for more than 20 years (Henrich et al., 
2007; Metz, 2008). It had been developed to withstand the corrosive, salty lignite of east and 
central Germany and could, therefore, be expected to be capable of gasifying the oil made 
from straw (Henrich et al., 2007).  
Hence, FZK researchers contacted the DBI gasification centre in Freiberg (Dinjus, 2007).156 At 
the time, the centre was owned by Babcock. However, following its subsequent bankruptcy 
                                                      
156 The Noell company took over the testing centre after DBI was dismantled, and in 1996 they erected a new 
5MW GSP pilot plant at the site in Freiberg (Metz, 2008; Henrich et al., 2007). 
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in 2002, Future Energy GmbH acquired the technical gasification know-how from the 
Babcock group, including the demonstration units.157 
In 2001–2002, FZK commenced sending samples of the pyrolysis slurry to Future Energy for 
testing in the GSP gasifier. In total, 40 tonnes of different bioslurries were tested (Henrich et 
al., 2007). A fruitful cooperation between Future Energy and FZK appears to have been 
established while the test campaigns progressed. According to Professor Dinjus (2007), 
Future Energy would have liked to continue cooperating with FZK to develop the business, 
based on the positive experiences they had from the different test campaigns.  
However, Future Energy was struggling at the time. They had a difficult time finding 
contracts, since a small company with only 25 employees was not well positioned to take on 
large-scale contracts worth several hundred million Euros (Friess, 2008). The owner of 
Future Energy, Sustec Industries, was a venture capitalist based in Switzerland; since the 
acquisition of Future Energy, Sustec had worked to increase the attractiveness of the 
company as much as possible in order to find new owners. Consequently, in October 2005 
Sustec also acquired Schwarze Pumpe (SVZ) in order to access the key reference plant where 
the GSP gasifier had previously been operating.158 Based on the reference plant (the GSP), 
the experience of Future Energy and the financial resources of the venture capital firm, they 
managed to book a few contracts in China for coal gasification (Friess, 2008).  
The new arrangement for Future Energy made them very interesting for potential buyers 
(Friess, 2008). In 2006, Sustec Industries sold Future Energy−including the contracts for coal 
gasification−to Siemens. The new owner had the financial muscle, infrastructure and other 
resources to continue to develop coal gasification. Since the acquisition, the business has 
grown considerably for Siemens: between 2006 and 2008, they increased staff from 25 to 70 
and have worked exclusively with large-scale projects in China and the United States on coal 
gasification, for which the gasifier was originally designed (Metz, 2008). 
With new owners and a booming coal gasification business, Future Energy and Siemens’ 
interest in advancing the cooperation on biomass-to-liquid came to a halt. While Siemens, 
                                                      
157 DGMK-Fachbereichstagung “Energetische Nutzung von Biomassen” vom 19. bis 21. April 2004 
158 http://www.tecpol.de/en/archive/news/05_09_29svz_selling.html accessed 2009-08-19. 
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recognised the positive experience they had with bioslurry and the technology’s potential, 
with limited resource at hand biomass gasification was considered, from a business 
perspective, less attractive than coal. A business for biomass gasification would have to be 
completely driven by policy and the market would have to be created by instruments which, 
as of yet, are not in place (Metz, 2008).159 
Hence, FZK was forced to start looking for other partners. Despite this, the cooperation with 
Future Energy has allowed FZK to advance knowledge development and strengthen 
entrepreneurial experimentation by attracting Future Energy into the TIS. FZK was thus able 
to draw on existing infrastructure, knowledge and other resources in the coal gasification 
industry (resource mobilisation). Consequently, it also strengthened the legitimation of the 
field, since it managed to illustrate the opportunities of bioslurry and convince at least one 
incumbent actor in the coal industry that it was a legitimate future business (at least for a 
limited period of time). However, when the conventional business began to do well, it was 
deselected by the incumbent firm since the institutional and market uncertainties were 
considered to be too large. 
In search of a new partner 
Although the partnership with Siemens never worked out, FZK still believed in the bioslurry 
concept and began looking for a new partner. However, finding one proved quite difficult. 
Not only were there very few capital goods suppliers in Germany with the required 
knowledge, but none would have access to a gasifier similar to the GSP. Nevertheless, both 
Uhde and Lurgi were considered as having interesting technology portfolios, as well as the 
knowledge and necessary resources to develop the entire chain of technologies needed for 
realising bioslurry gasification based on straw.  
At Uhde, the question came up for discussion at the board of directors. Among the 
alternatives they had seen, the board considered the FZK solution to be the best possible 
                                                      
159 Metz (2008) also refers to the impossible conditions that FZK had set in place, which created barriers to 
cooperation. FZK wanted a new GSP demonstration unit to be constructed in Karlsruhe, which was something 
Siemens could absolutely not agree with, since the plant itself contained a lot of their “know-how”. Siemens also 
felt that it was not the gasification part that needed to be demonstrated but rather their fast pyrolysis concept on a 
larger scale. Siemens was unsure about sharing the risk of a large-scale demonstration plant since the process of 
fast pyrolysis is still uncertain at such a scale. 
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one for converting biomass into chemicals. However, as had been the case with Siemens, 
Uhde was unable to identify any customers that would be ready to invest in such plants. 
They also estimated that the resources required to develop the market would be too large, 
and they eventually declined the request to cooperate (Abraham, 2008).  
Lurgi, however, was more interested in the technology than Uhde and Siemens. In August 
2006, FZK and Lurgi reached an agreement for developing and demonstrating the entire 
concept, in which Lurgi would enjoy the exclusive rights to the technology and all future 
developments (Dinjus, 2007).  
The reason for Lurgi’s attraction to the TIS for cooperating with FZK on developing the 
bioslurry technology can be found in a broader set of circumstances. For some time, Lurgi 
had been a turnkey supplier of plants for the production of first-generation diesel and 
ethanol. Therefore, it could be expected to have a better understanding of the biofuel 
market than Siemens and Uhde. Based on its own market studies, it did not expect first-
generation technologies to be sufficient in the future. For meeting goals of renewable 
transportation fuels within the EU and in many other countries around the world, Lurgi 
believed that there would be a demand for more flexible and efficient biomass-based 
technologies (Berger, 2008).  
Bioslurry is thus considered by Lurgi to be an attractive alternative to producing large 
quantities of renewable transportation fuels and other chemicals from agricultural residues 
that would otherwise have few alternative uses. Lurgi also recognised that there will be a 
shortage of carbon sources in the future and increasing competition over natural gas, coal 
and oil resources. Biomass and straw have been identified as a valuable source of carbon 
which, before the bioslurry concept, would have been difficult to handle for the 
conventional petrochemical industry (direction of search and legitimation).160 
The bioslurry concept also fits well into Lurgi’s general strategy. Its intention is to be able to 
convert all carbon sources (natural gas, oil, coal, and biomass) into chemicals and 
                                                      
160It has furthermore been argued that biomass would best be used to produce chemicals and transportations fuels 
and not electricity or heat, since that will be the only renewable carbon source available for this sector (direction 
of search) (Dinjus 2007; Berger 2008). 
178 
 
transportation fuels along a technologically similar route. Since bioslurry resembles oil in its 
viscosity and lignite in its corrosive character, it would be able to fit right into the technology 
portfolio consisting of conventional, fossil-based conversion technologies. 
Following the decision to cooperate with FZK, Lurgi announced that its strategic goal would 
be to own the complete technology chain for the production of BtL and that it would work 
with all feed-stocks (coal, natural gas, slurry, and biomass). Furthermore, it would give the 
same attention to all feed-stocks even though biomass is at an earlier stage than the other 
technologies (Plass, 2007; Berger, 2008). With this arrangement, the need for FZK to 
undertake system building activities decreases over time and the responsibility of realising 
the entire technology chain gradually shifts over to the alliance with Lurgi. 
However, in order to take the next step towards realising a market for bioslurry and the 
production of chemicals and transportation fuels, the actors had to demonstrate the entire 
technology chain and not just the process of fast pyrolysis. The demonstration of the chain 
can be broken down in four distinct parts. 
First, the pyrolysis process must be demonstrated on a larger scale than with the current 
pilot. Consequently, FZK and Lurgi constructed a demonstration plant on the scale of 5MW, 
or 500kg per hour of non-woody biomass at the FZK facilities in Karlsruhe. The construction 
of the demonstration plant was completed in June 2007 (FZK, 2007) and initial test runs 
were conducted at the end of 2008 (knowledge development, entrepreneurial 
experimentation and materialisation) (Dinjus, 2009). The financial resources to construct the 
plant were largely mobilised by FZK from the Ministry of Agriculture and Fachagentur 
Nachwachsende Rohstoffe (FNR) (resource mobilisation). FNR has strong agricultural 
interests and has identified the technology as having the potential to add income streams 
for farmers, and has therefore been supportive of the project (Dinjus, 2007). The total cost 
of constructing the demonstration plant was estimated in a Lurgi press release (2006) to be 
€3.75 million. The original plan was to be able to offer the pyrolysis units on a commercial-
scale from January 2008 onwards, marketed under the name “Bioliq” (Zwiefelhofer, 2007; 
Berger, 2008). However, a combination of technical and non-technical problems have 
delayed these plans (Dinjus, 2009).  
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Second, a new multi-purpose gasifier (MPG) similar to the Siemens GSP is being developed. 
According to Professor Dinjus (2007), the patents for the GSP have expired and similar 
solutions could be developed with a protective screen, or a “cooling screen”.161 The 
development of the new MPG reactor commenced in September 2007 and the original 
intention was to bring it to market by December 2009 (Zwiefelhofer, 2007), although this 
date has since been postponed.162 The new reactor will be designed so that it can be used 
for other fuels besides bioslurries, such as lignite, for which Lurgi did not have a technical 
solution.  
Third, the gas treatment equipment has to be tested. It will be a more or less off-the-shelf 
technology and is not associated with any major development costs. However, the 
equipment needs to be demonstrated together with the other pieces of equipment (Berger, 
2008).  
Fourth, a methanol-to-synfuel (MtS) unit will be demonstrated. Instead of going to FT diesel, 
FZK and Lurgi have decided to undertake methanol production and, as a second step, 
convert the methanol to gasoline and diesel.163 The MtS process will be developed together 
with Südchemie and Volkswagen, and the pilot will be constructed in Wolfsburg (where 
Volkswagen headquarters is located). Volkswagen will also perform the motor tests, while 
Südchemie will be responsible for the testing and development of catalysts.  The total cost of 
the project has not been revealed but FNR has contributed €4.5 million (FNR, 2008). The 
demonstration was scheduled for completion by December 2009 and was to be made 
available to the market afterwards (Zwiefelhofer, 2007; Berger, 2008), but since this fourth 
step depended on the success of the previous three, the completion date of the 
demonstration will be considerably later than first announced. The motor test series are not 
expected to be finalised until 2011 (FNR, 2008). The complete chain is indeed unlikely to be 
demonstrated before 2012–2013, even if no major technical problems are encountered 
                                                      
161 Without a cooling screen, the corrosive character of the pyrolysis oil will ruin the gasifier in less than six 
months, versus extending its lifetime beyond 10 years (Schingnitz and Mehlhose, 2005; Dinjus, 2007). 
162 The cost of this second step has not been revealed nor has the level of support from any third partner. Lurgi 
has, however, good reasons to consider the development of the MPG as a key technology and does not require 
any third-party financing. 
163 The process is similar to the methanol to propylene process that is used in the plastics industry, but it still 
needs to be demonstrated. 
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along the way. Given such a long time frame, these plans are very uncertain and are bound 
to change. 
The total cost of the demonstration has not been made public, but Dr. Berger (2008) 
describes it as several tens of millions of Euros. However, the risks that Lurgi is exposed to 
will be relatively small—only the bioslurry demonstration specific to the demonstration of 
biomass-to-liquids is exposed, and this will largely be paid for by others. The other parts of 
the demonstration will be beneficial to other (primarily fossil) carbon conversion processes.  
In sum, the system builder FZK has demonstrated a capacity to strengthen the direction of 
search and legitimation and was, therefore, able to attract Lurgi to the project. With Lurgi 
becoming the new principal owner of the complete technology chain, it also took over the 
main responsibility of undertaking system building activities in the alliance.  
FZK also strengthened resource mobilisation by attracting further financing from FNR. With 
the additional resources, in combination with collaboration with Lurgi, it was able to 
construct a new demonstration plant and take the first steps towards demonstrating the 
entire value chain. With the construction of the new demonstration plant, the actors 
strengthened the functions of materialisation and entrepreneurial experimentation. In 
addition, with the new demonstration plant they secured access to a science and technology 
infrastructure that will serve as a basis for further strengthening entrepreneurial 
experiments, knowledge development and materialisation. The success of the demonstration 
activities is, however, still very uncertain.  
The future of the FZK technology option 
Beyond the challenge of reducing the short-term technical uncertainties lies the greater 
challenge of addressing institutional and organisational uncertainties in order to form a 
market for second-generation fuel from straw. The general institutional uncertainties 
concerning market formation are addressed in Chapter XI. This section will instead discuss 
the specific challenges of market formation for the FZK bioslurry concept. 
The main challenge for the alliance will lie in reducing the organisational uncertainties 
associated with market formation based on a decentralised bioslurry production system, as 
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well as the market and institutional uncertainties around the cost at which the concept can 
become competitive with other alternatives. The idea behind decentralised production of 
bioslurry has been that a group of farmers would be able to invest in a plant suitable for a 
smaller area.164 The bioslurry would then be transported to a central location for gasification 
in an EF reactor (GSP or MPG).  
The ideal size of the production and its possible integration with other industrial processes 
have been analysed by various actors (Zwart et al., 2006b; Leible et al., 2007; Zwart, 2007; 
RENEW, 2008). Lurgi’s Dr. Berger (2008) argues that FT diesel production will be too 
expensive on a small-scale and a more feasible option is the MtG process that is currently 
being developed. The typical output of such a plant would be 14,000-15,000 b/d (750,000 
t/a).165  
Approximately 40 bioslurry plants would be required to support the operation of such a 
large, centralised plant. The coordination challenge is thus obvious: simultaneous 
investments in 40 or more bioslurry plants would need to take place and come into 
operation at the same time as a refinery.166  
A potential solution would be to decrease the amount of coordination required by 
integrating the MtG production facility with a first-generation bio-ethanol and a biodiesel 
production plant, each with a capacity of 100kt/a. Zwiefelhofer (2007) illustrates that with 
the waste residues from plants based on first-generation biofuel production, one would only 
need an additional five larger slurry plants with a output of 26t/h of bioslurry (approximately 
40t/h or 320,000t/a of dried straw). The simultaneous investments for this concept would be 
less difficult to coordinate, even though the capital investment would be very large. 
Cost calculations based on the FZK/Lurgi concept have been not considered for the MtG 
process, but rather focused on FT synthesis. These calculations illustrate a wide range of 
                                                      
164 For the economics of the production to be manageable, the transportation distance to each plant should not 
exceed 25-30km. In a farming area in central Europe where this transportation distance is not exceeded, about 45 
percent of the typical straw harvest corresponds to a throughput of approximately 200,000 tonnes annually (25t/h 
and 8,000 hrs per year). This input would generate an output of 134t/a, with 12 times the energy content of the 
straw and containing 90 percent of the original energy content (Henrich et al., 2007). 
165 1 boe= 6.8 toe,  14 000*365/6.8 ≈ 750,000 
166 In the meantime, the slurry plants could eventually find alternative applications, but the values of these are 
highly uncertain.  
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results depending on a) the cost of the feed-stock, b) the size of the central refinery plant, 
and c) whether it is integrated into an existing refinery site or a greenfield operation. Leible 
et al. (2007) illustrate that a production cost of €1.25/litre and €1.0/litre can be reached if 
the size of a central gasification unit ranges between 500 and 5,000MWth (0.12Mt/a to 
1.25Mt/a). Zwart et al. (2006b; 2007) suggest that the cost can be reduced if production 
takes place in an 8,000MWth FT production facility. A production cost of €0.5/litre could be 
reached if overseas slurry production was utilised. This would, however, require 
approximately 80 bioslurry facilities and thus put even greater emphasis on the actors’ 
ability to coordinate simultaneous investments. In a third study, undertaken within the 
RENEW project, the cost of producing the fuel was estimated to be €1.35-1.79/litre diesel 
equivalent at 2004 prices. This was applied to a central production site with an output of 
greater than 1 million tonnes annually and was based on an expected price of biomass in the 
range of €4-7/GJ (RENEW, 2008). 
All of the above estimates are very uncertain but it is possible that the FZK and Lurgi concept 
will be competitive at an oil price of $100-150/bbl in a smaller scale facility based on 
domestic EU resources, and at a price of $60-100/bbl if larger facilities can be realised in 
combination with cheaper straw resources from overseas (see Chapter III). 
It thus appears that the FZK/Lurgi solution would result in a more costly liquid than the 
Choren solution, if domestically grown straw is used and the scale of operation is relatively 
small. With the possibility of integrating production with first-generation biofuel production, 
the relative competitiveness of the concept may be improved, but further cost calculations 
are needed to support such an argument. Since the cost of straw makes up one-third of the 
total cost of production, access to cheap residue can further increase the competiveness of 
the solution. The basic problems of market formation are thus similar for the two competing 
alliances promoting large-scale gasification for transportation fuels. Both solutions are 
considerably more expensive than the production of first-generation fuels, even if their 
substitution potential has been estimated to be much greater. The main question of market 
formation and institutional alignment will be dealt with in Chapter XI. 
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6.1.3 ZSW 
Parallel to the development of large-scale solutions for the production of liquid 
transportation fuels by Choren, FZK and Lurgi, an alternative has been making quiet 
progress. The research institute Zentrum für Sonnenenergie und Wasserstoff-Forschung 
(ZSW), located in Stuttgart, has taken on the role of system builder in this project and has 
created an alliance for the development and promotion of BioSNG based on the FICFB 
process, originally developed in Güssing (Chapter V).  
The evolution of small-scale gasification for the production of synthetic natural gas 
ZSW was founded in 1988 with the purpose of conducting research in the field of solar 
energy and hydrogen technology, and transferring the results of this research into industrial 
application.167 The founders and owners of the institute are the state of Baden-Württemberg 
and a number of public research organisations and private companies with local interests in 
and around the Stuttgart area. It has therefore been important that the research activities 
undertaken by ZSW strengthen the industry in and around the Stuttgart area. 
Since the institute was founded with the explicit purpose of researching possible industrial 
applications in solar energy and hydrogen technologies, it provided funding and clear 
direction to researchers with regards to which areas they should explore (resource 
mobilisation, direction of search). A team of researchers began elaborating on a concept in 
which higher levels of hydrogen could be obtained when converting carbon-based materials 
to gas.  
The concept, Absorption Enhanced Reforming (AER), is a process in which the CO2
 produced 
during steam gasification, or steam reforming, can be separated from the reactor by an 
absorbent. Using the AER process, the resulting gas will contain an elevated level of 
hydrogen and lower concentrations of carbon oxides than would otherwise have been the 
case. The process was first tested on natural gas reforming with good results. However, the 
focus was shifted to biomass since the researchers at ZSW believed that the advantages of 
the process would be even greater (Specht and Zuberbühler, 2007).  
                                                      
167 http://www.zsw-bw.de/ Accessed 2010-04-14. 
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In 2001, the researchers began to evaluate a range of gasification technologies in order to 
find the best possible one to adapt for hydrogen production based on biomass. While they 
found very few suitable solutions, they eventually came across the FICFB Güssing process, 
and identified it as an attractive option in combination with the AER process (Specht and 
Zuberbühler, 2007). Collaboration was initiated between ZSW and the actors associated with 
the Güssing technology, and a consortium of actors interested in developing the AER process 
was established. The consortium received financial support from the European Commission 
and the 5th Framework Programme for the research project AER-GAS I & II (resource 
mobilisation).  
The Güssing facility was the largest demonstration facility within the consortium and 
provided unique opportunities for testing and demonstrating the concept on a larger scale. 
Since the research infrastructure was already in place, the ZSW researchers were able to 
shorten the development process considerably (positive externalities). The results from the 
Güssing facility became very important for developing the AER process, and could be done at 
a low cost compared to building a similar demonstration plant themselves (knowledge 
development and entrepreneurial experimentation) (Specht and Zuberbühler, 2007).168  
Encouraged by their success, the ZSW researchers wanted to continue developing the 
concept. However, the attractiveness of setting up a standalone hydrogen production site 
for a future “hydrogen economy” lost its appeal after the turn of the century. However, an 
alternative application had emerged during the development work that took place at 
Güssing. The actors at the Güssing facility had experimented with many different technology 
options and non-electricity uses for the product gas (Chapter V); the option that was 
identified as having the greatest potential was the production of synthetic natural gas (SNG).   
Methane (CH4) is a less complex molecule compared to synthetic diesel and thus uses less 
energy to synthesise. Standalone SNG production would therefore appear quite attractive, 
since as much as 60-70 percent of the energy content can be converted to methane, 
                                                      
168During the demonstration of the technology in Güssing, the actors from ZSW were able to demonstrate above 
50 percent H2 content in the product gas, compared to previous 40 percent, but they remain confident that close 
to 70 percent can be reached. The demonstration also showed that the amount of direct methane was increased 
and the amount of CO2 and CO were reduced (Marquard-Möllenstedt et al., 2004). 
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compared to only 30 percent if electricity is produced at the scale of 10-50MW. In addition, 
it has been shown that methane synthesis can be performed at atmospheric pressure and 
clearly benefits from elevated hydrogen content in the product gas (Marquard-Möllenstedt 
et al., 2004; Zwart et al., 2006a). 
A solution which includes the production of BioSNG would better suit the structure of the 
German heat market since it lacks large heat sinks such as district heating systems. These 
“discoveries”, as a result of the existence of positive externalities, clearly changed the 
direction of search for ZSW since 2000, making standalone hydrogen production less 
interesting to pursue and BioSNG production increasingly so. 
Instead of continuing to work with the Güssing plant and Repotec to further demonstrate 
and commercialise the technology, ZSW formed an alliance of companies from in and 
around the Stuttgart area with the ability to take the technology to the market. The goal of 
the project is to build a CHP gasification plant based on the AER process, conduct 
experiments and develop the BioSNG technology from a slipstream (Specht and 
Zuberbühler, 2007; Naab, 2008).  
The other main actor in the project, aside from ZSW, is the local utility Energieversorgung 
Filstal (EVF), which has its head office in Göppingen. EVF will be the operator of the future 
plant. Although the company’s main business is natural gas, EVF invested in a CHP plant 
because it had identified BioSNG based on local resources as an innovative and interesting 
niche product that it would like to explore further. In combination with gas from fermenting 
plants, EVF believe BioSNG could give it an advantage over competing gas suppliers in 
Germany (Naab, 2008).  
However, moving directly to BioSNG production was not seen as an option for ZSW. The 
methane synthesis process must be further developed and the incentive structure for 
feeding BioSNG into the gas grid has so far been inadequate in motivating the construction 
of such plants. A step-by-step approach was adopted instead, similar to the Güssing case, in 
which the plan has been to first construct a 10MW gasification plant for electricity and heat 
production. Supported by Germany’s Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneubare-Energien-
Gesetz, EEG), the plant would carry its own investment and operating costs. It will, however, 
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be considerably more expensive than a conventional combustion technology plant and total 
investment cost has been estimated as approximately €18 million (Naab, 2008). The main 
portion of the investment for the CHP gasification plant will be paid by the investment 
consortium, although investment subsidies will also be necessary (Specht and Zuberbühler, 
2007; Naab, 2008). 
Based on the continuous operation of the plant, a technology platform will be set up for 
developing the AER process further, with the intention of producing BioSNG in the future. 
Technology development with regard to BioSNG and other applications for the hydrogen-
rich gas will be conducted based on a slipstream from the CHP gasification plant, and has not 
been included in the above-mentioned budget. The plan has been to fund the technology 
platform through the National Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology Innovation Programme 
(NIP), which was set up in 2008. The programme has a budget of €1 billion and has been a 
part the German government’s efforts to maintain its position as one of the world leaders in 
fuel cell and hydrogen technologies. 
In sum, ZSW has a strategy of a “catching-up learner” (Lundvall and Johnson, 1994, p.27). 
This strategy allows it to benefit from positive external economies and, as a result, get a lot 
for “free”. For example, by not having to develop the necessary infrastructure it can 
concentrate on improving and developing existing ones. The researchers at ZSW 
demonstrate their capacity as system builders by strengthening resource mobilisation and by 
setting up a research consortium for exploring the AER process. By using the research 
infrastructure already in place in Güssing, they can further strengthen knowledge 
development and the entrepreneurial experimentation of the TIS. Through the experiments 
taking place at Güssing, the researchers soon realised that the best application may perhaps 
be the production of BioSNG, and not hydrogen or electricity, in combination with the AER 
process. This conclusion influences the direction of search and the legitimation of the 
technology, since it clarifies its potential. However, even though ZSW has taken on the role 
of “catching-up learners”, most “product or process technologies borrowed from abroad do 
not automatically fit into new institutional set-ups.” (Dalum et al., 1992, p.311). 
Consequently, they created an alliance with local firms in and around the Stuttgart area to 
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continue to develop the technology and align it to Germany’s own institutional set-up. The 
following section will outline some of the remaining challenges for realising the technology 
in the German market. 
The future of the ZSW technology option 
The development of the Güssing FICFB process for the poly-generation of heat, electricity 
and BioSNG takes place not only in Austria (Chapter V), but also in Germany by ZSW, as well 
as in Sweden by Chalmers and Göteborg Energy (see Chapter VII). At the medium-scale of 
10-40MW, these efforts have been successful and quite a few projects for CHP production 
are about to be realised. The feed-in law—which is relevant for CHP in Germany (and in 
Austria until 2006)—is being used to advance the technology towards BioSNG production. 
The law permits the construction of plants (materialisation) that can be used as platforms on 
which to perform additional experiments and, therefore, facilitates knowledge development, 
and entrepreneurial experimentation, from which valuable lessons can be drawn and 
complementary technologies developed.  
The TIS actors in Sweden, Germany and Austria appear to agree that BioSNG would be a 
preferred product over electricity. The best value and the largest quantities of future BioSNG 
would be found in its use as a transportation fuel in vehicles (Specht and Zuberbühler, 2007; 
Naab, 2008; Gunnarsson, 2009). However, the institutional set-up in Germany does not yet 
support the construction of BioSNG plants.  
To realise such a market in Germany, institutional changes and a new type of alliance would 
have to be created. In terms of the institutional framework, BioSNG would have to compete 
with natural gas in addition to conventional liquid fuels. When natural gas is used in 
Germany as a transportation fuel, the CO2 tax is reduced by half. As a result, even if BioSNG 
was exempted from tax completely, natural gas would still be considerably cheaper (Naab, 
2008). In addition, even if taxes were adjusted so that BioSNG would be favoured over 
natural gas, investors could perceive such an investment as associated with a large financial 
risk, since changes in tax policy can be implemented from one day to the next (Gunnarsson, 
2009) . 
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In addition to the required changes to the incentive structure, which can probably be 
resolved (see Chapter XI), a new set of actors must to be attracted to the TIS in order to 
develop the necessary complementary technologies. Most notably, a new generation of gas 
engines must be developed for heavy-duty vehicles. Methane is not a diesel fuel and cannot, 
with conventional engines, be combusted at the same rate of efficiency.169 It is also a 
gaseous fuel and even though cars with gas engines have been developed and sold, it is not 
seen as preferred option by the main automotive manufacturers in Germany or by the oil 
industries (Keppeler, 2007; Drescher, 2008; Picard, 2008a).170 Additional problems that have 
been mentioned include the considerably shorter driving range of personal vehicles, the 
need for two gas tanks, and the existence of too few fuel stations in Germany (Specht and 
Zuberbühler, 2007; Naab, 2008).  
Therefore, it is necessary that the automotive manufacturers, gas utilities and/or oil 
companies enter the TIS if BioSNG is to be developed as a fuel for the transport sector.171 It 
remains to be seen what ZSW, as system builder, manages to do to overcome the intentional 
and frictional resistance of these incumbent industries.  
                                                      
169 However, with further engine development the same efficiency for diesel engines could most likely be 
accomplished (Röj, 2009).  
170 Although Daimler and Volkswagen provide vehicles for the market, they claim that they will not actively 
promote the development of a gas infrastructure (Keppeler, 2007; Drescher, 2008). 
171 At least in terms of supporting the development of new or improved drive trains with higher fuel efficiency, 
and the construction of an improved and extended infrastructure.  
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Box 6.2: The role of the German institute CUTEC in promoting technology options172 
The research institute Clausthaler Umwelttechnik-Institut (CUTEC) was founded in 1990 by the state 
of Lower Saxony to promote local industry in the field of environmental products. The research focus 
of the institute is on large-scale equipment, and the state has directed it to focus on areas that can 
lead to rapid commercialisation, preferably in less than three years. 
 
In 2002, CUTEC was asked by the state of Saxony if they could “do something” in the field of biomass 
gasification for producing liquid transportation fuels based on residues from farming. Saxony has 
always been a farming-intensive state, and the idea of energy farming is deeply rooted as a way of 
developing additional income streams. As such, it was important for CUTEC to develop a concept that 
could handle a wide range of different feed-stocks produced by farms as byproducts.  
 
Based on their directives and the experience of the CUTEC staff, the institute constructed a 400kW 
oxygen-blown atmospheric CFB gasifier, including a system for gas cleaning and a pilot plant for 
developing Fischer-Tropsch synthesis. The CFB was chosen since it had the most flexible feed, 
although conventional designs had to be adopted for the use of oxygen. Construction was completed 
in October 2004, and between January 2005 and May 2007 the pilot underwent 1,400 hours of 
operation, during which the gasifier was adapted to the wide range of feed-stocks. 
 
The current, simple four-step cleaning system creates a clean gas that can be used for FT synthesis. 
The cleaning system cannot, however, be used in a commercial application and must be further 
developed. Further development is being pursued under the ABSART programme, which is funded by 
the state of Saxony at €1.6 million and situated within the EU project ERA Net Bioenergy together 
with HPC Starck, TU Vienna, Repotec, and the Güssing facility. The gas cleaning project, which runs 
until 2010, is of vital importance for the large-scale success of low temperature gasification for the 
production of FT liquids. 
 
In order to take the next steps towards commercialisation, a group of investors created 
Strohkraftwerk Gronan Plaungs GmbH, which is a consortium formed with the intention of building a 
20MW demonstration plant with simple gas cleaning and using gas engines for the production of 
electricity.  
 
The construction of the 20MW straw gasifier is seen as a very important step for demonstrating their 
concept on a larger scale before a commercial plant of several hundred MW is constructed. Thus, the 
investors in the plant are also using the EEG and investment subsidies available for electricity 
production to learn more about how other products, such as BioSNG or FT diesel, can be realised in 
the future. In the meantime, they are advancing their knowledge on gas cleaning and synthesis 
processes.  
 
The role of CUTEC is not to lead the project but to assist as technical experts. They also see 
themselves as a possible partner for operationalising the plant once it has been constructed. 
However, for the concept to be realised on a large-scale, they are dependent on even more generous 
support schemes or special circumstances that can support the production of a fuel with a 
production cost of approximately €1.30-1.80/lde.   
                                                      
172 All of the information in this box is based on an interview with Professor Vodegel (2008) at CUTEC and the 
Renew (2008) study. 
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6.2 The system builders’ transformative capacity, system weaknesses and 
the potential role of policy 
In this section, the four research questions specified in Chapter II will be revisited. Answers 
to the questions will be provided for the case of Germany by analysing the previously 
outlined history. The research questions were formulated as: 
1) Who act as system builders in the different national contexts? 
2) What characterises the nature and extent of the system builders’ transformative 
capacity? 
a) How do the system builders make use of the general structure in which they are 
embedded to form or strengthen the structure and the various functions of the 
TIS? 
b) To which extent do the system builders manage to strengthen the structure and 
functions of the TIS?   
3) What are the limits to the system builders’ transformative capacity and how can 
these be explained? 
4) Given these limits, which system weaknesses remain to be resolved by system builders 
and policymakers on different levels (national and EU)? 
 
This section is divided into two main parts. Research questions one and two will be analysed 
in the first, and research questions three and four in the second. The discussion will thus 
begin with discussing who have been acting as system builders, and describe the nature and 
extent of their transformative capacity. The focus then shifts to analysing and explaining the 
limits of the system builders’ transformative capacity, identifying the main system 
weaknesses and discussing the potential role of system builders and policymakers in 
addressing these limits. 
6.2.1 The nature and extent of the system builders’ transformative capacity 
With respect to RQ1, it has been illustrated how the start-up company Choren, as well as the 
three institutes FZK, ZSW and CUTEC, have taken on the role as system builders. In Germany, 
the technical institutes appear to be particularly important actors that take on the role of 
searching for and developing opportunities across new knowledge fields. This involves 
drawing upon the general structure, both nationally and internationally. The institutes may 
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thereby act as “catching-up learners” (Dalum et al., 1992; Lundvall and Johnson, 1994), 
developing new opportunities for industries. Of course, this role can also be taken by actors 
besides the institutes such as the start-up company Choren. 
Over time, the actors taking on the system building role has changed in the different 
projects. In the case of Choren, the identity of the system builder was from the start 
synonymous with that of the inventor Bodo Wolf. However, as the company increased in size 
and more actors became involved in the technology, the importance of the individual 
declined and the system building activities were increasingly taken over by Choren and its 
allies. In terms of FZK, ZSW and CUTEC, the role of the individual was less prominent and the 
initial system building activities were undertaken by a specific research group. Just as for 
Choren, the system building activities have been gradually taken over by the larger alliance 
or network consisting of incumbent actors from the structure in which the system builders 
are embedded.  
With respect to RQ2, it has been demonstrated that the system builders are embedded in a 
rich general structure that creates unique opportunities for them to mobilise various 
resources and thereby form and strengthen the TIS of biomass gasification. The general 
structure is made up of the four elements of technology, actors, networks and institutions 
belonging to different sectoral system of innovations. The most important features of the 
structure have already been described in relation to the various projects, especially 
concerning the actors and technology. 
Thus, these structural elements will only be summarised before an extended analysis is 
presented of the current institutional framework. The nature and extent of the system 
builders’ transformative capacity will then be discussed with regard to their ability to draw 
upon resources from the general structure for strengthening the TIS for biomass gasification.  
The actor structure in Germany includes a set of capital goods firms capable of providing a 
wide range of technical solutions in fossil gasification for the petrochemical, oil and 
electricity industries. The history of these firms was described in the introduction of this 
chapter and in Chapter III. Some of these firms have benefited from the efforts undertaken 
in former East Germany to develop various thermal conversion processes for the use of 
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lignite. They are also in the position of taking advantage of the rapidly growing market for 
coal gasification for the production of various chemicals, SNG, transportation fuels and 
electricity through the IGCC technology. As a result, incumbents have been able to fill their 
order books and the competencies associated with gasification are now short in supply. As a 
response to the rapidly growing market for alternative fuels, some of the incumbent capital 
goods suppliers of equipment for gasification of fossil fuels have developed a business in 
supplying equipment for the production of first-generation renewable fuels. However, 
developing coal gasification as a substitute for oil within the European context would 
probably not be seen as legitimate in the eyes of the public and has, thus, not been pursued.  
The actor structure in Germany also includes a set of firms from the automotive industry and 
the omnipresent agricultural sector. In particular, the automotive industry has developed a 
joint position against the blending of large volumes of first-generation fuels with 
conventional fuel, due to what it considers to be inferior fuel properties. Therefore, it has 
decided to actively promote second-generation fuels from biomass gasification, but without 
the intention of becoming fuel suppliers themselves.   
The emergence of the TIS for biomass gasification has been both intentionally and 
unintentionally promoted by the institutional framework in Germany. This framework has 
provided a broad set of resources that the system builders can utilise in the formation and 
strengthening of the TIS. In parallel with the extensive actor and technology structure, an 
institutional structure has been developed, consisting of a multitude of more or less 
technology-“neutral” and technology-“specific” instruments for stimulating the emergence 
of renewable energy and new industries. With this mix of policy instruments, Germany has 
set a target of reducing its total CO2 emission at 40 percent below the levels of 1990 by 2020 
(if the rest of the EU can commit to reducing its emission by 30 percent over the same 
period) (BMU, 2007). The target will be met with a range of measures, including increasing 
the share of renewable energy in electricity production to at least 30 percent and increasing 
the share of renewable transportation fuels so that a net emissions reduction of 7 percent 
can be achieved by 2020 (equivalent to approximately 12 percent energy content) (BMU, 
2009). 
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Since the early 1990s, the principal policy instrument in Germany for stimulating new 
electricity production based on renewable resources has been the Renewable Energy 
Sources Act (EEG), or feed-in law. The law guarantees producer of electricity a specified price 
for electricity produced from renewable energy sources, depending on when the production 
becomes operational and the type and size of the production facility (BMU, 2008). The law 
stimulates a wide array of technical solutions and is adapted to the specific cost structure of 
each technology. The EEG can thus be seen as technology-specific type of instrument, 
designed with the purpose of creating an initial market for immature electricity production 
technologies. 
For stimulating renewable fuels the instrument of choice has been a general blending quota 
that stimulates the production of the cheapest commercially available technology at the 
time. From the outset, the quota target was 17 percent renewable fuels by 2020, based on 
energy content (BMU, 2007). However, due to the recent debate over the social desirability 
of using food for fuel, German targets have been more or less harmonised with EU Directive 
2009/28/EC. The target has, therefore, been re-defined in terms of achieving a net emission 
reduction of 7 percent from the transport sector by 2020, which is equivalent to 
approximately 12 percent bio-fuel by energy content (BMU, 2009).  
The law has increasingly been geared to include more technology-specific measures by 
excluding the blending of first-generation fuels that do not meet certain sustainability 
criteria. Moreover, by 2015, the fuels will be rated by their respective net contribution to 
greenhouse gas reductions. The outcome of such a measure is that bio-fuel with a 
favourable greenhouse balance may be blended with conventional fuels in smaller volumes. 
Only those fuels with a CO2 savings potential of at least 35 percent are to be considered for 
blending; this limit will be increased to 60 percent by 2017. Bio-methane is included in the 
new legislation and will, therefore, be able to be counted towards the overall target. In 
addition, a separate target has been set that stipulate 6 percent of bio-methane in total gas 
consumption by 2020 and 10 percent by 2030 (BMU, 2009). 
In addition to these policy instruments there are measures for stimulating energy research 
and innovation, including demonstration programmes, grants and research and 
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development programmes. Altogether, the 2008 federal budget made about €3.3 billion 
available for integrated energy and climate policy (BMU, 2007). These programmes, in 
combination with the above-mentioned targets and incentive structures, should not be seen 
as tools solely for abating climate change, but also as a part of an industrial policy being 
pursued by the government with the objective of “ … strengthen[ing] the technology 
leadership of German companies in global markets” (BMU, 2007, p. 7). Bearing the general 
structure in mind, the nature and extent of the transformative capacity of Choren and the 
three institutes will now be analysed.  
Choren is currently the only privately owned company acting as a system builder within the 
German TIS. Although being privately owned, Choren has a history that is strongly tied to the 
former brown coal institute DBI, and the largest facility for coal gasification in eastern 
Germany, SVP. Given this background, Bodo Wolf, the founder of Choren, was able to draw 
on a technology and actor structure that was already developed for coal gasification, and 
adapt it to biomass gasification. The required resources were mobilised from the 
institutional structure in the form of the technology-neutral development fund that was 
available in eastern Germany. With these resources, Choren managed to strengthen the 
technology structure by constructing a first pilot plant (materialisation). In doing so, Choren 
also strengthened knowledge development, entrepreneurial experimentation, 
materialisation, legitimation and direction of search.  
On the basis of the stronger technology structure and functions, Choren managed to align 
the technology to the interest of the domestic automotive industry—Volkswagen and 
Daimler—as they were interested in promoting alternatives with superior fuel properties 
than the first-generation fuels already available on the market. With the support of Daimler 
and Volkswagen, the alliance could be extended to include Shell. Shell brought its FT 
synthesis technology, and since Shell was willing to grant an off-take price on the fuels from 
a first demonstration facility (at a sub-optimal scale), the required remaining resources could 
be mobilised for constructing such a demonstration facility.  
The institute FZK managed to mobilise resources from the existing structure when the 
nuclear institute had to be re-oriented. With these resources, it managed to strengthen the 
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technology structure of the TIS by developing a process for producing a bio-slurry based on a 
technology developed by Lurgi for the production of town gas.  
The bio-slurry resembles conventional oil in its physical characteristics and is based on low-
value farm residues. The process is, thus, relatively well aligned with the preferences of the 
incumbent capital goods industry of fossil fuel gasification, as well as with agricultural 
interests in Germany. By changing the physical properties of the farm residues, FZK 
strengthened legitimation and the direction of search for using biomass in industrial 
chemical process. FZK was, therefore, able to form a technology partnership with Future 
Energy, and mobilise resources from FNR, BMELV and other organisations with agricultural 
interests in Germany. With these additional resources, a demonstration facility for bioslurry 
could be constructed. FZK thus strengthens the actor and the technology structure of the 
TIS, as well as the functions of entrepreneurial experimentation, knowledge development 
and materialisation. 
However, it was not easy for FZK to strengthen the structure by creating an alliance with 
incumbents firms that have experience from fossil gasification and the required downstream 
processes. FZK encountered frictional resistance to biomass gasification from the 
incumbents due to the strong market demand for coal gasification, while the market for 
second-generation fuels still had to be developed (direction of search). Nevertheless, FZK 
succeeded in strengthening the actor structure of the TIS by setting up an alliance with Lurgi 
and the firms necessary to demonstrate the entire value chain. The fact that Lurgi was 
interested in cooperating with FZK arguably had to do with its extensive experience with 
first-generation fuels and the expectation that further technology development would 
strengthen Lurgi’s position in fossil gasification (direction of search). 
ZSW is a relatively new institute, founded in 1988 with the purpose of exploring solar and 
hydrogen technology and, thereby, strengthening local industry in and around the Stuttgart 
area. The institute thus provides a strong direction of search. It directs the attention of the 
researchers onto certain areas of focus and provides a structure from which resources can 
be mobilised. Since ZSW was a relatively late entrant to the field of biomass gasification, it 
was able to draw extensively on the positive externalities produced by the experience and 
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technology infrastructure that was developed in Austria. It also acted to extend the FCIFB 
trajectory of the TIS to Germany.  
ZSW, therefore, draws on the technology and actor structure developed in Austria but also 
strengthens the same structure by bringing the AER process to the TIS for biomass 
gasification. By combining it with the research infrastructure created in Güssing―while 
setting up a research consortium (AER I&II) with funding from the 5th Framework 
Programme―ZSW was able to strengthen the functions of entrepreneurial experimentation 
and knowledge development of the TIS at a relatively low cost. These activities not only 
strengthened the TIS in Germany but the TIS as a whole.  
Over time, however, ZSW came to realise that hydrogen may not be the best end-product, 
but that the AER process in combination with the FICFB gasification process developed at 
Güssing would be excellent for small-scale BioSNG production. With the discovery of the 
new application, the direction of search and the legitimation of the process was 
strengthened. Based on the new direction the project had taken, ZSW then managed to 
strengthen the structure by establishing an industry consortium with the purpose of 
commercialising the technology. However, it intend to first build a plant that can carry its 
own operating costs (supported by the EEG law) for the production of heat and electricity, 
and then use this facility to commercialise the BioSNG technology. The demonstration 
facility, however, has not yet been constructed.173  
CUTEC is the third institute in Germany to have played a significant role in developing 
biomass gasification. It utilised the availability of CFB gasification already developed for less 
advanced applications to take further steps towards more advanced applications (see 
Chapters VII and VIII on Sweden and Finland). An alliance between CUTEC and an industrial 
consortium was established, in which CUTEC plays a very important role in experimenting 
with and adapting the technology to the needs and desires of their stakeholders, thereby 
mobilising significant resources for further developing the TIS (resource mobilisation). Just as 
in the case of ZSW, the plan has been to develop the technology for less advanced 
                                                      
173 The technology is well aligned with the German heat market, which is dominated by small district heating 
networks and the currently relatively limited availability of biomass in Germany. 
197 
 
applications, utilising the existing institutional structure for strengthening market formation, 
while developing the technology for more advanced applications such as BioSNG or FT diesel 
production. 
In the conclusions of RQ1 and RQ2, the three institutes appear to have institutionalised the 
system building role, even though a privately-owned start-up company was also found to 
take on the role. These actors have made use of the general structure in which they are 
embedded by:  
1) drawing upon fossil gasification and existing fossil-based technologies. 
2) aligning the technology to the interests of a) the automobile manufacturers, and b) 
the incumbent capital goods industries of gasification equipment. 
3) drawing upon a wide range of technology-neutral and technology-specific 
instruments to solve climate, job and nuclear crises, as well as for supporting 
agricultural interests.  
 
As a result, both structure and functions of the TIS have been strengthened. The embryonic 
structure of the TIS has been strengthened by building various pilot and demonstration 
plants (technology), attracting actors (actor), and creating knowledge networks and alliances 
with incumbents (networks). Seven of the functions have been strengthened: resource 
mobilisation, knowledge development, entrepreneurial experimentation, materialisation, 
legitimation, direction of search, and the development of positive externalities. Hence, all 
functions of the TIS have been strengthened except for market formation.174     
6.2.2 Limits of the system builders’ transformative capacity, system 
weaknesses and the potential role of policy    
Although it was argued that the system builders had been able to strengthen both structure 
and functions, there are still limits to their transformative capacity. In this section, the limits 
of the system builders will be identified, as well the resulting system weaknesses and the 
potential role of system builders and policymakers for resolving these will be discussed. 
                                                      
174 One could argue that market formation was strengthened in the case of Choren through their special 
agreement with Shell on the future production of liquids from the demonstration plant.  However, the agreement 
is a one-time event, not replicable in the larger scale as any FT liquids have as of yet not been produced at the 
plant. If the plans of ZSW and CUTEC are realised, market formation will also be strengthened for less 
advanced applications due to the existing institutional framework.   
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To begin with, it was previously shown that, to varying degrees, the system builders have 
managed to strengthen all of the functions of the system except for market formation. With 
regard to market formation, there has been some early articulation of demand from 
potential customers: Choren was able to reach a deal with Shell, which has committed to 
buy the fuel produced by the demonstration plant. However, no second-generation fuels 
have yet been produced in any of the demonstration facilities, even though a science and 
technology infrastructure has materialised in Germany consisting of pilot plants and 
demonstration facilities.  
This infrastructure can potentially be used for demonstrating the production of second-
generation fuels, thereby strengthening market formation. However, the actors have so far 
been limited in their capacity to strengthen knowledge development, entrepreneurial 
experimentation and materialisation to a level where the actors’ know-how is sufficient for 
making the technology operational on the scale of demonstration plants.175  
The first system weakness is, therefore, an incomplete technology structure and lack of 
know-how for taking the demonstration plants into operation. 
Although difficult to assess, the three major alliances formed by Choren, FZK and ZSW 
appear to have access to the competencies required to address this system weakness. 
Nevertheless, it may take years before they can overcome this weakness―the actual time 
and resources required to fully address it is very difficult, if not impossible, to predict even 
for experts. Addressing the first system weakness, is thus an unpredictable and potentially 
costly process.  
The system builders will most likely be limited in their ability to pursue knowledge 
development, entrepreneurial experimentation and further strengthen materialisation over 
extended period of times without additional support from policy. The role of policy should, 
therefore, be focused on supporting the process with so called “patient capital” (cf. Donner-
Amnell (2000)) in terms of sufficient research and development funding to foster such 
activities―even if they take a long time to produce results. This “patient capital” will 
                                                      
175 This can probably be explained by the fact that the actors began experimenting with the technology relatively 
late and have little or no experience with less advanced applications based on EF gasification of biomass. 
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probably be particularly important to FZK and Choren, as they will not be in a position to 
make money on less advanced products while improving the technology for more advanced 
products. This option is being pursued by ZSW and CUTEC by mobilising resources from the 
current institutional structure in support for renewable electricity from biomass.176   
If the demonstration plants can be made operational within the next few years, the technical 
uncertainties around the construction of subsequent plants can be reduced. Demonstration 
plants that are successfully up and running would considerably strengthen the legitimation 
and direction of search of the TIS, and positive externalities may arise. On the other hand, if 
one or several of the projects fail, there may be negative externalities in the form of reduced 
legitimacy. 
The function of market formation would be strengthened if the demonstration plants are 
successfully constructed and taken into operation (in that a supply of fuel is made available). 
This would not, however, guarantee that markets are formed. On the contrary, all the 
system builders in Germany agree that the current institutional framework is not aligned 
with the technology and that market uncertainties are substantial.  
However, even though the system builders share a common understanding that the current 
institutional framework is insufficient, they have so far been limited in their capacity of 
strengthening market formation in support of the first commercial-scale demonstration 
plants and beyond.  
So far, the system builders have been able to considerably strengthen the actor structure of 
the TIS by setting up alliances and knowledge networks across the different projects, not just 
in Germany but also throughout Europe. Many firms, institutes, universities and other actors 
interested in various aspects of the process have, therefore, entered the TIS. A crucial factor 
in this has been the funding made available through various EU Framework Programmes 
such as RENEW and AER I&II (coordinated by Volkswagen and ZSW). These networks have 
                                                      
176 Ultimately, whether any of the technology solutions proposed by the above-mentioned actors will work is 
impossible to predict. To reduce technical uncertainty it may very well be necessary to further strengthen market 
formation and materialisation in order to attract other actors to the TIS. These actors could strengthen the 
technology structure by experimenting with new trajectories or technology options, as well by extending the 
existing science and technology infrastructure. However, such a structural and functional weakness has not been 
identified in the German case, since the scope of technical options is still quite encompassing. 
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focused on developing the technical aspects of the technology, assessing the biomass and 
market potential, as well as conducting well-to-wheel analysis.  
In contrast to the Austrian case, there is thus not a lack of actors with substantial resources 
in the TIS. Rather, there are cognitive limitations and underlying conflicts between the actors 
concerning which future solutions are considered “the best”. The system builders see each 
others as fierce competitors and spend much time arguing about “petty politics”, and 
downplay each others’ technical solutions rather than finding a common agenda. Therefore, 
they have not been able to transform the knowledge networks into broader political 
networks, developing a common agenda for aligning the institutional framework and, 
thereby, strengthening market formation. Hence, 
The second system weakness is the absence of joint political networks necessary for aligning 
institutions and technology. 
The various actors and system builders would all benefit if they pooled their resources, “ran 
in packs”, and argued for an institutional change that would enable market formation 
beyond the demonstration stage. As Van de Ven (2005, p. 373) argues: 
“Technological innovation is fundamentally a collective action process of building an 
infrastructure that reduces the time, costs, and risks for each participating member”  
Since the actor structure of the TIS consists of many powerful actors, agreeing on a common 
goal would increase their chances of aligning the institutional framework significantly. In a 
sense, cooperation between the competitors, VW and Daimler, already occurs regarding the 
development of the common fuel standard and in their common position on the promotion 
of FT diesel. However, this would also have to be extended to include the other actors within 
the TIS and concern the general market conditions for second-generation fuels. 
In spite of the second system weakness, the activities undertaken by the various system 
builders have strengthened the direction of search and legitimation of the TIS. As a result, it 
is more than likely that the legal framework for biofuels has been partly aligned in Germany 
and in the EU as whole in support of a market for second-generation fuels. To reach the 10 
percent target by 2020, Directive 2009/28/EC states that “ … it is essential to develop and 
201 
 
fulfill effective sustainability criteria for biofuels and ensure the commercial availability of 
second-generation biofuels” (EC, 2009a, p. 17). Furthermore, it is argued that the binding 
character of the directive is “subject to the availability” of these types of fuels. The reasons 
for policy to address this remaining system weakness from an EU level―as well as the 
possible forms of intervention―will be further analysed in Chapter XI.  
In addition to these two system weaknesses, which are relevant for all the system builders in 
Germany, there are system weaknesses that are specific to the individual trajectories. One 
such weakness concerns both Choren and FZK, and refers to the fact that both of their 
projects rely on the formation of a supply chain that is able to supply large amounts of 
biomass and bioslurry to a central location. In the case of Choren, it involves securing the 
future biomass supply for a commercial-sized plant by managing contracts with fuel supplies 
in the range of 1 million tonnes of locally produced biomass per year. This challenge may, 
however, be even more difficult for FZK/Lurgi to address. Their distributed solution requires 
up to 40 slurry plants that need to be up and running before the slurry-oil can be used in a 
centrally located gasification plant.  
Due to the second system weakness―poor political networks that limit the system builders’ 
capacity to strengthen market formation―there are weak incentives for the creation of a 
supply chain for the production and distribution of bioslurry, torrefied biomass, short 
rotation coppice and other types of biomass necessary for large-scale production of second-
generation transportation fuels based on the EF gasification process. Hence,  
The third system weakness is an incomplete actor and technology structure for organising a 
supply chain capable of handling large-scale production and distribution of biomass suitable 
for EF gasification. 
Overcoming this system weakness will require that the system builder has the ability to 
coordinate multiple investments in the upstream value chain. It appears as if coordination is 
a strength for both FZK and Choren, which have been able to coordinate the actions of 
various down-stream suppliers. If the two first weaknesses can be overcome by the system 
builders and policymakers, the third system weakness may well be addressed by the system 
builders without any further policy intervention.   
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With regard to ZSW, it was argued that it has limited capacity to strengthen legitimation and 
direction of search for using BioSNG as a transportation fuel, mainly due to intentional and 
frictional resistance from the automotive and petrochemical industries, as well as from the 
major gas utilities (controlling the downstream use of the gas from their process). The 
automotive sector would need to develop new and improved gas engines, increase the 
driving range of gas vehicles and develop diesel engines for heavy-duty vehicles that can run 
on methane with the same or higher rate of energy efficiency. If the market for personal 
vehicles is targeted, the incumbent gas suppliers would need to build an increased number 
of filling stations. Hence,  
The fourth system weakness is the lack of an actor and technology structure for using BioSNG 
as a transport fuel. 
Direction of search could eventually be strengthened if the system builder creates an alliance 
or forms a network with first-generation biogas producers, thereby strengthening the actor 
structure of the TIS. Policymakers could address this system weakness by a) improving the 
conditions for using BioSNG as an alternative fuel in Germany, i.e. by changing the current 
tax legislation, and b) supporting the creation of networks with incumbent industries by 
financing, for example, engine development and the creation of an improved fuel 
infrastructure.177 
6.4 Conclusions 
By analysing the five most prominent projects for biomass gasification in Germany, four 
system builders were identified―the start-up company Choren and three research institutes 
FZK, ZSW and CUTEC.178 It was concluded that the institutes appear to have institutionalised 
the system building role by developing an expertise in searching for and developing 
opportunities across new knowledge fields, contributing to the creation of new TISs. This 
involves identifying opportunities and drawing upon the general structure, both nationally 
and internationally. The institutes thereby act as “catching-up learners” (Dalum et al., 1992; 
                                                      
177 If these weaknesses are not addressed, ZSW will risk being in the same situation as Güssing (Chapter V), in 
that they will continue strengthening knowledge development, resource mobilisation and entrepreneurial 
experimentation, thereby creating many new technical opportunities—but without simultaneously creating the 
industrial capacity to take them to the market. 
178 It was concluded that TU Freiberg had not acted as a system builder (see Box 6.1).  
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Lundvall and Johnson, 1994) and develop new opportunities for industry. It was also 
concluded that the actors taking on the system building role changes over time. At the start, 
individuals such as Bodo Wolff or small research groups at the different research institutes 
took responsibility for undertaking system building activities, but with time the system 
building is taken over by the alliances or networks created by the system builders. 
By making use of the rich structure in which they are embedded, the system builders have 
been able to create the embryonic structure of the TIS. By building various pilot and 
demonstration plants (technology), attracting actors (actor), and creating knowledge 
networks and alliances with incumbents (networks), the system builders have strengthened 
the structure and all functions except for market formation. 
However, although the system builders have strengthened the structure and the functions of 
the TIS, they have not yet managed to take the first demonstration plants into operation. 
They have also, so far, failed to develop the political networks required to align the 
institutional framework and the technology so that a market formation for commercial-scale 
plants is enabled. Hence: 
1) The first system weakness is, therefore, an incomplete technology structure and lack 
of know-how for taking the demonstration plants into operation. 
2) The second system weakness is the absence of joint political networks necessary for 
aligning institutions and technology. 
The first system weakness has to be addressed by the provision of sufficient funding through 
policy, so that the demonstration plants can eventually become operational. This may take a 
long time and the role of policy would be to provide “patient capital” (Donner-Amnell, 2000) 
for the first plants to succeed. If the first one or two demonstration plants fail before others 
succeed, it would most likely create negative externalities and significantly decrease the 
legitimacy of not only the specific trajectory but of the TIS as whole, reducing the possibility 
of other projects to materialise in Europe.  
The second weakness has not been resolved by the system builders since they see each 
other only as competitors. Hence, even if they agree that the current framework is 
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insufficient, they have failed to create the necessary political network and formulate a 
commonly supported alternative. Since the actor structure of the TIS consists of many 
powerful actors, agreeing to and working on a common goal would increase their chances of 
aligning the institutional framework. 
In addition to the two system weaknesses that are relevant to the four projects, two 
additional weaknesses exist: one concerning Choren and FZK and the other concerning ZSW. 
3) The third system weakness is an incomplete actor and technology structure for 
organising a supply chain capable of handling large-scale production and distribution 
of biomass suitable for EF gasification. 
4) The fourth system weakness is the lack of an actor and technology structure for using 
BioSNG as a transport fuel. 
It was argued that if policy can address the first two system weaknesses, the system builders 
are likely to coordinate the creation of the necessary supply chain for bioslurry and biomass 
in the required quantities. With regard to the fourth system weakness, it was argued that 
the system builder need to create alliances or form networks with first-generation biogas 
producers to strengthen the actor structure of the TIS. Policymakers will be required to 
finance and support the formation of such networks and alliances to also include the 
automotive industry for engine development and eventual test fleets, as well as for 
extending the fuel infrastructure. 
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The history of biomass gasification in Sweden is relatively long compared to that of Austria 
(Chapter V) and Germany (Chapter VI). Since the 1970s, it has evolved along two main 
trajectories over three main episodes. Each episode has been dominated by a direction of 
search and an actor structure interaction specific to the TIS of biomass gasification in 
Sweden.  
The first episode began during the 1973 oil crisis with the first serious experiments on 
biomass gasification since the Second World War. The direction of search was influenced by 
a desire to create a substitute for oil, and methanol was identified as the preferred 
alternative fuel at the time. The favoured feed-stock was peat and biomass, but experiments 
were also conducted using coal and extra-heavy oils. These early experiments gave rise to 
two main trajectories. The first to emerge was focused on stand-alone fluidised bed 
gasification. The second was based on the integration of entrained flow gasification of black 
liquor in chemical pulp mills.179 
In 1986, the direction of search rapidly shifted towards large-scale production of electricity 
due to a sudden drop in the price of oil and the Chernobyl nuclear accident. As a result, 
other actors became interested in the technology and further attempts were made to 
develop it (although no real commercial break through was made by Swedish actors). 
Interest in new electricity generation based on biomass gasification decreased during the 
late-1990s, mainly due to the deregulation of the electricity market and less political 
pressure placed on the decommissioning of nuclear power. 
                                                      
179 The first attempts with black liquor gasification were, however, intended to produce electricity and not 
transportation fuels.   
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Nevertheless, the gasification of renewable resources became fashionable once again when 
the threat of climate change was initially recognised and the technology was identified as 
strategically important for realising the production of renewable transportation fuels in large 
quantities.  
This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section will describe the history of 
fluidised bed gasification from 1973 to 2009. The second will outline the evolution of the 
entrained flow gasification of black liquor in approximately the same time period. The first 
two sections will focus on describing the interactions between actors and the characteristics 
of the emerging technological innovation system (TIS). The focus is on how the system 
builders act to create the emerging structure of the TIS by building the structure directly, but 
also by strengthening the various functions specified in Chapter II.  
The third section of this chapter provides answers to the research questions (as specified in 
Chapter II). The discussion will start with identifying who have been acting as the system 
builders, and then describe the nature and extent of their transformative capacities. The 
focus then shifts to analysing and explaining the limits of the system builders’ transformative 
capacity, identifying main system weaknesses, and discussing the potential role of system 
builders and policymakers in addressing these weaknesses. The fourth section of this 
chapter presents the main conclusions. 
7.1 Three episodes of fluidised bed gasification in Sweden, 1973−2009 
This section will describe the development of fluidised bed gasification in Sweden from when 
it started during the first oil crisis in the early-1970s up to 2009. The section is divided into 
the previously mentioned three episodes. Following the final episode, a project developed 
by Göteborg Energy will be described in a box. This project is not really an outcome of the 
history of gasification in Sweden, but is more related to the recent development of FICFB 
gasification in Austria (see Chapter V). The section concludes with a summary of the three 
episodes. 
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7.1.1 Episode I: 1973−1986. The oil crises, transportation fuels and lime 
kilns 
At the beginning of the 1970s, the district heating and transportation sectors were almost 
completely dependent on cheap oil. As such, when the first oil crisis hit in 1973, a wide range 
of initiatives were undertaken to reduce this level of oil dependency (direction of search).180  
The focus of government spending on biomass gasification was on developing methanol 
production based on domestic resources. The intent was to use the methanol in the 
transportation sector in order to reduce oil dependency (Sandén and Jonasson, 2005). While 
there was a need to increase electricity production at the time, the parties in parliament, the 
military and leading scientists essentially agreed that nuclear power was the preferred 
choice over any other alternatives (Kaijser, 1992; Anshelm, 2000). As a result, developing 
biomass gasification for electricity production did not interest the government at the time. 
As a consequence of the oil crisis, the funding for Professor Olle Lindström and his research 
group at the Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) significantly increased. He received 
dedicated funding from the government to start experimenting with various new energy 
technologies, that could potentially reduce oil dependency (resource mobilisation) (Rensfelt, 
2008).   
One of his students, Erik Rensfelt also received funding from the regional research council 
Norrlandsfonden, with the objective of developing the industry in northern Sweden. His task 
was broadly defined as “to do something interesting with peat”.181 Consequently, Mr. 
Rensfelt started experimenting with peat gasification, constituting the first serious peat and 
biomass gasification experiments in Sweden since the first time since the Second World War 
(Rensfelt, 2008).182  
                                                      
180 Between 1970 and 1974, the price of oil increased by approximately five times, from $10 to $50 per barrel, in 
2008 dollars (BP, 2009). 
181 The peat resources in northern Sweden are vast and had previously been developed as an emergency fuel in 
the case of war (Hellsmark, 2005) 
182 These first activities at KTH continued and eventually evolved into a research group at KTH, which still 
focuses on various aspects of biomass gasification (Rensfelt, 2008; Sjöström, 2009). 
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The need to reduce oil dependency became even more pressing in the wake of the second 
oil crisis in 1978-1979 (direction of search).183 As a result, government efforts in support of 
the development of alternative technologies intensified, and researchers involved in 
biomass and peat gasification were offered more money than they could find time and 
people to spend it on (resource mobilisation) (Rensfelt, 2008). The government also directed 
(direction of search) both the Technical University in Lund (LTH) and KTH to develop biomass 
gasification with the goal of building a pilot plant in Studsvik for methanol production based 
on domestic fuels (Rensfelt, 2008). Consequently, the process development of gasification 
technology moved from KTH to Studsvik, while research on the science behind the process 
still continued at KTH.184 
Studsvik had been developed as a government-owned research and development laboratory 
for energy technologies. It employed more than 600 scientists, but the vast majority was 
engaged in developing nuclear technology for electricity production. However, most of the 
government resources allocated to Studsvik were for developing alternative energy 
technologies such as solar and wind power. The process development of biomass 
gasification continued at the Department for Thermal Processes at Studsvik, which initially 
employed about 20-25 individuals (Waldheim, 2005, 2010).185   
By 1980, the Studsvik researchers had constructed a pressurised oxygen-blown 2MWth 
bubbling fluidised bed (BFB) pilot plant that could be operated at a maximum 25 bars of 
pressure. The pilot plant (MINO) was intended for methanol synthesis. The pilot plant 
operated successfully from 1980 to 1986, and was tested with a wide range of biomass-
based fuels. It was considered the most advanced pressurised biomass gasification process 
at the time (Blackadder et al., 1992; Rensfelt, 2008). With the completion of the pilot plant, 
the actors strengthened the functions of knowledge development, entrepreneurial 
experimentation and materialisation of the emerging TIS.  
                                                      
183 Between 1978 and 1979, the price of oil more than doubled from $46 to $96 per barrel (BP, 2009). 
184 Researchers at KTH interpreted this as an explicit request from the government to engage in scientific 
research on the gasification process but not on process development itself. This practice was later 
institutionalised at KTH, in that they do not develop new processes. However, their research still requires access 
to experimental research equipment (Sjöström, 2009). 
185 The research and experimental activities at the Department for Thermal Processes took place in close 
cooperation with Svensk Metanolutveckling AB (SMAB), who performed different motor tests and evaluated 
methanol as an alternative transportation fuel (Sandén and Jonasson, 2005). 
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With the completion of the pilot plant, the researchers at Studsvik considered the process 
ready for scaling up. To do so, they sought to increase collaboration with European 
contractors, and in 1986 Linde made an offer to the Finnish chemicals company Kemira 
based on the MINO process technology (Waldheim, 2010). These initiatives were undertaken 
because Kemira was interested in constructing a commercial-scale, 80MWth, peat-based 
gasification system for ammonia synthesis in Oulu, Finland (market formation).186 The 
project would receive substantial investment support and funding from the Finnish 
government for the research and development work involved. It was thus an attractive 
project for both Studsvik and Linde. However, competition from two other suppliers resulted 
in them losing the contract; the German engineering firm, Uhde, with extensive experience 
in oil and coal gasification for various synthesis processes―won it instead (see Chapter VIII).  
In parallel with the development of pressurised gasification systems, an alternative and less 
advanced application for biomass gasification was being explored by Götaverken and its 
main competitor in Finland, Ahlstrom (see Chapter VIII). Together with the pulp and paper 
industry, Götaverken had developed an atmospheric circular fluidised bed (CFB) gasification 
processes for oil substitution in lime kilns. The application did not require any advanced gas 
cleaning and enabled the pulp and paper industry to utilise residue feed-stocks from the 
mills such as bark and other types of waste wood.  
Since the commercial success of pressurised gasification for methanol synthesis had been 
difficult to achieve, Studvik also took an interest in the market for less advanced applications 
and developed their own CFB atmospheric lime kiln gasifier in cooperation with Fläkt 
Industri AB (later ABB Fläkt Industri AB).  
Studsvik was also selected for a project in Italy, Grevé-in-Chianti, in which they installed two 
15MWth atmospheric refuse-derived fuel (RDF) gasifiers, based on their lime kiln gasifier and 
without hot gas cleaning, in which the gas was fed into a conventional boiler (Blackadder et 
al., 1992; Waldheim, 2010). The project was important as Studsvik gained commercial 
experience, a reference plant and experience with working with large-scale equipment 
(knowledge development, entrepreneurial experimentation, materialisation, market 
                                                      
186 A synthesis process similar to that for methanol. 
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formation). The installation was operated with limited success between 1993 and 1997 
(Knoef, 2005).187  
Besides Grevé-in-Chianti, they only made a few additional offers to potential clients before 
the market collapsed with the rapid decrease in the price of oil in 1986 (Rensfelt, 2008). 
Thus, the re-emergence of cheap oil marked an end to the first episode of biomass 
gasification in Sweden. 
In summary, the government provided ample resources in support of the development of 
new technologies for oil substitution during this first episode. These resources made it 
possible to begin experimenting with biomass gasification for the first time since the Second 
World War. Guidance on the main development efforts was provided by the government’s 
interest in developing methanol from domestic resources as an alternative fuel (direction of 
search).  
In response, various actors entered the TIS, while Studsvik was the main actor in pursuing 
methanol production based on domestic peat and biomass resources. Even if methanol 
production failed, all of these actors considerably strengthened the TIS and created positive 
interconnections involving resource mobilisation, knowledge development, entrepreneurial 
experimentation, materialisation, and market formation for less advanced applications. 
However, what was not accomplished (nor attempted) was aligning the institutional 
framework to support the formation of a market (market formation) that did not rely on a 
high price of oil. Thus, when the price of oil dropped, this momentum ceased. Nonetheless, 
this first episode resulted in the creation of a new structure upon which the next episode 
could build.  
7.1.2 Episode II: 1986−1999. Towards large-scale electricity production 
During the first episode, the relevant actors experienced a situation wherein they had access 
to more money than they could find time to spend. By 1987, however, the availability of 
cheap oil turned this situation into a crisis and forced the restructuring of energy research in 
                                                      
187 According to Waldheim (2010), it was operated until 2004. 
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Sweden.188 As a result, developing biomass gasification for methanol synthesis suddenly 
became unattractive. Due to a series of exogenous events, however, a new episode soon 
emerged, re-igniting interest in the development of large-scale heat and electricity 
production based on pressurised gasification systems integrated with a combined steam and 
gas turbine (BIGCC). 
The first such event to shift the direction of search in favour of biomass gasification had 
actually occurred during the first episode in March 28, 1979, with the nuclear accident at 
Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania, USA. Nuclear energy was already controversial in the 
beginning of the 1970s, and the accident swiftly convinced a majority of Parliament of the 
need for a referendum on the future of nuclear power in Sweden, which took place in spring 
1980 (Anshelm, 2000). Based on the outcome of the referendum, Parliament decided that all 
nuclear power plants in Sweden should be decommissioned no later than 2010. However, 
this decision also identified the importance of developing alternatives to nuclear power, so 
that decommissioning would not jeopardise the welfare of the country (Anshelm, 2000). The 
referendum did not, however, result in any specific directions as to how a decommissioning 
should be accomplished, nor in any new incentives for the development of alternative 
technologies (Anshelm, 2000).  
These incentives were not introduced until the second major exogenous event, the 1986 
Chernobyl nuclear accident. The Swedish Minster of Energy at the time, Birgitta Dahl, 
intensified her efforts to organise a swift decommissioning of nuclear power and reinforced 
her and the government’s strong belief in realising the potential of alternative and domestic 
energy resources. This new rhetoric led to strong reaction from industry and the energy 
utilities (Anshelm, 2000), who were more or less forced to start looking for alternatives to 
nuclear power (Ståhl, 2008).   
A new direction of search was thus created to develop alternative technologies for electricity 
production based on domestic resources. As a result, the two dominant energy utilities, 
Sydkraft and Vattenfall, were encouraged (or forced) to enter the TIS for biomass 
                                                      
188 In 1987, Studsvik Energiteknik AB was renamed Studsvik AB, and its research was divided into the divisions 
of Nuclear Technologies and Energy Technologies. 
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gasification. Nevertheless, this new direction of search also created new opportunities for 
the surviving actors and networks from the previous episode. The activities undertaken by 
Sydkraft and Vattenfall will now be described.  
Sydkraft 
Sydkraft evaluated several alternative technologies for producing electricity with the 
potential of replacing nuclear power. Early on, it considered NGCC and IGCC as the most 
promising options. Although it was aware of the environmental problems associated with 
energy production from coal, it saw coal-based IGCC technology as a “clean” coal technology 
that could be pursued on a large-scale (Ståhl, 2008).  
An internal project at Sydkraft was initiated and a vision was developed for a flexible plant in 
which one could easily shift between different feed-stocks such as biomass, coal and natural 
gas. Consequently, Sydkraft went ahead with a preliminary study on a 15MWel coal gasifier 
and decided to procure the necessary components for the pilot. Ultimately, this project was 
terminated in 1989, since the required environmental permits could not be obtained (Ståhl, 
2008).  
The project did, however, enable Sydkraft to increase its knowledge of gasification. It also 
allowed the company to identify the potential of offering large-scale electricity production at 
a high level of electrical efficiency compared to the combustion of solid fuels (knowledge 
development and direction of search). This was of particular importance to new energy 
technologies at the time, if they were to be considered as a realistic alternative to nuclear 
power.  
Public opinion indicated that biomass was, in contrast to coal, considered to be a highly 
legitimate fuel, although the technical and economical potential of utilising biomass for 
electricity production was quite controversial. The best estimates of its potential varied 
somewhere between 7 and 30TWh (SOU, 1991:93). Even if there were disagreements on the 
size of its actual potential, it was large enough to encourage the introduction of further 
incentives for phasing out nuclear power in Sweden.  
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The means of developing biomass-based alternatives to nuclear power were partially 
created with the “green tax reform” of 1990−1991, when a CO2 tax was introduced. With the 
CO2 tax, the institutional framework was aligned with the use of biomass for district heating 
(Hellsmark, 2005). The tax reform also created a surplus of SEK 650 million, which were 
subsequently dedicated to a major demonstration programme for supporting the 
development of electricity production from biomass, called FABEL (resource mobilisation, 
direction of search) (Tegnér, 2009).189  
Gasification was thus identified as a process with the potential to produce a lot of electricity 
based on domestic resources, and once again the government identified it as a strategically 
important field of knowledge (SOU, 1991:93; Tegnér, 2009). As a result, biomass gasification 
became one of few (and attractive) options for Sydkraft to explore, since it could no longer 
expand electricity production with nuclear power, the availability of natural gas was limited 
and using coal was highly controversial in the eyes of the public.  
However, Sydkraft soon discovered that there were no suppliers of commercial BIGCC plants 
on the market, thus forcing it to conduct its own investigations into how the development of 
this novel technology would best be pursued (knowledge development).  
Based on this study, Sydkraft concluded that pressurised fluidised bed gasification integrated 
with a combined steam and gas turbine was the best way to maximise electricity production 
from biomass. While its study led to several ideas for solving the technical problems 
associated with BIGCC, Sydkraft did not want to develop the technology itself and take on 
the role of a future capital goods supplier. Instead, Sydkraft began looking for a partner who 
would be interested in developing the technology in collaboration (Ståhl, 2008). 
Studsvik was one of the few surviving actors from the first episode and had, together with 
Götaverken190 and Fläkt Industri, extensive experience with both pressurised (MINO) and 
atmospheric FB gasification. With further knowledge development, this experience was seen 
as important for developing both large- and small-scale BIGCC.  
                                                      
189 FABEL - Främjande av biobränsle-el 
190 At the time the name of the company they collaborated with was Generator but it later merged with 
Götaverken (Waldheim, 2010). For reasons of consistency, only the name Götaverken will be refereed to 
throughout the text. 
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In 1988−1989, the Department of Thermal Processes at Studsvik took the first steps towards 
developing the BIGCC application with a smaller research programme devoted to gas 
cleaning and based on their atmospheric lime kiln gasifier (knowledge development). The 
research programme did not lead to the materialisation of any new plants, but provided 
further insights into a knowledge field of strategic importance to the government (Rensfelt, 
2008). Studsvik also tried to attract interest from potential customers for using the MINO 
technology and pilot plant for this application (Waldheim, 2010). 
Sydkraft began looking for a partner in 1990 and in so doing, contacted and evaluated all 
actors with experience in biomass gasification that would be willing to develop the 
technology in collaboration with it (Ståhl, 2008). However, possible partners for 
collaboration were few in number. 
Amongst these were, of course, Studsvik and Götaverken. Discussions on developing such a 
plant were held between Sydkraft and the two companies (Rensfelt, 2008; Ståhl, 2008). 
Sydkraft also discussed this with Götaverken’s main competitor, Ahlstrom, which had sold 
more atmospheric CFB lime kiln gasifiers than Götaverken and was, along with Götaverken, 
among the world leaders in CFB boiler technology. However, Ahlstrom had limited 
experience with pressurised systems, although it had long worked with the Finnish research 
institute VTT, which had gained experience with pressurised systems in collaboration with 
Uhde at the Kemira plant in Finland (see Chapter VIII). Ahlstrom was interested in 
collaborating with Sydkraft because the BIGCC technology had also been identified in Finland 
as an important potential alternative to nuclear power. In addition, Ahlstrom had identified 
a potential market in countries with less demand for heat and higher electricity prices than 
in the Nordic countries (Palonen 2008).  
The project leader for biomass gasification at Sydkraft, Krister Ståhl (2008), emphasised that 
it was important for Sydkraft to have a reliable industrial partner to collaborate with. 
Ahlstrom was perceived as such a partner, while Götaverken and the Department of Thermal 
Processes at Studsvik AB were not selected.191 Why Sydkraft did not select Studsvik and 
                                                      
191 Since the technology was novel and both parties would take part in technology development, Ahlstrom and 
Sydkraft decided to form a jointly-owned company called Bioflow. The new company became part of the 
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Götaverken in favour of a Finnish supplier is a difficult question to answer (and perhaps not 
even meaningful).192 Indeed, although both Götaverken/Studsvik and Ahlström appeared to 
have had similar types of experience in the field, there is no reason to doubt that Sydkraft 
made the best possible choice for succeeding with the project.  
In 1991, Sydkraft applied for SEK 50 million from the Swedish government to support the 
construction of a 18MWth BIGCC in the town of Värnamo (resource mobilisation) (Tegnér, 
2009). The goal of the project was to design, construct and operate a BIGCC demonstration 
for combined heat and power generation (Sydkraft, 1997). Sydkraft’s priority was clear from 
the start: it wanted to demonstrate the technology in a fully integrated facility at the lowest 
possible cost, and it did not aim to demonstrate the highest possible electrical efficiency of 
the technology (Sydkraft, 1997; Ståhl, 2008).193  
The size and cost of the demonstration was directly and indirectly determined by the 
turbines in the plant for two main reasons. First, the turbines were one of the most 
expensive parts of construction. To keep investment costs down it was, therefore essential 
to find the smallest and cheapest turbines available, even if this resulted in lower electrical 
efficiency than would otherwise have been possible (Sydkraft, 1997, p. 19-21).194 Second, 
the size of the plant was determined by the gas flow required for operating the gas turbine 
at full effect (Sydkraft, 2000, p. 18).  
                                                                                                                                                                         
organisational structure of Ahlstrom, which also owned 51 percent of the company (Sydkraft owned the 
remaining 49 percent). All IPR and development work concerning pressurised BIGCC was transferred into 
Bioflow, and the plan was to market the technology through that company (Ståhl, 2008; Jönsson and Tillberg, 
2009). 
192 In 1990, Götaverken was sold by Svenska Varv to the company Kamyr, which was owned by the Norwegian 
group Kvaerner. The state also transferred all of its shares in Studsvik AB to the state-owned utility Vattenfall, 
which was the main competitor to Sydkraft AB. 
193 Instead, the expected output from the project was operational data, information on fuel flexibility, 
assessments of the cost of operation, and maintenance. Ultimately, the necessary knowledge on how integration 
could be best designed for future plants at the lowest possible cost and highest possible efficiency would, 
thereby, be obtained. In the Värnamo demonstration, total plant efficiency was at 82 percent, and electrical 
efficiency was at 32 percent, based on a wood fuel with 15 percent moisture content. Losses in the fuel 
preparation are thus not accounted for and real electrical efficiency was even lower. 
194 A Typhoon gas turbine, manufactured by European Gas Turbines (now part of Alstom Power), was chosen, 
with an effect of 4.2MWel. It was a modern and highly efficient gas turbine. It was, however, combined with a 
less expensive steam turbine with a moderate efficiency. A more expensive and efficient steam turbine could not 
be motivated, since the primary purpose was to illustrate the integrated process and not the highest possible 
electrical efficiency (Ståhl, 2010). Their combined achieved effect was 6MWel. 
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As a result, the plant in Värnamo was constructed as an 18MWth plant, which was the 
smallest possible plant for demonstrating the technology in a fully integrated mode. 
However, it was still a rather large plant and the investment cost amounted to SEK 230 
million. Moreover, a “fuel factory” had to be built for an additional SEK 70 million (Ståhl, 
2008). During the construction phase, Sydkraft received SEK 53 million, or 18 percent of the 
total investment cost, from the government (resource mobilisation) (Ståhl, 2008).195    
Sydkraft and Ahlstrom commenced plant construction in September 1991, and after some 
minor delays the demonstration plant was completed in 1993 (materialisation). The plan 
was to have it in full operation the same year, but due to problems during the start-up of the 
plant, this was delayed until 1996 (market formation) (Sydkraft, 1997, 2000). Such problems 
should, however, be expected when new technology is developed and all the problems that 
occurred were eventually solved.  
Nevertheless, by the end of 1996, the number of operating hours with the gasifier had 
reached approximately 3000 but only 400 hours with the gas turbine (Sydkraft, 1997; Ståhl, 
2008). Therefore, the demonstration programme was extended until 1999 in order to 
achieve more operational experience and to test the process with a wider range of biomass 
and waste feed-stocks (entrepreneurial experimentation and knowledge development).196 At 
the end of the second demonstration period, the Värnamo project was declared a success. 
The gasifier had been operating for 8,500 hours and the gas turbine for 3,600 hours 
(Sydkraft, 2000). 
With the completion of the demonstration programme in 1999-2000, the power plant was 
mothballed and put up for sale, since it had not been constructed or planned for continuous 
operation (Ståhl, 2008). The cost of running the plant continuously was, and still is, higher 
than the revenue it could generate by selling the heat and electricity it produced (Bengtsson, 
2008; Rensfelt, 2008; Ståhl, 2008). The total cost for construction and operation during the 
demonstration programmes has been estimated to be about SEK 500 million, of which 
                                                      
195 Of this, SEK 53 million came from Nutek, including “kraftvärmestöd” at SEK 4,000/kW (6MW plant equals 
SEK 24 million). An additional SEK 45 million came from Svensk Energiutveckling (SEU) AB (which later 
became part of Elforsk AB). These are, however, not counted as government support since SEU was owned by 
the industry (Ståhl, 2010). 
196 According to the original time plan, demonstration was planned for 1994-1998 (Ståhl, 2008). 
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approximately SEK 65 million came from the Swedish government and SEK 45 million from 
SEU (Ståhl, 2008, 2010).197 
However, at the end of the demonstration programme, no nuclear plants had been 
decommissioned. Sydkraft and Foster Wheeler were interested in scaling up the Värnamo 
concept for commercial operations, but no customers―including Sydkraft― were willing to 
make the investment and take on the technical and market risks associated with the first 
full-scale and commercially operating BIGCC plants on a deregulated market (the reasons 
behind this will be discussed later).  
Vattenfall 
Vattenfall probably felt, just as Sydkraft, more or less forced by the government to start 
exploring alternatives to nuclear power. In 1989, they declared that they would invest 
approximately SEK 1 billion in the Bioenergy Programme. The explicit goal of the programme 
was declared by the board of directors in December 1989 as [my translation]:  
“Vattenfalls goal within the field of bioenergy is to clarify the economics and potential for 
combined heat and power generation in Sweden over the long-term. Technology 
development will be an important means for meeting this goal” (Vattenfall, 1991).198  
The hallmark project of the Bioenergy Programme was VEGA, which was initiated in 
December 1990. The purpose of the project was similar to that of Sydkraft’s Värnamo 
project, but collaboration between the two utilities was seen as out of the question (Tegnér, 
2009).  
Hence, Vattenfall also set out to explore the potential of pressurised fluidised bed 
gasification for combined heat and power generation, integrated with a combined heat and 
steam cycle (BIGCC). Thereby, Vattenfall entered the TIS of biomass gasification, and based 
on their programme declaration it was clear that they intended to bring significant resources 
                                                      
197 For completing the second demonstration phase, Sydkraft received SEK 12 million from FABEL (Tegnér, 
2009). They also received some financial support from the EU THERMIE programme, which had financed a 
Danish IGCC project called BIOCYCLE that was never executed (Ståhl, 2008). Tegnér (2009) has argued that 
SEK 150 million came from the government.  
198 Original text: “Vattenfalls mål inom bioenergiområdet är att klargöra ekonomi och potential för el-och 
kombinerad el-värme-produktion i Sverige i ett långsiktigt perspektiv. Teknikutveckling blir ett viktigt medel för 
att nå detta mål” (Vattenfall, 1991). 
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to the TIS and to strengthen, at least, knowledge development, entrepreneurial 
experimentation materialisation, and perhaps also contribute to market formation. 
The VEGA project was initiated the same year as the government transferred the ownership 
of Studsvik AB to Vattenfall. With the transfer, Vattenfall also became owners of the 
Department of Thermal Processes, giving it direct access to one of the most advanced pilot 
plants for the pressurised fluidised bed gasification of biomass in the world and a group of 
experts with extensive experience in the field.  
The Department of Thermal Processes was awarded a contract together with Götaverken to 
conduct a preliminary study for the VEGA project. A similar study was also awarded to the 
Finnish actor Tampella Power Oy (Waldheim 1998). In parallel with these studies, Vattenfall 
undertook its own investigation in which it evaluated different gasification concepts, their 
possibilities, the required investment levels, the further need for technology development, 
and possible technology suppliers. In addition, a timeline for demonstrating the technology 
was established (knowledge development) (Vattenfall, 1991).  
For the contract, Vattenfall selected Tampella Power Oy and, at the same time, decided that 
all the activities at Studsvik that were not related to nuclear power would be terminated 
(Waldheim, 1998; Rensfelt, 2008). The former managing director of the Department of 
Thermal Process at Studsvik, Mr. Renselt (2008), argued that it was probably cheaper for 
Vattenfall to collaborate with Tampella, as it had already constructed a larger pilot facility in 
the town of Tampere, Finland. It did, however, not include an integrated gas and steam 
turbine (Ståhl, 2010).199  
Vattenfall’s agreement with Tampella created a new company called Enviropower. All the 
rights to the technology, including the pilot plant in Tampere, were transferred to the new 
company, which was 75 percent owned by Tampella and 25 percent by Vattenfall (Salo, 
2008). Enviropower was then awarded the contract for a feasibility study on a commercial-
scale, 60MWel BIGCC demonstration facility to be located in the town of Eskilstuna, Sweden.  
                                                      
199 In 1989, Tampella Power had bought the license for the U-GAS process, developed at IGT (Institute of Gas 
Technology) in Chicago. The technology was based on a bubbling fluidised bed, developed for coal gasification 
but for which peat had been tested during the 1980s (Vattenfall, 1994). 
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In addition, a series of tests and verifications was financed by Vattenfall to be performed in 
Finland at the pilot plant in Tampere, but also in a small laboratory gasifier that had been 
constructed at the VTT institute in Helsinki (Vattenfall, 1994). These activities strengthened 
the know-how of the Finnish actors, as well as the functions knowledge development and 
entrepreneurial experimentation of the TIS in Finland.  
The investment decision to construct the commercial-scale demonstration facility in 
Eskilstuna was, however, never taken. Just two years after the collaboration with Tampella 
was initiated, the preliminary study was terminated.200 Vattenfall decided to end their plans 
for a commercial demonstration in Eskilstuna and their relationship with Enviropower. As a 
result, Enviropower went bankrupt but some of the gasification competencies were later 
spun-off and the privately-owned firm Carbona Oy was established (Salo, 2008). The 
remaining parts of Tampella (the majority owner of Enviropower) were then acquired by 
Kvaerner and subsequently by Metso Power.   
Vattenfall’s executive committee identified the large volume of investment and the power 
balance in the Nordic countries as its primary reasons for not developing the technology 
further (Vattenfall, 1994). The manager of the Bioenergy Programme, Birgit Bodlund (1998), 
argued that the risk would have been too great for Vattenfall. A commercial plant in 1995 
would have cost about SEK 1,000 million and there were, at the time, no sufficiently large 
funding schemes that could reduce the risk for Vattenfall. Even if it would have received all 
of the money available under FABEL (SEK 625 million), Mrs. Bodlund argued that it would not 
have been enough. In addition, she argued that Vattenfall’s articles of association did not 
support the fact that it would engage in new technology development. As a state-owned 
utility, it was supposed to act as a buyer on the market, but no commercially BIGCC 
technology was available (Bodlund 1998; Tegnér 2009). This last claim is, of course, 
contradictory to what was declared in the original intention of the Bioenergy Programme.   
                                                      
200 The preliminary study was terminated during the summer of 1992, but Vattenfall chose to continue with the 
testing and verification programme of the technology that had started in Finland. It was completed in November 
1994 (Vattenfall, 1994).   
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TPS 
Despite not being selected by Sydkraft or Vattenfall, and being officially terminated by 
Vattenfall, the staff at the Department of Thermal Process in Studsvik did not give up. 
Instead of accepting their termination, they decided to start a company that was 
independent from Vattenfall. They also managed to convince both Vattenfall and the local 
union that they had the necessary means and know-how to run a successful business. The 
parties eventually agreed. As a result, they received the money allocated for terminating the 
department and they were allowed to keep existing government research contracts with the 
Swedish National Board for Technology Development (STU)201 (Rensfelt, 2008). As a result, 
the company Termiska Processer AB (TPS) was created in July 1992. Fifty percent was owned 
by its staff and management, and the remaining 50 percent belonged to a consortium of 
mostly municipal energy companies in Sweden (Rensfelt, 2008).  
Municipal interest in the company was important. They were interested in accessing the 
research and development competencies within the company and some of them had 
substantial interest in pursuing BIGCC, but on a smaller scale than Vattenfall and Sydkraft. 
An atmospheric BIGCC technology was developed at the size that would be suitable for the 
district heating systems owned by the municipalities (Johansson, 2005; Peters, 2005).  
One of these utilities, Borås Energy, not only conducted a feasibility study but also prepared 
for installation by acquiring a large drying unit. The management spent a great deal of time 
securing funding, but failed to convince policymakers to provide funds greater than a 50 
percent subsidy. It was argued that such a subsidy was necessary for reducing the technical 
and financial risks involved to an acceptable level (Peters, 2005). Consequently, Borås Energy 
(and others) decided to await the results of other potential customers’ experience with TPS 
and its projects outside Sweden. 
TPS had been selected by Shell as a partner for a project in Brazil, which was financed 
through the World Bank (Waldheim, 1998; Rensfelt, 2008). Shell had evaluated all 
gasification technologies available at the time, including the Värnamo process that was in 
commissioning at the time. Waldheim (1998) and Rensfelt (2008) argue that TPS won the 
                                                      
201 STU - Styrelsen för Teknisk Utveckling 
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contract over Ahlstrom because it could demonstrate its MINO-process with the installation 
at Studsvik, while Ahlstrom had encountered several technical problems during the 
commissioning of the plant in Värnamo. The project was, however, never realised. In 1997-
1998, the activities in the project ceased before plant construction had begun and in 2004, 
the whole project was aborted since the Brazilian energy market did not fulfil the formal 
conditions of the World Bank (Rensfelt, 2008; Waldheim, 2010).  
However, the interest in atmospheric BIGCC in Europe had picked up and a call for proposals 
came in July 1993 within the context of the 5th EC Framework Programme (resource 
mobilisation). The call targeted the construction of three semi-commercial BIGCC plants at a 
scale of 8-12MWth based on short rotation coppice (SRC). TPS, in collaboration with three 
other European partners, was selected in July 1994 for what has become known as the Arbre 
project (knowledge development, entrepreneurial experimentation, materialisation, market 
formation) (Rensfelt et al., 2003).202 The plant was completed, commissioned and operated 
as a complete unit only for a few hours before being shut down (see Rensfelt et al. (2003) 
and Piterou et al. (2008) for an analysis of the project). By the end of this episode all BIGCC 
demonstration projects had either failed or been terminated, not only in Sweden but all over 
the world. 
In conclusion, due to the two nuclear accidents and a growing public distrust towards coal, 
the gasification of biomass was once again identified as a strategically important knowledge 
field by the government and the two dominant energy utilities. The utilities were, however, 
also the owners of the nuclear plants in Sweden and were more or less “forced” to start 
developing alternatives to nuclear energy.  
In so doing, they did not have a national perspective on the development of a knowledge 
field of strategic importance. Instead of drawing upon and strengthening the structure of 
biomass gasification that had emerged during the previous episode, Vattenfall and Sydkraft 
chose to mostly strengthen the TIS of biomass gasification in Finland. Their actions 
                                                      
202 They later also received an NFFO contract, which in Britain would guarantee them a fixed price of 
8.75p/kWh for electricity over the next 15 years. The technology was based on the TPS atmospheric CFB 
gasifier, from which producer gas, after gas cleaning and compression, was discharged in a Typhoon 4.5MW gas 
turbine (Rensfelt et al., 2003). 
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strengthened the functions of knowledge development, entrepreneurial experimentation, 
materialisation, and market formation. By strengthening the know-how of the actor 
structure—consisting of VTT, Ahlstrom and Carbona—the capacity to actually make further 
advancements based on the new science and technology infrastructure was also created, 
again mostly in Finland (see Chapter VIII). One can argue that some of these functions were 
also strengthened in Sweden (especially materialisation with the construction of the 
Värnamo facility), but there is little value in having a technology structure without an actor 
structure. 
Since the actor structure consisting of TPS and Götaverken was not selected, TPS was forced 
to seek collaboration outside Sweden to maintain and advance its know-how of constructing 
gasification plants. As a result, the gasification competence at TPS managed to survive until 
new possibilities emerged in Sweden around 2000. Götaverken, which was acquired by 
Kvaerner, ceased its activities in FB gasification altogether.  
7.1.3 Episode III: 1995−2009. The re-emergence of alternative fuels 
The third episode emerged during the end of the 1990s, partly in parallel with the 
development of BIGCC. Once again, alternative fuels were part of the agenda. This time, 
however, the direction of search in favour of biomass gasification came from the desire to 
reduce particle emissions, abate climate change and “saving” the Värnamo plant from ruin. 
This episode started with a debate over particle emissions from diesel vehicles, which cause 
urban air pollution and respiratory diseases (direction of search). The European response 
was the introduction of the Euro I standard in 1992, which set a limit on carbon monoxide 
(CO), hydrocarbons (HC), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and diesel particle matters.203 This first 
standard was subsequently followed up with more stringent ones, forcing engine 
manufacturers to make significant and costly investments to develop cleaner diesel engines. 
These standards also created incentives for engine manufacturers to begin experimenting 
with and developing alternative fuels as a means of reducing particle emissions (Röj, 2009).  
                                                      
203 By 2008, and with the introduction of Euro V, diesel particle matters had been reduced by close to 97 percent 
and other emissions had been reduced as well. 
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In the 1990s, one such development was the introduction of natural gas vehicles in a 
number of cities around the world. However, even though natural gas reduces particle 
emissions, the engines do not enjoy the same thermal efficiency and robustness as diesel 
engines do. Using natural gas in heavy-duty vehicles is, therefore, not a preference among 
most engine manufacturers (Röj 2009).  
In 1995, therefore, it was with great interest that Volvo AB read three papers written by 
Ammoco, Navistar and AVL, which illustrated the fact that particulate emissions could be 
completely eliminated and NOx emissions reduced by 40 percent by running a diesel engine 
on Dimethyl Ether (DME). In addition, it was argued that the cost of operating a DME 
infrastructure would be on par with diesel (Fleisch and Meurer, 1995).204  
The publications received significant attention, especially since they came from large, well-
respected, incumbent actors (knowledge development, legitimation and direction of search) 
(Röj 2009). They also inspired Volvo to begin experimenting with the new diesel fuel. These 
experiments eventually materialised in a first-generation DME demonstration vehicle in 
1999 (entrepreneurial experimentation, materialisation) (Röj, 2009). 
Soon thereafter, Volvo’s interest in DME encountered a corresponding interest in the 
municipality of Växjö, which had decided to become free from fossil fuels by 2020, as well as 
the interest of the Swedish Energy Agency in “saving” the Värnamo plant.205 Interest in and 
around Värnamo, which is located in the municipality of Växjö, had grown in support of 
keeping and developing the competencies associated with the BIGCC demonstration plant 
that Sydkraft had been running during the 1990s but was now determined to sell.  
The local interest in “saving” the demonstration plant from being sold was strongly 
supported by the Swedish Energy Agency. They considered that it would be “a shame” if the 
plant was sold, dismantled and shipped abroad (which Sydkraft was planning to do at the 
                                                      
204 At the time, stranded natural gas fields were considered to be the main feed-stock for producing DME, and 
the reduction of CO2 was not used as an argument for supporting DME (Röj, 2009). Coal was, however, viewed 
as controversial, and the benefits of biomass in producing DME had been identified and analysed (Blinge, 1994). 
205 The interest in alternative fuels based on domestic and renewable sources re-emerged with the climate change 
debate. It began to be taken seriously in the political arena towards the end of the 1990s (direction of search) 
(Sandén and Jonasson, 2005). 
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time), since they had spent SEK 150 million of the government’s money to construct it 
(Tegnér, 2009).206  
Sydkraft had offered the Swedish Energy Agency the plant for as little as SEK 1 
(approximately €0.1), but the agency had to decline since they are not allowed to own such 
facilities (Levald 2009; Tegnér, 2009). At the time, TPS re-entered the Swedish gasification 
field. Together with Volvo, they became the main agents behind the creation of a 
consortium of mostly Swedish companies with a common interest in investigating the 
possibilities of reconstructing the Värnamo facility for the demonstration of DME production 
from biomass, and to test and verify the use of DME as a motor fuel (Atrax Energi, 2002; 
Danielsson, 2008).207 
In 2002, the investigation concluded that it would cost about SEK 540 million (€54 million) to 
rebuild and demonstrate DME production from biomass at the Värnamo facility.208 Mr. 
Danielsson at Volvo AB, who was the project leader for the Bio-DME project, tried to 
convince the large incumbent mineral oil companies to invest major sums of money for the 
further development of the technology. However, beyond putting up a few hundred 
thousand krona for the Bio-DME project, Mr. Danielsson (2008) described their interest in 
the technology as “ice-cold”.  
Volvo’s own interest also dissipated when faced with the large sums of money required to 
further develop the technology. It could not see fuel production as part of its core business 
in the future. In addition, it had discovered that the engine development required to realise 
mass production of DME vehicles was not easily achieved. The adoption of the fuel injection 
system that was needed was more difficult than first anticipated, and further development 
of the technology would generate larger costs than Volvo was prepared to invest at the time 
                                                      
206 When Ann Segerborg-Fick started her career at the Energy Agency in 2000, and later became responsible for 
the Värnamo project, it was all about “saving the Värnamo plant” from being shipped abroad (Segerborg-Fick, 
2008). 
207 The study was financed by the consortium, where each member paid a small amount that was, in turn, 
matched by the Swedish Energy Agency (knowledge development and resource mobilisation) (Danielsson, 
2008). 
208 It was also concluded that a greenfield production plant, with a capacity of 200,000 tonnes of DME from 
biomass per year, would cost about €390 million to build. The production cost of the DME from such a plant 
was estimated to be €0.49-0.55 per litre diesel equivalent (Atrax Energi, 2002). 
227 
 
(Röj, 2009).209 As a result, the project to reconstruct Värnamo for DME production became 
mostly viewed as a research project rather than a commercial project. It would thus require 
large subsides from the government and the EU in order to be realised. 
Two parallel research initiatives with alternative motives were initiated as a response to 
Sydkraft’s move to sell the plant. The first came from the Greek company Helector, which 
was in the business of waste incineration and was interested in developing the Värnamo 
facility for demonstrating refuse-derived fuel (RDF) gasification. A contract was signed 
between Helector and the European Commission within the context of the 5th Framework 
Programme and aimed at further demonstrating the IGCC operation at Värnamo (resource 
mobilisation) (Ståhl et al., 2004; Ståhl, 2008).210 
The second initiative came from some of the partners behind the DME consortium, TPS and 
Ducente AB being among them.211 They applied to the European Commission, to a call for 
proposals within the 6th Framework Programme, for the demonstration of a hydrogen-rich 
synthetic gas from renewable feed-stocks such as biomass. The research project, which has 
since become known as CHRISGAS, would not cover the actual reconstruction of the 
Värnamo facility, but research at the facility once it had been reconstructed (CHRISGAS, 
2003; Ståhl, 2010). 
The Swedish Energy Agency had already expressed its explicit desire to “save” the Värnamo 
plant. It therefore supported the CHRISGAS application and wanted to take part in funding 
the necessary reconstruction of the plant (Tegnér, 2009).212 The Swedish Energy Agency 
granted SEK 75 million (€7.5 million) to Växjö University in 2004 on condition that the 
CHRISGAS project would be granted (resource mobilisation).  
                                                      
209 Motor development was able to progress in the context of the AFFORHD (Alternative Fuel For Heavy Duty) 
project, financed by the 5th EU Framework Programme. Within the time frame of the project (2002–2005), the 
second-generation fuel injection system for DME and the drive-train were developed and demonstrated. At the 
end of period, the goal was to have one heavy-duty vehicle rebuilt and optimised for DME and ready for field 
testing (Landälv, 2005). 
210 A third option had also been discussed, which was to sell the plant to Helector and ship it to Greece (Ståhl, 
2008). 
211 Ducente AB is a consulting company founded by the former project leader of Värnamo BIGCC from 
Sydkraft, Krister Ståhl. 
212 The willingness to co-finance the project was also clearly expressed in the application to the EC 
(CHRISGAS, 2003). 
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With this decision, EUN (the deciding board at the Swedish Energy Agency), made it clear 
that the Värnamo project was underfinanced (EUN, 2004).213 EUN had by then been 
presented with a preliminary total budget which indicated that the reconstruction of the 
plant and the demonstration of syngas production would cost approximately SEK 450 million 
(€45 million) (Waldheim and Ståhl, 2006).214 If an additional application to the ERA 
programme215 and partner financing would be granted, the total financing required by the 
Swedish Energy Agency was SEK 258 million (€26 million). It could, therefore, be expected to 
commit at least SEK 183 million (€18 million) in the following years for the reconstruction of 
the plant.  
When the CHRISGAS application was eventually granted (€9 million), a new company called 
Värnamo Växjö Biomass Gasification Centre (VVBGC) was created. It became a subsidiary to 
the holding company of Växjö University with the purpose of owning the Värnamo plant, 
leading its reconstruction and coordinating the CHRISGAS project. The plant was eventually 
sold to VVBGC for SEK 4 million (€0.4 million).216  
However, for the CHRISGAS application to be approved, the European Commission 
demanded that an IPR agreement be established (Bengtsson, 2008). The purpose of the IPR 
agreement was to avoid future conflicts between CHRISGAS partners and the original 
owners of the plant (Foster Wheeler and Sydkraft), who owned the pressurised gasification 
technology through the company Bioflow. 
The majority owner of Bioflow, Foster Wheeler, had no interest in granting VVBGC more 
than a limited right to use, improve and sub-licence the technology to the CHRISGAS 
                                                      
213 If the EU was to approve the CHRISGAS project, the Swedish Energy Agency would have to commit 
substantial resources to the project in the future, which would decrease its ability to finance other research and 
development programmes in the future (EUN, 2004). 
214 The CHRISGAS project and the reconstruction of the Värnamo facility did not include DME or any other 
actual production of synthetic fuels. 
215 The ERA program is a European Commission funding scheme with the purpose of stepping “ ... up the 
cooperation and coordination of research activities carried out at national or regional level in the Member States 
and Associated States through: the networking of research activities conducted at national or regional level, 
and the mutual opening of national and regional research programmes.” Source: 
http://cordis.europa.eu/coordination/era-net.htm, Accessed 2010-06-22. 
216 The vision behind the creation of VVBGC was a European centre for research and development concerning 
gasification of renewable energy carriers (i.e., biomass) and the subsequent syngas processing (VVBGC, 2006; 
Bengtsson, 2008). 
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partners (see Chapter VIII).217 The primary objective of the IPR agreement was to satisfy the 
EC and enable reconstruction and future research at the plant at the lowest possible cost. 
Limited rights were therefore deemed to be sufficient for these purposes, and these were 
later acquired from Bioflow by VVBGC for SEK 3 million (VVBGC, 2006; Bengtsson, 2008).218 
Hence, the future commercialisation of the technology was not in focus when the IPR 
agreement was signed. According to VVBGC, it was not their responsibility to take on future 
commercial gasification projects, but up to the various CHRISGAS partners instead 
(Bengtsson, 2008).  
TPS was identified by both VVBGC and the Swedish Energy Agency as the main CHRISGAS 
partner for taking on such projects (Bengtsson, 2008; Segerborg-Fick, 2008; Tegnér, 2009). 
Despite being a relatively small company, TPS was seen to have the required competencies 
for leveraging the knowledge developed within the CHRISGAS project and taking on future 
commercial projects. TPS also had the proprietary rights to the pressurised BFB gasification 
technology developed in the 1970s and 1980s. Hence, even if it was the Foster Wheeler CFB 
gasifier that would be demonstrated at the Värnamo facility, the resulting commercial plants 
could be based on TPS technology and know-how (Bengtsson, 2008; Rensfelt, 2008). In 
addition, Talloil AB had acquired TPS in 2004 and was considered to be a financially strong 
and credible owner (Bengtsson, 2008; Talloil, 2004; TPS, 2004).  
As a result, at the outset of the project everything looked quite promising. An actor structure 
with the required competencies and financial muscles were in place. The project was backed 
by the EU and the Swedish Energy Agency and had stronger national ties than did those in 
the previous episode. The technology development would, therefore, strengthen the 
Swedish actor structure and hopefully lay the foundation for a future national industry. 
However, by spring of 2005 problems began emerging when the WASTE project was 
terminated, and Helector declared that it no longer was interested in the project. The 
                                                      
217 According to the “Agreement on Transfer of Know-How and License Rights”, improvements of the Bioflow 
technology at the Värnamo plant would be allowed as long as Bioflow was informed about the changes and the 
rights to the improvements were transferred to them. VVBGC could only sub-license the rights to the technology 
to the CHRISGAS partners but was allowed to make use of the technology outside the CHRIGAS project against 
further compensation—a royalty that is specified in the agreement—to Bioflow (MAQS Law Firm, 2008). 
218 The IPR agreement was approved by the Swedish Energy Agency, who had taken part in the negotiations, the 
CHRISGAS partners and the European Commission (Segerborg-Fick, 2008; Bengtsson, 2010). 
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original idea had been that the WASTE project would refurbish and restart the plant for IGCC 
operation. The plant would then be up and running and the necessary personnel trained 
when VVBGC and the CHRISGAS project would take over in 2006-2007 (Bengtsson, 2008; 
Segerborg-Fick, 2008; Ståhl, 2008; Tegnér, 2009). The lack of interest from Helector and 
Sydkraft to support the project may very well have been due to a mutual lack of interest 
from VVBGC to actually host the WASTE project at the Värnamo plant (Gårdemark, 2009; 
Ståhl, 2010).219,220 
In addition, the ERA application for SEK 45 million (€4.5 million) was rejected and local 
companies in Växjö, which had promised an additional SEK 5 million (€0.5 million), failed to 
pay up (Waldheim and Ståhl, 2006). Consequently, the need for funds for realising the 
reconstruction of the Värnamo plant increased and when VVBGC applied to the Energy 
Agency, in April 2006, they asked for SEK 250 million (€25 million) instead of the expected 
SEK 183 million (€18 million) for completing the reconstruction of the Värnamo facility 
(VVBGC, 2006). 
As a response, the director of the Department of Energy Technologies at the Swedish Energy 
Agency, Birgitta Palmberger, sent a formal letter by e-mail to the principal of Växjö 
University, Johan Sterte, in which she explained that the application exceeded the expected 
SEK 183 million (€18 million) by 40 percent. The new sum, SEK 250 million (€25 million), had 
not been accounted for in the Swedish Energy Agency’s current budget; as such, supporting 
the application was deemed impossible without further inquiry. She stated in her e-mail [my 
translation]: 
”We need to secure the ability to commercialise the results from the projects and it would 
thus be of great advantage if the companies already now invest in some sort of 
ownership.”221 (Palmberger, 2006). 
The Swedish Energy Agency appointed an international group of experts to assist in the 
decision-making process.222 The experts concluded that the CHRISGAS project and the 
                                                      
219 The engineers at VVBGC were worried that RDF gasification would damage their plant (Gårdemark, 2009). 
220 Since electricty production no longer was in focus the project was not aligned with the interests of Sydkraft, 
which also exited the TIS. 
221 Original text: “vi behöver också säkerställa möjligheten att kommersialisera resultaten från projektet och ser 
därför en stor fördel om företagen redan nu går in i någon form av ägarskap.” (Palmberger, 2006). 
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Värnamo plant provided an excellent opportunity to demonstrate the technology, but that 
the project is too research-oriented to make the technology commercially interesting for the 
future. They suggested that:  
“ ...the project needs a clearly defined industrial strategy, which the evaluation team believes 
can come via strong industrial leadership.”  (Junker et al., 2006, p.4). 
In line with the letter sent by Mrs. Palmberger and the advice from the expert group, EUN 
decided to grant SEK 182 million (€18 million) to VVBGC on condition that a group of 
industry representatives financed the remaining SEK 68 million (€6.8 million) 
(Energimyndigheten, 2006b). The industry group was required to form a new company 
(Company A), which would have direct influence over VVBGC, proprietary access to the 
knowledge generated at the Värnamo plant, and be responsible for the future 
commercialisation of the technology. The new demand by the Swedish Energy Agency was 
clearly triggered by rising costs. It also marked a shift in its view on the commercialisation 
process from being very loosely defined to having specific responsibilities assigned to a core 
group of actors.  
In autumn 2006, the ability to secure a group of firms to invest in Company A looked very 
promising. TPS and Talloil decided that they wanted to lead the effort, and the gas company 
AGA and venture capital firm Industrifonden were also seriously interested (Bengtsson, 
2008; Rensfelt, 2008). An initial potential customer, Göteborg Energy, was also interested in 
constructing the first commercial-scale plant (see box 7.1) (Junker et al., 2006; Gunnarsson, 
2009).223  
However, these prospects quickly changed. The IPR contract that had been signed between 
VVBGC and Bioflow was brought up for investigation (Bengtsson, 2008). While the contract 
had been “good enough” to satisfy the European Commission and the Swedish Energy 
Agency in the context of the previous, loosely defined commercialisation process, it was far 
                                                                                                                                                                         
222 The experts were: Helle Junker from DONG Energy, Eric D. Larsson from Princeton University, and Hartmut 
Spliethoff from Munich Technical University. 
223 Göteborg Energy had already decided to build a 100MW biomass gasification plant for BioSNG production. 
However, they ultimately chose not to participate due to what they considered was the high cost associated with 
running the demonstration plant and the fact that there were no commercial actors at the time willing to supply a 
commercial plant based on the Värnamo technology within the suggested time horizon (Gunnarsson, 2009; 
Hedenstedt, 2009).  
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from “good enough” to satisfy potential industrial partners to invest SEK 68 million in 
Company A and assume control of the commercialisation process, which the Swedish Energy 
Agency was now demanding.224 
Further problems emerged soon thereafter. In less than two years, Talloil had managed to 
turn profits into major losses and both Talloil and TPS were forced into reconstruction. In 
September 2007, TPS was sold to a venture capital firm—ACAP Invest AB—that had little 
interest in Company A (Talloil, 2006; TPS, 2007). With TPS and Talloil out of the picture, 
there were no alternate actors capable of appropriating the benefits of the necessary 
technology development and to take on future commercial projects. TPS had been the only 
Swedish company with experience from FB gasification from the previous episodes and still 
active in the field. 
As a result, in December 2007, the Swedish Energy Agency decided to mothball the project 
and freeze all current payments to VVBGC until further notice. The project is, however, still 
alive. Erik Rensfelt, with whom gasification pretty much started in Sweden in the 1970s,225 
has been appointed as a new CEO of VVBGC. The Swedish Energy Agency defined Mr. 
Rensfelt’s new mission as solving the IPR situation and finding new industrial partners willing 
to create Company A (Energimyndigheten, 2007; Rensfelt, 2008). As of May 2010, he was 
still working to complete this mission. 
                                                      
224 The problem with the IPR agreement was that it did not clearly define the extent of Bioflow’s future rights to 
further developments. Thus, it was not obvious how the agreement should be interpreted, which created 
uncertainty around the size of future royalties to Bioflow and the actual potential to appropriate the benefits of 
the technology developments. In retrospect, it would have been better if no agreement had been written at all, 
since all patents for the technology had expired. However, an agreement was required by the EC (Bengtsson, 
2008; Rensfelt, 2008). 
225  When he received the broad mission from Norrlandsfonden “to do something interesting with peat”. 
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Box 7.1: System building activities undertaken by Göteborg Energy  
Natural gas has always been a controversial issue in Sweden, and has suffered from a lack of 
legitimacy. Despite ambitious plans for a nationwide grid, natural gas is currently only available in the 
southern and western parts of Sweden. Until more recently, it has not been used for electricity 
production since the electricity sector has been dominated by nuclear and hydro power. For heating 
purposes, biomass and electricity have been the preferred choices. In addition, since the introduction 
of a CO2 tax in 1991, the use of natural gas for energy purposes has not been favoured (Hellsmark, 
2005).    
 
However, a window of opportunity opened when the nuclear reactors at Barsebäck were de-
commissioned in 2005. In coalition with E.ON and others, Göteborg Energy worked to change the 
existing tax rules. These efforts were successful and allowed Göteborg Energy to build a 600MW 
NGCC in Göteborg (Hellsmark, 2005). However, with its large-scale investment in a fossil resource 
plant, Göteborg Energy was under political pressure to further develop biogas as an alternative. 
During a meeting between the Green Party and the management of Göteborg Energy with regard to 
the allocation of emission rights of the NGCC, Göteborg Energy was asked whether they could do 
something to increase the production of biogas in Sweden (Hedenstedt, 2009). 
 
In response, Göteborg Energy hired the consultancy firm Nykomb Synergetics to conduct a 
preliminary study on the technical possibilities for large-scale BioSNG production. The study pointed 
in two directions: either further develop the pressurised fluidised bed technology that had been 
demonstrated in Värnamo, or further develop the FICFB gasification processes being demonstrated 
in Güssing (see Chapter V) (Hedenstedt, 2009).  
 
The CEO (Mr. Hedenstedt) and the utility’s management group decided that they should start 
preparing for the construction of a commercial plant of 100MW to produce BioSNG based on the 
gasification of forest residues. Consequently, a project group and a new subsidiary called Gobigas 
were created.  The task of the project group was to realise this vision as soon as possible 
(Hedenstedt, 2009; Gunnarsson, 2009).   
 
The project group spent most of 2006 making the necessary preparations for issuing a tender to 
possible technology suppliers of such a plant. During their preparations, they regarded the 
pressurised FB technology of Foster Wheeler as the most interesting option. However, TPS and 
Foster Wheeler were either unwilling or unable to make an offer for the desired plant within the 
specified time frame. As a matter of fact, most of the incumbent actors with the potential to develop 
the BioSNG application based on biomass gasification declined to make an offer to construct such a 
plant. Since neither TPS nor Foster Wheeler were interested, Göteborg Energy could see no reasons 
for further engaging the Värnamo project and Company A (Hedenstedt, 2009; Gunnarsson, 2009).  
 
However, a new option that also reduced interest in participating in the Värnamo project had 
emerged during the process. A researcher at Chalmers, Henrik Thunman, was asked to look into the 
question of how large-scale BioSNG production could be accomplished in Göteborg (Thunman 2009). 
He had a longstanding relationship with Professor Hofbauer at TU Vienna and knew that the FICFB 
Güssing plant worked very well. By simplifying the existing design, he came up with a way of 
retrofitting existing CFB combustion plants with a gasification, thereby reducing the cost of building 
FICFB plants in the future (knowledge development) (Thunman, 2009). 
 
With the financial help of Göteborg Energy, the 20-year-old 12MW CFB boiler at Chalmers University 
was retrofitted with a gasification unit of 2-4MW fuel power. The cost of the project was SEK 12 
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million and the demonstration was successfully inaugurated in December 2007 (knowledge 
development, resource mobilisation, entrepreneurial experimentation, materialisation) (Thunman, 
2009).   
 
At the plant, since the product gas is re-circulated into the boiler, the demonstration carries its own 
operating costs, and research can be simultaneously undertaken on the gasifier and on gas based on 
slipstreams. This significantly reduces the cost of research compared to the Värnamo set-up. Since 
construction, the project has received further financial support from the Swedish Energy Agency (SEK 
17.7 million), and Metso Power has entered the TIS in Sweden by supporting the technology 
development with an additional SEK 10 million (Energimyndigheten, 2009a; Chalmers, 2009). 
 
While developing the demonstration facility at Chalmers, Göteborg Energy eventually managed to 
secure three offers from technology suppliers for a 100MW plant in Göteborg for BioSNG production. 
It chosen to proceed with the offer from an alliance headed by Repotec (see Chapter V), which 
proposed a three-stage solution where an initial 20MW BioSNG plant will be constructed once the 
1MW metanisation unit in Austria has been demonstrated. When completed, it will be followed by a 
subsequent scale-up of the technology with two 40MW plants. The cost of the first stage has been 
estimated to be SEK 700 million (€70 million), and the total investment as approximately SEK 2,500 
million (€250 million) (Gunnarsson 2009). The Swedish Energy Agency has decided to support the 
project with SEK 222 million (€22 million), and Metso Power and E.ON have entered the alliance 
(Energimyndigheten, 2009c; Gunnarsson, 2009). 
 
Based on the estimates made by Göteborg Energy, the gas from such a plant should be competitive 
with natural gas and biogas as long as it is used as a vehicle fuel. However, to secure the long-term 
legitimacy of using BioSNG as a transportation fuel, Göteborg Energy has recognised the need to 
form a strategic alliance with the automakers to advance engine development. Improved engines 
have been identified as important for achieving the same high level of fuel efficiency and robustness 
shown by existing diesel engines (cf. ZSW in Chapter VI). However, actors such as Volvo AB or Volvo 
Cars have been hesitant in their support of the project to date (Röj, 2009). 
 
7.1.4 Summary of Episodes I-III: The evolution of fluidised bed gasification 
in Sweden 
During the third episode, the possibilities of creating a national industry capable of realising 
the potential of FB gasification based on the Värnamo facility deteriorated further, for a 
number of reasons that will now be summarised. 
In the first episode, a world-leading actor and technology structure was created in Sweden. 
It was based on pressurised fluidised bed gasification and the commercial-scale atmospheric 
CFB gasification for oil substitution in lime kilns. During the second episode, interest in 
developing a substitute for oil disappeared, and new actors entered the TIS to develop the 
technology for large-scale electricity production. However, the two main actors, Sydkraft and 
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Vattenfall, chose not to strengthen the actor and technology structure that had already been 
created. Instead, the main activities undertaken to strengthen the know-how and industrial 
capacity to build such future plants strengthened the actor structure in Finland, consisting of 
VTT, Foster Wheeler and Carbona (see Chapter VIII). A critical aspect of this was that the 
knowledge and control over the Värnamo facility was “given” to Foster Wheeler. The main 
actors from the first episode, Götaverken and TPS (Studsvik), were thus not selected by 
Vattenfall and Sydkraft. TPS was instead supported by a number of municipal companies 
that were interested in TPS smaller scale, atmospheric BIGCC technology, which was more 
suitable for the district heating systems owned by these utilities. However, policy was not 
willing to support demonstration project with 50 percent funding or more, which was argued 
to be necessary to offload the technical risk of investing in the technology. Consequently, 
TPS was forced to survive until the third episode through having contracts abroad. 
When new incentives to develop alternative transportation fuel based on biomass 
gasification emerged, an alliance was formed consisting of TPS, Volvo, the Swedish Energy 
Agency, and some local firms around the Värnamo facility. The alliance had a common 
interest in “saving” the Värnamo facility and in demonstrating the production of an ultra-
clean syngas suitable for DME production or other synthetic fuels. In addition, a local utility, 
Göteborg Energy, expressed an interest in acquiring such a commercial-scale plant. 
The alliance was almost able to mobilise the necessary resources and competencies for 
rebuilding the plant, but ultimately failed—not because of lack of will or competence, but 
due to a number of circumstances outside its control. First, the alliance did not own the IPR 
rights to the Värnamo plant. The real owner, Foster Wheeler, had no incentive to support 
the alliance and or grant it a technology license sufficient for enabling the creation of 
Company A. 
Second, the cost of reconstructing the plant was high and perhaps too high for the alliance. 
The size, location and infrastructure of the plant had been determined based on the 
minimum size of the available gas turbines. The options for reducing investment costs by 
building a smaller demonstration or running it in a continuous mode for electricity 
production (or finding other ways to cover at least the operating cost the plant) were 
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extremely limited due to previous choices. The cost of research at the plant would, 
therefore, be relatively high. These high costs also partly discouraged Göteborg Energy from 
investing in Company A. 
Third, the final “nail in the coffin” proved to be the financial problems created by the owner 
of TPS, Talloil. With TPS out of the picture, there was no longer any Swedish-based actor 
structure that could capitalise on the completion of the Värnamo plant for syngas 
production. These problems have thus resulted in an altogether weaker Swedish actor 
structure. 
Nevertheless, the project lives on and hopes for its eventual success come down to one 
individual, Erik Rensfelt, who must solve the IPR situation and create a new alliance with an 
interest in commercialising biomass gasification based on demonstrating the technology at 
the Värnamo facility. Meanwhile, an alternative alliance of actors has been formed by 
Göteborg Energy. Together with E.ON, Chalmers, Metso Power, and Repotec, it has 
constructed a demonstration facility at Chalmers and is in the process of building an initial 
large-scale 20MW BioSNG facility. 
7.2 Three episodes of entrained flow gasification in Sweden, 1978−2008 
The second major trajectory in Sweden concerns black liquor gasification, which has its 
origins in the late-1970s and in the gasification of extra-heavy oils, bitumen and coal for 
methanol and ammonia production. The history of black liquor gasification (BLG) can be 
divided into roughly the same three main episodes as outlined above. The first episode 
began in 1978 with the second oil crisis and ended in 1986. In this episode, an initial 
technology and actor structure emerged in terms of a patent on black liquor gasification and 
the two important companies for the further development—Chemrec and Nykomb 
Synergetics. The second episode focuses on Chemrec’s efforts to turn invention into 
innovation for the production of heat and electricity through an IGCC integrated in the pulp 
and paper industry. During the third episode, interest in using the technology for electricity 
production vanished but was instead replaced by strong direction of search for the 
production of transportation fuels.   
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7.2.1 Episode I: 1978−1986. Kombinat Nynäs and the creation of a structure  
The first episode began in 1978 in the town of Nynäshamn about 60km from Stockholm, 
where Nynäs Petroleum AB operated an oil refinery and had its headquarters. Nynäs 
Petroleum identified a potential business during the second oil crisis (direction of search): 
developing their refinery operations by integrating a gasification process for coal, extra-
heavy oils and bitumen within the existing refinery structure. This concept (knowledge 
development) offered reduced dependency on conventional oil and the introduction of a 
flexible combination for the production of heat, electricity and methanol (NE, 1981:6).226   
There were many factors in favour of the project, which was commonly known as Kombinat 
Nynäs. The main actor of the project, Nynäs Petroleum AB, had very good preconditions in 
place for production. It had the necessary competencies, access to infrastructure and a 
conventional refinery in Nynäshamn into which the gasification complex could be integrated. 
Integration was argued to result in improved economics and environmental performance of 
both the existing refinery and the future gasification plant (Schein, 1990).  
Nynäs Petroleum was able to mobilise support and resources (resource mobilisation) from 
an alliance of actors supporting the project, consisting of Svensk Metanolutveckling AB 
(Swedish Methanol Development) (SMAB), Sydkraft AB, ‘Stockholms Energiverk’ (Stockholm 
Energy) and Södertörns Fjärrvärme (Södertörns District Heating). The alliance developed a 
proposal for a large-scale facility which was presented for the ”Nämnden för 
energiproduktionsforskning” (Swedish Energy Board).227 It eventually supported the idea of a 
plant with the capacity to produce 700,000 tonnes of methanol and a combined heat and 
power production equivalent to 600MWth (NE, 1981:6). The alliance expected the plant to be 
in operation by 1987.  
However, loud protests were voiced when the plans for building a coal and oil gasification 
plant in Nynäshamn were presented to the public. Coal was not considered legitimate for 
environmental reasons and the protestors managed to renegotiate and delay the entire 
                                                      
226 Methanol was viewed as the best alternative fuel to petroleum at the time (DFE, 1982). 
227 This alliance was most temporary and other actors also entred and exited as the project was developed 
(Landälv, 2010) 
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project. While a new configuration that excluded the use of coal was presented in 1986, the 
price of oil suddenly dropped, making methanol less attractive to produce (Schein, 1990).  
The plan for a gasification plant in Nynäshamn was, however, not terminated. Instead, the 
advocates came up with a new configuration that could be profitable. This time, the actors 
saw a potential business in the production of ammonia for fertilisers. Ammonia production 
uses a similar synthesis process as methanol, but demands more electricity. The plan was 
finally approved by the government under the condition that enough electricity would be 
produced to cover internal demand. Such a production was, however, still too small to 
motivate the additional investment cost. Instead, electricity production had to be scaled up 
and the surplus electricity and heat was to be sold on the market (Schein, 1990). 
At the same time, a new competitor for the attractive heat market in Stockholm had 
emerged. A commercial demonstration project with a new coal combustion technology228 
was suggested to be built at Värtan, in central Stockholm. The technology had been 
developed by ASEA, and had the full support of Vattenfall as well as the government, which 
saw the potential of an export market for ASEA (Jacobsson, 1994).229  
In competition with ASEA, Nynäs Petroleum drew the shortest straw. Vattenfall and 
Stockholm Energy, which controlled the electricity and heat market, did not select the 
project and refused to sign a long-term contract with Nynäs Petroleum. Project advocates 
argued that the price they could offer was competitive with other alternatives at the time, 
but that Vattenfall and Stockholm Energy had other priorities (Ruberg 2009, Schein 1990).230  
Although the Kombinat Nynäs never materialised, it became the first entrepreneurial 
experiment with high temperature gasification in Sweden. A series of positive and mutually 
re-enforcing events strengthened the functions of resource mobilisation, entrepreneurial 
                                                      
228 Pressurised fluidised bed combustion based on pulverised coal (Jacobsson, 1994) 
229 Vattenfall and ASEA have a common history of developing technology together. They thus share a common 
understanding of which technologies are relevant and how things should be done (cf. “den gemensamma 
utvecklingen” (Fridlund, 1999). Nynäs Petroleum has never been part of this common development, and since 
the gasification technology was new to Vattenfall and never really been pursued by ASEA, as it was viewed with 
scepticism (Schein, 1990). The PFBC Värtan project also failed for numerous reasons, see Jacobsson (1994) for 
a review. 
230 Mr. Rudberg (2008) speculates that the primary reason for terminating the project is that Vattenfall did not 
want a competitive alternative to nuclear power on the market. 
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experimentation and knowledge development, and resulted in a new actor and technology 
structure. This new structure would prove to be very important for the future development 
of black liquor gasification for three main reasons. 
First, it resulted in the creation of a new actor, Nykomb Synergetics, which was founded by 
Nynäs Petroleum and the venture capital firm Investeringsbanken in 1986 to make all of the 
necessary technical and economical evaluations within the project. The idea behind the 
company was also to appropriate on the knowledge developed in the project and to consult 
other actors on the construction of similar projects elsewhere in the world (Nykomb, 2006; 
Ekbom, 2007).231  
Second, an extended network of actors was created with knowledge and experience with in 
high temperature gasification. Third, a new gasification process was patented. The director 
of the project in Nynäshamn in its early phase, Jan-Erik Kignell, had background in the pulp 
and paper industry and could therefore recognise the similarities between the black liquor 
combusted in a chemical pulp and paper mill and heavy fuel oil (Rudberg, 2008). He believed 
that gasification could result in more efficient chemical recovery and that more electricity 
could be produced compared to a conventional recovery boiler. He presented this idea to 
Nynäs management, who were supportive of the idea but had their mind set on coal and oil 
gasification and did not want to explore the potential of black liquor gasification (Rudberg, 
2008). Instead of pursuing the idea himself, Mr. Kignell filed a US patent on the idea in 1986 
and sold it to a newly formed company called Chemrec (Kignell, 1989). Chemrec had been 
working on a similar idea but with a different technology (Bergek, 2002).  
The remaining two episodes will concern the efforts undertaken by Chemrec to 
commercialise the technology invented by Mr. Kignell, first for electricity production and 
then for the production of alternative fuels. 
                                                      
231 It was hired for the construction of two similar plants in Italy and has been working on numerous gasification 
projects around the world (Nykomb, 2006; Ekbom, 2007). 
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7.2.2 Episode II: 1986−1999. Black liquor gasification for electricity 
production 
Due to a rapidly decreasing price of oil and the Chernobyl nuclear accident, the direction of 
search in this episode shifted from oil substitution to developing renewable technologies 
with the potential of replacing nuclear power (see Chapter 7.1.2 for a longer discussion).  
The two owners of Chemrec, Mr. Stigsson and Mr. Bernhard, had previously been working at 
SKF Steel in Hovfors on a similar technology developed for the pulp and paper manufacturer 
STORA (Bergek, 2002).232 When SKF and Stora declared that they were no longer interested 
in developing the technology, the two inventors formed Chemrec, started looking for new 
partners, and acquired the patent from Mr. Kignell.  
By 1990, they had developed a synthesis of the two technologies with the goal of replacing 
the existing boilers for chemical recovery with the black liquor gasifier. They argued that it 
would result in more efficient chemical recovery and the production of nearly twice as much 
electricity. Hence, with a gradual shift towards the new technology, a significant amount of 
renewable electricity could be produced. As such the technology was viewed as an 
interesting option for replacing nuclear power (Hylander, 2002).  
Shortly thereafter, Chemrec was acquired by the Norwegian company Kvaerner, which 
already owned the boiler manufacturer Götaverken and had a business selling recovery 
boilers to the pulp and paper industry. In 1991, Chemrec and Kvaerner managed to secure a 
loan of SEK 13 million (€1.3 million) from Industrifonden (resource mobilisation) for an initial 
demonstration of the technology (entrepreneurial experimentation). Together with the pulp 
and paper company Assi-Domän, they built an atmospheric “Booster” demonstration at the 
pulp and paper mill in Frövi (materialisation). The total investment for demonstrating the 
Booster was SEK 30 million (€3 million), and the facility had a capacity of 75 tonnes of black 
liquor solids per day (tbd) (Hylander, 2002).  
The atmospheric application was viewed as a less advanced process than the pressurised 
one. It was not intended for electricity production, but for increasing the capacity and 
                                                      
232 They had also constructed a pilot plant in 1985 that was later replaced by a new pilot plant at the same site in 
1987, with a capacity of 3 tbd (entrepreneurial experimentation). 
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lifetime of conventional recovery boilers. Since it did not replace the existing recovery boiler, 
it implied less risk for the customer and was thus viewed as an application closer to 
commercialisation, allowing Chemrec to develop the technology at a lower cost and risk 
(knowledge development). 
In 1995, a commercial breakthrough came with the first sale of a Booster to Weyerhaeuser 
in New Bern, USA (market formation). The Booster came into operation in 1996 and had a 
capacity of 300tbd, or 15 percent of the mill’s capacity (materialisation).  
In parallel with the Booster plant in New Bern, a smaller pressurised pilot plant was 
constructed at the pulp and paper mill owned by STORA in Skoghall, Karlstad. The intention 
with the new plant was to take the next step towards the development of the IGCC 
application in which the recovery boilers would eventually be completely replaced with a 
system of significantly higher electrical efficiency. The pilot plant could be operated at up to 
15 bars of pressure and had a capacity of 6tbd using air as oxidant (knowledge development, 
entrepreneurial experimentation, and materialisation) (Hylander, 2002; Landälv, 2010).  
However, Chemrec and Kvaerner had significant problems with the technology. The 
refractory linings at the Booster plant in New Bern and the pilot plant did not last for very 
long. In New Bern, different materials were tested, but none of them lasted longer than 8-10 
months, and incurred a replacement cost of up to $1 million and two to three weeks of 
downtime (Rudberg, 2008; Landälv, 2010). 
Due to the problems Kvaerner experienced with the Chemrec technology, it contracted 
Nycomb Synergetics in 1996.233 Nykomb was the only company with experience in high 
temperature gasification in Sweden due to their common history in the previous episode 
(Rudberg, 2008). Nykomb thus re-entered the TIS in Sweden after having worked mainly on 
projects abroad (Bergek, 2002; Nykomb, 2006).234 
                                                      
233 Nycomb Synergetics was renamed to Nykomb Synergetics in the mid-1990s (Landälv, 2010).  
234 One important technical improvement was recommended by Nykomb and implemented in the Skoghall plant 
in 1996. The oxidant was changed from air to pure oxygen, a decision that was shown to be vital in the further 
development of the technology. The produced syngas became considerably more energy rich (no nitrogen from 
the air) and thus a more suitable gas turbine fuel. The capacity of the plant went from 6 to 10 tpd (Landälv, 
2010). 
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Since 1995 and the construction of the pressurised pilot plant, Chemrec and Kvaerner had 
been in contact with the pulp and paper company AssiDomän, discussing a larger 
demonstration plant using the pressurised technology for electricity production. With the 
aid of Nykomb, several configurations, scales and two different sites of the plant were under 
discussion for several years. They finally agreed to build a pressurised BLG unit at 
AssiDomän’s mill in Piteå.  
The plant had to be relatively large in order to justify the use of gas turbines and for the 
extra capacity that was being planned for the Piteå mill. It was therefore designed for 500-
550tbd, equal to about one quarter of the black liquor at the mill. This implied scaling up the 
pilot plant by more than 50 times (Bergek, 2002; Hylander, 2002). 
Even though severe technical problems had been encountered at the facility in New Bern as 
well in the pilot plant, the partners appeared confident that the technology would work on a 
larger scale. A plan was, however, made for how the remaining technical uncertainties could 
be solved, which involved building a smaller pilot facility close to the large demonstration 
plant (Hylander, 2002; Rudberg, 2008).  
In 1997, further steps towards realising the plans were taken by creating a joint venture 
company. The cost of the construction was estimated to be SEK 475 million (€47 million) and 
the government body FABEL was ready to finance the project with 50 percent of the 
required funding (SEK 237.5 million, or €24 million) (resource mobilisation). The remaining 
sum would be shared equally between the two partners AssiDomän and Kvaerner (Rudberg, 
2008; Tegnér, 2009). 
During 1998, however, AssiDomän and Kvaerner experienced financial problems and 
became concerned that the technical risk was too high for such a large investment. As a 
result, they decided to postpone the construction of the large IGCC demonstration plant and 
suggested that the remaining technical issues should be resolved in a larger pilot plant at 
AssiDomän’s mill site in Piteå.235 The financial situation for Kvaerner and AssiDomän was by 
                                                      
235 The US based company Air Product, were also interested participating in the project by supplying the 
equipment for oxygen production. With the introduction of black liquor gasification, they identified the pulp and 
paper industry as an important market for oxygen (Landälv, 2010). 
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then referred to as the primary reasons for not supporting the new plan (Bergek, 2002; 
Hylander, 2002; Rudberg, 2008).  
During 1999, the financial situation at Kvaerner became even worse and a leading consulting 
firm recommended they “cut all negative cash flow” (Rudberg, 2008). Since Chemrec was 
most definitely in a negative cash flow situation, Kvaerner started to look for new owners for 
the company.236 When Kvaerner and AssiDomän broke up the alliance with Chemrec, the 
second episode of black liquor gasification was terminated.  
During this episode, Chemrec, in collaboration with Kvaerner, Nykomb and various pulp and 
paper firms, managed to strengthen knowledge development, entrepreneurial 
experimentation, materialisation, and market formation by building pilot and demonstration 
facilities, as well as a commercial-scale plant for the Booster application. As a result, they 
had access to a science and technology infrastructure that enabled them to strengthen 
knowledge development and entrepreneurial experimentation even further. A motor of 
positive interconnections had developed and a new structure of firms, networks and 
technology had been developed by the end of the episode. Nevertheless, the real 
commercial breakthrough was postponed for the future. After Kvaerner and AssiDomän 
broke up the alliance, Chemrec was in real financial difficulties and was being forced to 
struggle harder than ever before in order to survive. 
7.2.3 Episode III: 2000−2009. Black liquor gasification for transportation 
fuels  
During the first part of the third episode, Chemrec was struggling to survive. However, Mr. 
Tegnér, the head of FABEL who had been responsible for granting the SEK 237.5 million (€24 
million) to Chemrec, identified the Chemrec technology as very important, even though 
AssiDomän and Kvaerner backed out of the project. When FABEL was subsequently 
integrated into the Swedish Energy Agency and Mr. Tegnér received a position there, 
Chemrec was allowed to keep the grant (Rudberg, 2008; Tegnér, 2009). According to Tegnér 
(2009), the grant was approved as a “development plan” for Chemrec, meaning that it could 
                                                      
236 Mr. Landälv has estimated (2005b) that Kvaerner invested approximately SEK 200 million in the 
development of the technology during the eight years they owned the company. 
244 
 
not be used for salaries, but could be used for equipment and construction so long as 50 
percent of the money came from other sources.237 
With the Agency’s provision of long-term financing, by 2000 Chemrec’s problems appeared 
to have been resolved. Kvaerner managed to sell 52 percent of its shares in Chemrec to the 
German-based capital goods supplier Babcock Borsig, and 24 percent to Nykomb Synergetics 
(Chemrec, 2000). With the acquisitions, Babcock Borsig and Nykomb Synergetics had 
committed to co-finance and construct the new pilot plant in Piteå by 2003 (Chemrec, 2000; 
Rudberg, 2008).238  
The cost of the pilot plant was estimated to be SEK 70 million (€7 million); it would be 
pressurised up to 32 bars and able to process 20 tbd and use oxygen as oxidant. It would 
include a novel refractory lining design, a new main burner design, an improved system for 
gas and smelt separation, be engineered for continuous operation, and equipped for long-
term material testing to resolve the final technical problems that had been identified during 
the previous episode (Chemrec, 2002, 2005). 
However, several new problems emerged and the completion of the new pilot plant was 
delayed due to a series of both unfortunate and fortunate events. To start with, the new 
principal owner, Babcock, experienced financial difficulties in 2001, could not meet its 
obligations (Chemrec, 2002), and filed for bankruptcy in July 2002. Fortunately for Chemrec, 
however, the Director of Nykomb Synergetics, Stefan Jönsson, managed to acquire 
Babcock’s shares in Chemrec before it declared insolvency and had its assets frozen. As a 
result, by the end of 2002, Nykomb owned 76 percent of Chemrec shares. In 2003, they 
acquired the remaining shares from Kvaerner to became the sole owners of the company 
(Rudberg, 2008; Tegnér, 2009).   
                                                      
237 The SEK 237.5 million thus provided a long-term financing situation for Chemrec that is probably quite 
unique. By 2009, they had still not used all of these funds (Rudberg, 2008). 
238 In 1991, Babcok had acquired the GSP coal gasification technology that had been developed in the former 
East Germany at DBI (see Chapter VI). The GPS technology, which used a cooling screen, had been developed 
especially for brown coal slurries that, just like black liquor, were considered corrosive. Tests were made using 
black liquor in the GSP gasifier. The tests were inconclusive due to practical problems and Chemrec adopted no 
technical solutions from Babcook (Rudberg, 2008; Landälv, 2010). 
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The intentions of Nykomb Synergetics were, of course, honourable. Indeed, without the 
swift action of Mr. Jönsson, Chemrec would have been dragged into bankruptcy with 
Babcock. Nevertheless, Nykomb is a small, family-owned consulting company with limited 
means of taking over Babcock’s role.  
In the meantime, by 2001 the Booster plant in New Bern had to be closed down due to 
overwhelming technical difficulties (legitimation). Moreover, the technical advantage 
Chemrec had indentified, replacing conventional recovery boilers with black liquor 
gasification, had overtime become less interesting due to the development of more efficient 
recovery boilers (Modig, 2005; Landälv, 2010).239 As a result, no potential customer was 
interested in the technology for large-scale power production (market formation, direction 
of search and legitimation).240 Hence, the years between 2000 and 2003 marked a very low 
point for Chemrec and the survival of the company was uncertain (Rudberg, 2008).  
However, it decided not to give up and started to think of alternative use of the gas. 
Chemrec soon realised that the gas was an excellent syngas and could be used for 
synthesising various chemical products, at a near competitive price with fossil alternatives.  
It would, however, be necessary to restore the energy balance in the pulp and paper mill by 
building additional combined heat and power capacity at the mill (Landälv, 2010). Chemrec 
filed a patent covering the production of syngas from black liquor for the purpose of 
producing transportation fuels and other chemicals in 2001 (Landälv and Lindblom, 2001).  
In addition, a study published by Nykomb in 2003 illustrated that Chemrec’s technology 
could be used to produce substantial volumes of methanol, or other second-generation 
transportation fuels, substituting up to 30 percent of the demand for transportation fuels in 
Sweden at a relatively low cost (Ekbom et al., 2003). The continued strategic importance of 
the Chemrec technology could, therefore, be confirmed (legitimation).  
                                                      
239 When Chemrec started the development in the 1980s it could illustrate a possible electrical efficiency of 22 
percent compared to conventional boilers with an efficiency of 7-8 percent. By 2001-2003, the leading suppliers 
started marketing recovery boilers with an electrical efficiency of approximately 16 percent. The additional 
investment cost and risk involved with new technology could not motivate a shift to black liquor IGCC 
(Landälv, 2010).    
240 In addition, just as for Värnamo during the end of the 1990s and early-2000s, interest in building new 
electricity capacity was very low due to the deregulation of the electricity market and the halt in the 
decommissioning of nuclear power, which was no longer viewed as such a pressing issue. 
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Chemrec was then able to mobilise a set of very important financial and technical resources 
that allowed it to continue. The mobilisation of these resources was made possible by the 
emergence of a new direction of search in support of the development of alternative 
transportation fuels.241  
With the renewed importance of alternative fuels, Chemrec, Nykomb and the Swedish 
Energy Agency undertook a wide range of activities to strengthen Chemrec and take the 
necessary steps towards commercialisation. To begin with, the remaining technical problems 
with the ceramics had to be resolved, causing the problems at plant in New Bern, USA. The 
first steps towards resolving these were already taken in 1997 when collaboration was 
initiated between Chemrec, Weyerhaeuser and Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Over time, 
Oak Ridge became one of the most important partners for Chemrec in advancing the 
development of the technology (Landälv, 2010). With their experience in developing and 
designing ceramic tiles for heat shields in space shuttles, a new and durable ceramic 
refractory lining could be developed for black liquor gasification. This collaboration enabled 
the Booster in New Bern to be restarted with a new design in 2003, with significantly 
improved availability as a result (knowledge development, entrepreneurial experimentation, 
materialisation) (Chemrec, 2003; Rudberg, 2008).242 
In addition, Chemrec and the Swedish Energy Agency worked with Professor Tore Berntsson 
at Chalmers University to include Annex XV: “Gasification of Black Liquor”, in the OECD/IEA 
implementing agreement on advanced energy-related technologies for the pulp and paper 
industry (IEA, 2003; Rudberg, 2008). The agreement was important for gathering the 
remaining technology expertise in black liquor gasification and keep a technology 
development alive, which experienced great difficulties at the time (Landälv, 2010).  
                                                      
241 Just as for Värnamo, interest in developing alternative fuels emerged as a response to the threat of climate 
change. 
242 Mr. Rudberg (2008) emphasises the importance of the long-term financing Chemrec received from the 
Swedish Energy Agency and the good contacts it had with the agency as the principal reason for surviving. The 
Swedish Energy Agency and good contacts with the universities also made it possible to make further 
connections and extend its networks. It was thanks to the Agency that Chemrec had the opportunity to meet with 
the US ambassador in Sweden, Mr. Woods. It was also one of the top three on the list of companies Mr. Woods 
ranked as the most promising companies in field of renewable energy in Sweden. Chemrec also managed to 
make very good contacts with the governor of Michigan, Mrs. Granholm, who visited the plant in Piteå with Mr. 
Woods. Given the long-term cooperation with New Page, Chemrec also had good contacts at the US Department 
of Energy, which financed much of the technology development in the US. 
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The Swedish Energy Agency and Chemrec also acted to set up research programmes that 
complemented the large FABEL investment grant. The purpose of these programmes was to 
further knowledge development for black liquor gasification and enable more than 50 
percent of the funding for the construction of the pilot plant. In the first period, from 2001 
to 2003, two smaller programmes were initiated. In 2004, these programmes were replaced 
by a larger programme on black liquor gasification (BLG), and a new legal unit called BLG 
Programmet AB was created (Kempe and Henke, 2009; Tegnér, 2009).243 This allowed the 
initiation of research at three universities and two institutes in Sweden (Gebart, 2008). The 
programme and the entry of the various universities and institutes were important for 
strengthening knowledge development of black liquor gasification. As a result, the actor 
structure of the TIS was strengthened and several new entrepreneurial experiments could be 
conducted. These activities have in turn further extended the design space of biomass 
gasification and strengthened the actor structure of the TIS (see Box 7.2).  
Through the financial arrangements established by the BGL research programme, the 1997 
FABEL grant, and equity financing from the owner of Chemrec, the new pilot plant was 
completed and inaugurated in February 2005 by the Swedish Minister of Energy, Mona 
Sahlin (resource mobilisation, entrepreneurial experimentation, materialisation)  (ETC, 2005; 
Gebart, 2008). 244  
Hence, in just three to four years a very difficult situation for Chemrec had been turned into 
a great opportunity. By 2004, it had a commercial-sized Booster plant operating without 
technical problems in New Bern, a new pilot plant under construction, several new patents 
on the technology, as well as access to top class international and national research 
(Landälv, 2010). In addition, if the technology could be made operational on a large-scale, a 
worldwide billion dollar market for renewable fuels could be realised at a relatively low cost. 
                                                      
243 The new legal unit was created to allow for more than 50 percent funding for the construction of the new pilot 
plant. It is owned by LtU (45%), UU (45%) and Chemrec (10%). It is also through BLG Programmet AB that all 
the money has been distributed to participating research organisations (Gebart, 2008; Rudberg, 2008). 
244 The first period, BLG I, 2004–2006, involved SEK 100 million, of which SEK 34 million was channelled to 
the construction, technical development and operation of the new pilot plant, not including the SEK 30.3 million 
that could be allocated from the FABEL programme. The second period, BLG II, 2007–2009, involved SEK 85 
million (resource mobilisation) (Gebart, 2008; Rudberg, 2008).  
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Even so, Chemrec had great difficulties finding new investors for developing the commercial 
opportunity.  
Between 2003 and 2006, the management of Chemrec visited more than 40 different 
venture capital firms. Only one showed any interest in the company: Vantage Point Venture 
Partners, a US-based venture capital firm.245 The CEO of the firm, Mr. Bulkin, had a lot of 
experience from the refinery industry, and knew what gasification was and appreciated its 
potential. In December 2006, the firm invested $10 million (€8 million),246 together with the 
Swedish venture firm Volvo Technology Transfer (resource mobilisation) (Rudberg, 2008).  
The investment in Chemrec resulted in Volvo re-entering the TIS for biomass gasification, 
which it previously had left during the Värnamo project in 2002. The focus of Chemrec has 
been on developing black liquor gasification for methanol or DME synthesis and Volvo’s 
interest has, all along, been for developing DME as an alternative fuel. Meanwhile, the 
technology for DME in heavy-duty vehicles had been developed in the EU-AHFORD 
programme (Landälv, 2005). When the EU project was completed, Volvo mobilised an 
additional SEK 62 million (€6 million) from the Swedish Energy Agency to develop the third 
generation of BioDME vehicles. The grant covered 50 percent of the development cost and 
the goal of the project was to demonstrate the technology in field trials of 30 vehicles by 
2009 (Energimyndigheten, 2006a). 
Following the venture capital investment, a new series of positive events would occur. In 
August 2007, the first potential customer, New Page, ordered a feasibility study worth $1.2 
million (€0.96 million) on a large-scale semi-commercial plant for fuel production at its mill in 
Escanaba, Michigan. The study was later supported by the US Department of Energy with 
funding of $0.3 million (€0.24 million) (Granholm, 2007; DOE, 2008; Rudberg, 2008). 
Shortly thereafter, in April 2008, a similar agreement was signed between Smurfit Kappa 
(formerly AssiDomän) and Chemrec for a semi-commercial production plant utilising one-
                                                      
245 Volvo Technology Transfer indicated an interest at an early stage but it did not want to become lead investor 
in the company. Mr. Rudberg (2008) felt that the majority of the venture capital firms displayed great ignorance 
of the technology and an inability to evaluate it (cf. Teppo (2006)). 
246 In 2006, the average rate was 0.8 Euro for 1 dollar. Source: http://www.oanda.com/currency/average, 
Accessed 2010-06-22. 
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third of the black liquor at the mill in Piteå, corresponding to 70,000 tonnes per year of DME 
(Chemrec, 2008a; Rudberg, 2008). The investment cost of the above-mentioned plants has 
been estimated at SEK 1,400 million (€140 million) in Piteå and approximately $220 million 
(€176 million) in Escanaba (Rudberg, 2008).  
7.2.4 The future of black liquor gasification in Sweden 
For investors to make actual investment decisions and for the market for black liquor 
gasification to be realised, two main sets of uncertainties must be reduced. The first set is 
associated with the technical and organisational aspects of large-scale production, 
distribution and the use of DME from black liquor gasification.  
The first major step to reduce these uncertainties will be taken in the BioDME project, which 
is financed through the EU 7th Framework Programme and the Swedish Energy Agency 
(resource mobilisation). The Swedish Energy Agency granted SEK 100 million (€10 million), 
although this sum was deducted from the SEK 237.5 million (€24 million) that Chemrec was 
awarded already in 1997 (Rudberg, 2008). The total budget of the project is €28 million 
(Chemrec, 2008a) 
Under the project, Chemrec and the Danish catalyst developer Haldor Tropsoe will design 
and build a DME plant located at the Smurfit Kappa mill in Piteå, integrated with the existing 
black liquor gasification pilot plant. With the new facility in operation, 4 tonnes of DME can 
be produced daily (entrepreneurial experimentation) (Chemrec, 2008a; Rudberg, 2008).  
The project is coordinated by Volvo and set to demonstrate the complete infrastructure of 
BioDME production, distribution and application in a test fleet of 14 heavy-duty vehicles 
(market formation). Together with the component supplier Delphi, Volvo will develop an 
injection system for heavy-duty DME vehicles (Chemrec, 2008b). The participation of Delphi 
is seen pivotal for making the DME technology commercially interesting, since it will enable 
Volvo to acquire the injection system from a supplier and enable future series production of 
DME vehicles (Röj, 2009). In addition, the 14 DME vehicles will be fuelled and operated in 
field experiments at four locations in Sweden: Piteå, Göteborg, Stockholm and Jönköping. 
The project partner Preem will construct the filling stations, while Total will develop fuel and 
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oil specifications (Chemrec, 2008b; Rudberg, 2008). The alliance underlying the DME project 
thus includes all the necessary industrial actors for demonstrating the complete 
infrastructure of DME.  
If the project is realised by 2010, Chemrec will be the first system builder to have achieved 
continuous production of second-generation fuels.247 It will, thereby, not only strengthen 
market formation but also be in a position to strengthen legitimation by illustrating the fact 
that DME is a realistic transportation fuel for the future (Rudberg, 2008).  
However, even if the legitimacy of DME is strengthened, it will by no means be sufficiently 
strengthened to ensure future commercial success. DME is still a new type of transportation 
fuel and several incumbent firms still oppose its widespread use. For example, the 
automotive manufacturers Volkswagen and Daimler have clearly expressed opposition to 
the introduction of DME on the European market (Keppeler, 2007; Drescher, 2008), and 
even some of the oil companies participating in the BioDME project have expressed 
scepticism towards the introduction of DME as a new fuel in Europe (Eriksson, 2009; 
Hervouet, 2009).248   
In addition to the BioDME project, a second step towards realising the potential of black 
liquor gasification has been taken. In 2009, the Swedish Energy Agency granted Chemrec and 
the biorefinery Domsjö Fabriker in Örnsköldsvik SEK 500 million (€50 million) for the first 
commercial-scale production facility of renewable transportation fuels from black liquor. The 
total investment cost is calculated at approximately SEK 3,000 million (€300 million), the 
plant has a planned capacity of 100,000 tonnes of DME (or 140,000 tonnes of methanol) per 
year, and the final decision on project procurement is planned for autumn 2011 (Landälv, 
                                                      
247 Choren has a demonstration plant under commissioning that may come into operation before Chemrec. 
248 Preem is part of the DME project in Piteå but state that it is not a fuel it prefer, given that new infrastructure 
needs to be constructed (Eriksson 2009). According to Véronique Hervouet (2009) at Total, it does not believe in 
DME for mature markets such as in Europe or North America, but perhaps rather in Southeast Asia and China. 
Total’s interest in the project is in learning about the technology; the company is involved in many different 
technology tracks concerning renewable fuels, with BioDME being just one. However, Total is one of the 
mineral oil companies that has announced an interest in investing in the semi-commercial plants that will 
constitute the next steps in Piteå and Escanaba (Rudberg 2008). 
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2010).249 The grant is, however, contingent on approval by the EU Directorate General for 
Competition according to the state aid rules (Domsjö, 2009).  
The second set of uncertainties that must be reduced to attract future investors is related to 
how the actors manage to reduce institutional and market uncertainties. This set of 
uncertainties is largely shared with the other projects for second-generation fuels and will be 
further discussed in Chapter XI. 
                                                      
249 Co-production of DME and Methanol will be possible at any ratio between the two.  
252 
 
Box 7.2: Strengthening the network of actors in biomass gasification 
With the creation of the BLG programme, a network of actors with an interest in black liquor 
gasification was significantly strengthened. To begin with, the research institute ETC in Piteå became 
the coordinator of the programme. Founded in 1989, it had long focused on experimenting with 
large-scale pilot equipment for combustion and gasification research. With the BLG programme, its 
resources increased significantly and it began to focus on the development of the Chemrec pilot 
plant, also located in Piteå. In addition to the research activities at ETC, research was also undertaken 
at Chalmers, Luleå and Umeå University, as well as at the research institutes STFI Packforsk (now 
Innventia) and the Corrosion Institute (Gebart, 2008).   
 
With all the activities taking place at ETC and Chemrec, a wide network of firms interested in utilising 
biomass and black liquor for heat, electricity and renewable transportation fuels has emerged in and 
around Piteå. One of the first firms to become involved was the local ventilation and sanitation 
installations firm Infjärdens Värme AB (IVAB). It constructed the pilot plant for Chemrec when 
Babcock went bankrupt. Through its mechanical workshop, it has been engaged in constructing other 
laboratory equipment for gasification and combustion at ETC. Since 2008, it has been working with 
ETC to develop a new type of EF reactor for biomass powder (Gebart, 2008). The project is financed 
by the Swedish Energy Agency with SEK 16.8 million and involves both the development of a pilot-
scale reactor and the adoption of a biomass powder technology in operation at the lime kiln at Kappa 
Kraftliner in Piteå (Energimyndigheten, 2009a). 
 
The interest in gasification has inspired the company MEVA, in Skellefteå, to enter the TIS. Together 
with ETC, it is developing a new type of cyclone gasifier for small- and medium-scale district heating 
systems. They are currently constructing a small pilot (1MW) and has plans for a 10MW 
demonstration plant in the town/district of Hortlax, located close to the town of Piteå (Gebart, 
2008). In 2008, a science park was inaugurated with a strong focus on developing and supporting 
companies working towards the future of “biorefinery” (Bergman, 2008).  
 
The Department of Energy Technology and Thermal Process Chemistry (ETPC) at Umeå University 
have also started developing new ideas for enabling biomass gasification. They have been working 
with pre-treating biomass, thereby changing its physical properties through the process of 
torrefaction (see Chapter III). The technology is well aligned with standard coal gasification 
technologies, since it most likely can be used without having to adapt the reactor or any of the 
downstream processes (Nordin, 2008). 
 
The technology is being developed by ETPC in collaboration with Övik Energy and the company Bio 
Energy Development North, which was started by researchers at ETPC. A pilot plant has been 
constructed and the Swedish Energy Agency is financing the construction of a commercial-sized 
demonstration plant in Örnsköldsvik. A research programme has also been set up to further support 
knowledge development and entrepreneurial experimentation based on the torrefaction of biomass. 
The total financing from the Swedish Energy Agency in this project is SEK 41 million 
(Energimyndigheten, 2009b). 
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7.3 The system builders’ transformative capacity, system weaknesses and 
the potential role of policy 
In this section, the four research questions specified in Chapter II will be revisited. Answers 
to each question will be provided for the case of Sweden by analysing the histories of 
fluidised bed and entrained flow gasification. The research questions were formulated as: 
1) Who act as system builders in the different national contexts? 
2) What characterises the nature and extent of the system builders’ transformative 
capacity? 
a) How do the system builders make use of the general structure in which they are 
embedded to form or strengthen the structure and the various functions of the 
TIS? 
b) To which extent do the system builders manage to strengthen the structure and 
functions of the TIS?   
3) What are the limits to the system builders’ transformative capacity and how can 
these be explained? 
4) Given these limits, which system weaknesses remain to be resolved by system builders 
and policymakers on different levels (national and EU)? 
 
This section is divided into two parts. Research Questions I and II will be analysed in the first 
part. The discussion will depart from the structure during each episode and identify who 
have been acting as system builders, and describe the nature and extent of their 
transformative capacity. In the second section, the focus shifts towards analysing and 
explaining the limits of the system builders’ transformative capacity, identifying the main 
system weaknesses and discussing the potential role of system builders and policymakers in 
addressing these weaknesses.  
7.3.1 The nature and extent of the system builders’ transformative capacity 
By the end of the oil crisis in 1986, a technology and actor structure had been created in 
Sweden with the capacity to build atmospheric CFB gasifiers for oil substitution in lime kilns. 
The structure consisted of Fläkt Industri, Götaverken and a few such plants that were 
installed at paper mills in Sweden and abroad. Several suppliers and customers had gained 
experience with the technology. One of the most advanced pilot plants in the world for the 
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pressurised gasification of peat and biomass had been constructed by the Department of 
Thermal Processes in Studsvik, which later became the firm TPS. In addition, the activities of 
Nynäshamn Petroleum had resulted in the creation of the consulting company Nykomb 
Synergetic, as well as the granting of a patent on black liquor gasification. The patent was 
subsequently acquired by Chemrec, which experimented with new methods for chemical 
recovery.  
In this first episode, one can argue that Studsvik and Nynäshamn Petroleum were the system 
builders, since they acted to build new types of structures and strengthened the various 
functions. Due to the crises at the time, they were able to mobilise financial resources from 
the government, launch projects and create alliances (networks) for commercialising their 
technology options. Through their actions, they came to strengthen the functions of 
knowledge development, entrepreneurial experimentation and materialisation for EF 
gasification, atmospheric CFB and pressurised BFB gasification. 
A commercial break through was, however, not possible with pressurised BFB and EF coal or 
black liquor gasification. Studsvik encountered technical challenges and was not awarded, 
along with Götaverken, the contract with Kemira. At least one such project would probably 
have been necessary to resolve the remaining technical issues, but no additional customers 
were to be found.    
Nynäs Petroleum had obvious problems strengthening legitimation, since the use of coal (EF 
gasification) was seen as controversial and it had no real interest in pursuing black liquor 
gasification, even though the technical director at the company invented and patented the 
process. In addition, when Nynäs encountered the intentional resistance of Vattenfall and 
Stockholm Energy, the plans for a large-scale poly-generation plant had to be terminated, 
even though the government had already approved the project. 
In the case of atmospheric CFB gasification, Götaverken was successful in developing the 
technology for substituting oil in lime kilns. This was an incremental type of innovation for 
Götaverken, since it could draw heavily on its development of CFB boilers. Götaverken was 
already one of the world leaders in boiler technology and had established networks within 
the pulp and paper industry (Koornneef et al., 2007). Compared to Studsvik and Nynäs 
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Petroleum, Götaverken did not need to build a new type of structure to succeed with 
atmospheric CFB gasification. As a result, the design space of lime kiln gasification appears to 
have co-developed within the design space of fluidised bed combustion.  
The activities undertaken by Götaverken, and its customers, strengthened the technology 
and actor structure of the TIS, as well as the functions of knowledge development, 
entrepreneurial experimentation, materialisation, market formation, legitimation, and 
direction of search of the TIS. The activities undertaken did not, however, align the 
institutional structure to the technology. Hence, when the price of oil fell in 1986, interest in 
biomass gasification, oil substitution and alternative fuels fell along with it.  
Soon after the oil crisis, the direction of search shifted to large-scale electricity production 
from domestic resources due to the Chernobyl accident and the increased controversy of 
nuclear power. Chemrec took over the role of system builder from Nynäshamn Petroleum, 
who was not interested in pursuing black liquor and biomass gasification. With the shift in 
direction of search, they could draw upon new resources in the structure and formed an 
alliance with Kvaerner, who by then had acquired Götaverken. The alliance was later 
strengthened through Nykomb Synergetics’ entry into the TIS. The alliance, thus, had 
extensive experience with gasification from the first episode, and it managed to advance the 
technology by establishing a wide range of atmospheric and pressurised pilot plants, as well 
as a commercial-scale Booster plant in New Bern, USA. The Chemrec technology was also 
identified as strategically important to Sweden for reducing its dependency on nuclear 
power. It could, therefore, mobilise a large grant totalling SEK 237.5 million (€24 million) 
from the government for the construction of an initial semi-commercial demonstration BLG 
IGCC facility at AssiDomän’s pulp and paper mill in Piteå. Although the large-scale BLG IGCC 
was never constructed, Chemrec and its allies managed to strengthen knowledge 
development, entrepreneurial experimentation, materialisation, resource mobilisation, and 
market formation of the TIS.  
The new direction of search forced two new actors, Vattenfall and Sydkraft, to enter the TIS. 
However, due to Vattenfall’s and Sydkraft’s intentional resistance, Studsvik/TPS was unable 
to create an alliance with the two utilities and with Götaverken/Kvaerner to further develop 
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biomass gasification for large-scale power production. In addition, Studsvik/TPS was unable 
to develop the smaller scale atmospheric BIGCC technology suitable for the numerous 
municipal-owned local utilities, since the government was unwilling to provide more than 50 
percent financing in demonstration projects. In order to survive, TPS was forced into finding 
contracts abroad. Consequently, the activities undertaken by TPS strengthened the TIS of 
biomass gasification as a whole, but not the TIS in Sweden until it re-entered around 2000. 
Instead, one could perhaps argue that Sydkraft and Vattenfall took over the system builder 
role in Sweden. However, in terms of their transformative capacity, they mostly 
strengthened knowledge development, entrepreneurial experimentation and materialisation 
in Finland. They thus came to strengthen the Finnish actor and technology structure, 
consisting of Tampella and its pilot plant, VTT and its science and technology infrastructure, 
and Foster Wheeler. Sydkraft strengthened, however, materialisation in Sweden with the 
completion of the Värnamo plant.  
By the end of the 1990s, the BIGCC technology was successfully demonstrated in Värnamo 
but the plant was mothballed. At the time, the direction of search had changed−the 
electricity market was being deregulated and electricity prices were expected to fall. In 
addition, the decommissioning of nuclear power was no longer seen as a pressing issue for 
the utilities. As a result, Sydkraft and Vattenfall were no longer interested in pursuing the 
technology.  
Vattenfall’s and Sydkraft’s motives for engaging in new technology development can, of 
course, be questioned. Were they really interested in developing alternatives to nuclear 
power, or were they only interested in delaying decommissioning for as long as possible? 
Regardless of the answer to that question, it is clear that whilst Vattenfall and Sydkraft 
strengthened the TIS of biomass gasification in Europe as a whole, they did not build on the 
Swedish structure developed in the previous episode. 
As a result, by the end of the second episode the actor and technology structure for realising 
FB gasification in Sweden was not significantly stronger than it was in 1986, even though a 
successful demonstration had been completed in Värnamo. The situation for Chemrec, 
however, was quite different. It had considerably strengthened the actor and technology 
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structure for BLG both in Sweden and abroad. However, by the end of the 1990s, the 
planned large-scale project was abandoned by Kvaerner and AssiDomän, and Kvaerner’s 
shares in Chemrec were put out for sale. 
The intentional and frictional resistance of Vattenfall, Sydkraft, and later Kvaerner and 
AssiDomän forced the considerably smaller companies of TPS and Chemrec to the brink of 
ruin. However, they managed to survive until the third episode, when the direction of search 
was once again strengthened in favour of alternative fuels. Under this new direction of 
search, new actors entered the TIS and the system builders could draw further resources 
from the structure.  
To start with, Nykomb Synergetics and the Swedish Energy Agency saved Chemrec from 
bankruptcy. Jointly, the three actors assumed the role of system builder and began 
strengthening the structure and functions of the TIS by supporting Chemrec’s technology 
development in collaboration with the unique competencies at the Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory for a) improving the refractory lining, and b) restarting the New Bern plant with 
the new lining. They acted to include BLG in the IEA agreements, supporting the remaining 
expertise within the field through a very difficult time. They also initiated the BGL 
Programme, through which more than 50 percent funding was made possible and which 
enabled them to a) construct the new pilot plant in Piteå, and b) create a research 
infrastructure for black liquor gasification at three universities and two specialised research 
institutes in Sweden. Through these actions, the system builders managed to strengthen 
knowledge development, entrepreneurial experimentation, materialisation, and resource 
mobilisation of the TIS in Sweden.  
With the new actor and technology structure in place, Chemrec could attract a new set of 
owners and significantly improve the company’s equity situation. In addition, they managed 
to mobilise further resources from the EU and set up a new alliance for demonstrating the 
entire value chain of black liquor gasification, including the complete infrastructure for using 
DME as a fuel for heavy-duty vehicles. If the project is completed as planned by 2010, 
Chemrec and its allies will have further strengthened resource mobilisation, knowledge 
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development, entrepreneurial experimentation, materialisation, market formation, 
legitimation and direction of search.  
As a result of the various activities undertaken to strengthen Chemrec, various spin-off and 
related activities have been created (see Box 7.2). Hence, the collective dimension of the 
innovation and diffusion process has also been strengthened (the development of positive 
externalities). 
With regard to fluidised bed gasification, in 2000, there were several actors interested in 
commercialising FB gasification for the production of liquid fuels. Volvo had an interest in 
developing DME as an alternative fuel, the Swedish Energy Agency was seriously interested 
in “saving” Värnamo, and TPS was provided an opportunity to re-enter the TIS in Sweden. 
There was, later, also a call for proposals from the European Union within the context of the 
6th Framework Programme for the demonstration of second-generation fuels. A network of 
actors around the Värnamo facility therefore emerged and attempted to undertake system 
building activities. Although the actors had many and perhaps conflicting goals, they all 
acted with a common interest of redesigning the Värnamo plant as a research facility for the 
demonstration of clean hydrogen-rich synthesis gas. Consequently, the research project 
CHRISGAS was set up and the network was, thereby, extended to include a wide range of 
EU-based partners.    
The Swedish Energy Agency played a key role in the Swedish-based network for mobilising 
resources and establishing an actor structure. This new structure included the creation of a 
new actor owned by Växjö University (VVBGC) which would own the plant, as well as apply 
for further resources and coordinate its research activities. The intention was that this 
improved structure would strengthen knowledge development, entrepreneurial 
experimentation, and the materialisation of a new science and technology infrastructure 
that would be valuable to all of Europe and hopefully, over the long-term, contribute to 
market formation.  
However, the above-mentioned functions were not strengthened and the vision could not 
be realised. VVBGC and Växjö University had been responsible for finding additional 
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financing for the CHRISGAS project and an additional project, WASTE, was supposed to start 
up the Värnamo facility and thereby share some of the associated costs. These plans failed 
and as a result the funding required for reconstructing the Värnamo facility increased. 
Hence, when VVBGC applied for SEK 250 million (€25 million) instead of the expected SEK 
182 million (€18 million), the Swedish Energy Agency responded by requiring industrial 
ownership of the plant through a new company (Company A). Industry would thereby co-
finance reconstruction and initial demonstration with at least SEK 68 million. In return, it was 
offered ownership of the technology that was developed, as well as the responsibility for 
commercialising the technology. To date, this company has not been created and the 
Värnamo plant has once again been mothballed. 
In the third episode, in parallel with the development of Värnamo and perhaps due to all of 
its problems, a new potential system builder has emerged in the form of Göteborg Energy. It 
has managed to create an alliance of firms and establish research activities at Chalmers that 
might lead to the first semi-commercial-scale demonstration plant for BioSNG production 
based on the FICFB gasification process developed in Austria. Through its efforts, it has 
strengthened the actor structure by attracting E.ON and Metso Power, as well as broadened 
Chalmers’ work in the field. It has also strengthened the technology structure through 
financing the construction of a pilot facility at Chalmers. Through this, it has strengthened 
the functions of knowledge development, entrepreneurial experimentation and 
materialisation.   
After having described the three episodes of fluidised bed and black liquor gasification, it is 
now possible to provide short answers to RQ1 and RQ2. With respect to RQ1 and black 
liquor gasification. Chemrec has been the primary system builder but Nykomb Synergetic 
and the Swedish Energy Agency have also undertaken system building activities that have 
been crucial to the survival of Chemrec and the development of the knowledge field. In the 
field of fluidised bed gasification, no single system builder was identified but rather a wider 
network of actors. This national network was strong during the 1980s, but weakened during 
the 1990s when the two major utilities, Sydkraft and Vattenfall, chose to strengthen the 
actor and technology structure in Finland instead of that in Sweden. Since 2000, the Swedish 
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Energy Agency, TPS, VVBGC (but also others) have attempted to take on the system building 
role, thereby strengthening the Swedish actor and technology structure, but instead it has 
continued to deteriorate. More recently, Göteborg Energy has taken on the role of a system 
builder and may enable the first semi-commercial-scale demonstration plant for BioSNG 
production based on the FICFB gasification process developed in Austria. 
As the system builders have emerged from different contexts, the nature and extent of their 
transformative capacity (RQ2) has been quite different from one another. In black liquor 
gasification, Chemrec has been able to utilise the existing technology structure by drawing 
upon fossil gasification and technology developed in Nynäshamn for producing methanol 
and the ceramic technology developed for space shuttles. Chemrec has also managed to 
attract actors to the field by aligning the technology to the interests of a) the pulp and paper 
industry for boosting capacity in existing recovery boilers and finding additional revenues, 
and b) Volvo’s and other actors’ interest in DME. In addition, resources have been possible 
to mobilise due to the nuclear crisis in the 1980s and the current climate crisis.  
As a result, Chemrec has been able to strengthen all eight functions, resource mobilisation, 
knowledge development, entrepreneurial experimentation, materialisation, legitimation, 
direction of search, development of positive externalities, and market formation for less 
advanced applications. It has also built and strengthened the structure of the TIS. Chemrec 
has, for example, been able to build pilot, demonstration and commercial-scale plants for 
less advanced applications (technology), attract actors (actors), create national and 
international knowledge networks, as well as form alliances with incumbents (networks). 
The network of system builders in fluidised bed gasification has been able to draw upon 
existing actors and technologies in fluidised bed combustion. Götaverken explored 
atmospheric gasification and managed to sell a few commercial-scale lime kiln gasifiers, 
while Studsvik pressurised the technology and made attempts to develop it for the 
production of methanol. Studsvik also developed a less advanced atmospheric lime kiln 
gasifier, but came too late into the market. Hence, when an interest in electricity production 
from biomass gasification emerged, Studsvik/TPS had two technology options.  
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The atmospheric option was aligned with the interest of the municipal companies, as the 
technology was promising for developing BIGCC on a smaller scale that was suitable for the 
existing district heating networks in Sweden. Several municipal companies invested in TPS 
and efforts were made to develop the technology. However, there were no government 
funding available that could cover more than 50 percent of the investment costs, and the 
municipal companies were not willing to take the added risk. Similar projects were instead 
pursued by TPS with international partners.  
The second option was the pressurised technology. It could have been further developed for 
large-scale BIGCC, which was in line with the main interests of Vattenfall and Sydkraft. 
However, these major utilities did not choose to build on the experience from the previous 
episode in Sweden, and made alliances with Finnish firms instead.       
In the third episode, most of the actors with competence in building fluidised gasifiers had 
exited the TIS. However, a small network of actors re-emerged and they could draw upon 
Volvo’s interest in DME, the Swedish Energy Agency’s interest to save the Värnamo facility, 
and the municipal of Växjö to become a fossil free community.  
New structures were created, such as the knowledge network (CHRISGAS), and a new 
organisation (VVBGC), and substantial resources could be mobilised from the EU. With these 
resources, knowledge development and entrepreneurial experimentation could be 
strengthened. However, they were not sufficient to re-design and take the Värnamo facility 
into operation and the network failed to create an actor structure, with strong Swedish 
national interest, that could appropriate on the future knowledge development at such a 
facility.  
7.3.2 Limits to the system builders’ transformative capacity, system 
weaknesses and the potential role of policy 
The final part of the discussion will begin by analysing the limits of the system builders’ 
transformative capacity and identifying the main system weaknesses. This will be followed 
by a discussion on the role of the system builders and policymakers in addressing these 
weaknesses. 
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Explaining the limits to the system builders’ transformative capacity and identifying the 
main system weaknesses 
The network of actors in fluidised bed gasification, including Götaverken and Studsvik/TPS, 
was able to strengthen the TIS in Sweden during the first episode. However, due to the 
intentional resistance of Vattenfall and Sydkraft, their ability to act as a system builder was 
very limited during the second episode. Nevertheless, in the third episode a new network of 
actors with an interest in fluidised bed gasification could be created, consisting primarily of 
TPS, VVBGC and the Swedish Energy Agency but also many more actors. With time, the 
Swedish Energy Agency identified the need for creating additional structure, in terms of a 
new company called Company A. The purpose of Company A was to appropriate on the 
knowledge development at Värnamo and, thereby, be responsible for commercialising the 
technology and co-financing the reconstruction of the plant. The alliance managed to 
mobilise resources from the EU but the system builders were unable to strengthen the 
functions (except resource mobilisation and, to a limited degree, knowledge development) or 
find investors for Company A, due to various limits to the system builders’ transformative 
capacity.  
The explanation for these limits can be found in the second episode, where the actions of 
Sydkraft (and Vattenfall) had primarily strengthened the TIS in Finland. Thus, the IPR of the 
Värnamo facility did not belong to any of the Swedish actors, but to Foster Wheeler. It had 
constructed the plant in the first place and only granted the Swedish actors a limited IPR 
agreement. By then, Foster Wheeler had also become involved in similar projects, but in an 
alliance with VTT and Stora Enso (see Chapter VIII). Its interest in supporting a potential 
alliance of competitors in Sweden must therefore be seen as limited. While the Värnamo 
plant may be located in Sweden, for the time being it should be seen as an “outpost” of 
Foster Wheeler rather than a “golden egg” for any Swedish-based alliance.  
Even if the IPR problem could be resolved, it would still be difficult to create Company A due 
to the weak actor structure. There is a lack of Swedish companies250, with a strong 
                                                      
250 Based on this study, it has not been possible to identify any other actors in Sweden that could leverage the 
investment in Värnamo, except certain customers who could build one or two such plants for themselves. 
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competence in the field, which could appropriate on the knowledge development at 
Värnamo by building subsequent plants.251  
With regard to the trajectory of entrained flow gasification of black liquor, Chemrec 
managed to survive due to the actions undertaken by the Swedish Energy Agency and 
Nykomb Synergetic. Together, they managed to strengthen the actor and technology 
structure of black liquor gasification and all the functions, except for market formation. 
However, even though Chemrec appears to be doing well today, the weak actor structure in 
Sweden (in terms of the lack of a capital goods industry) is still a factor it has been forced to 
work around. Since Chemrec is a small company, it must rely on strong alliances with 
incumbent actors to succeed. By itself, Chemrec are unable to take on large projects and 
secure the necessary financial guarantees for turning chemical pulp mills into biorefineries 
that produce renewable transportation fuels.  
Although Chemrec has managed to create strong alliances with international actors, other 
small-scale actors entering the TIS will have to operate in a structure lacking large capital 
goods suppliers that can enter alliances and provide complementary competencies and 
resources. Hence,   
The first system weakness is the lack of capital goods industries with the capacity of entering 
into alliances, appropriating on knowledge development, and constructing large-scale plants.  
The joint transformative capacity of Chemrec, Nykomb Synergetics and the Swedish Energy 
Agency appears, however, to be sufficient for compensating for this system weakness by 
developing alliances with various international actors. Through such an alliance, Chemrec 
may still play an important role in the construction of full-scale plants for converting black 
liquor into transportation fuels and other chemicals. Nevertheless, small firms or single 
individuals that are not part of a strong structure cannot be expected to establish alliances 
with multinational corporations.  
                                                      
251 The only company with any real competence in FB gasification at the time was TPS. Götaverken had long 
since exited the TIS and was owned by Metso Power. They could possibly have been a good partner for TPS or 
taken over TPS’s role when they went into reconstruction and later exited the TIS. However, the IPR agreement 
with Foster Wheeler explicitly denied the actors the chance to enter such an alliance with Metso, and it is highly 
unlikely that Foster Wheeler would help their principal competitor gain such an advantage. 
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A second system weakness relates to the formation of markets. The actors have worked to 
create niche markets for the technology by occupying less advanced applications, such as 
lime kilns or the Booster, with which the actors have been able to gain commercial 
experience and continue the development of the technology for more advanced 
applications. Less advanced applications have though been fewer in Sweden and the actors 
have, thus, had limited possibilities to learn from them.  
As importantly, the system builders have not acted, or been able, to influence market 
formation for advanced applications through aligning the institutional framework to the 
technology. This may be explained by the fact that the system builders have always been 
relatively small actors and highly dependent on the creation of alliances with very large 
actors.252 It has not been in the interest of the large actors to influence the institutional 
framework in order to form markets for emerging technologies such as biomass gasification. 
First, the utilities have limited interest in supporting emerging technologies with the 
potential to replace even parts of their nuclear capacity. Second, the pulp and paper industry 
has limited interest in promoting new technologies that would increase competition for 
and/or the price of biomass and electricity. Any special provisions for emerging biomass-
based technologies and other incentives that would increase the price of biomass and 
electricity would, therefore, not be favoured by industry and have not been encouraged.  
In addition, the dominant belief among policymakers, at least prior to the 1990s, appears to 
have been that research and development, in combination with some additional investment 
support, would be sufficient for bringing down the price of emerging technologies to the 
level of conventional technologies. The new technology would then eventually replace 
conventional technology, which in this case was nuclear power. Hence, through the history 
of biomass gasification in Sweden, there is an absence of efforts to form markets by 
institutional change. 
                                                      
252 There is a possible exception in TPS, as it was backed by a wide range of municipal utility companies. 
Together they tried to develop the atmospheric BIGC technology, which was well aligned with the government’s 
interest in increasing electricity production form biomass at the time, the interests of the municipal companies 
and the existence and size of district heating systems in Sweden. However, the municipal companies refrained 
from investing in a first demonstration plant since they could not get above 50 percent funding from the 
government. 
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Given the introduction of the green certificates in Sweden in 2003, however, this linear 
perspective on the innovation process may be understood to shift to a somewhat less linear 
one. Under the new system, special provisions were granted for emerging and renewable 
technology, but only for those that currently have the lowest cost and not necessarily those 
with the highest potential over the long-term. Hence, the potential of the system to actually 
drive down the cost of radically new and, at the beginning, costly technologies such as BIGCC 
must be seen as extremely limited without additional support (Bergek and Jacobsson, 2010). 
With this type of instrument, biomass gasification will not be developed since it is initially 
more expensive to produce, even though it is more socially desirable than first-generation 
fuels. Hence, 
The second system weakness is the lack of an institutional framework that recognises the 
need for creating specific market preconditions in support of emerging technologies. 
The two weaknesses are general, even though Chemrec has been capable of manoeuvring 
past the first due to actions undertaken by the Swedish Energy Agency. However, there are 
also weaknesses that are specific for the two trajectories. 
With regard to Chemrec, it has been able to create alliances with all major actors involved in 
demonstrating the production of DME from black liquor, for distribution and for using it in 
14 new DME heavy-duty vehicles. The series production of future DME vehicles appears to 
have been solved with Delphi’s participation in the development project and with securing 
the supply of necessary components for the series production of DME vehicles.  
If the current BioDME projects and the first pre-commercial-scale demonstration facility at 
Domsjö are successful, the alliance will have considerably strengthened the legitimacy 
(legitimation) and direction of search for DME as a new alternative fuel. In addition, if 
successful, the system builders will have created a limited market with dedicated fleets 
utilising their own fuel infrastructure253 in cities and towns (primarily in Sweden), thereby 
strengthening market formation. However, this may not be sufficient for a larger market to 
                                                      
253 Such a market can, for example, consist of city buses, garbage collection vehicles, logging trucks, etc., which 
return to the same location every night and have a limited need for many fuel stations over great distances.  
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materialise since there is no infrastructure developed for distributing DME anywhere in 
Europe. Hence,  
The third structural system weakness is the lack of a technology infrastructure for diffusing 
DME as a transportation fuel in Europe. 
The development of such an infrastructure is questioned by Volvo’s main competitors (such 
as Volkswagen and Daimler) and by the oil industry (such as Preem and Total). The system 
builders have, thus, been limited in its capacity to strengthen direction of search and 
legitimation for the use of DME in the EU. Overcoming the intentional and frictional 
resistance of the incumbents will, of course, take time and require considerable resources 
compared to if the incumbents were in favour of such a development.  
Dedicated fleets with their own fuel infrastructure is also the type of market that has been 
targeted by advocates of BioSNG (methane) as a transportation fuel such as Göteborg 
Energy. The system builder in focus has managed to set up an alliance with firms consisting 
of E.ON, Metso Power, Repotec and a catalyst developer for demonstrating the technology 
on the scale of 20MWth. However, it has still been limited in its capacity to strengthen 
legitimation and the direction of search for using methane as a transportation fuel. The 
primary explanation for this is that methane is not a diesel fuel and Göteborg Energy has, so 
far, been unable to create an alliance with manufacturers of heavy-duty vehicles for further 
engine development. The heavy–duty vehicles using methane therefore suffer from lower 
energy efficiency and engine robustness compared to those operating on diesel. Hence:  
The fourth system weakness is an incomplete technology and actor structure for using 
BioSNG as a transportation fuel in heavy-duty vehicles.  
Nevertheless, Volvo demonstrated the use of methane in a diesel engine in a line-up of 
various fuel alternatives in 2007. If further developed, methane could be a good alternative 
or complement to DME. Steps in that direction have more recently also been taken 
(Hedenstedt, 2010). The success of such a development is too early to foresee, and the 
current interest from other manufacturers of heavy-duty vehicles is extremely limited. The 
alternative for Göteborg Energy is, of course, to continue promoting BioSNG for personal 
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vehicles, although the physical infrastructure to support this is still under-developed in most 
of Europe. 
Role of system builders and policymakers  
The role of policymakers is to address those of the above-mentioned system weaknesses 
that are currently beyond the transformative capacity of the system builders. Out of the four 
system weaknesses, the first two require a longer discussion on how they can be addressed. 
The discussion on the first system weakness will be presented in this section. The second 
system weakness is addressed in Chapter XI. 
The role of policy with respect to the third and fourth system weaknesses is seen as 
relatively uncomplicated. Policy can, of course, focus on supporting the creation of 
infrastructure for BioSNG and DME, as well as supporting engine development for the use of 
methane in diesel engines. In addition, the system builders have proven to have great 
capacity for creating various types of alliances, and with time will probably be able to 
overcome these system weaknesses through working in established networks with 
policymakers and other actors. 
With respect to the first system weakness, no policy can be expected to turn the clock back 
to the 1980s and reconstruct the previous industry and technology structure. Instead, the 
example of Chemrec illustrates that through active and “technology-specific” policymaking, 
it is possible to strengthen a weak TIS structure and, thereby, the transformative capacity of 
the individual actors. A stronger structure enables individuals and small firms to draw 
resources from the structure to create or engage in the necessary national and international 
alliances.  
With the recent success of Chemrec, direction of search has been strengthened and a wide 
range of new actors and technologies has emerged. As a result, the design space of biomass 
gasification has been extended; networks and other structural elements as well as various 
functions of the TIS, such as the development of positive externalities, have been 
strengthened. Hence, even if none of the new Swedish actors, including Chemrec, can take 
on entire multi-billion Euro projects to build new biorefineries by themselves, they may still 
fulfil very important niches and do so in a wide range of knowledge areas.  
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Based on the Swedish experience, strong lessons for policy can be drawn. In technology 
development projects of this type, the risk of failure is great. However, as is clear from the 
history of black liquor gasification, failure is a part of a long learning process. Before 
financing such projects, therefore, it is necessary to identify:  
a) what type of science and technology infrastructure is created. Is it useful beyond a 
single experiment or demonstration and, if so, who can continue to learn from it? 
b) who has the ability to appropriate the benefits of the knowledge development, even 
if the project itself fails? 
Rather than only focusing on succeeding with the individual project, which of course remains 
important, it is also necessary to identify which actors can learn from an eventual failure. In 
the case of Chemrec, if it fails to demonstrate the production of renewable fuels and other 
chemicals, it will still have benefited from the experience of trying. Chemrec will have all the 
proprietary rights to the technology, and the investments in the pilot plant can be used for 
experimenting with other applications or finding new uses for the knowledge already 
developed. The science and technology infrastructure that has already been constructed can 
continue to be used for research.  
If tax payers in Sweden finance technology development through, for example, the Swedish 
Energy Agency or through utilities owned by municipalities or the government, this should 
only be done when an actor and technology structure exists (or is created) that can 
appropriate the benefits of knowledge development beyond a single experiment (successful 
or not). Hence, policymakers who would like to address the main system weakness in 
Sweden should neither accept the fact that the main science and technology infrastructure is 
created or strengthened in a different country, nor that the principal actor with the ability to 
appropriate the benefits of knowledge development moves back to Finland (or somewhere 
else) once the project is over. 
7.4 Conclusions 
In fluidised bed gasification, a network of actors has attempted to undertake system building 
activities since the 1970s. In the first episode, the network was strong and consisted of 
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prominent actors such as Götaverken, ABB Fläkt and Studsvik/TPS. However, when Sydkraft 
and Vattenfall entered the TIS in the 1990s, the main actors from the previous episode 
exited and the network was weakened. In the beginning of 2000, TPS could return and a 
new, but also weak, network of actors could be formed―primarily consisting of TPS, the 
Swedish Energy Agency, VVBGC but also others. In black liquor gasification, the main system 
builder has all along been Chemrec, but pivotal system building activities were also 
undertaken by Nykomb Synergetics and the Swedish Energy Agency. In particular, the 
actions undertaken by the Swedish Energy Agency in enabling the survival of Chemrec was 
highlighted. Similar actions were attempted to support a new network of actors in fluidised 
bed gasification and save the Värnamo plant, but so far these have failed and the only 
remaining actor from the first episode, TPS, is bankrupt. More recently, Göteborg Energy has 
taken on a system building role and attempts are undertaken to further develop and 
commercialise the FICFB technology, originally developed in Austria (Chapter V).  
As a technological field, biomass and black liquor gasification has been identified as 
strategically important for Sweden for the production of alternatives fuels, as well as large-
scale renewable electricity with a capacity to contribute to the decommissioning of nuclear 
power in Sweden. As such, the system builders have been able to mobilise various resources 
from the government. However, the main actors, TPS and Chemrec, are quite small and rely 
on alliances with incumbent actors to succeed. 
This is also where the histories of the both companies start to differ. Chemrec was able to 
create alliances (albeit fragile ones) with large incumbent actors in Sweden for developing 
the technology during the 1980s and 1990s. The alliances made it possible to strengthen the 
technology and actor structure of black liquor gasification. Although the project eventually 
failed and the alliance was dissolved by the end of the 1990s, a new alliance with Nykomb 
and the Swedish Energy Agency was established. The new alliance managed to create and 
strengthen a new actor and technology structure through which Chemrec could act. As a 
result, Chemrec’s transformative capacity was significantly improved and the new alliance 
has been able to strengthen all the functions of the TIS. Lately, a strengthened system has 
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resulted in new entrants which have started experimenting with biomass gasification (Box 
7.2).  
In terms of TPS (and Götaverken), they could not overcome the intentional resistance of 
Vattenfall and Sydkraft. The two utilities did not act as system builders and they were not 
interested in building on the achievements made during the first episode. In addition, a 
market for TPS’s smaller scale and atmospheric BIGCC technology could not materialise due 
to the lack of financial support from the government. As a result, TPS was forced to create 
alliances and find projects beyond Sweden’s borders.  
The alliances formed by Sydkraft and Vattenfall mostly strengthened the TIS of biomass 
gasification structure abroad (in Finland). As a result, the actor and technology structure in 
Sweden for fluidised bed gasification was weakened and the control over the Värnamo plant 
was “given” to Foster Wheeler. When attempts were made during the 2000s to revive the 
Värnamo plant for the creation of a new actor and technology structure that could 
appropriate on the planned technology development, they failed. Hence:  
1. The first system weakness is the lack of capital goods industries with the capacity of 
entering into alliances, appropriating on knowledge development, and constructing 
large-scale plants.  
Overcoming this weakness is beyond the capacity of individual system builders. Instead, 
policy has to focus on strengthening the structure. Policy intervention needs to focus on 
identifying and creating structures that are able to learn from failure and not just provide 
the best possibilities for securing the success of individual projects. Such a structure should, 
thus, consist of a science and technology infrastructure that is useful beyond a single 
demonstration and actors that are able to appropriate on the knowledge that is developed. 
In addition to the above-mentioned structural weakness, three other weaknesses were 
identified:  
2. The second system weakness is the lack of an institutional framework that recognises 
the need for creating specific market preconditions in support of emerging 
technologies. 
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The system builders have been limited in their capacity and may not even have attempted to 
create markets that go beyond natural niche markets such as those for oil substitution in 
lime kilns. The availability of such markets would have been of critical importance for the 
development of more advanced applications. Nor has policy opened up such markets by 
institutional change. Technology development based on a linear model has been manifested 
by a system that stimulates the diffusion of renewable technologies that currently have the 
lowest cost. The consequence of using such a system and the role of policy for addressing 
this system weakness will be further analysed in Chapter XI.   
The system weaknesses mentioned above affect all trajectories, while the remaining two 
weaknesses concern only DME and BioSNG production. 
3. The third structural system weakness is the lack of a technology infrastructure for 
diffusing DME as a transportation fuel in Europe. 
Chemrec had been successful in creating various alliances for demonstrating the complete 
value chain of DME production, distribution and use in heavy-duty vehicles. To date, 
however, the major automotive manufacturers in Germany, such as Volkswagen and 
Daimler, as well as some of the mineral oil companies included in the alliance, are opposed 
to the widespread use of DME in Europe. It is expected that Chemrec will be able to address 
this weakness, mostly by targeting dedicated fleets with their own fuel infrastructure, but 
that policy would also have a role in supporting the development of a wider infrastructure.  
4. The fourth structural system weakness in Sweden is an incomplete technology and 
actor structure for using BioSNG as a transportation fuel in heavy-duty vehicles.  
The final system weakness concerns the use of BioSNG, where the system builder, until most 
recently, has been limited in his capacity to create alliances for demonstrating the use of 
methane in heavy-duty vehicles with the same high level of engine robustness and energy 
efficiency provided by diesel engines. The role of policy should be geared towards 
supporting such engine development and improving the fuel infrastructure for the use of 
BioSNG in personal vehicles.  
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Chapter VIII                                                                                    
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The recent history of biomass gasification in Finland began in the early-1970s and has been, 
at times, closely intertwined with its development in Sweden, which has created some 
similarities between the two countries. However, the focus of development in Finland has 
primarily been on fluidised bed gasification for combined heat and power generation. 
Interest in alternative fuels did not pick up until 2003.  
Just as with Sweden, the development of biomass gasification can be divided into three main 
episodes. For each episode a specific direction of search was dominant, influencing the 
evolution of the structure. 
The first episode began during the 1973 oil crisis with the first serious experiments with 
biomass gasification since the Second World War. The direction of search at that time was 
influenced by the need to find a substitute for oil. Gasification technology was developed for 
lime kilns in the pulp and paper industry, but experiments were also conducted for electricity 
generation and the first plans for a large-scale pressurised peat gasifier were put in place by 
the chemical company Kemira for ammonia production. However, these plans were not 
realised until the beginning of the second episode.   
The second episode began in 1986, when the direction of search quickly shifted towards 
large-scale production of electricity due to a sudden drop in the price of oil, the Chernobyl 
accident and the emerging climate debate. Interest in pressurised gasification picked up and 
the first entrepreneurial experiments were conducted with ammonia production and with 
electricity production based on the BIGCC technology. Two large experiments were 
performed by Finnish actors on behalf of Swedish customers. Several entrepreneurial 
experiments with less advanced applications for electricity production were also conducted 
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during the episode. However, no real commercial break-through was made, and interest in 
electricity generation based on biomass gasification tapered off during the end of the 1990s. 
A third episode began in 2003, when the direction of search shifted towards large-scale 
production of renewable fuels based on biomass gasification as a result of EU Directive 
2003/30/EC, which created a vision of a substantial market within the EU. Based on previous 
experience, the Finnish actors were in a good position to further develop the technology. In 
parallel with the development of alternative fuels and as a result of increasing electricity 
prices, interest in combined heat and power production based on low value waste streams 
has picked up once again.  
This chapter is divided into six main sections. The three main episodes will be outlined in the 
first three sections. These sections will focus on describing the interactions between actors 
and the characteristics of the emerging technological innovation system (TIS). The focus is on 
how the system builders act to create the emerging structure of the TIS by building the 
structure directly, but also by strengthening the various functions specified in Chapter II. 
Also included in the sections is a description of what the system builders consider to be 
necessary for realising their technology options on a commercial-scale. The fourth section 
provides a summary of the three episodes.  
The fifth section of this chapter provides answers to the research questions (as specified in 
Chapter II). The discussion will start by identifying who have been acting as system builders, 
and describe the nature and extent of their transformative capacities. The focus then shifts 
to analysing and explaining the limits of the system builders’ transformative capacities, 
identifying main system weaknesses, and discussing the potential role of system builders 
and policymakers in addressing these weaknesses. The sixth section of this chapter presents 
the main conclusions. 
8.1 Episode I: 1970―1986. Oil and nuclear crises, and the first experiments 
with biomass and peat gasification 
By the middle of the 20th century, 75 percent of primary energy demand in Finland was met 
by domestic sources such as hydroelectric power, wood fuel and peat (OECD, 1970). At the 
outset, Finland’s dependency on imports of foreign energy sources such as oil and coal was 
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relatively low. This gradually increased over time and coal became the country’s preferred 
fuel.254 Oil was not introduced on a large-scale until the late 1960s, when demand for 
electricity increased rapidly. In the relatively short period between 1960 and 1970, Finland’s 
oil dependency increased from 20 to 50 percent (OECD, 1970). The government’s energy 
policy strategy, presented at the OECD in 1970, predicted that electricity consumption would 
continue to grow rapidly during the 1970s and that future demand would best be met 
through imported oil until 1975, when the first nuclear reactors would come online. 
According to calculations by the state utility Imatran Voima, a total of 10 reactors with a 
capacity of 8,000MW was deemed to be necessary for meeting expected demand by 1990 
(OECD, 1970; Kommonen and Rundt, 1976).255 
The government’s strategy was to increase Finland’s dependence on oil until nuclear power 
came online. In retrospect, this can of course be judged as an unfortunate choice which, 
clearly, had to be revised in the wake of the 1973 and 1978 oil crises. Indeed, a wider set of 
fuels had to be introduced and used on a larger scale. For example, natural gas was 
introduced in 1975 and the use of peat, coal and biomass increased along with the rising 
price of oil and the introduction of investment support (Ericsson et al., 2004). The first two 
Soviet-built nuclear reactors did not come online until 1977 and 1980, respectively, due to 
delays during their construction (Kaikkonen, 2010). The Swedish company ASEA completed 
two additional reactors in 1980. 
The original energy strategy had to be revised again during the latter part of the 1970s. 
During the construction of the first nuclear power plants, opposition against nuclear 
technology increased and the plan to further expand the programme to a total of 10 nuclear 
plants was heavily criticised (Kommonen and Rundt, 1976). In addition, an unforeseen 
slowdown in the world economy during the latter part of the 1970s made it possible to 
postpone further decisions on the planned fifth and sixth nuclear reactors until the mid-
1980s (MTI, 1979, 1983).  
                                                      
254 Finland had suffered from being isolated from sea transportation during winters. Coal, thus, became a 
preferable fuel since it is cheaper to store over long periods of time. Coal has continued to play an important role 
in the Finnish energy mix until the present day. 
255 The calculations were based on the rapid increase in the use of electricity during the 1960s, and expectations 
of even stronger economic growth in the future.  
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However, it is unlikely that these were the only reasons for revising the plans for further 
nuclear expansion. Sweden, for example, had similar plans but moved on and constructed a 
total of 12 reactors (Kaijser, 1992; Kåberger, 2002).  
Finland made a different choice. During the oil crises, it had emphasised the strategic 
importance for the nation to further develop and make competitive their vast domestic peat 
and wood residue resources for energy production (MTI, 1979). Forest residues are 
abundant in supply from the domestic wood processing industry and Finland’s peat 
resources are among the largest in the world (Statistics Finland, 2009).256 
Finland also decided to favour combined heat and power (CHP) production over condense 
power production, and to use the heat load in the district heating systems (DH) for CHP as 
much as possible. To support its development, the government decided to substantially 
increase spending on energy research.257 The priority within the field of energy research was 
made clear from the outset: the funding should be used to improve methods for harvesting 
peat and the collection of forest residues not used in the pulp and paper industry, and 
reduce the overall costs of using domestic resources (MTI, 1979). Such methods were also 
developed and local markets for peat could be created and used in CHP production (Asplund, 
2009).  
The government considered nuclear research too expensive and decided that it should not 
be given a priority in the research and development budget (MTI, 1979). Even though 
Finland’s domestic industry was clearly pro-nuclear, the decision made sense―Finland never 
had a national capital goods industry for nuclear power and has never attempted to develop 
one. On the other hand, Finnish industry could benefit from increased efforts to develop 
domestic resources and the construction of CHP plants.   
The focus of research and development efforts was the national capital goods industry, 
which had developed alongside the dominant pulp and paper industry (Lehtinen et al., 2004; 
                                                      
256 Finland’s peat resources have been estimated to be about 12,800TWh, which can be compared to total energy 
consumption in 2007 of 408TWH  
257 It was about one-fifth that of the other Nordic countries on a per capita basis until the late-1970s (MTI, 1979). 
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Donner-Amnell, 2009).258 Its development had been supported over a long period of time, 
since the capital goods sector was part of a national strategy to increase the competitiveness 
of the pulp and paper industry. The essence of the strategy was to replace imported 
machinery with innovative domestic technology and thereby improve its competitive 
advantage on the world market (Donner-Amnell, 2000).  
New, innovative pulp and paper technologies were developed by the machinery industry and 
pulp and paper companies in joint projects. The domestic pulp and paper industry also 
served as the first customers for the new technologies. Having a domestic customer, in 
combination with research and development support from the government, was seen as key 
for developing the most advanced paper technologies (Anonymous 1, 2009).259  
In addition, co-existence and competition between various national manufacturers within 
the capital goods industry was stimulated by the pulp and paper industry to keep up the 
pace of innovation and generate price competition. During the 1970s and 1980s, the 
strategy eventually resulted in the existence of three dominant manufacturers―Tampella, 
Ahlström and Valmet―as well as various smaller and specialised suppliers. The two 
dominant corporations, Tampella and Ahlström, supplied not only paper machines but also 
energy and boiler technologies for electricity generation suitable for the domestic resource 
base (Anonymous 1, 2009). 
When the oil crisis emerged, these manufacturers initiated the development of alternative 
combustion technologies. Some of these projects were also supported by various 
universities and the research institute VTT, in Finland. The goal of this development was to 
enable the combustion of more difficult, wet and heterogeneous biomass- and peat-based 
fuels, primarily for CHP production. As a result, experiments with variants of the fluidised 
bed combustion technology were initiated (Koornneef et al., 2007).  
                                                      
258 The pulp and paper industry is very energy intensive and dependent on cheap raw materials and electricity. 
They consume about one-third of the electricity produced in Finland. It is also a sector that has come to dominate 
economic life in Finland―about one-quarter of export revenues is generated from the forest industry (even 
though it decreased to less than 20 percent in 2008) and it strongly influences all political arenas (Donner-
Amnell, 2000, 2009; Statistics Finland, 2009; Uljas, 2009). 
259 The common development of the industries appears to be by analogy with the common development of the 
capital goods suppliers, utilities and the Swedish government that Fridlund (1999) writes about. 
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Most of the technology development in this field took place in the Nordic countries, even 
though the Winkler fluidised bed gasification system had been invented in the US in 1922 
and its first industrial installation was led by Foster Wheeler, also in the US, in 1979 
(Koornneef et al., 2007). The pulp and paper industries in the Nordic countries provided a 
demanding home market, due to its insistence on using difficult by-products of the pulp and 
paper process as fuels (wood waste and sludge). However, other low grade fuels such as 
peat were also of particular importance in Finland. Even though the development work on 
fluidised bed technology took place in many countries, the specific demands and the size of 
the home market made the Finnish and Swedish capital goods suppliers among the front 
runners in the field early on (Koornneef et al., 2007; Thunman, 2009).  
These capital goods suppliers were, thus, active in technology development with the 
purpose of reducing oil dependency, through technology substitution or by introducing 
various measures to improve the energy efficiency in the pulp and paper industry (Kivimaa, 
2008). Since fluidised bed combustion and gasification are similar processes, they also 
started experimenting with biomass gasification as a means for replacing the fuel oil in the 
lime kilns with the biomass-derived gas from fluidised bed gasification. 
8.1.1 Early entrepreneurial experiments in biomass and peat gasification  
The research and development work on gasification was dominated by the incumbent 
capital goods industry, in particular Ahlström, and it was spun-off as an interesting 
application based on its development of fluidised bed boilers.  
Ahlström started to develop the technology at Hans Ahlström Laboratory by building a 
2MWth pilot plant, intended for substituting fuel oil in the lime kilns (without any advanced 
gas cleaning). Due to the oil crises and a strong demand from the pulp and paper industry, a 
commercial market existed and gasification thereby found a first commercial application 
(market formation) (Anonymous 2, 2010).  
Ahlströms first commercial installation had a maximum capacity of 35MW fuel power and 
came into operation in 1983 at Wisaforest Oy in Pietarsaari, Finland (Kurkela, 1989). Four 
plants were installed in total. Two of them were installed at mills in Sweden (Norrsundets 
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Bruks and ASSI in Karlsborg) and one at the Portucel mill in Rodao, Portugal (Kurkela, 2002; 
Palonen et al., 2006; Anonymous 2, 2010). 
In 1983, Ahlström also initiated the development of the atmospheric CFB gasification 
technology for CHP generation together with Wärtsilä Oy. The plan was to clean the gas and 
use it in stationary diesel power stations based on Wärtsilä’s Pielstick diesel engine. The 
technology was demonstrated at the scale of 3MWth, at the Ahlström laboratory and it was 
intended for installations in the range of 2.3-28MW of electricity and 2.9-35MW of heat 
(Kurkela, 1989; Anonymous 2, 2010). The project was terminated when Wärtsilä declared 
that it was no longer interested in pursuing it (Asplund, 2009; Anonymous 2, 2010). 
The Technical Research Centre of Finland (VTT) supported the development at Ahsltröm with 
various type of gas analysis, etc., but had a minor role in the technology development at the 
time (Isaksson, 2009; Anonymous 2, 2010). VTT also made conceptual studies on pressurised 
systems. However, since it was believed that future electricity demand would be covered by 
nuclear power, the high development costs associated with the pressurised technology on a 
large-scale were discouraging (Leppämäki et al., 1976; Asplund, 2009).260 
VTT also initiated additional entrepreneurial experiments and started experimenting with a 
simple up-draft gasifier from Volvo, which had been used during the Second World War. 
There were some experienced personnel at VTT that had been working with the technology 
during the 1940s, and they felt that it still had potential to be developed further and made 
several attempts to co-produce heat and electricity using a stationary diesel engine 
(knowledge development, entrepreneurial experimentation). The results, however, were 
mostly disappointing, but they continued developing the technology for a less advanced 
application in 1979−1982 (Asplund, 2009). VTT then established a cooperative partnership 
with the small company Perusyhtymä Oy (which later became known as Bioneer Oy). Instead 
of electricity production, their first commercial application was found in district heating 
                                                      
260 An interest in pressurised gasification came from the chemicals company Kemira, which produced ammonia 
based on oil gasification near the town of Oulu. Plans were made to convert the plant to peat gasification but 
these were not realised until the following episode.  
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systems and in lime kilns (Kurkela, 1989).261 Bioneer supplied the first commercial 
gasification plants to the market since the Second World War and by 1989 had sold ten units 
in Sweden and Finland with a capacity range of 1.5-6MW by (materialisation, market 
formation) (Kurkela, 1989).  
Hence, by the beginning of the first episode a strong industrial structure existed in Finland 
consisting of capital goods suppliers, the institute VTT and the pulp and paper industry. By 
drawing on previous knowledge in fluidised bed combustion and on updraft gasification, the 
actors developed biomass- and peat-based gasification systems as an attractive alternative 
to the use of conventional oil in the lime kilns. The principal actors Ahlström, Bioneer and 
VTT conducted several entrepreneurial experiments, in collaboration and independently, 
which strengthened knowledge development and the actors gained commercial experience 
from the initial market formation. The customers, who were primarily within the pulp and 
paper industry, gained experience with the technology and, thereby, the functions of 
legitimation and direction of search of the TIS were also strengthened. Due to the existing 
market, resources could be mobilised internally by the incumbent firms but also from the 
government, which considered it strategically important to reduce oil dependency and 
increase the use of domestic resources (resource mobilisation).  
The structure was strengthened through the strengthening of these functions. Of particular 
importance was the emerging science and technology infrastructure for developing the 
technology at Ahlstöm and VTT. However, an alignment between the technology, actors and 
institutions was not accomplished. Consequently, when the price of oil rapidly fell in 1986, 
further market formation was effectively terminated and this first episode came to an end.  
8.2 Episode II: 1986−2003. Pressurised gasification, large-scale research 
programmes and the concentration of actors in Finland 
Although some commercial actors identified gasification as an interesting technology during 
the first episode and reducing oil dependency was a prioritised goal of the government, the 
technology in itself was not deemed to be strategically important to the government. Public 
                                                      
261 It has, however, been contested that the technology was useful in lime kiln and that it was only suitable for 
district heating (Anonymous 2, 2010). 
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policy was instead mainly focused on promoting CHP production in the district heating grid 
and increasing the competitiveness and use of domestic energy resources. As the future 
electricity demand was expected to be met by nuclear power, developing the pressurised 
gasification technology was, as above-mentioned, not seen as a realistic option (Kurkela, 
1989; Asplund, 2009).  
The Chernobyl accident in 1986 made the planning of the fifth and sixth nuclear reactors in 
Finland politically impossible to pursue, although the state-owned company Imatran Voima 
and the privately-owned company Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO) attempted to proceed with 
the plans anyway. These were finally stopped in 1992, when parliament adopted a 
resolution stating that nuclear power should no longer be a part of Finland’s future energy 
strategy (direction of search) (MTI, 1993; Stadsrådet, 1993).  
With nuclear out of the picture, it became even more important to develop alternative 
domestic resources and technologies. It was deemed necessary to increase the power-to-
heat ratio in cogeneration, since electricity consumption was increasing and the heat load in 
the district heating and process industry could no longer be expanded (Kurkela, 2002; 
Asplund, 2009). CHP production was based on a combination of peat, coal and some biomass 
and had a rather low electrical efficiency. Hence, there was room for improvement through 
technical progress and the introduction of biomass gasification to the system (Asplund, 
2009).  
At the time, the capital goods industry had reached a stage at which their empirical, trial and 
error approach to product development made it difficult to make further progress without 
having a better understanding of the underlying chemistry of the combustion and 
gasification processes (Hupa, 2008). In supplying power generating equipment, the capital 
goods industry had become an important export industry. Export revenues had increased 
and by 1992 were estimated to be €700-900 million. The Ministry of Trade and Industry 
(MTI) therefore identified the industry as strategically important to develop and wanted to 
improve its competitiveness even further (direction of search). The government set a target 
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to increase exports to €1,800 million, which equalled the predicted total value of energy 
imports in 2000 (MTI, 1993).262 
Consequently, an industrial policy was developed to provide the best possible conditions for 
exporting capital goods and placed an even greater emphasis on the development of 
technologies for energy conservation, the combustion of domestic fuels and the 
development of fuel supply from peat and biomass residues.263 A central part of the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry’s policy was the launch of ten new research programmes (resource 
mobilisation). The first programmes were initiated in 1988 and lasted for approximately five 
years.  
Among the ten programmes, “Liekki” was the most significant for raising the level of 
scientific knowledge on combustion and “Jalo” for understanding the processes for fuel 
conversion (MTI, 1994a, b). It has been argued that with these programmes, a new research 
and development culture of industry-university collaboration emerged in Finland (Hupa, 
2008). As many as 50 parallel projects could be pursued within Liekki, which was the largest 
programme. In each project, engineers from competing companies would work alongside 
scientists from VTT and the main universities. Collaboration between competitors was made 
possible because the programme focused on what they came to call pre-commercial 
research―which could potentially benefit all of the actors.  
In these collaborations, the different actors took on different roles: VTT was primarily 
engaged in research on the various gasification processes and setting up experiments in their 
laboratories, the universities focused on the basic science behind the various processes and 
the capital goods suppliers focused on process development, patenting and commercialising 
the various results generated from the projects. 
The programme was divided into two phases: 1988−1992 and 1993−1998. In these, the level 
of knowledge increased considerably and through this programme alone, the number of 
                                                      
262 The value of the export market was estimated as 4-5 billion Finnish Marks (FIM) and the target was set to 
FIM 10 billion in the actual report published by MTI (1993). The value of a Finnish Mark in 1992 was 
approximately FIM 5.6 to €1. Source: http://www.oanda.com/currency/table, accessed 2010-06-08.  
263 The Finnish government devoted 80 percent of all research and development funding to energy efficiency and 
the development of energy conversion technologies based on domestic resources (MTI, 1993). 
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scientific experts on combustion and gasification went from approximately two individuals 
to more than 60 (resource mobilisation) (MTI, 1994b; Hupa, 1998, 2008).264 
The new research and development programmes also significantly strengthened direction of 
search for pursuing electricity production based on gasification. With this new direction of 
search, the development of pressurised peat and biomass gasification for increasing 
electricity production became highly attractive to the incumbents, and they could continue 
strengthening the structure that already been developed during the first episode.  
The actors engaged in various projects which will now be described. However, the first 
project to be realised in the context of pressurised bed gasification was not for electricity 
production, but for large-scale production of ammonia based on peat. 
8.2.1 Kemira 
One of the main actors that had been particularly interested in the pressurised technology as 
early as the 1980s was the state-owned company Kemira. The company owned an ammonia 
plant in the town of Oulu that it had desired to convert from oil to peat gasification ever 
since the second oil crisis. When Kemira finally decided to realise its plans in 1986, the price 
of oil fell. Although its interest waned somewhat, Kemira decided to pursue the project 
anyway.265 This resulted in the first market formation for the pressurised technology.  
The re-construction of the plant and research and development work involved was 
supported by the Jalo programme and joint research was carried out in collaboration with 
VTT. However, the Finnish actors had not chosen to pursue the pressurised technology 
during the first episode. As a result, there were no Finnish technology suppliers with access 
to the necessary technology and expertise for building the required plant (Koljonen et al., 
1993). Instead, three foreign technology choices were evaluated by VTT and tested with 
Finnish peat. The evaluated options were the HTW process from Germany, the U-GAS 
process from the United States and the MINO process, which had been developed by 
Studsvik in Sweden. Kemira ultimately chose the German HTW process marketed by the 
                                                      
264 Research and development in energy technologies at this point reached the same level as that in the other 
Nordic countries (Ericsson et al., 2004). 
265 The reason may have been that the project received significant support from the Jalo programme (MTI, 
1994a).  
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large engineering firm Uhde. In retrospect, Uhde was probably chosen since it was the most 
experienced actor and the HTW process had been used in many similar coal installations 
before (Rensfelt, 2008). It was also judged to be the least complicated process and 
preliminary testing had demonstrated good results with peat (Asplund, 2009).  
The re-construction of the plant was successful and the first ammonia based on peat 
gasification was produced in 1988. The plant had a thermal capacity of 42t/h (80MWth) of 
peat with a moisture content of 40 percent, which was fed to the gasifier at 10 bars of 
pressure through a lock-hop system. Several test runs and changes were made before the 
production process could be stabilised. The total cost of the project has been estimated to 
approximately FIM 230 million (€38 million). In total, the plant accumulated 258 days of 
operation, but the use of peat was eventually terminated when the price of oil continued to 
drop to a level that made the plant’s operation uneconomical (Koljonen et al., 1993).  
From the perspective of Kemira and the government, which financed the construction and 
research and development work involved, the commercial experiment could be seen as a 
complete failure. However, one could instead think of it as an entrepreneurial experiment 
that significantly strengthened knowledge development and materilisation, and from which 
at least VTT was able to gain valuable experience. The project generated important insights, 
which may have been critical for allowing the Finnish actors to catch up with Studsvik, who 
had already gained experience with biomass-based pressurised systems (see Chapter VII).  
Following the construction of the Oulu plant, the Finnish actors became interested in 
developing the pressurised BIGCC application. In addition to the “No to New Nuclear” 
campaign and the need to increase the power to heat ratio of CHP, the actors’ interests 
were driven by the emerging debate on climate change (direction of search), which had 
reached the wider public through the “Bruntland Report” at the end of the 1980s (WCED, 
1987). In response, in 1990 Finland became the first country in the world to introduce a tax 
on CO2 emissions. A similar CO2 tax was introduced in the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and 
Denmark shortly thereafter (Vehmas, 2005). The introduction of the CO2 tax was in a sense 
an institutional alignment, but the tax was very low and did not provide any real advantage 
to electricity production based on biomass gasification.  
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Hence, no “niche market” (Kemp et al., 1998) was created in which the technology’s poor 
price-performance ratio could be reduced through increased use and innovation. Instead, it 
was thought that further research and development through the Liekki and Jalo programmes 
would bring down the technology’s investment and operating costs. With some additional 
investment support, it was expected that the technology would become competitive with 
conventional alternatives. In the early-1990s, therefore, there were high expectations 
among the actors that the BIGCC technology would be commercially available by the end of 
the decade, without any major changes in the institutional context (Sipilä, 1993). 
New projects were initiated as a response to these expectations. One of the first was 
launched at VTT in 1986, which strengthened the science and technology infrastructure by 
constructing a test facility for pressurised fluidised bed gasification (knowledge development, 
entrepreneurial experimentation and materialisation). The project was supported by 
Ahlström, Tampella, Imatran Voima, and the Swedish state-owned utility Vattenfall (Kurkela, 
1989). Ahlström was very serious about developing the technology and devoted a large 
amount of internal resources to it (resource mobilisation) (Anonymous 1, 2009).  
Ahlström’s main competitor, Tampella, was led by a visionary CEO who invested heavily in 
many new technology areas. Gasification was a priority, but a field in which they had no 
commercial experience. Instead of pursuing internal process development, Tampella decided 
to acquire a license for the U-GAS, pressurised BFB-process from GTI in the United States 
and constructed a 15-18MWth pilot plant in Tampere. Both Ahlström and Tampella were 
looking for potential customers with which they could share the cost of further technology 
development and demonstrate the technology on a large-scale.  
The three largest potential customers were the Finnish and Swedish utilities Imatran Voima, 
Vattenfall and Sydkraft, since these utilities were no longer allowed to pursue nuclear power 
(Äijälä and Huuskonen, 1993; see also Chapter VII). In particular, the Swedish utilities that 
had been able to push through a rapid expansion of nuclear power during the 1970s and 
1980s (constructing 12 reactors) were under enormous pressure to demonstrate that they 
were developing alternatives (direction of search).  
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As a response to this pressure, the state-owned utilities Vattenfall and Sydkraft devoted 
significant internal resources to the effort (resource mobilisation). Vattenfall, for example, 
launched a €100 million programme to develop biomass-based energy resources, in which 
pressurised BIGCC was made a priority in the context of the VEGA project (see Chapter VII). 
The utilities also conducted their own separate preliminary studies on how best to pursue 
thermal conversion of biomass into heat and power. They arrived at the same conclusion: to 
maximise the output of electricity, biomass should be converted using pressurised IGCC 
systems. Of course, the problem was that the technology was not yet commercially available 
and there were very few technology suppliers with whom they could cooperate in 
developing it.  
The most advanced knowledge of pressurised biomass gasification systems resided within 
Swedish and Finnish companies and research institutes. There were also a few US- and 
German-based actors with experience in coal gasification systems that could have been 
considered. In the process of selecting the best possible technology supplier, Vattenfall 
awarded preliminary studies to the Swedish constellation of Götaverken and Studsvik, as 
well as to Tampella (Vattenfall, 1991). In 1990−1991, both of the major Finnish actors 
Tampella and Ahlström were awarded contracts by the two Swedish utilities. Tampella 
received a contract for the VEGA project by Vattenfall and Ahlström for the Värnamo project 
by Sydkraft. These two projects will now be described from the Finnish perspective (cf. the 
Swedish perspective Chapter VII) before moving on to the restructuring of the Finnish capital 
goods industry that took place during the mid-1990s, and the failed attempts to build 
commercial-scale BIGCC demonstration plants in Finland. The second episode is concluded 
by describing two additional gasification projects undertaken by the Finnish actors.  
8.2.2 VEGA and Värnamo 
When Vattenfall came to an agreement with Tampella, a new company called Enviropower 
Inc. was created. All of the rights to the technology, including a pilot plant, were transferred 
to the new company, which was owned at 75 percent by Tampella and 25 percent by 
Vattenfall (Salo, 2008). Enviropower was awarded the contract based on a feasibility study 
for a commercial-sized, 60MWel BIGCC demonstration plant to be located in Eskilstuna, 
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Sweden. Furthermore, a test and verification series was financed by Vattenfall to be 
performed at the pilot plant in Tampere and in the smaller laboratory gasifier at VTT in 
Helsinki (knowledge development and entrepreneurial experimentation) (Vattenfall, 1994). 
From 1991 to 1995, 1,630 tonnes of wood chips, 1,750 tonnes of forest residue, 1,180 
tonnes of paper mill waste (including bark, paper and sludge), 400 tonnes of willow, 20 
tonnes of straw (together with 120 tonnes of coal), and 120 tonnes of alfalfa stem pellets 
were gasified (Kurkela, 2002). Despite extensive testing, knowledge and technology 
development, the feasibility study never resulted in an actual plant being built in Eskilstuna. 
During summer 1992, just two years after the collaboration with Tampella was initiated, the 
feasibility study was terminated and no investment decision was made. However, Vattenfall 
decided to continue with the test and verification programme until it was completed in 
November 1994 (Vattenfall, 1994). When Vattenfall decided to withdraw from Enviropower 
Inc, it went bankrupt (Salo, 2008). 
The Executive Committee at Vattenfall considered the large investment volumes and the 
power balance in the Nordic countries as the primary reasons for not constructing the 
demonstration facility (Vattenfall, 1994). The manager of the VEGA programme, Birgit 
Bodlund (1998), argued that the technical risk would be too great for Vattenfall. In 1995, it 
was estimated that a commercial-sized demonstration plant would had cost about €100 
million, but no funding schemes were available to off-load the risk to Vattenfall (see Chapter 
VII).  
The second project between a Swedish utility and a Finnish capital goods supplier was that 
between Sydkraft and Ahlström, who decided to form a joint venture company called 
Bioflow, to develop and market the BIGCC technology based on Ahlströms previous 
experience (Ståhl, 2008; Jönsson and Tillberg, 2009). Sydkraft’s goals were somewhat 
different from Vattenfall’s; their priority was to demonstrate the technology in a fully 
integrated facility at the lowest possible cost—not to demonstrate the highest possible 
efficiency of the technology on a commercial-scale (Ståhl, 2008; Sydkraft, 1997). 
Approximately 70 percent of the total cost of construction, or €23 million, was financed by 
Sydkraft and the remaining part (€7 million) was funded by the Swedish government 
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(resource mobilisation). Construction began in March 1991 and was completed, after some 
delays, in 1993. However, several problems occurred and the plant could not be brought into 
full operation until 1996 (Sydkraft, 1997, 2000). 
Upon completion of the plant, Ahlström became the first actor with the experience of 
constructing a large-scale pressurised IGCC plant specifically designed for using biomass. 
Having taken part in the development work of both the VEGA and Värnamo projects, VTT 
reinforced its already strong position as perhaps the world’s leading research organisation 
for biomass gasification. 
However, in order to attain the high electrical efficiencies that everyone was hoping for 
(about 40-45 percent in CHP mode), at least one large-scale, fully integrated demonstration 
facility would have to be built.266 In addition, a new type of turbine would have to be 
developed, designed specifically for the low calorific biomass-based producer gas. So far, the 
turbine manufacturers have been reluctant to devote resources to this, as well as to 
participate in research and development projects that may result in such modifications, even 
though it is likely that only relatively small changes will need to be made (Horazak, 2007b; 
Nyström, 2007; Kurkela, 2008; Salo, 2008). However, neither Sydkraft nor Vattenfall were 
interested in realising such a plant. Instead, the Finnish capital goods suppliers could only 
hope that potential customers in Finland would realise their plans. Before continuing with a 
description of those plans and assessing the potential of realising a large-scale 
demonstration of the technology in Finland, it is necessary to review the restructuring of the 
Finnish capital goods industry that took place in the mid-1990s. 
8.2.3 Restructuring of the Finnish capital goods industry and the potential 
for demonstrating BIGCC in Finland 
When the VEGA project was terminated, and just before the construction of the Värnamo 
facility was completed, a major restructuring of the Finnish capital goods industry took place. 
It began when Vattenfall pulled out of Enviropower, forcing the small company with about 
50 personnel to go bankrupt. This resulted in the formation of a spin-off company, Carbona, 
                                                      
266 It has been argued that more than 30 plants would have to be built for the technology to be commercially 
competitive with conventional alternatives without any further support schemes (Claeson Colpier, 2009).  
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consisting of 10-15 of the core individuals with gasification experience. Carbona 
subsequently received a sub-license for the pressurised BFB technology that had been 
piloted in Tampere (Salo, 2008; Isaksson, 2009).  
The mother company, Tampella, was eventually forced into bankruptcy. It was then acquired 
by Kvaerner, which had already acquired the Swedish capital goods suppliers Götaverken, 
Generator, Kamyr and Chemrec (for developing black liquor gasification). Biomass 
gasification was, however, not a priority for Kvaerner, and the remaining gasification experts 
at Enviropower were given other types of positions at the company and the pilot plant in 
Tampere was mothballed (Salo, 2008; Isaksson, 2009).      
In 1995, a second major structural change took place when two divisions at Ahlström were 
sold to the two multinational capital goods suppliers Foster Wheeler and Andritz. With the 
acquisition, the gasification competencies at Ahlström were divided between the two 
companies. The lime kiln related gasification technology became an integral part of Andritz 
and other gasification technologies (pressurised and atmospheric) became part of Foster 
Wheeler (Kurkela, 2008; Palonen, 2008; Salo, 2008). Both divisions were located in the small 
town of Varkaus, in central Finland. 
It was not self-evident that the multinational corporations, particular Kvaerner, Foster 
Wheeler and Andritz would keep the research and development departments in the 
relatively small, remote and sparsely populated Finnish towns of Tampere and Varkaus. In 
addition, it was probably even more unlikely that they would concentrate their research and 
development efforts and sales activities within the relevant areas on these locations. For 
Foster Wheeler the question was whether research and development for CFB boilers should 
be moved to the United States or remain in Finland (Hupa, 2008).  
A the time, Professor Hupa was head of the Liekki research programme and took part in 
presenting the knowledge base within the field to the management at Foster Wheeler. 
According to Hupa (2008), the management team at Foster Wheeler was impressed by the 
elevated level of knowledge and could not find the corresponding expertise in the United 
States. It has therefore been suggested that the ten research and development programmes 
initiated by the Ministry of Trade and Industry strongly contributed to making Finland an 
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attractive location for the multinationals to concentrate their research and development 
activities (Hupa, 2008).  
By the mid-1990s three major capital goods suppliers, Kvaerner, Foster Wheeler and Andritz, 
and one smaller supplier, Carbona, were located in Finland. These firms had the experience 
and capacity necessary to build various types of gasification plants. In addition, VTT was 
perhaps the world’s leading research institute on biomass gasification. Several research 
departments at  Åbo Akademi, Helsinki University of Technology and the University of 
Tampere, had significantly increased their knowledge on the chemical processes of 
combustion and gasification through the various research programmes, pilot and 
commercial projects. 
Hence, in 1996 and after the Värnamo facility was completed, the Finnish structure was 
among the most advanced in the world with regard to pressurised gasification systems. In 
addition, management at Foster Wheeler had a list of customers who were interested in 
such plants. Before the market could be realised, however, it was necessary to construct at 
least one large commercial demonstration for reducing the remaining technical risks of the 
technology (Palonen, 2008).  
It would have made clear sense to build such a commercial demonstration plant in Finland. 
The capital goods industry would benefit from a first market, Finland has large district 
heating systems, and a pulp and paper industry with which the technology could be 
integrated and there was a growing demand for new electricity production that had high 
electrical efficiency and could utilise the existing heat sinks. Some steps towards realising a 
commercial demonstration were also taken.  
The utility Imatran Voima and actors within the pulp and paper industry, such as Enso and 
Metsäliitto, had been awaiting the result from the experiments that were taking place in 
Sweden and had made their own preliminary studies on commercial-sized plants, either 
integrated in a district heating system or in a pulp and paper plant. The Imatran Voima study 
concluded, however, that a commercial demonstration would not be possible without 
significant investment support (Äijälä and Huuskonen, 1993). 
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Tampella (Kvaerner) and Foster Wheeler had two projects with Enso and Metsäliitto 
respectively. The decisions to invest were almost taken at the mills in Summa and Äänekoski. 
The firms had applied for investment supports to construct two 60MWel BIGCC plants. They 
were offered 25 percent of the investment cost as well as some employment support, but 
the customers did not consider this to be sufficient (Asplund, 2009). Instead it was argued 
that 35-40 percent of the investment cost would have been (and still is) necessary to realise 
a first commercial-scale demonstration of this type (Salo, 2008).  
So far, such high levels of investment support have not been available in Finland, and there 
have been no real attempts by the actors to align the institutional framework in such a way 
that would allow for such volumes. It has also been argued that the price of heat in Finland 
and Sweden is relatively high compared to the price of the electricity, which makes it 
unattractive to invest in technology with higher power output ratios. It would, therefore, 
make more sense to develop the technology for warmer countries where the price of 
electricity is higher in relation to heat; such countries, however, usually lack sufficient heat 
sinks.  
Hence, the next step towards developing BIGCC was never taken in Finland (or anywhere 
else in the world). The decision to mothball all further BIGCC projects seriously weakened 
the legitimacy of the technology and put an end of all further market formation activities for 
BIGCC. Consequently, Kvaerner (former Tampella) and Andritz withdrew from the market, 
but continued to participate in research projects (Isaksson, 2009). Carbona tried to continue 
to develop the market, but had a very difficult time finding any new projects to pursue at all 
(Salo, 2008).  
In retrospect, it is not difficult to understand why the capital goods and pulp and paper 
industries hesitated to pursue the technology further. Towards the end of the 1990s, many 
of these actors struggled with financial difficulties, and pursuing a completely new 
technology with high investment costs and high risk of technical failures is not a very 
attractive option in such a situation, particularly given the level of the available investment 
subsidies. Few new investments were made in energy technology at all towards the end of 
the 1990s due to ongoing deregulation of the European energy markets. The deregulations 
294 
 
created uncertainties around future market conditions, dampening investors’ willingness to 
pursue risky new technology development projects.  
Although they did not actively pursue further projects, the capital goods suppliers were able 
to maintain their levels of competence due to the ongoing research programmes on 
combustion and gasification (Isaksson, 2009). In addition, Foster Wheeler and VTT could 
maintain and also develop their competencies in the field by taking on new commercial 
projects. These projects were, however, on applications that were less advanced than BIGCC, 
and were focused on using more difficult fuels. The projects will be described in the 
following section.  
8.2.4 Project pursued by Foster Wheeler and VTT 
In 1998, Foster Wheeler supplied an CFB gasifier to the Kymijärvi Power plant in Lahti 
(entrepreneurial experiment and market formation). The gasifier was of the same type of 
atmospheric lime kiln gasifier developed by Ahlström in the first episode, but in combination 
with simple gas cleaning. The plant connects to an existing coal-fired boiler in which the 
producer gas is fired, replacing approximately 15 percent of coal consumption. The gasifier 
utilises roughly 300GWh annually and has a capacity of 40-70MWth depending on the 
moisture content and heating value of the input fuel. The fuel used is a combination of solid 
biofuels, sorted house-hold waste, and industrial refused-derived fuels from the Lahti area, 
which are all mixed together. Since the new plant could be integrated into the existing 
infrastructure, the cost of the gasification system could be limited to €12 million, for which 
€4 million was granted from the EU Thermie Programme (Kivelä and Takala, 2009). A second 
plant of the same type was later delivered to Electrabel in Belgium for the same purposes, 
although the operator uses pure biomass in the plant in order to qualify for green 
certificates.  
In 2001, yet another entrepreneurial experiment was completed when a first commercial-
sized BFB gasifier was constructed in Varkaus. The 40MWth gasifier utilises plastics and 
aluminium containing rejected materials that are by products of the recycling process for 
used liquid cartons. In the process, aluminium is removed from the gas and recycled, while 
the producer gas is combusted in a steam boiler, replacing fuel oil in the Stora Enso’s power 
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plant in Varkaus (Kurkela, 2002). The main development work was undertaken by VTT and its 
customer Corenso United Ltd. Foster Wheeler constructed the plant, but even though the 
plant continues to be in operation, it believes that the design will probably be the only one 
of its kind since the process is quite complicated (Palonen, 2008). Nevertheless, the TIS was 
strengthened, and the above-mentioned projects particularly strengthened the functions of 
knowledge development, entrepreneurial experimentation and materialisation as well as 
market formation for the less advanced applications. 
After the completion of the two plants, interest in gasification waned and remained quite 
low until the beginning of 2003, although it did not stop completely. Some activities 
continued at VTT, such as experimenting with small-scale electricity production based on 
gasification. VTT and Lahti Energia also sought ways to further explore waste gasification. 
Initial tests were carried out in collaboration with VTT, illustrating that 100 percent pre-
sorted household waste could be used and, with some additional gas cleaning, a stand-alone 
unit could be built with significantly higher electrical efficiency compared to conventional 
waste incineration (Kurkela, 2008; Kivelä and Takala, 2009). 
Lahti Energia wanted to proceed with the new opportunity that had emerged in 
collaboration with VTT. As its existing coal-fired boiler was getting old and it wanted 
additional capacity, Lahti Energia was interested in building a new stand alone 160MWth 
(50MWel) plant, designed for 100 percent gasification of pre-sorted household waste 
combusted in a separate boiler (Kivelä and Takala, 2009).  
Hence, due to the activities undertaken by VTT and Lahti Energia, two possible business 
opportunities for waste gasification opened up for Foster Wheeler. First, it could continue 
developing waste gasification where the gas would be co-fired with coal in existing boilers 
and, second, it could develop the stand alone waste gasification process with considerably 
higher electrical efficiency than conventional waste incineration.  
To realise these potential markets, two prominent issues had to be resolved. The first 
concerned whether co-firing with a gas derived from pre-sorted household waste would turn 
the entire coal plant into a waste incineration plant, which would then have to be operated 
under the EU waste incineration directive. The matter is of great importance, since old coal 
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plants would never be able to be fulfil the waste incineration directive, which would 
effectively eliminate the business opportunity (Kivelä and Takala, 2009).    
The second issue was that a first stand alone commercial-scale demonstration facility would 
have to be built and successfully operated in order to secure the interest of subsequent 
customers. Lathi Energia was interested in being the first customer for such a plant, and was 
able to obtain a 10-20 percent investment subsidy from the EU and the Finnish government 
(Kivelä and Takala, 2009). 
However, a set of delays caused considerable problems for Lahti Energia. The capital goods 
supplier, Foster Wheeler, was at first hesitant to develop the opportunity due to the difficult 
regulatory environment and protests against the stand alone plant (Palonen, 2008). With 
time, they became even less interested and eventually declined the offer to construct the 
plant, even though environmental permits were finally granted (Kivelä and Takala, 2009).  
The main reasons for this can be found in the third and final episode of biomass gasification, 
in which interest in transportation fuels emerges also in Finland. The firms with 
competencies in biomass gasification were once again in short supply and most of the 
research and development resources at Foster Wheeler became tied up in new promising 
projects for converting forest residues into high value transport fuels (Kurkela, 2008; 
Palonen, 2008; Kivelä and Takala, 2009).  
In summary, the second episode commenced with the falling price of oil and the 1986 
Chernobyl accident. The accident provided a new direction of search that was later 
reinforced by the emerging debate on climate change, as well as the recognition of the 
increasing importance of the national capital goods industry’s capacity to produce and 
export power generating equipment. The new direction of search resulted in an institutional 
change in which 10 new research programmes were created, and investment support as well 
as a CO2 tax were introduced to support the development of renewable technologies. 
Attention was, directed towards large-scale electricity production of biomass and peat with 
high electrical efficiency compared to conventional combustion. However, no niche markets 
were created for the technology. Rather, it was expected that further research and 
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development and some investment support would drive down the costs associated with the 
immature technology to the levels of conventional electricity production.  
The research programmes contributed to resource mobilisation and were designed to 
enhance the competencies of Finnish industry and make domestic resources competitive 
compared to fossil fuels and nuclear power. Among the programmes, Jalo and Liekki were 
directly aligned with the field of gasification and enabled the actors to significantly 
strengthen knowledge development, entrepreneurial experimentation and materialisation. It 
is likely that the Jalo and Liekki programmes also contributed to strengthening market 
formation in terms of a first attempt at pressurised gasification in Oulu, Finland.  
With the experience from Oulu and the research programmes, the Finnish actors managed 
to catch up with their US, German and Swedish competitors in the field of pressurised 
gasification. Their position was further advanced when the two most prominent capital 
goods suppliers, Tampella and Ahlström, were selected by the Swedish utilities Vattenfall 
and Sydkraft to proceed with major demonstration projects. This further strengthened the 
functions of resource mobilisation, knowledge development, entrepreneurial 
experimentation, and materialisation, as well as the actor and technology structure in the 
Finnish TIS of biomass gasification. 
The major Finnish capital goods suppliers were acquired by the large multinationals 
Kvaerner, Foster Wheeler and Andritz during the mid-1990s. However, even though 
Kvaerner and Andritz eventually withdrew from the field of gasification, the main research 
and development activities of the multinationals remained and concentrated to Finland. This  
related to the high level of resident knowledge in the country, which had been developed 
through research and development programmes and many market activities in combustion 
as well as in gasification. In addition, by the end of the episode, VTT had probably become 
the most experienced institute in the world with regard to fluidised bed biomass gasification. 
However, although the conditions for realising commercial-scale BIGCC were excellent in 
Finland, this was not achieved mainly because the level of available investment subsides was 
too low. 
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The competencies in biomass gasification at Kvaerner and Andritz were maintained through 
their participation in various research programmes. In addition, Foster Wheeler and  VTT 
pursued a few less advanced applications and a potential market for waste gasification 
emerged as a result. However, after completing two plants by 2001, no new projects were 
pursued and the episode came to an end. Interest in biomass gasification remained low until 
2003, when interest in the production of renewable transportation fuels made biomass 
gasification a technology worth exploring.   
8.3 Episode III: 2003-2009. An emerging interest for second-generation 
transportation fuels from biomass 
Historically, the interest in increasing the share of renewable liquid fuels in the 
transportation sector has been very weak in Finland. Not even during the 1970s and the oil 
crises had any serious attempts been made to produce such fuels from gasification. There 
has been no domestic production of first-generation renewable transportation fuels in 
Finland, and the agriculture industry has not made it a priority to promote them.  
EU Directive 2003/30/EC provided a mandate for increasing the share of biofuels in the 
transportation sector in all EU member states. The directive set targets for each state to 
increase their share of biofuels to 2 percent by 2005 and 5.75 percent by 2010. Moreover, it 
encouraged actions to be undertaken for developing domestic resources for increasing the 
production of biofuels (EC, 2003). 
At the time of the directive’s adoption, the share of biofuels in Finland was 0.10 percent, as 
compared to 0.13 percent in Austria, 1.33 percent in Germany, 1.07 percent in Sweden and 
the EU-25 average of 0.49 percent (Eurostat, 2009). The directive encouraged member 
states to take actions to increase their share of biofuels, and as a result the EU average 
increased from 0.49 to 1.08 percent by 2005. However, only Germany and Sweden managed 
to reach the 2 percent target.  
In Finland, commitments for reaching the targets set within the EU framework are usually 
made, but with no ambition of exceeding them (Hildén, 2008). Government policy has been 
dominated by avoiding all costs that such policy can impose on the incumbent industry. The 
government has argued that Finland is too small to take the lead in climate and 
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environmental protection. Instead, the strategy to curb increasing CO2 emissions has been to 
increase the amount of nuclear power through the construction of a fifth and perhaps sixth 
reactor (MTI, 2005; Hildén, 2008). A national target was eventually set to maintain the 0.10 
percent share of biofuels in transportation fuels. By 2005, that share had decreased to 0 
percent (MTI, 2005; Eurostat, 2009). 
Although the Finnish government provided no response to the EU directive, Finnish industry 
was quick to realise that a huge market for renewable fuels was under development. The 
first actor to react was the Finnish oil refining company, Neste Oil. Neste Oil had a common 
history with Fortum, which had been created through the merger of the state-owned utility 
Imatran Voima and Neste Oil in 1998. Just seven years later, Neste Oil was spun-off as an 
independent company (Kaikkonen, 2008).267  
Neste Oil saw that the directive had created a niche market for innovative renewable 
products in which a smaller refinery corporation with a high technical standards (such as 
itself) could find competitive advantage over larger refineries (Kaikkonen, 2008). From Neste 
Oil’s perspective it made sense to react quickly to the opportunity, and it decided to explore 
two possible routes towards renewable fuels.  
First, Neste Oil developed a process for hydrating vegetable oils and animal fats (NExBTL) to 
produce a diesel fuel that can be blended with ordinary diesel in any quantity. It soon 
realised that even though the process was far more promising than the production of first-
generation fuels from wheat, corns and soya, the feed-stock was in limited supply and could 
not generate any significant volumes in the future (Kaikkonen 2008). In addition, Neste Oil 
came to be heavily criticised for its use of palm oil in the hydration process (legitimation). 
Second, in 2003 Neste Oil did some preliminary work with VTT to explore the possibilities of 
biomass gasification for producing transportation fuel. However, they concluded that it was 
too early for an industry-driven project (Kurkela, 2008). Instead, VTT initiated a three-year 
research and development programme called “Ultra Clean Gas” (UCG) with a total budget of 
€4 million (resource mobilisation) and which commenced in January 2004 (Kurkela, 2008). 
                                                      
267 http://www.nesteoil.com,  accessed 2009-08-11. 
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Helsinki University of Technology also participated in the research activities and TEKES 
provided a total of €846 000 in funding for the project. As a result, an initial industry 
consortium could be created consisting of Foster Wheeler, Neste Oil, Andritz and the utility 
firm Vapo with a strong focus on bio-energy (Kurkela, 2008).268 The project led to the 
construction of a 500kW process development unit (PDU) at VTT, and system studies were 
carried out (knowledge development, entrepreneurial experimentation, materialisation).  
The studies suggested that the technology would be most efficiently integrated in the pulp 
and paper industry. The industry was thus invited to participate in the project and UPM, 
StoraEnso, M-real, Botnia, and the utility PVO joined the industry consortium shortly 
thereafter (Kurkela, 2008). 
The pulp and paper industry had, at the time, strong incentives for joining the ongoing 
development project. Since 2000, the entire industry had been in deep crisis as a result of 
increased energy prices, export tariffs on wood from Russia, increased competition from 
Brazil and other countries with access to a faster growing forest than in the Nordic countries 
and production overcapacity in the European market (Sohlström and Helin, 2008; Donner-
Amnell, 2009; Gädda, 2009; Isaksson, 2009). 
Historically, the industry has met increased competition from southern forests through 
mergers, acquisitions and moving towards higher value paper products (Donner-Amnell, 
2000, 2009). Today, however, it is very difficult to identify higher value paper products. 
Besides, during the end of the 1990, when the electricity market was undergoing 
deregulation, some of the pulp and paper firms had sold their power production capacity 
located at the mills to the power utilities.269 While the firms who kept their own capacity for 
electricity production were in a better position than those who did not, they were still 
desperately trying to find higher value use for the residues from the papermaking process. 
                                                      
268http://akseli.tekes.fi/opencms/opencms/OhjelmaPortaali/ohjelmat/ClimBus/en/system/projekti.html?id=88103
32&nav=Project, accessed 2010-08-04. 
269The idea behind the strategy was that they should focus on their “core business” (pulp and paper production) 
and not on power generation. It was expected that in a deregulated market, the prices would go down and not up.  
A few years later, when electricity prices had significantly increased, they had arrived at a situation in which 
they had to cover their electricity demand by acquiring everything on the market and selling their forest residues 
to the utilities at what they considered a very low price (Englund, 2008). 
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The production of high value renewable transportation fuels and other chemicals fits 
relatively well into the business model of the pulp and paper industry. It is a large-scale, 
process-oriented, business-to-business activity and could improve the conditions for making 
paper in northern countries (Donner-Amnell, 2009; Gädda, 2009). However, the industry is 
also very conservative and in the absence of crisis, it is unlikely that they would have become 
involved in the production of transportation fuels and chemicals (Donner-Amnell, 2009; 
Gädda, 2009).  
The UltraClean Gas project was, therefore, not only critical for strengthening various 
functions of the TIS in Finland. Perhaps more importantly, it became an important node in 
the network that enabled the formation of two major Finnish industrial alliances with the 
goal of realising the production of renewable transportation fuels and other high value 
chemicals on a large-scale. 
To start with, Stora Enso and Neste Oil teamed up and created the joint venture company 
NSE Biofuels Oy in 2006. The joint venture has since then contracted Foster Wheeler to take 
part in the technology development and to construct a larger demonstration facility. VTT has 
also been contracted as a preferred partner for testing and research (Jokela, 2008; 
Kaikkonen, 2008; Palonen, 2008). 
The demonstration plant was designed as an atmospheric 12MWth lime kiln gasifier located 
at Stora Enso’s pulp and paper mill in Varkaus. During the demonstration phase, the gasifier 
will be operated with oxygen and steam as a gasification agent at atmospheric pressure. The 
gas flow will be divided into two streams. In one of these, 5MW of the gas will be cleaned 
and part of that to “ultra-clean” gas levels. The clean gas will then be tested for FT-
production, diverted back and consumed in the lime kiln. It has been argued that the actual 
wax or liquid production at the scale of 5MW is not necessary—as such it will not be a part 
of the project. However, based on the slip streams, various FT catalysts will be tested 
(Jokela, 2008; Kaikkonen, 2008; Palonen, 2008).  
The size of the demonstration facility and the gasifier corresponds to the gas requirements 
of the lime kiln at the mill. Hence, the demonstration carries most of its own operating costs. 
In addition, the investment makes sense beyond the demonstration alone, since if the 
302 
 
oxygen and additional cleaning systems are removed, the gasifier can be operated as a 
normal lime kiln gasifier (Jokela, 2008). 
The total budget was set at approximately €40 million during the demonstration phase, 
including investments as well as research and development work. Out of the total sum, the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy (formerly MTI) supports the investment with €7 
million and TEKES supports the project by funding 50 percent of the research and 
development activities. The remaining sum is covered by Neste Oil and Stora Enso on equal 
terms (Jokela 2008; Kaikkonen 2008). The demonstration facility was inaugurated in June 
2009 (Stora Enso, 2009). 
The second alliance to emerge in Finland as a result of the Ultra Clean Gas project at VTT 
consists of UPM and Andritz. However, in this case no joint venture company has been 
created and UPM remains the principal actor in the project. The role of Andritz is that of a 
partner in technology development and it will profit from the construction of such plants in 
the future (Anonymous 1, 2009).  
The gasification competencies at Andritz originate from the acquisition of Ahlstrom’s division 
for pulp and paper machinery in Varkaus, which had constructed the atmospheric lime kiln 
gasifiers during the first episode.270 However, in order to realise BtL production within the 
context of the cooperation agreement, the gasification competencies at Andritz would have 
to be significantly strengthened. 
For that purpose, Andritz approached Carbona, the company created when Tampella and 
Enviropower went bankrupt in the mid-1990s. Carbona had since the 1990s been working on 
various gasification projects. Most importantly, they had realised a project in the town of 
Skive, Denmark, where they had constructed a 12MWth BFB gasification plant, connected 
with gas engines for combined heat and electricity production. In addition, Carbona was 
perceived as attractive since it has a longstanding and, for Andritz, important collaboration 
                                                      
270 In 2003, Andritz decided to market their atmospheric lime kiln gasifiers when the price of oil began to 
increase. Consequently, it received a few major proposals for the project. Due to the financial crisis in 2008, 
however, none of them have been realised (Anonymous 1, 2009). 
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with the Gas Technology Institute (GTI) in Chicago,271 with whom it developed the BFB 
technology piloted in Tampere by Enviropower in the previous episode.  
For Carbona such a collaboration was also attractive, as it was a rather small actor that had 
difficulties taking on large-scale projects and securing financial guarantees (Salo, 2008). 
Therefore, Carbona eventually came to an agreement with Andritz (Salo 2008). 
The first steps towards realising the plans for BtL production were taken in 2005 by 
rebuilding the pressurised IGCC pilot plant in Chicago for BTL purposes. The plant is a 5MWth, 
oxygen-blown, pressurised BFB pilot plant. GTI has also been contracted for further testing 
and research on the pilot. By combining the experience from the pilot plant with Carbona’s 
experience from Skive, the alliance has expressed that they will scale up the technology 
directly to a commercial-sized demonstration plant in the range of 3*150MWth at a UPM mill 
site, beginning no earlier than 2011 (Salo, 2008; Sohlström and Helin, 2008).272  
Production of FT liquids or waxes, as well as the testing of different FT catalysts, has not 
been announced as part of the pilot and the development project. Rather, the FT process is 
viewed as an off-the-shelf technology that can be contracted once the commercial plants are 
built (Sohlström and Helin, 2008). 
UPM is the project owner and is responsible for funding all of the development work in 
Chicago. In total, it has invested €10 million in the pilot phase. UPM has also invested €50 
million developing a new type of dryer that can handle the volume of biomass residues 
required for a commercial-scale plant. For a full-scale plant of 200,000 tonnes liquid 
production, UPM has estimated the cost to be €300-400 million. According to Hans 
Sohlström (2008), Director of New Businesses and Biofuels, UPM will be prepared to take the 
lead in such a large investment even if it will be looking for partners.  
The third Finnish technology supplier to become seriously interested in biomass and waste 
gasification during the third episode is Metso Power. Metso was created through a merger 
                                                      
271 For UPM and Andritz, collaborating with VTT on technology development was viewed as out of the 
question. It was argued that VTT is the best institute for biomass gasification in the world, but for realising BtL 
production, it was seen as too closely affiliated with the competing team (Salo, 2008). 
272 The 12MW Skive plant is operated at 2 bars of pressure, and its cleaning equipment is the same size as that 
for a commercial-sized (150MW) BtL plant operating at 15 bars of pressure. 
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of Rauma and Valmet in 1999. Valmet had, in 1992, acquired Tampella Paper Machinery 
while Tampella Power had been sold to the Norwegian company Kvaerner. Kvaerner had 
also acquired the Swedish boiler manufacturer Götaverken, in 1991. In January 2007, Metso 
acquired Kvaerner’s pulping and power businesses. As a result, Metso attained access to the 
previous experience and the reference plants of both Götaverken and Tampella Power 
(Isaksson, 2009).273 
However, the main interest for Metso has not been in developing gasification for the 
production of renewable transportation fuels or other chemicals. Instead, it picked up the 
Lahti waste gasification project when Foster Wheeler declared that it was no longer 
interested (Isaksson, 2009). When the necessary environmental permits had finally been 
granted, Metso Power was asked to take over the project. 
Metso was interested in the technology because it was identified as an application that was 
closer to reaching the market than renewable fuels. It was also argued that it is possible to 
create a market for the technology that does not depend on future state subsidies and 
investment support once it is demonstrated on a commercial-scale (Isaksson, 2009). Since 
then, Metso has mobilised significant resources to develop the business opportunity. It 
initiated a test campaign with gas cleaning equipment, both at the lime kiln gasifier at the 
Värö paper mill in Sweden (which was built by Götaverken during the early 1980s) and at the 
waste gasifier in Lahti. VTT has also been involved in testing and research on the technology 
(Isaksson, 2009).  
In November 2009, Lahti Energia took an investment decision to start constructing the plant. 
The construction project will receive €7 million in financial aid from the EU and €14 million 
from the Finnish government. The total project has been valued at €157 million (Lahti 
Energia, 2009). Meanwhile, in planning for Lathi II, Mälardalen Energi of Sweden has sought 
proposals for a similar but larger plant. It aims to construct a 200MW plant through a project 
valued at approximately €220 million (Isaksson, 2009).  
                                                      
273 At the time, Carbona was also in discussions with Metso Power in parallel with Andritz. In a way, 
collaboration between them would have been more natural due to their common origins. 
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More recently, Metso has expanded its interest in producing renewable transportation fuels, 
and participating in the Gobigas project in Sweden and collaborating with Chalmers 
University of Technology on the development of indirect gasification (see Chapter VII).   
8.4 Summary of Episodes I-III: The evolution of fluidised bed gasification in 
Finland 
The first episode was dominated by the oil crisis, which encouraged the manufacturers of 
capital goods for the pulp and paper industry and VTT to start experimenting with 
atmospheric gasification for oil substitution in the lime kilns, district heating and relatively 
small-scale electricity production with gas engines. The technology co-evolved with the 
development of fluidised bed combustion, an area which Finnish actors became very strong.  
For gasification, a commercial application was found in lime kilns for which the need for gas 
cleaning was modest. Electricity generation, on the other hand, requires more advanced gas 
cleaning which limited the diffusion to a few pilot installations. Conceptual studies on 
pressurised systems were undertaken, but the technology was seen as too complicated and 
expensive to pursue, especially since the future of electricity generation was expected to 
come from nuclear power.  
It was not until the beginning of the second episode that interest in pressurised gasification 
took off. Due to the Chernobyl accident and increased awareness of climate change, the 
direction of search changed in favour of large-scale electricity production. However, the first 
project to be realised was for ammonia production. Since no Finnish actor had experience 
with pressurised gasification from the previous episode, the German capital goods supplier 
Uhde was contracted and the ammonia plant owned by Kemira was rebuilt for peat 
gasification. VTT took part in the development process and was able to learn from the 
experience, even though peat gasification was terminated after just 258 days of operation. 
The Finnish capital goods suppliers Ahlström and Tampella identified BIGCC as an important 
technology to pursue and started developing it in collaboration with VTT. They also started 
looking for customers, but the utility Imatran Voima and the pulp and paper industry were 
reluctant to participate. Instead, the first contracts were signed with the Swedish actors 
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Vattenfall and Sydkraft, who were being pressured by the Swedish government to develop 
alternatives to nuclear power.  
Through mainly these three projects, VTT and the capital goods suppliers were able to “catch 
up” with the Swedish actors who had already experimented with pressurised systems during 
the first episode. The development was supported by the Ministry of Industry and Trade that 
launched ten large-scale projects with the purpose of increasing the level of knowledge in 
industry with regards to combustion, gasification and fuel conversion, and to develop 
domestic energy resources. Through these projects, collaboration between the capital goods 
suppliers, VTT and the universities was further strengthened. In these collaborations, VTT 
primarily took on the role of research on process development and setting up large-scale 
laboratory experiments; the universities focused on the basic science behind the various 
processes; and the capital goods suppliers focused on patenting and commercialising the 
various results generated from the projects.  
Through the research programmes, in combination with laboratory experiments and large-
scale semi-commercial projects such as Oulu, Värnamo and VEGA, the actors considerably 
strengthened resource mobilisation, knowledge development, entrepreneurial 
experimentation, materialisation, legitimation, direction of search and, to some degree, 
market formation for less advanced applications. By strengthening the above-mentioned 
functions, the actors also strengthened the structure of the TIS. The number of experts on 
thermal conversion of biomass increased from about two individuals to over 60 through one 
of the major programmes alone (Liekki). Hence, the level of knowledge of the existing actors 
increased considerably—not just in gasification but in several complementary fields. In 
addition, an advanced science and technology infrastructure was developed, which was of 
great importance to the future survival of the capital goods industry in Finland.  
Hence, by the mid-1990s, when a major restructuring of the Finnish capital goods industry 
took place, the technology and actor structure of the TIS for both combustion and 
gasification was very strong in Finland. As a result, instead of moving important research and 
development activities to other countries, multinational capital goods firms―such as Metso 
Power, Andritz and Foster Wheeler―have since concentrated their activities in Finland.   
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Even though MTI was successful with the research and development programmes, it was 
unsuccessful in creating the conditions for realising the first commercial-scale demonstration 
plant in Finland. The basic idea had been that research and development, in combination 
with investment subsidies in the range of 20 percent, would be sufficient for making the 
technology commercially interesting. This was, however, insufficient.  
There were no attempts to achieve a stronger institutional alignment in order to create a 
niche market for the technology. Consequently, interest in BIGCC tailed off and no 
commercial-scale demonstration projects were realised, even though the preconditions in 
Finland were probably better than anywhere else in the world. Foster Wheeler and VTT did, 
however, continue developing waste and biomass gasification in combination with boiler 
technology for combined heat and power generation, and the level of knowledge in the field 
was maintained through the various research programmes. 
Interest in biomass gasification once again picked up in 2003, when the direction of search 
shifted towards the production of renewable transportation fuels due to EU Directive 
2003/30/EC. Prior to 2003, interest in biofuel had been very low and the government had 
developed a late adopter approach to all new environmental and climate regulations 
imposed by the EU. However, the main refinery company in Finland, Neste Oil, identified 
gasification as an interesting technology option for developing the large-scale production of 
renewable fuels. Together with the capital goods suppliers and VTT, a research project was 
initiated to explore the possibilities with the technology. They soon came to the conclusion 
that the technology would be best integrated into the pulp and paper industry, which was 
also invited to participate in the project.   
The pulp and paper industry, which had been in a deep crisis since the turn of the century, 
was in dire need of finding new high value products and markets into which they could 
expand. The production of renewable fuels from low value residues from the papermaking 
process appeared to provide such an opportunity. Based on the existing industry structure, 
two competing teams were established to further explore biomass gasification for FT diesel 
production in Finland.  
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In addition, Metso Power has continued working on waste gasification and is in the process 
of constructing the first commercial-scale standalone plant in the town of Lahti. More 
recently, it has also started taking steps towards BioSNG production through collaborative 
projects with Chalmers, Göteborg and Repotec (see Chapter VII). 
8.5 The system builders’ transformative capacity, system weaknesses and 
the potential role of policy 
In this section, the four research questions specified in Chapter II will be revisited. Answers 
to each question will be provided for the case of Finland by analysing the previously outlined 
history of fluidised bed gasification. The research questions were formulated as: 
1) Who act as system builders in the different national contexts? 
2) What characterises the nature and extent of the system builders’ transformative 
capacity? 
a) How do the system builders make use of the general structure in which they are 
embedded to form or strengthen the structure and the various functions of the 
TIS? 
b) To which extent do the system builders manage to strengthen the structure and 
functions of the TIS?   
3) What are the limits to the system builders’ transformative capacity and how can 
these be explained? 
4) Given these limits, which system weaknesses remain to be resolved by system builders 
and policymakers on different levels (national and EU)? 
 
This section is divided into two main parts. Research Questions I and II will be analysed in the 
first part, which will start by identifying the system builder and discuss the nature and extent 
of the system builders’ transformative capacity. In the second, the focus shifts to explaining 
the limits of the system builders’ transformative capacity and the potential role of system 
builders and policymakers in resolving these. 
8.5.1 The nature and extent of the system builders’ transformative capacity 
At the outset of this chapter, no specific individual system builder was identified. It has not 
been possible to distinguish specific actors, or a smaller group of actors, as system builders 
throughout the episodes. Instead, it has been a network of actors consisting of VTT, the 
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universities, and the capital goods manufacturers and their customers in the pulp and paper 
industry that—with the support of the Ministry of Trade and Industry—has collectively 
strengthened the TIS of biomass gasification. This network of actors has developed various 
types of capital goods throughout its common history in order to increase the 
competitiveness of the pulp and paper industry, and to reduce their dependency on energy 
imports. More recently, two distinct alliances have been formed for realising the production 
of second-generation fuels based on biomass gasification.  
For the various actors within the network, extending the design space of fluidised bed 
combustion to include fluidised bed gasification has not represented a significant break with 
established values or practices. Instead, the TIS of fluidised bed biomass gasification has 
been largely embedded in the TIS of fluidised bed combustion in Finland, and the need for a 
specific actor to take on the role of the system builder has, therefore, been limited. This also 
means that internal resources of the TIS were available for experimenting with gasification. 
The Finnish actors, therefore, have had to rely on the general structure beyond this network 
to a much lesser extent than the system builders in the other countries.   
Since 1973, the field of biomass gasification has progressed tremendously. Rather than 
attributing this progress to the achievements of a single system builder or an alliance, it has 
been made possible by contributions from various actors in the network. I will now briefly 
comment on the contributions made by VTT, the universities, the capital goods industry and 
their customers, as well as the Ministry of Industry and Technology in developing the field. 
VTT has, since the beginning of the 1970s, been learning from and contributing to almost all 
major gasification projects in Finland, as well as two major projects in Sweden. Even if some 
of the large-scale experiments may be judged as failed attempts to commercialise the 
technology, VTT has been able to learn important lessons from these failures. 
Through VTT’s experiments and by focusing its research on process development, VTT has 
been able to construct a world-class science and technology infrastructure for experimenting 
with biomass gasification for a wide range of applications. In addition, with the continuous 
interest in the CHP application and support from the government through a mixture of 
research and development grants, the level of knowledge has been maintained and 
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developed even when interest in the technology has been relatively low in industry. Hence, 
when interest in the technology picked up again in 2003, VTT was able to respond quickly by 
setting up a research project with relevant actors and illustrate how and where the 
technology could best be configured and integrated, given the existing industry structure in 
Finland. It may, therefore, be argued that VTT contributes to system dynamics by acting as 
an important “node” and “system memory” in the Finnish network, attracting actors and 
facilitating the formation of the two more recent alliances. VTT, thus, strengthen the 
technology, network and actor structure in the TIS, in addition to the functions of knowledge 
development, entrepreneurial experimentation and materialisation, as well as direction of 
search and legitimisation. 
The contributions to system dynamics of the academic sector, in relation to VTT, have been 
equally important. One could argue that the strong position of VTT cannibalises the 
academic sector, making it more difficult for universities to compete for research grants and 
industry contracts, at least in the field of biomass gasification. Such a scenario has played out 
in the case of some of the weaker research groups (Fogelholm, 2008), but it has also been 
argued that strong competition with VTT has forced universities to focus more on the basic 
science of the field and not on process development or other areas where VTT is relatively 
strong (Hupa, 2008). Through collaboration with industry and VTT, some of the stronger 
academic departments have been able to excel and benefit from the collaborations, 
becoming even stronger in basic science and strengthening, mostly, the function of resource 
mobilisation, knowledge development and diffusion. Furthermore, it has been argued that 
the collaboration and division of labour between the actors has resulted in an arrangement 
where the researchers could focus on research, while the industry partners could focus on 
commercialising the results (Hupa, 2008).  
The contributions to system dynamics of the capital goods industry has taken the form of an 
active participant in collaboration with their customers for testing and implementing new 
products and processes. Through their active participation in the research programmes 
Liekkie and Jalo, their “absorptive capacity” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) was strengthened. 
This enabled them to appropriate on the knowledge development in terms of identifying 
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potential patents, business opportunities and new product areas. The capital goods industry 
and their customers have strengthened resource mobilisation, knowledge development, 
entrepreneurial experimentation, materialisation, and market formation for less advanced 
applications of the TIS.  In addition, they are most likely a dominant force in setting the 
agenda in terms of direction of search and legitimation of the technology, feed-stocks, and 
applications to experiment with. Hence, Finnish industry has not moved beyond the design 
space of the fluidised bed technology and experimented with, for example, entrained-flow 
and black liquor gasification.  
Finally, the Ministry of Trade and Industry has played a key role in designing a long-term 
industrial policy that has considerably strengthened the existing actor network. Finland 
decided early not to devote any significant resources to nuclear power research and instead 
focus on developing domestic peat and biomass resources for energy purposes, based on 
the development of new technologies and methods. The core of this strategy was the launch 
of 10 research programmes during the mid-1980s. Through the various programmes the 
function of resource mobilisation was considerably strengthened and the level of knowledge 
increased considerably (knowledge development and diffusion). As a result, Finland became 
an attractive location for multinational corporations to focus their research and 
development activities.  
The collective transformative capacity of the network of actors has been able to strengthen 
all of the functions of the TIS, except for market formation for the more advanced 
applications of BIGCC and renewable transportation fuels and other chemicals. It has also 
strengthened the structure of the TIS, as experience has accumulated from one episode to 
another and the actors have been able to build larger and larger plants, use more difficult 
feed-stocks, and test more advanced applications. The network has, thus, strengthened the 
technology structure with various pilot plants, demonstration plants and commercial-scale 
plants, as well as with the creation of an advanced science and technology infrastructure for 
enabling further experiments and knowledge development. The organisational structure has 
also been strengthened with new gasification specialist firms such as Carbona, but most 
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importantly by strengthening the position of the incumbent capital goods industry, VTT and 
universities in the field.  
The limits of their transformative capacity as the well as the potential system weaknesses 
will now be identified and discussed, as will the potential role of policy in addressing these 
weaknesses. 
8.5.2 Limits of the system builders’ transformative capacity, system 
weaknesses and the potential role of policy 
Athough the Finnish network of actors has created a strong structure and strengthened all of 
the functions of the TIS, there are still limits to what it has been able to accomplish. By 
explaining these limits, it is possible to identify a set of system weaknesses that must be 
addressed by policymakers and system builders for realising biomass gasification for more 
advanced applications, such as the production of second-generation fuels. 
To begin with, it was not until 2003 that the direction of search shifted towards the 
development of renewable transportation fuels in Finland. Prior to that, the actors in the TIS 
paid very little attention to developing gasification for fuel and chemical synthesis, even 
during the first episode.  
For succeeding in the production of second-generation fuels, it is necessary to extend the 
design space beyond the TIS of combustion, and the existing synthesis process will have to 
be more or less modified (when using fludised bed gasification, see Chapter III). However, 
although the Finnish actors have extensive experience with gasification, they have very little 
experience making an ultra-clean gas suitable for various synthesis processes. The exception 
was the Oulu ammonia plant during the end of the 1980s. VTT participated in the 
development work, but it was the German engineering firm Uhde that supplied the 
gasification and enabled the integration with synthesis technology.  
As mentioned above, the Finnish actors have not extended the design space of biomass 
gasification beyond that of combustion to also include chemical synthesis. Even if there are 
plenty of potential suppliers of various types of catalysts, they are currently not taking part 
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in the technology development undertaken by the two main alliances.274 The Finnish actors 
rather see the synthesis technology as “off-the-shelf” technology that can be acquired once 
the large-scale plants are built.   
There may, of course, be a range of opinions with regard to the extent of adaptation 
necessary and whether the synthesis technology is an “off-the-shelf” technology when 
applied to biomass gasification. However, what makes it particularly problematic is that the 
two alliances focus on FT diesel production. 
The production of FT-liquids is a far more advanced and less well-known synthesis 
technology than methanol or DME. In total, there are only four operating plants in the world 
and two proprietary owners of the technology with commercial experience, Shell and Sasol 
(GASIF, 2007). Sasol operates three of the plants based on coal gasification and Shell has one 
plant in operation in Malaysia based on natural gas. Hence, FT synthesis has never been used 
on a commercial-scale in combination with low temperature gasification or biomass. More 
recently, Shell has attempted to combine the synthesis process with high temperature 
gasification of biomass in Germany (Choren), but withdrew from the project (see Chapter 
VI).  
It may, therefore, be very difficult for the Finnish actors to extend their alliances to include 
Shell or Sasol. Those companies appear to have little interest in biomass gasification but are 
engaged in several projects based on coal gasification and reforming natural gas, for which 
the technology has already been demonstrated. Hence,  
The first system weakness is the lack of technology structure due to a lack of actors from 
complementary knowledge fields taking part in catalyst development and in the adaption of 
the downstream synthesis processes.  
An option, of course, is to collaborate with a new supplier of catalysts for FT diesel. Since the 
new actors have no reference plants, the Finnish alliances cannot, however, argue that it is 
an off-the-shelf technology. Before deciding to construct the first commercial-scale plant, 
                                                      
274 Not officially at least. 
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the technology needs to be successfully demonstrated, at least on the scale of the current 
demonstration plants.  
The risk involved for the commercial actors is that the first demonstration phase will take 
considerably longer and be considerably more expensive than anticipated. The system 
builders can address this system weakness by switching to a synthesis process with which 
there is more experience. The role of policy would be to provide “patient capital”, i.e. 
financing research and development at the demonstration facilities on different and suitable 
catalyst processes in collaboration with potential suppliers, thereby extending the alliances 
to also include catalyst developers.   
There is also a second system weakness. The actors have been successful in developing 
different technical solutions for various applications for biomass gasification, including on a 
commercial-scale. However, innovative but immature technologies such as BIGCC for 
electricity production have not been supported beyond investment subsidies in the range of 
10-20 percent and have not, therefore, had the chance to become competitive with 
conventional alternatives. Throughout the history of biomass gasification, the network of 
actors has not attempted to align the institutional framework, creating niche markets for 
immature technology and thereby support their development.  
It was previously argued that the pulp and paper industry dominates political life in Finland 
(Donner-Amnell, 2000). Just as in the case of Sweden, the pulp and paper industry has a 
limited interest in promoting new technologies that would increase the price of their main 
feed-stocks, biomass and electricity. Any special provisions for emerging biomass-based 
technologies that would increase the price of biomass and electricity would, therefore, not 
be expected to be supported by the industry (and, for that matter, have not been 
suggested). For instance, even if a CO2 tax was introduced and gradually increased, a number 
of exceptions to the law were implemented to avoid imposing additional costs on the 
industry (Vehmas et al., 1999; Vehmas, 2005). The network of actors, therefore, appears to 
be limited in its capacity to strengthen market formation through aligning the institutional 
framework to create niche markets for emerging technologies. Hence,   
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The second system weakness is the lack of an institutional framework that recognises the 
need for creating specific market preconditions in support of emerging technologies. 
The government has chosen not to take the lead in environmental protection or abating 
climate change in ways that could lead to higher costs for the dominant pulp and paper 
industry (MTI, 2005; Hildén, 2008). Finland has chosen to support the use of peat and 
biomass for oil substitution with the intention of increasing the competitiveness of both the 
capital goods industry and pulp and paper industry. As a result, the use of biomass for 
electricity production in Finland is the highest in Europe (Eurostat, 2009).275 However, other 
forms of renewable energy have not been identified as strategically important and have 
received little support. As a result, wind and solar power have experienced relatively slow 
growth and has a low share of the total electricity production in comparison with the EU 
average.276  
More recently, however, the government has increased its ambitions to actually reach the 
prescribed EU targets and form markets. For example, the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy (formerly MTI) has suggested that Finland should adopt a feed-in law to promote 
wind power. The new goal has been set to increase production from 0.2TWh to 6TWh and 
thereby cover 24 percent of Finland’s obligations by the year 2020 (MEE, 2009). With regard 
to renewable transportation fuels, the Ministry has indicated an increased level of ambition. 
In June 2009, during the inauguration of the Varkaus demonstration plant, the Minister of 
Employment and Economics, Mauri Pekkarinen, announced that Finland would exceed EU 
biofuel Directive 2009/28/EC, proposing a target of 10 percent by as early as 2015 and 15-20 
percent by 2020 (Saarinen, 2009). The new targets and additional incentive structures to 
reach these targets have not yet been adopted in parliament. 
In combination with the new targets, the Ministry has estimated that the government needs 
to support the proposed projects with investment subsidies in the range of €100 million per 
                                                      
275 In 2008, 13 percent of the gross electricity produced in Finland was generated in biomass-fired power 
stations. That is the highest figure in the entire EU, which averaged 3.2 percent (Eurostat, 2009).  
276 In 2008, 0.34 percent of the gross electricity production in Finland came from wind power, compared with the 
EU average of 3.52 percent (Eurostat, 2009). Finland produced 2.48 percent of all gross electricity among the 
EU15, but their share of the total production of electricity from solar and wind was 0.21 and 0.24 percent, 
respectively. In absolute numbers Finland produced 170GWh of wind and 3GWh of solar during that same year 
(Eurostat, 2009). 
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full-scale plant (approximately 25 percent of the total investment cost) or about €200 million 
in total by 2010–2011.277 It remains to be seen if these incentives will be sufficient to induce 
investments.  
8.6 Conclusions 
Broadly, the same network of actors―responsible for developing and using advanced and 
innovative paper machines, as well as fluidised bed combustion technology―has taken on 
the system building role with regard to fluidised bed gasification. In three main episodes, 
since 1973, this network of actors has conducted various experiments with different type of 
feed-stocks and for a wide range of more and less advanced applications. 
In the first episode, the oil crisis provided incentives for the actors to start experimenting 
with technologies for oil substitution in the pulp and paper industry. Gasification of biomass 
for the lime kilns was developed and found a commercial application as long as the price of 
oil was high. During the second episode, there was a demand for increasing electrical 
efficiency by a better utilisation of the existing heat sinks since nuclear power became 
politically impossible to pursue. Based on experience from the previous episode, the capital 
goods industry was able to respond by developing pressurised solutions for biomass 
gasification, as well as less advanced gasification technologies for electricity production. In 
the third episode, the interest shifted towards the production of renewable fuels from 
gasification and almost the same network of actors was able to mobilise the necessary 
resources to set up two competing alliances for commercialising an opportunity based on 
previous experiences. 
In Finland, it is not a particular system builder or formal alliance that the creation of the TIS 
can be attributed to, but rather an established network of actors that has experimented with 
the design space of fluidised combustion to also include that of biomass gasification. Instead 
of emphasising the particular role of a single system builder, different contributions to 
system dynamics and interplay between the various actors in the network were highlighted. 
                                                      
277 This is not to say that each project will be supported by funding or with how much. Currently, no decisions 
have yet been made (Saarinen, 2009). 
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VTT has an important role as the node and “collective memory” of the system. Since the first 
episode, it has been involved in nearly all major gasification projects in Finland, as well as in 
two major ones involving BIGCC in Sweden (see Chapter VII). VTT has been able to learn 
from all of the projects and draw important lessons for following projects. Over time, it has 
constructed a world leading science and technology infrastructure for fluidised bed 
gasification.  
The universities appear to have been able to advance their position in basic science, since 
VTT has been focused on research on process development. Since the mid-1980s, industry 
has participated in major joint research programmes with VTT and the universities. These 
collaborations have created a division of labour where the researchers could focus on 
research and industry could focus on process development and finding commercial 
applications of the research. The role of the Ministry of Trade and Industry was emphasised 
as important for making the programmes possible in the first place and for recognising early 
on the strategic importance of the capital goods industry.  
Due to these programmes, and in combination with the various large-scale experiments, the 
level of knowledge and number of experts active in the field were significantly enhanced. As 
a result, the entire actor and technology structure could be strengthened, which made 
Finland attractive to major multinationals in the field. Collectively, the network of actors has 
been able to strengthen the structure of the TIS and all of the functions, except for market 
formation for BIGCC and the production of renewable fuels. 
Although the Finnish system appears to be strong, two main system weaknesses can be 
identified based on the limits of the transformative capacity of the network. First, it was 
concluded that actors had been limited in their capacity to extend the design space of 
biomass gasification beyond the design space of combustion to also include chemical 
synthesis. Throughout the history of biomass gasification, the network has had only one 
experiment with chemical synthesis—at the ammonia plant in Oulu in the late-1980s. Since 
then, the focus has not been on developing the catalyst competencies, and the current 
alliances have communicated that it is an “off-the-shelf” technology that they will contract 
once they are ready to build the first commercial-scale demonstration plant. Throughout this 
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thesis, however, it has been argued that combining low temperature gasification with 
chemical synthesis for the production of renewable fuels will require further demonstration 
and development work of the downstream process. Hence, 
The first system weakness is the lack of technology structure due to a lack of actors from 
complementary knowledge fields taking part in catalyst development and in the adaption of 
the downstream synthesis processes.  
This weakness is, of course, best addressed by including catalyst developers already at the 
demonstration stage. For example, since the demonstration facility at Varkaus carries its 
own operating costs, continuous experimentation to achieve a syngas quality could also 
include the development and demonstration of various catalysts for fuel and chemical 
synthesis. The role of the government may, of course, be to support the development with 
additional funding for further developing these competencies in Finland in collaboration 
with international actors.  
The second weakness concerns the network’s inability to strengthen market formation by 
acting to align the institutional framework to create niche markets for emerging 
technologies. Throughout the history of biomass gasification, the only available support for 
making the technology competitive with the incumbent alternatives has been relatively low 
levels of investment support. The need for programmes to create a market to support the 
technology to improve its price-performance ratio has not been recognised. Hence, 
The second system weakness is the lack of an institutional framework that recognises the 
need for creating specific market preconditions in support of emerging technologies. 
The government has been extremely careful in introducing incentives that could increase the 
cost of biomass and electricity to the pulp and paper industry. As result, Finland has been 
one of the laggards within the EU with respect to environmental and climate targets. Despite 
this, the head of the ministry has recently indicated that they intend to take the lead in 
Europe on the development of second-generation fuels. It remains to be seen though if the 
government will introduce measures to form markets from second-generation 
transportation fuels. 
  
 
 
Part III         
Back to the future 
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Chapter IX                                                                                      
Cross-country analysis 
 
 
In Chapter I, the purpose of this thesis was formulated as to:  
“ ... analyse the role of the system builders in the emergence of an industry with the capacity 
to realise the potential of gasified biomass for the production of second-generation 
transportation fuels and other chemicals within the European Union.” 
In Chapter II, this purpose was broken down into four research questions, each of which was 
addressed in the four countries studied (Chapters V-VIII). The questions were formulated as:   
1) Who act as system builders in the different national contexts? 
2) What characterises the nature and extent of the system builders’ transformative 
capacity? 
a. How do the system builders make use of the general structure in which they are 
embedded to form or strengthen the structure and the various functions of the 
TIS? 
b. To which extent do the system builders manage to strengthen the structure and 
functions of the TIS?   
3) What are the limits to the system builders’ transformative capacity and how can 
these be explained? 
4) Given these limits, which system weaknesses remain to be resolved by system builders 
and policymakers on different levels (national and EU)? 
 
On a country level, the answers to each question have been summarised in Tables 9.1-9.5, 
and the research questions will now be addressed through a cross-country analysis. The first 
two questions will be analysed separately in Section 9.1 and Section 9.2, respectively. 
Questions three and four will be addressed in Section 9.3, since it is convenient to specify 
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the limits of the system builders’ transformative capacity and simultaneously address the 
system weaknesses that are natural consequences of these limits.  
9.1 RQ1: The identity of the system builders 
This section provides answers to the first research question:  
1) Who act as system builders in the different national contexts?  
The relevance of the question stems from previous literature in which the entrepreneur, 
system builder and prime mover in a new technological field have been assigned a 
particularly important role for addressing various technical, organisational and institutional 
uncertainties (Schumpeter, 1934; Hughes, 1983; Hughes, 1987; Summerton, 1994; Carlsson 
and Jacobsson, 1997). The entrepreneurs and system builders have often been portrayed as 
extremely capable individuals, while the prime movers have been described as new 
technology-based firms, established firms investing into new technological fields, or as 
networks of actors.  
In this thesis, a wide array of actors taking on the role of the system builder has been 
identified (see Table 9.1). In the case of Austria, the system builder was an individual―a 
professor in chemical engineering at the Technical University of Vienna. This individual 
managed to create a network of actors, which over time has taken over the system building 
role. In Germany, the role of the institutes as the system builder was emphasised, even 
though a privately owned start-up company was also found to take on that role. In Sweden, 
a strong network of actors such as Götaverken, ABB Fläkt and Studsvik/TPS emerged during 
the 1970–80s. However, when Sydkraft and Vattenfall entered the TIS in the 1990s, the main 
actors from the previous episode exited and the network was weakened. A partially new, but 
also weak, network of actors could eventually be formed in early-2000s, primarily consisting 
of TPS, the Swedish Energy Agency and VVBGC. In black liquor gasification, the main system 
builder has always been Chemrec, but Nykomb Synergetics and the Swedish Energy Agency 
also undertook pivotal system building activities. In particular, the actions undertaken by the 
Swedish Energy Agency in enabling the survival of Chemrec were highlighted. More recently, 
Göteborg Energy has taken on a system building role. In the Finnish case, it was an already 
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established network of actors that carried out the system building activities by extending the 
design space of fluidised bed combustion to also include gasification for various applications.  
Table 9.1: The system builder in the four different case studies. 
Austria An individual professor created a network of actors, which over time has taken 
over the system building role. 
Germany Three institutes appear to have institutionalised the system building role, even 
though a small privately owned start-up company was also found to take on the 
role. 
Sweden A diminishing network in fluidised bed gasification in which actors have entered 
and exited, but in which TPS has remained a central actor until it was forced into 
reconstruction in 2007. The Swedish Energy Agency took a major system building 
role in the third episode. In addition, Chemrec, Nykomb Synergetics and the 
Swedish Energy Agency have taken on the role of system builders in entrained 
flow gasification of black liquor. More recently, a municipal-owned utility has 
acted as system builder for the Austrian FICFB technology. 
Finland An established network of actors undertakes system building activities by 
experimenting with biomass gasification for various applications, extending the 
design space of already established technologies. 
 
Clearly, the system building role should not be associated with a specific organisational form, 
but can be undertaken by a multitude of actors such as: individuals, institutes, policymakers, 
utilities, established networks, and private firms. The common link between all these system 
builders is that they act to form alliances (or networks) with actors along the value chain 
with the required complementary resources and competencies for commercialising the 
knowledge field. After having successfully created such alliances (or networks), these 
alliances (or networks) take over the system building role even if certain individuals can 
remain very influential in the networks.  
9.2 RQ2: The nature and extent of the system builders’ transformative 
capacity 
The second research question was broken down into two sub-questions. In this section, the 
two sub-questions will first be analysed before providing an answer to the main question:  
2) What characterises the nature and extent of the system builders’ transformative 
capacity? 
a) How do the system builders make use of the general structure in which they are 
embedded to form or strengthen the structure of the TIS and its various functions?  
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b) To which extent do the system builders manage to strengthen the structure and 
functions of the TIS?   
 
The answer to the first sub-question (RQ2a) is summarised in Table 9.2. It illustrates that the 
system builders make use of the general structure by drawing resources from it in three 
different ways.278  
First, they utilise the existing technology structure in related fields for developing the new. 
Hence, depending on their personal experience and technology resources available to them, 
they develop different solutions to the same problem. For example, the strength of coal 
gasification technology in Germany has led the actors to draw upon that knowledge base, 
while many actors in Sweden and Finland have drawn upon the knowledge developed for 
fluidised bed combustion. The exception in the Nordic countries is the development of black 
liquor gasification in Sweden, which draws on the experience from entrained flow 
gasification of fossil resources (see Germany (1), Sweden (FB-1, BL-1) and Finland (1) in Table 
9.2).  
Second, they mobilise resources and attract actors from the existing and primarily national 
industry structure by aligning the technology to their interests and existing technologies. For 
example, in Germany the system builder Choren could draw resources from the main 
automotive manufacturers―Daimler and Volkswagen―by providing a solution for 
alternative fuels that it considered technically superior to first-generation fuels. Likewise, 
FZK could draw resources from the incumbent gasification capital goods industries by 
offering a solution suitable for its existing reactors and downstream processes used for fossil 
gasification (see Germany (2) in Table 9.2). In Sweden, Volvo developed an interest in DME 
as an alternative fuel for heavy-duty vehicles in the 1990s. This interest, in combination with 
the Swedish Energy Agency’s interest to save Värnamo, made it possible for TPS to re-enter 
the TIS in Sweden and a new network of actors with an interest in developing fluidised bed 
gasification could be formed (see Sweden (FB-2) in Table 9.2).  
                                                      
278 Examples from the table will be used for illustrating these three different ways, without repeating the entire 
content of Table 9.2. 
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Also, Chemrec was able to exploit the interests of Volvo, and other elements in the 
structure, to set up a strong alliance, including all actors necessary for demonstrating the 
entire value chain from black liquor gasification to the use of DME in heavy-duty vehicles 
(see Sweden (BL 2) in Table 9.2). In Finland, the actors have been able to mobilise resources 
by attracting/aligning the technology to the interests of actors within the already established 
network for developing fluidised bed combustion, including the pulp and paper industries 
(see Finland (2) in Table 9.2). 
Third, resources are mobilised in conjunction with crises (oil, financial, nuclear, climate, and 
other industry-specific crises), using development support available for underdeveloped 
regions, exploiting agricultural- and forestry-based interests in finding additional revenues, 
as well as drawing on both technology-neutral and technology-specific instruments. For 
example, in Austria resources could be attracted since Güssing could apply for regional 
development support. In addition, the existence of the EEG law made it possible to explore 
CHP gasification, which in turn enabled the system builders to start experimenting with 
more advanced applications (see Austria (3) in Table 9.2). Similarly, due to oil, nuclear and 
climate crises in Finland and Sweden, funds were made available to the system builders, 
which enabled them to start experimenting with various applications (see Finland (3) and 
Sweden (BL and FB 3) in Table 9.2). 
In three out of four cases, the system builders have made use of the structure in which they 
are embedded to create elements of a new structure specific for biomass gasification. In the 
Finnish case, however, it has rather been a matter of a number of individuals being able to 
draw upon internal resources of the TIS for fluidised bed combustion, thereby extending the 
design space to include various applications of biomass gasification. 
In conclusion, the respective TIS are shaped through the interaction between the system 
builders and their primarily local context (general structure). This interaction requires that 
the technological trajectories pursued must be aligned with the general industrial and 
institutional structure in which they are embedded.  
This highlights the path dependency of the process in which new TIS are formed, drawing on 
related industries (Porter, 1990a). Therefore, the extent of the system builders’ 
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transformative capacity is conditioned, although not determined, by the general structure in 
which they are embedded. I will now proceed to analyse the extent of the system builders’ 
transformative capacity (RQ2b), first with respect to the functions and then to the structure 
of the TIS. 
Table 9.2: How the system builders make use of the general structure to strengthen the TIS  
Austria (1) Utilising the existing technology structure by drawing upon coal gasification and 
combining it with knowledge of biomass for creating small-scale systems. 
(2) Mobilising resources by attracting a) incumbent capital goods manufacturer AEE 
through personal contacts to explore the small-scale CHP application, and b) 
international collaborations to develop the technology by offering a research 
platform. 
(3) Mobilising resources available due to a) the town of Güssing situated in an 
underdeveloped region and with an interest in becoming independent on 
imported resources, b) EU and Austrian regional development funds, and c) the 
EEG and a risk absorption scheme. 
Germany 
 
(1) Utilising the existing technology structure by drawing upon fossil gasification and 
existing fossil-based technologies. 
(2) Mobilising resources by attracting/aligning the technology to the interests of a) 
the automobile manufacturers, and b) the incumbent gasification capital goods 
industries.  
(3) Mobilising resources from a wide range of technology-neutral and technology-
specific instruments to solve climate, job and nuclear crises, as well as for 
supporting agricultural interests. 
Sweden –  
Black Liquor 
(BL)  
(1) Utilising the existing technology structure by drawing upon a) fossil gasification 
and technology developed in Nynäshamn for producing methanol, and b) ceramic 
technology developed for space shuttles in the US. 
(2) Mobilising resources by attracting/aligning the technology to the interests of a) 
the pulp and paper industry for boosting capacity in existing recovery boilers and 
finding additional revenues, and b) Volvo and other actors’ interest in DME. 
(3) Mobilising resources available due to a) nuclear crises and b) climate crises. 
Sweden –  
Fluidised 
Bed 
(FB) 
(1) Utilising the existing technology structure by drawing upon fluidised bed 
combustion.  
(2) Mobilising resources by attracting/aligning the technology to the interests of a) 
municipal utilities in Sweden and Europe interested in a medium-scale solution, b) 
Volvo’s interest in DME, and c) the Swedish Energy Agency’s interest in saving 
Värnamo.  
(3) Mobilising resources available due to a) oil crises and b) climate crises―Shell, 
World Bank, EU.  
Finland 
 
(1) Utilising the existing technology structure by drawing upon fluidised bed 
gasification.  
(2) Mobilising resources by attracting/aligning the technology to the interests of a) 
actors within an already established network for developing fluidised bed 
combustion, and b) the pulp and paper industries for finding additional revenues. 
(3) Mobilising resources available due to a) oil and nuclear crises, b) MTI long-term 
and strategic industry support, and c) climate and forestry crises. 
327 
 
When all the functions in a TIS are strengthened, a “system building motor” is formed 
(Suurs, 2009). In this particular case, the virtuous circles created in the motor, feed and 
receive feed-back from the three structural elements in Figure 9.1.279  
Figure 9.1: The system builders’ impact on functions and structure. 
 
The functions involved in the system building motor can be divided into three sets of 
epistemologically different functions (see Table 2.3 in Chapter II and Figure 9.1). The first set 
of functions―knowledge development and diffusion, entrepreneurial experimentation and 
materialisation―is strengthened by the system builders when they build pilot-, 
demonstration- and commercial-scale plants; conduct basic and experimental research at 
these plants; test various types of feed-stocks; and experiment with different applications. It 
was argued in Chapter II that this particular set of functions strengthens the system builders’ 
know-how in plant construction. A strong motor that includes the “know how” functions is 
necessary for strengthening the capacity of the system builders in moving from pilot to 
demonstration plants, and from demonstration plants to the first commercial-scale plants, 
as well as for improving the competitiveness of such plants in the long run (learning curve). 
                                                      
279 The exact inter-functional and functional-structural dynamics involved will not be the focus of the analysis.   
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In a similar manner, the second set of functions can be referred to as “know about” 
functions, including the functions of direction of search and legitimation. The system builder 
has strengthened them, for example, by conducting system studies and informing about the 
benefits of the production of second-generation fuels over other alternatives, by aligning the 
technology to the interest of actors and elements in the general structure in which they are 
embedded, and by being able to show pilot-, demonstration-, and commercial-scale plants in 
operation. Legitimation and direction of search are, of course, also strengthened by 
exogenous events such as crises (oil, nuclear, climate), as well as increased public awareness 
of, for example, the negative externalities associated with the use of coal.  
Such exogenous factors may also strengthen the third set of functions, here called 
“enablers”, including the functions of resource mobilisation, market formation and the 
generation of positive externalities. However, in this thesis it has been illustrated that the 
system builders have also, skilfully and to a great extent, been able to strengthen these 
enablers.280 To begin with and as already argued in connection with RQ2a, resource 
mobilisation has been strengthened by the system builders as they use the general structure 
in which they are embedded to draw resources. This structure includes, for instance, the 
agriculture and forestry industries, incumbent capital goods suppliers, governmental 
research, and development funds (See 1-3 in Table 9.2).  
With these resources, they have strengthened the “know how” functions by conducting 
entrepreneurial experiments and engaging in knowledge development, which has enabled 
them to materialise (materialisation) new types of plants and designs (resulting in a stronger 
technology structure of the TIS). In addition, with these resources they have been able to 
strengthen the “know about” functions―direction of search and legitimation―as pilot and 
demonstration plants that are taken into operation can be used to attract investors and 
other actors to the TIS.      
The second enabling function―market formation―is strengthened by the ingenuity of the 
system builder in experimenting with the technology and adapting it to an existing or, by 
                                                      
280 Exogenous factors have previously been emphasised as being dominant in the formative phase, and it has 
been argued that the actors’ ability to strengthen the key innovation and diffusion processes are limited in the 
early phase (Raven, 2005; Bergek et al., 2008a). 
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exogenous events, changing general structure and changes in relative prices. In the case of 
biomass gasification, these factors have enabled the system builders to explore and 
commercialise less advanced applications and, thereby, find a commercial use of the 
technology for oil substitution in lime kilns, boosting the capacity of conventional recovery 
boilers, advanced recycling of paper waste, co-firing with coal, and combined heat and 
power generation with gas engines (see Chapters III and VII-VIII). However, so far the system 
builders have not strengthened market formation by explicitly acting to align the 
institutional framework to the technology.  
By strengthening market formation, the system builders engage in the extremely important 
interaction with the first paying customers―“lead users” (Von Hippel, 1986). The “know 
how” functions can thereby be strengthened as such customers provide information and 
feedback on possible improvements.281 In addition, the “know about” functions can be 
strengthened as the system builders gain access to reference installations, if operated 
successfully (cf. Falkus (1982)). 
As a result of the activities of the system builders and as the TIS progresses, positive 
externalities arise. These often benefit more recent entrants, enabling them to mobilise 
resources and identify new opportunities based on achievements and lessons made by 
earlier entrants. For example, it was illustrated that the experiments undertaken by system 
builders in Austria created a science and technology infrastructure that made it possible for 
a German alliance, headed by ZSW, to identify new opportunities and rapidly catch up with 
the technology development, and for an alliance in Sweden to construct a new type of FICFB 
gasification plant that may be used for retrofitting existing CFB combustion plants (see 
Chapters VI-VII). The development of positive externalities may thus strengthen both the 
“know about” and “know how” functions.  
The system builders have been able to create an embryonic structure of the TIS by 
strengthening it directly or through the three sets of functions discussed above. In the 
process, they have been particularly successful in creating and strengthening the structural 
                                                      
281 See, for example, the importance of the Booster plant in New Bern, USA for Chemrec in Chapter VII. 
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elements of knowledge networks, actors and technology. In turn, these add to the dynamics 
of the TIS by further strengthening the three sets of functions (see Figure 9.1 and Table 9.3).  
To begin with, all system builders have created or taken part in knowledge networks (see 
Table 9.3). From these, they have been able to draw substantial resources. For example, 
Chemrec and the Swedish Energy Agency created the BLG Programme through which 
Chemrec could access substantial resources, enabling the construction of the pilot plant i 
Piteå (see Chemrec in Table 9.3). Choren and Volkswagen set up the network RENEW 
through which substantial resources were mobilised (see Germany in Table 9.3).  
These networks not only strengthen the enabling functions resource mobilisation and 
development of positive externalities, but also the “know about” and “know how” functions. 
As mentioned previously, the “know about” functions of the emerging TIS were 
strengthened, as the networks engaged in conducting system studies and informing about 
the benefits of the production of second-generation fuels over other alternatives, etc. The 
“know how” function is strengthened, as strong networks enable the system builder to 
conduct more advanced experiments, wherein ideas and resources can be generated for 
materialising new design alternatives, etc. 
By aligning the technology to the interests of the current industry structure (influencing 
direction of search and legitimation), the system builders have attracted a heterogeneous 
mixture of private and public organisations to the TIS. Such actors bring resources, 
competencies and experience. With more resources, the construction of further 
demonstration- and commercial-scale plants are enabled, and feed-stocks and various types 
of applications can be experimented with.  
For example, FZK strengthened the “know how” functions when experimenting with the 
production and gasification of pyrolysis oil from straw in the existing pilot facilities of Future 
Energy (Siemens) (see Chapter VI). By illustrating that its technology had the potential to 
produce large volumes of second-generation fuels using the gasification and downstream 
equipment for fossil gasification, it strengthened the “know about” functions. As a result, it 
was able to create an alliance with Lurgi and other firms along the entire value chain for 
demonstrating the concept of the technology on a larger scale, which in turn strengthened 
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the “know about” functions, inducing more entrants into the TIS. Indeed, all system builders 
act to strengthen the “know how” and “know about” functions to form alliances, 
strengthening the structural elements of actors and networks of the TIS (see Table 9.3). The 
system builders can also create spin-off companies and new firms directly, as in the case of 
Choren and Repotec.    
By attracting actors and forming networks, the system builders strengthen the structural 
element of technology. In the field of biomass gasification, new knowledge is developed, 
tested and experimented with by building pilot and demonstration plants that become a 
central part of the science and technology infrastructure of the field.282 The development of 
such an infrastructure is necessary for strengthening the “know how” functions, thereby 
accumulating knowledge and advancing the field towards large-scale production of second-
generation fuels based on various types of feed-stocks. As already mentioned, an advanced 
science and technology infrastructure is also important for strengthening the “know about” 
and enabling functions of the TIS, since an advanced technology structure attracts actors and 
can become central to the formation of new knowledge networks, for example Güssing. All 
system builders, therefore, construct pilot-, demonstration- and commercial-scale plants for 
various applications and feed-stocks (see Table 9.3). The specific contributions of pilot and 
demonstration plants to system dynamics will be elaborated on in Chapter X. 
In sum, in terms of the extent of the system builders’ transformative capacity (RQ2b), the 
system builders have been capable of strengthening the three sets of functions “know 
about”, “know how” and “enablers”, as well as the three structural elements knowledge 
networks, actors and technology. By strengthening these functions and structure, the system 
builders set in motion cumulative and virtuous circles between the functions, as well as 
between the functions and the structural elements that progresses the TIS within the 
formative phase. 
With respect to the complete research question two (RQ2), it is concluded that the nature 
and extent of the transformative capacity of the system builders is conditioned, although not 
determined, by the general structure in which they are embedded and from which they 
                                                      
282 Sometimes, these plants have become central in the formation of new knowledge networks. 
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manage to strengthen the enabling functions. With these enablers, they have been 
successful in strengthening the “know how” and “know about” functions, as well as 
structural elements of knowledge networks, actors and technology. 
Table 9.3: The system builders’ capacity to build structure and strengthen the various functions of the 
TIS.  
Austria  Build Structure:  building pilot and demonstration plants, and enabling second 
commercial CHP plant (technology); setting-up RENET and various EU 
knowledge networks; and attracting actors.   
Strengthen Functions: knowledge development, entrepreneurial 
experimentation, materialisation, market formation (CHP), legitimation, 
direction of search, and development of positive externalities. 
Germany  
 
Build Structure: building pilot and demonstration plants (technology); creating 
knowledge networks, attracting actors, and creating alliances with incumbents 
(actors and networks).  
Strengthen Functions: resource mobilisation, knowledge development, 
entrepreneurial experimentation, materialisation, legitimation, direction of 
search, and development of positive externalities. 
Sweden – 
Black Liquor 
(BL) 
Build Structure: building pilot-, demonstration- and commercial-scale plants for 
less advanced applications (technology); creating national and international 
knowledge networks; and attracting actors, creating alliances with incumbents 
(actors and networks).  
Strengthen Functions: resource mobilisation, knowledge development, 
entrepreneurial experimentation, materialisation, legitimation, direction of 
search, development of positive externalities, and market formation for less 
advanced applications.  
Sweden –  
Fluidised Bed 
(FB) 
Build Structure: building pilot-, demonstration- and commercial-scale plants for 
less advanced applications (technology); creating a knowledge network 
(CHRISGAS); and setting-up new organisations (VVBGC) (actors).  
Strengthen Functions: knowledge development, entrepreneurial 
experimentation, materialisation, and market formation for less advanced 
applications. 
Finland 
 
Build Structure: building pilot-, demonstration- and commercial-scale plants for 
less advanced applications (technology); and undertaking experiments within 
established network, setting up research and development programmes, and 
creating alliances between established actors (networks). 
Strengthen Functions: resource mobilisation, knowledge development, 
entrepreneurial experimentation, materialisation, legitimation, direction of 
search, development of positive externalities, and market formation for less 
advanced applications. 
 
Largely as a result of the actions undertaken by the system builders, a system building motor 
of positive interconnections has emerged, resulting in a structural and functional build-up. 
As mentioned above, a similar type of motor has in previous literature been called a “system 
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building” motor, and it is one of several other typical motors of the formative phase (Suurs, 
2009). However, for finalising the formative phase and shifting the TIS to a phase marked 
with rapid market growth, the system building motor must be turned into a “market motor” 
in which the institutional framework is aligned to the technology (Suurs, 2009).283 In this 
case, this shift implies an institutional change that results in the formation of markets for 
advanced applications. So far, such markets are missing. 
In the next section, the limits of the system builders and remaining system weaknesses of 
the TIS will be analysed. These are weaknesses that must be adequately addressed if a 
market motor is to be set in motion.  
9.3 RQ3 and RQ4: The limits to the system builders’ transformative capacity 
and remaining system weaknesses  
In this section, the focus of the analysis shifts to identifying and explaining the limits of the 
system builders’ transformative capacity. Based on these limits, the remaining system 
weaknesses at the EU level will be identified. Hence, research questions three and four will 
be addressed:  
3) What are the limits to the system builders’ transformative capacity and how can 
these limits be explained?  
4) Given these limits, which system weaknesses remain to be resolved by system builders 
and policymakers on different levels (national and EU)?  
 
Throughout the case study countries, a set of 11 instances have been identified where the 
system builders have been limited in their capacity to strengthen one or more functions, or 
to create certain structural elements, which in turn has resulted in specific weaknesses of 
the system (see Tables 9.4 and 9.5).284 Some of these are probably of such nature that 
eventually the system builders will be able to overcome them by themselves, while others 
will require an increased involvement of policymakers.  
                                                      
283 The shift has also been conceptualised as a consequence of the occurrence of various stabilisation 
mechanisms (Nygaard, 2008). 
284 These tables will be referred to throughout the remaining parts of this chapter. When certain points are made, 
the content of the tables will be used for making illustrative examples but without repeating the entire contents 
for all countries.  
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Since the innovation process is highly contextual in nature (cf. Rosenberg (1976)), these 
limits and associated system weaknesses are, as clearly visible in the case studies, highly 
contextual as well. However, based on the context-specific interactions between the system 
builders and the structure in which they are embedded, it will be argued that two main and 
shared system weaknesses remain. The main task of policy is to address these weaknesses, 
thereby reducing the structural constraints of the system builders. 
In spite of the strength of the system building motor, the system builders have in common a 
limited capacity to strengthen the “know how” functions―knowledge development, 
entrepreneurial experimentation and materialisation―resulting in an insufficiently strong 
technology and actor structure. A direct consequence of this system weakness is that 
current demonstration plants are not in operation and there is no production of second-
generation fuels.  
The first system weakness can, however, only be fully understood in relation to a second 
system weakness. This weakness is constituted by incomplete and weak political networks 
that have yet not aligned the institutional framework, thereby strengthening the system 
enabling function market formation.  
Without a strong market formation the “know about” functions―legitimation and direction 
of search―will remain insufficiently strong to attract further actors with complementary 
competencies and resources. These are, in turn, necessary for addressing the first system 
weakness in terms of a weak and incomplete actor and technology structure.  
The limits in the system builders’ transformative capacity have, thus, created weak inter-
connections between the functions and the structure, constituting the “weak motor” of the 
TIS (see Figure 9.2). Completing the formative phase and shifting the TIS into a growth phase 
involves addressing this weak motor by dealing with these two main system weaknesses.  
 
 
 
335 
 
Figure 9.2: Insufficiently strong interconnection and elements from shifting the TIS into a growth 
phase.  
 
In the next two subsections, the details of the two system weaknesses will be given, 
beginning with Austria. 
9.3.1 Weakness in technology and actor structure 
The recent back-lash against the support for new renewables in Austria is quite unique and 
has strongly influenced the possibilities to commercialise the technology in the country (see 
Austria (1) in Table 9.4. The system builders have been limited in their capacity to strengthen 
direction of search, legitimation and market formation, due to the unfavourable changes in 
the feed-in law and lack of influential actors in the network. As a result, the actor structure is 
weak (while the technology structure is relatively strong), and there are clear problems with 
regard to appropriating on the knowledge developed at the Güssing facility. 
In the case of Germany, its long history of coal gasification in combination with a) the 
existence of an incumbent industry with extensive experience in the field, and b) a “thick” 
incentive structure of technology-specific, as well as technology-neutral instruments in 
support of renewable energy technologies, is quite unique. These combined factors have 
created opportunities for the system builders to draw upon a common knowledge base, 
strengthen the enabling functions (except for market formation), and form alliances 
consisting of firms with complementary competencies and resources along the entire value 
chain. However, as a result of their relatively short history in biomass gasification, the actors 
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have accumulated limited experience from experimenting with less advanced applications 
for biomass gasification.285  
Hence, even if operating from a good position, the system builders have so far been limited 
in their capacity to strengthen the “know how” functions enough to make the technology 
operational on the scale of the demonstration plants. Consequently, a main system 
weakness that must be addressed is the incomplete technology structure and lack of know-
how for constructing functioning demonstration plants (see Germany (1) in Table 9.4).286 
Since there is no production of second-generation fuels elsewhere, the system weakness is 
not unique to Germany. For different reasons, it is shared between all case study countries.  
In contrast to Germany, the Swedish TIS has a long history of biomass and black liquor 
gasification. In particular, Studsvik developed a unique competence in the field of 
pressurised fluidised bed gasification already in the early-1980s, well before actors in the 
other cases. However, instead of building upon the previous knowledge base, the two major 
utilities Vattenfall and Sydkraft decided to co-operate with Finnish actors. As a result, they 
strengthened the actor and technology structure in Finland instead of the one already 
developed in Sweden. 
Over time, the capital goods sector in Sweden, which could supported fluidised bed 
gasification, has deteriorated.287 The possibility to create commercial opportunities based on 
fluidised bed gasification and Swedish actor interests is, therefore, currently remote.  
In Sweden, current and future actors in the field of fluidised bed gasification will be limited 
in their capacity to strengthen the functions of the TIS by creating alliances with national 
capital goods suppliers in possession of the complementary resources necessary for 
commercialising the technology. The main system weakness in Sweden is, thus, a lack of a 
capital goods industry with the capacity of entering into alliances, appropriating on 
knowledge development, and constructing large-scale plants (see Sweden (1) in Table 9.5).  
                                                      
285 However, as mentioned previously, they have accumulated extensive experience in fossil gasification. 
286 With time and continued support from policy, the system builders should be in a good position to overcome 
their current lack of know-how and take the plants into operation. 
287 The intention of this thesis is not to address why the capital goods industry, capable of constructing boilers 
and gasifiers, has deteriorated in Sweden. 
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This weakness is also valid in the case of black liquor gasification in Sweden. However, 
through the technology- and actor-specific policies of the Swedish Energy Agency, the 
system builder have been able to compensate for this weakness by building international 
collaborations with complementary competencies and resources. Consequently, black liquor 
gasification has been able to continue to develop and is now in a good position to be one of 
the first technologies that demonstrates continuous production of second-generation fuels.  
The lack of an actor structure in Sweden (and Austria) becomes even more apparent when 
compared with Finland. Sweden and Finland had a similar starting point in terms of actor 
and technology structure in the early-1970s. However, when the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry decided to support the development of the capital goods industry for using 
domestic resources for energy purposes in the mid-1980s, the technology and actor 
structure in Finland was strengthened in that the knowledge level of both combustion and 
gasification could be significantly increased. Due to the long-term government support for 
research, development and demonstration, the close co-operation between customers and 
capital goods suppliers, and an active involvement of VTT―various more and less advanced 
applications could be experimented with, where lessons made from one experiment 
benefited the following.  
These experiments have taken place over four decades. So far, the network of actors has 
mainly experimented with extending the design space of fluidised bed combustion to include 
gasification for a range of energy-related applications but not for transportation fuels. 
Therefore, the network has been limited in its capacity to strengthen knowledge 
development, entrepreneurial experimentation and materialisation to also include catalyst 
development.  
The main system weakness in Finland is, therefore, in the technology structure, which lacks 
the contribution from actors from complementary knowledge fields taking part in catalyst 
development and the adaption of the downstream synthesis process to fluidised bed 
biomass gasification for FT diesel production (see Finland (1) in Table 9.5). 
Only two firms, Sasol and Shell, have commercially operating FT diesel plants. Other catalyst 
developers with an interest in developing FT catalysts exist, but the process would have to 
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be developed and demonstrated on a commercial-scale in combination with fluidised bed 
gasification. As of yet, incumbent catalyst developers have not entered alliances with actors 
involved in fluidised bed gasification.288 
Their lack of interest can partially be explained by a strong demand for their competencies in 
conventional fossil gasification, but also with a preference to work with the cleaner gas from 
entrained flow gasification. As a result, the technology and actor structure for FT synthesis 
remains weak within the TIS, which may become a problem for those developing the route 
based on fluidised bed gasification. The alternative is, of course, to look for other types of 
fuels than FT diesel such as the gaseous fuels DME and BioSNG. This is also what Chemrec 
and the actors advocating FICFB gasification have been doing.  
However, due to the intentional resistance from the automotive and oil industry with 
respect to DME and BioSNG, the development of new heavy-duty vehicles for BioSNG has 
been limited, and the weak motor has resulted in a limited physical infrastructure for using 
BioSNG and DME (see Germany (4), Sweden (3 and 4) in Tables 9.4 and 9.5).289 As a result, 
the technology and actor structure is currently weak with respect to distribution and use of 
gaseous second-generation fuels. 
Finally, and perhaps less severely, investors in large-scale stand-alone plants (regardless of 
fuel) are dependent on the supply of large volumes of bioslurry, or other types of pre-
treated biomass, or large areas of short rotation coppice around the plant as suggested by 
FZK and Choren. Such supply chains of technology and actors have not yet been formed (see 
Germany (3) in Table 9.4).290 Hence, the technology and actors structure is underdeveloped 
upstream to these gasification processes.  
In sum, although the specifics vary between the four countries, it is clear that the first system 
weakness identified at the EU level is insufficient actor and technology structures in support 
of the development and diffusion of second-generation fuel.  
                                                      
288 With the possible exception of Haldor Topsoe. Most recently, Haldor Topsoe appear to have entered the TIS 
and collaborate with Göteborg Energy on BioSNG production based on FICFB technology developed in Austria 
(Hedenstedt, 2010).   
289 Although Volvo has more recently started developing a diesel engine also for BioSNG (Hedenstedt, 2010).  
290 There exists a global trade of pellets, wood chips and other types of forestry residues that, to a certain extent, 
can compensate for this weakness. 
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9.3.2 Weak political networks and institutional alignment 
What all of the cases study countries have in common, as in the European Union as a whole, 
is that none of them have adopted instruments that specifically support market formation 
for second-generation renewable transportation fuels, and few solutions have been 
advocated for by the nine main alliances.  
This is critical since, even if the plants are made operational, the fuel produced will be 
considerably more expensive than both conventional liquids and first-generation fuels from 
sugar cane and food crops (see Chapter III). If constructed, the first demonstration- and 
commercial-scale plants would, therefore, have a very limited market.  
For market formation to be strengthened, an institutional alignment must be achieved, 
allowing for at least initial niche markets to develop. So far, such an institutional alignment 
has not been possible for two principal reasons.  
First, although it was previously argued that the actor structure is insufficient, the nine 
projects are still supported by strong alliances consisting of multinational corporations such 
as some of the largest automotive manufacturers in the world (Daimler, Volkswagen and 
Volvo); major suppliers of gasification equipment (Foster Wheeler, Andritz, Metso Power 
and Lurgi); world leading catalyst developers (Haldor Topsoe and Südchemie);291 and some 
of the world largest pulp and paper manufacturers (UPM and Stora Enso). It would not be 
farfetched to suggest that these actors are also influential on the political arena. However, 
although the firms cooperate with a wide range of institutes, universities and start-up firms 
in nine specific alliances and participate in knowledge networks across the various alliances, 
they have so far failed to form political networks.  
Through such networks, it is pivotal that a larger group of advocates agree on what they 
believe are reasonable “rules of the game”, and argue for a common political solution in 
each country or for the entire European Union (cf. Van de Ven (2005)). However, instead of 
actors searching for common grounds, conflicts over resources and who has the “best” 
technical solutions dominate. Such conflicts have made the formation of political networks 
                                                      
291 The catalyst developers mentioned support projects based on entrained flow gasification, save for Haldor 
Topsoe, who is also involved with Göteborg Energy since 2010.  
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and a common agenda difficult. These conflicts were illustrated in the case of Germany (see 
Germany (2) in Table 9.4) but are present between all system builders throughout the TIS. 
Second, in the cases of Sweden and Finland, there is a lack of an institutional framework that 
recognises the need for creating market preconditions in support of emerging technologies 
(see Sweden (2) and Finland (2) in Table 9.5). Such frameworks (feed-in law) exist in 
Germany and Austria for renewable electricity. However, in Austria it lost in legitimacy, and 
after revision the incentives it provides are insufficient for CHP based on gasification to be 
further developed. In Sweden and Finland, technology-specific market provisions―such as 
the feed-in law―have never been seen as a preferred policy instrument. Instead, research 
and development grants and investment subsidies have been the primary tools for 
improving the competitiveness of emerging technologies. Although the pre-conditions were 
probably among the best in the world for making the BIGCC technology commercial in 
Finland by the end of the 1990s, these tools proved insufficient at the time for finalising the 
formative phase, and the technology was not made commercial (see Chapter VIII).  
The second system weakness identified at the EU level is the lack of joint political network(s), 
advocating an alignment of institutions and technology. 
Such networks are of particular importance for Sweden and Finland given the reluctance to 
implement technology-specific policies in support of market formation. Without an 
alignment, market formation will not be strengthened. Consequently, it will be difficult for 
the system builders to address the first system weaknesses by a) attracting actors with 
additional resources and complementary competencies for strengthening the “know how” 
functions, and b) developing an industrial capacity necessary for taking the existing 
demonstration plants in operation and mobilising enough financial capital to construct the 
first commercial-scale plants (cf. Chapter III).  
Hence, by avoiding the question of market formation now, the system builders will have 
great difficulties addressing the first system weakness even with additional support from 
policy. Consequently, it would be difficult to finalise the formative phase by 2020 as 
suggested (see Table 3.4.1, Chapter III). The role of policymakers in reducing the structural 
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constraints of the system builders, by resolving these two system weaknesses, is of pivotal 
importance and will be analysed in Chapter XI. 
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Table 9.4: The limits to the system builders’ transformative capacity and system weaknesses in Austria and Germany. 
 
 
 The system builder(s) have been limited in their capacity to: The system weakness is: 
Austria (1) strengthen direction of search, legitimation and market formation due to a lack of 
influential actors in the network and associated unfavourable changes in the feed-
in law. 
lack of actors and political networks with an interest in 
aligning the institutional framework in support of the 
technology.  
Germany (1) strengthen knowledge development, entrepreneurial experimentation and 
materialisation for making the technology operational on the scale of the 
demonstration plants. Probably due to lack of previous experience with using 
biomass for less advanced applications based on entrained flow gasification. 
an incomplete technology structure and lack of know-how 
for taking the demonstration plants into operation. 
 
Germany (2) strengthen market formation in support of the first commercial-scale 
demonstration plants and beyond due to fierce competition and neglecting the 
need for a common agenda.  
the absence of joint political network(s) necessary for 
aligning institutions and technology. 
 
Germany (3) strengthen market formation, which in turn creates weak incentives (direction of 
search) for the creation of a supply chain for the production and distribution of 
bioslurry, torrefied biomass, short rotation coppice and other types of biomass 
necessary for large-scale production with EF gasification. 
an incomplete actor and technology structure for 
organising a supply chain capable of handling large- scale 
production and distribution of biomass suitable for EF 
gasification. 
Germany (4) strengthen legitimation and direction of search for using BioSNG as a 
transportation fuel, mainly due to intentional and frictional resistance from the 
automotive and petrochemical industries, as well as major gas utilities.  
the lack of an actor and technology structure for using 
BioSNG as a transport fuel. 
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Table 9.5: The limits to the system builders’ transformative capacity and system weaknesses in Sweden and Finland. 
 The system builder(s) have been limited in their capacity to: The system weakness is: 
Sweden (1) strengthen most functions of the TIS in fluidised bed gasification by creating 
alliances with national capital goods suppliers in possession of 
complementary resources necessary for commercialising the technology. 
the lack of capital goods industries with the capacity of entering 
into alliances, appropriating on knowledge development, and 
constructing large-scale plants. 
Sweden (2) strengthen market formation for more advanced applications (including 
BIGCC) through the creation of niche markets with the aid of policy, mainly 
due to a fear of high electricity prices.  
the lack of an institutional framework that recognises the need 
for creating specific market preconditions in support of emerging 
technologies. 
Sweden (3) strengthen legitimation and direction of search of the use of DME in the EU 
due to the frictional and intentional resistance of dominant actors.  
the lack of a technology infrastructure for diffusing DME as a 
transportation fuel in Europe. 
Sweden (4) strengthen legitimation and the direction of search for using methane as a 
transportation fuel due to intentional resistance of automotive 
manufacturers. 
an incomplete technology and actor structure for using BioSNG 
as a transportation fuel in heavy-duty vehicles. 
Finland (1) strengthen knowledge development, entrepreneurial experimentation and 
materialisation to also include catalyst development in combination with 
fluidised bed gasification of biomass. 
the lack of a technology structure due to a lack of actors from 
complementary knowledge fields taking part in catalyst 
development and in the adaption of the downstream synthesis 
processes. 
Finland (2) strengthen market formation for more advanced applications (including 
BIGCC) through the creation of niche markets with the aid of policy, mainly 
due to a fear of high electricity prices. 
the lack of an institutional framework that recognises the need 
for creating specific market preconditions in support of emerging 
technologies. 
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9.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter, the four research questions were addressed and the conclusions will now be 
summarised. 
It was concluded that the system building role should not be associated with a specific 
organisational form. It was illustrated that a multitude of actors such as individuals, 
institutes, policymakers, established networks, and private firms can act as system builders. 
However, in common for system builders is that they form alliances (or networks) along the 
value chain with other actors in possession of valuable complementary competencies and 
other resources. With time, these alliances (or networks) take over the system building role, 
even if certain individuals may remain very influential in them.  
One of the system builders’ primary capabilities is to use the general and TIS-specific 
structure, in which the system builders are embedded, for strengthening the enabling 
functions resource mobilisation, market formation and positive externalities in a highly path-
dependent process. With these enablers, the system builders have been able to strengthen 
the “know how” functions―knowledge development, entrepreneurial experimentation and 
materialisation―building an industrial capacity for less advanced applications, and 
constructing a science and technology infrastructure, on which experiments with also more 
advanced applications can be based. In addition, they have been used for strengthening the 
“know about” functions―legitimation and direction of search―inducing the entry of further 
actors, creating networks and alliances. As a result of the actions undertaken by the system 
builders, the structural elements knowledge networks, actors and technology have been 
created and strengthened.  
Although the complete dynamics caused by the system builder have not been analysed in 
this Chapter, it is clear that the actions undertaken by the system builder have resulted in a 
motor of positive interconnections, resulting in a structural and functional build-up. This 
“system building” motor (cf. Suurs (2009)) progresses the TIS in the formative phase. 
However, for finalising the formative phase and shifting the TIS to a phase marked by rapid 
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market growth, the system building motor must be turned into a “market motor” (Suurs, 
2009), in which the institutional framework is aligned to the technology.  
With respect to such a shift, it is concluded that the system builders have been limited in 
their capacity to strengthen the “know how” and “know about” functions, as well as market 
formation through institutional alignment. This limited transformative capacity has resulted 
in two main system weaknesses, where the first concern a weak and incomplete actor and 
technology structure.  
Although, the system builders have attracted actors with complementary competencies and 
resources to enter the TIS, no second-generation fuels from biomass have been produced. In 
addition, the involvement of catalyst developers for developing or adapting synthesis 
processes for fluidised bed gasification is lacking; there is a weakness in the distribution and 
use of gaseous second-generation fuels and in the upstream supply chain for large-scale 
stand-alone gasification units; and a weak national actor structure exists in Sweden and 
Austria with a capacity to appropriate on the knowledge development. Hence,  
the first system weakness identified at the EU level is insufficient actor and technology 
structures in support of the development and diffusion of second-generation fuels.  
Addressing the first system weaknesses involves addressing the second system weakness: 
strengthening market formation by aligning the institutional framework. However, although 
the TIS is supported by a wide range of multinational corporations, the system builders have 
been limited in their capacity to form joint political networks necessary for aligning the 
institutional framework to the technology, thereby strengthening market formation.  
Such networks are necessary for communicating what the system builders perceive as 
reasonable rules of the game that would enable market formation. However, conflicts over 
resources and who has the “best” technical solution has made it difficult to form such 
networks. In addition, in Sweden and Finland there is a lack of an institutional framework 
that recognises the need for creating market preconditions in support of emerging 
technologies. Hence, 
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the second system weakness identified at the EU level is the lack of joint political network(s), 
advocating an alignment of institutions and technology. 
Without an alignment, it will be difficult for the system builders to address the first system 
weaknesses by, a) attracting actors with complementary competencies and resources for 
strengthening the “know how” functions, thereby creating the industrial capacity necessary 
for taking the existing demonstration plants in operation, and b) mobilising the required 
financial capital for constructing the first commercial-scale plants, and begin exploring the 
potential of second-generation fuels on a large-scale.  
A suggestion on the foundation of such a policy framework will be presented in Chapter XI. 
However, before such an analysis is undertaken, the following chapter (Chapter X) will 
reflect on the contributions of other actors and elements to system dynamics.  
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Chapter X                                                                                       
Contributions to system dynamics of other elements in the structure 
 
 
Throughout the thesis, the role of the system builders has been emphasised for realising the 
potential of gasified biomass. Nevertheless, it should be clear from reading the different 
chapters that the system builder is only one of several important actors and elements in the 
formation of a new TIS.  
Pilot and demonstration plants have been emphasised as a key “tool” of the system builders 
for realising their intentions. The contributions made by institutes, universities, industry, and 
policymakers to system dynamics have been stressed. These actors can take on the role of 
system builders, but they also make other important contributions to system dynamics. 
Understanding the contributions made by not only system builders but also these other 
elements in the emerging TIS structure is important for the discussion of policy options 
(Chapter XI) and for drawing more general conclusions with regard to implications for 
policymakers and system builders (Chapter XII). 
The specific contributions made by system builders to system dynamics was analysed at 
great length in Chapter IX and will therefore not be repeated here. Instead, the first section 
will start by analysing the contributions to system dynamics made by demonstration plants, 
for example, how they are used by the system builders to form networks. In the second 
section, the contributions of, and relationships between, universities and institutes will be 
discussed. It is followed by an analysis of industry’s different contributions and the 
relationships between the large incumbents and smaller entrepreneurial firms. The fourth 
and final section analyses the role of policy as a “midwife” in the creation of new industries 
that can realise the potential of new fields of knowledge. 
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10.2 Demonstration plants 
The primary tools of the system builders for realising their intentions are pilot and 
demonstration plants. These plants provide a critical contribution to the dynamics of the TIS. 
In Chapter II, these contributions were summarised based on previous literature. In 
particular, Karlström and Sandén (2004) argued that demonstration projects are a special 
type of materialisation that is central to the industrialisation of new knowledge fields. For 
example, they can play a key role in the formation of knowledge networks, in reducing 
technical uncertainties, and in facilitating learning that can be used to support decisions on 
technology choice. In addition, they can raise public awareness of the technology, 
strengthen its legitimacy and expose system weaknesses such as various institutional 
barriers. Since different actors with a common interest come together in demonstration 
projects they can form a potential base for creating advocacy coalitions that can address 
these barriers. Demonstration programmes can also strengthen market formation―being a 
first protected market―even if the larger institutional context does not support the diffusion 
of the technology (cf. Kemp et al. (1998)). These observations are valid also in the case of 
biomass gasification.  
In addition, this study has shown how demonstration plants are of pivotal importance as a 
tool for the system builders to align the emerging technology to the organisational, 
institutional and technological structure, as well as the physical infrastructure, in which they 
are embedded. This alignment is, of course, necessary in order to obtain the benefits listed 
above.  
In Austria, the system builders aligned the technology to the small-scale district heating 
systems, hitherto not used for electricity production. They also made use of, and aligned, the 
technology with the EEG framework to strengthen market formation for less advanced 
application while experimenting with more advanced. Initially, they also managed to create 
an alignment with the complementary competencies of the major capital goods supplier in 
Austria, AE&E. However, the alignment was undone due to exogenous events beyond the 
control of the system builders.  
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In Germany, the demand for large volumes of renewable fuels has made it possible to launch 
two projects for the large-scale production of second-generation transportation fuels. The 
system builders have aligned the technologies to the interest of the agricultural sector, the 
automobile industry, the oil and petrochemical industries, as well as to some of the main 
capital goods suppliers of these industries by focusing on increasing the value of farm 
residues (FZK), providing infrastructure ready fuels, and adapting the biomass to existing 
gasifiers and down-stream processes used by the capital goods industries for gasification of 
fossil fuels and fuel synthesis.  
In Sweden, it has been most challenging for system builders to align the technology to 
various interests. Black liquor gasification was “discovered” as a promising opportunity in 
the mid-1980s, but it was not well aligned with the interest of the pulp and paper industry. 
The industry was sceptical with regard to replacing their recovery boilers, which are at the 
heart of a chemical pulp and paper plant, with a novel and untested technology (Bergek, 
2002; Modig, 2005). In addition, gasification of black liquor at the high temperatures of an 
entrained flow gasifier creates an extremely corrosive gas, which caused major material 
problems for the system builders.  
However, due to extensive experimentation in various pilot and demonstration plants over a 
long period of time, the system builders appear to have overcome the immediate technical 
problems. In combination with actions undertaken by the Swedish Energy Agency, Volvo’s 
interest in DME and the more recent crisis for the pulp and paper industry,292 the system 
builders have been able to proceed with the process of creating an alignment between their 
technology and the interest of not only the paper and pulp industry, but also a wide range of 
national and international firms with complementary resources and competencies. Yet, it 
remains to be seen if the alignment process will be completed, as evidenced by the 
commitment of the involved industry to a commercial-scale plant.  
In the late-1980s and early-1990s, an alignment process was initiated by Studsvik/TPS when 
they decided to pursue atmospheric BIGCC. The technology was aligned with the interests of 
                                                      
292 The crisis has forced the industry to start looking for additional income streams (please see Chapter VIII for a 
longer discussion). Domsjö AB has also declared that it is willing to invest in a first large-scale demonstration 
plant.  
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municipal utilities and their smaller-scale district heating systems. However, it was not 
aligned with the intention of policy, which failed to provide sufficient financing for the 
technology to develop. Instead, the large utilities explored pressurised, large-scale 
gasification that was not well aligned with the district heating networks in Sweden. If it 
would have been pursued on a commercial-scale, only a few such large-scale plants could 
have been built.293 When TPS and others tried to assume the system building role in 2000, 
they “inherited” Sydkraft’s and Foster Wheeler’s large-scale technology but with limited 
commercial rights. In combination with a lack of national capital goods suppliers to 
collaborate with, these structural barriers became overwhelming for the system builders in 
fluidised bed gasification, and the process of aligning the technology to various interests 
failed to develop.  
In Finland, all past and current demonstrations have been closely aligned with the interests 
of the incumbent boiler and pulp and paper industries, as well as the physical infrastructure 
of Finland with large heat sinks and an extensive supply of forestry residues. Small steps in 
the technology development have been taken by the actors experimenting with more and 
less advanced application of the technology since the 1970s. High-risk projects that would 
require extensive government support, such as the pressurised BIGCC technology, have not 
been pursued.  
Only more recently, with the crisis of the pulp and paper industry, high-risk projects have 
also become sufficiently interesting for the Finnish pulp and paper and capital goods 
industry. For the development of second-generation fuels, in line with previous experience 
and the interest of the existing industry structure, the system builders have decided to 
develop fluidised bed gasification integrated in the pulp and paper industry but without the 
intention of replacing the recovery boiler. This reduces, of course, greatly the risk for the 
involved pulp and paper firms.    
Thus, the individual designs of the various demonstration plants are a result of highly path-
dependent processes in which technology choices are heavily influenced by the background 
of the system builders in combination with the local and national characteristics of the 
                                                      
293 It has also been argued that the utilities did not take on a system building role. 
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physical environment, the interests of incumbent industries, and institutional structures. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that demonstration plants are sole results and images of 
an existing structure. Instead, they should be seen as a means for actors from various 
complementary knowledge fields to test new combinations, thereby beginning to build new 
types of structures. As a result, nine rather different demonstration projects have emerged 
in the four countries. 
These demonstration plants may be divided into two main categories. The first category of 
plants fulfils “just” the purpose of demonstrating a certain application on a large but sub-
optimal scale of operation. Examples of such plants are Choren’s demonstration facility 
being constructed in Freiberg and the Värnamo facility used for demonstrating BIGCC.   
For a number of reasons, the risks of pursuing such plants are large. They are expensive to 
construct and they are likely to overrun budgets, as the development of novel technologies 
is highly unpredictable. Once constructed and in operation, these demonstration plants do 
not generate any, or only very small income streams, which discourages the undertaking of 
extensive experimentation as each hour of experimenting is costly. In addition, the afterlife 
of such plants may become problematic if it is not planned from the beginning and if the 
next step in the development is not pursued. Nevertheless, the construction of such 
demonstration plants may be unavoidable for certain applications, technology choices or 
when shifting from smaller to commercial-sized demonstration plants.  
The second category of demonstration plants is the plants that, more or less, carry their own 
operating costs. These plants allow for continuous experimentation with more and less 
advanced applications and various feed-stocks whilst gaining operational experience. 
Examples of such demonstration plants are the gasification plant for combined heat and 
power production in Güssing and at Chalmers in Göteborg, and the lime kiln plant in 
Varkaus. An additional such plant is under construction in Göppingen. In all these plants, 
experiments with more advanced applications are made based on slip streams, recirculating 
the gas to a main application. With this set-up, extensive experimentation is encouraged and 
the development of more advanced applications can be pursued at a lower cost than in the 
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first category. However, finding opportunities to construct such plants may, of course, be 
difficult and not even possible for all trajectories, scale or applications.  
Demonstration plants have the potential of strengthening all functions, but they are 
particularly important for strengthening the “know how” functions of knowledge 
development, entrepreneurial experimentation and materialisation. Once constructed, they 
become part of the science and technology infrastructure. The existence of such an 
infrastructure is fundamental for continuing with new experiments and drawing lessons 
from successes and failures, thereby progressing the knowledge field towards more 
advanced applications.  
In addition, strengthening the “know how” functions is essential in the industrialisation of an 
emerging knowledge field, as the actors involved develop an expert level of “know how” in 
new plant constructions and operations. In large-scale demonstration plants, this includes 
the development of an industrial capacity along the entire value chain.  
To build such a capacity involves not only the construction of one plant, but of many plants 
for various applications and in many different scales. As others have illustrated, developing 
this capacity may take decades and the risk of failure is always present (Carlsson and 
Jacobsson, 1997; Grubler, 1998; Breshanan et al., 2001; Wilson, 2009). Arguably, it is of 
fundamental importance that the system builders (including capital goods industry) are 
embedded into an environment that allows them to experiment, fail and have the chance to 
learn from their failures.  
10.3 Institutes and universities 
Throughout the four case studies, the contributions of institutes and universities to the 
dynamics of the TIS have been emphasised. For example, it was illustrated that a university 
professor in Vienna took on the system building role (Chapter V). This particular individual 
appeared to have been exceptional in his capacity to build structure and strengthen the 
various functions of the TIS. His role and “usefulness” in progressing the TIS foremost 
concerned a capacity to create international knowledge networks, set up experiments on 
laboratory and demonstration scales, extend and combine design spaces into a new 
knowledge field, finding new applications, but also for diffusing the knowledge by offering 
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consulting services. In addition, he managed to perform many of the tasks usually expected 
by a university professor such as publishing and examining students on Masters and Ph.D. 
levels. Ultimately, he also contributed to building a future human capital base from which 
companies in the field can recruit. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that although Professor 
Hofbauer accomplished extraordinary things, he never started a firm and has been granted 
only a few patents.  
For an individual to take on such a system building role should perhaps be seen as quite 
extraordinary. In the three other cases, academia has taken a somewhat different role in the 
development of the TIS. In Germany, the universities have contributed by developing, for 
instance, models and simulations, for understanding the basic science of the various 
processes, in addition to various types of system studies of the technologies. An attempt to 
contribute to process development was taken at Freiberg University, which developed a new 
design of the pressurised high temperature Winkler gasifier and intended to construct a 
large pilot plant. So far, that project has failed, and process development and other activities 
associated with the system building role have primarily been done by institutes (see Chapter 
VI).  
ZSW, FZK and CUTEC are three institutes who search for and develop opportunities across 
various knowledge fields relevant to the new TIS. By drawing on the general structure, both 
in Germany and internationally, institutes have acted as “catching-up learners” (Dalum et al., 
1992; Lundvall and Johnson, 1994) within the German national innovation system. In so 
doing, they have focused on process development, setting up laboratory and demonstration 
plants, as well as taking on the system building role by setting up alliances with potential 
capital goods suppliers and customers. The system building role, thus, appears to have 
become institutionalised, as the institutes have taken on the responsibility to support and 
improve the competitiveness of industry not only along established trajectories, but also for 
finding and creating new business opportunities in promising areas. 
In Finland, the institute VTT has to a lesser degree been a system builder since it has been 
part of a network with established actors interested in experimenting with the knowledge 
field for a wide range of applications. Instead, the most important role of VTT has been as a 
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node and system memory within the Finnish TIS. Although private firms have largely 
undertaken process and technology development, VTT has participated in the main 
gasification projects in various industry collaborations both in Finland and in Sweden since 
the 1970s. It has, therefore, had a unique opportunity to learn from successes and failures. 
VTT has also been able to build a science and technology infrastructure in their laboratories, 
which has enabled further learning. Additionally, as a result of long-term basic funding, VTT 
has been able to continuously conduct various types of experiments, thereby advancing the 
knowledge field even when private actors’ interest in the technology has been low. 
Consequently, when an industrial interest in gasification re-emerged with alternative fuels, 
VTT could play out their role as a system memory by setting up a research project (UCG) and 
quickly assessing how the technology could best be pursued for the new purpose. In 
addition, by setting up the research project and inviting all relevant industrial partners, they 
could be a node in the system, enabling the formation of two competing alliances (see 
Chapter VIII).   
In national contexts where there exists both strong institutes and universities competing in 
similar arenas, such as in Germany and Finland, there is a risk of a tension between the two 
types of actors. For example, since VTT focuses on applied research and process 
development in collaboration with industry in similar areas as the universities, there is a risk 
of “cannibalising” the university sector. However, within this particular knowledge field, a 
division of labour between the universities, institutes and firms appears to have been 
created during the Jalo and Liekkie research programmes. In this, the strong position of VTT 
has forced the academic units to focus and become even stronger on basic and pre-
commercial research in order to attract funding (Fogelholm, 2008; Hupa, 2008).  
In the case of Sweden, a similar division of labour was created between the national 
research and development laboratory in Studsvik and at the Royal Institute of Technology 
(KTH) in the 1970s. Studsvik focussed on research on process development and KTH on basic 
research. However, when all of the research-related activities in the field of renewable 
energy were terminated at Studsvik by Vattenfall, there was no longer a public actor in the 
field of fluidised bed gasification taking on the role of experimenting with process 
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development. Moreover, the spin-off company from Studsvik, TPS was later excluded from 
all collaborations with Vattenfall and Sydkraft.  
Hence, a hole in the Swedish structure was created where no actor (institute) existed that 
could take part and learn from major demonstration- or commercial-scale projects. Instead, 
VTT partly took on that role in Sweden.294 As a result, when the interest in fluidised bed 
gasification for transportation fuels re-emerged in the early-2000s, the universities were the 
only possible option to host the development projects. Hence, Växjö University created a 
holding company, VVBGC, for owning the Värnamo plant and coordinating research 
programmes. However, it clearly did not see that as its role―nor was it expected―to 
undertake system building activities or set up semi-commercial projects based on the 
research taking place. 
In the field of black liquor gasification, the research institute ETC has recently become an 
important partner for hosting large-scale experimental research equipment necessary for 
process development, while the participating universities have focused on basic science and 
system studies. The most well-known laboratory or demonstration equipment has, of 
course, been Chemrec’s black liquor gasifier but with the experience gained by participating 
in the development, ETC has been able to start experimenting in related fields and setting up 
collaborations with other actors. 
Hence, universities and institutes have important contributions to make to the dynamics of 
the TIS. They: 
a) act as “catch-up learners” and translate opportunities between different contexts 
(Lundvall and Johnson, 1994); 
b) set up alliances with technology suppliers and customers, create knowledge 
networks, and learn over an extended period of time from past experiments, thereby 
becoming the “system memory”; 
c) host a science and technology infrastructure of large-scale experimental equipment; 
d) can become a node for further experiments extending the design space into other 
areas; and  
                                                      
294 This “hole” in the structure has overtime been filled by Swedish-based actors such as the department of 
Energy technology at Chalmers (see Box 7.1, Chapter VII) and the institute ETC (see Box 7.2, Chapter VII). 
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e) educate future experts within the field and conduct basic research, as well as system 
studies.  
 
In the emergence of a new technological field, these two actors must deal with a complex 
set of tasks contributing to system dynamics. When possible, it is suggested that it could be 
beneficial for the two actors to seek and specialise in the undertaking of different types of 
system building and system supporting activities. In the above-mentioned cases, the 
institutes appear to have primarily focused on activities of system building and process 
development, as well as hosting large-scale experimental equipment, while the universities 
have focused on education, basic science and system studies.   
10.4 Industry 
The fourth contributor to system dynamics has been industry. For example, Repotec has so 
far dominated the industrial involvement in the Güssing project in Austria. As it is a small 
spin-off company (from AE&E), Repotec cannot take on large contracts by providing the 
required financial guarantees. It is therefore dependent on creating alliances with larger 
actors. Although potentially mutually beneficial, such an alliance could not be sustained with 
AE&E, since they had a booming business in their conventional technologies after their re-
construction. AE&E had, therefore, no incentives to set resources aside for a new and 
uncertain alternative technology, which they considered to be outside their current scope of 
business.  
In addition, Repotec was dependent on the EEG law supporting innovative CHP technologies. 
However, an alliance of incumbent industries in Austria, including the pulp and paper 
industry, managed to change the EEG law. Due to the weak functions of legitimation and 
direction of search in support of biomass gasification, both AE&E and the pulp and paper 
industry focused on improving the conditions for their current businesses instead of looking 
for new opportunities, which Repotec and the Güssing facility potentially could have offered.  
If Repotec, Professor Hofbauer at TU Vienna and the Güssing facility symbolise the 
possibilities of renewing the established industry structure in Austria, then institutes and the 
start-up company Choren carry the same symbol in Germany. All the institutes included in 
this study, as well as Choren, have identified from the start the need to create alliances with 
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capital goods suppliers and potential customers with complementary competencies, in order 
to take the next steps towards commercialising the technology. For example, FZK never 
considered it an option to create a new firm with the competence necessary to take the 
technology to the market, or for Choren to start developing new FT diesel catalysts (see 
Chapter VI).  
Compared to the Austrian system builders, the German actors have been more successful in 
creating alliances and setting up common development projects with national industries, 
arguably due to the focus of Volkswagen and Daimler on promoting FT diesel as an 
alternative fuel over first-generation fuels. Due to their involvement, further resources could 
be mobilised to the field, not the least by setting up the EU project RENEW.  
Despite the automotive manufacturers’ strengthening of legitimation and direction of search 
in Germany, the incumbent capital goods industries with complementary knowledge in 
gasification and downstream synthesis processes have been reluctant to enter the TIS. 
Future Energy was only willing to engage in developing the field when it had spare capacity. 
When Future Energy was acquired by Siemens and coal gasification boomed in China, it lost 
interest in the field. Uhde has also been reluctant to enter for similar reasons. In addition, 
both firms referred to the high costs of developing the technology and the market, lack of 
paying customers, and dependency on government support for the technology to be 
competitive.  
Nevertheless, FZK managed to convince Lurgi to take a major role in developing the 
technology. Lurgi already had experience with supplying equipment for first-generation fuels 
and could, based on its experience, identify a future market for second-generation fuels. In 
addition, Lurgi could find synergies between developing the option provided by FZK and the 
development of its future business in coal gasification (Chapter VI). 
Hence, although they have been reluctant at times, the incumbents provided 
complementary resources and competencies to the institutes and to Choren, gradually 
taking over technology development and taking the first steps towards enabling a renewal of 
the established industry structure in Germany.  
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In Sweden, development has been dominated by the small firms Chemrec and TPS, acting in 
networks supported by the Swedish Energy Agency. The capital goods supplier Götaverken-
Kvaerner was involved in the development in the 1980s and 1990s but was weakened over 
time. More recently, it was taken over by the Finnish capital goods supplier Metso. Since 
2000, no major Swedish-based capital goods supplier295 has taken part in the development 
by providing resources and complementary competencies. Nevertheless, Chemrec has been 
able to compensate for the lack of national capital goods suppliers. Backed by Volvo and the 
Swedish Energy Agency, it has been able to create alliances with European-based firms and 
the domestic pulp and paper industry for taking the necessary steps towards demonstrating 
the technology. Despite a similar type of backup, TPS was not able to compensate for the 
lack of industry structure and, due to also other circumstances, the recent plans for the 
Värnamo facility have so far not been realised.  
Hence, Chemrec, TPS and other actors with an interest in exploring new technological 
opportunities―within the field of biomass and black liquor gasification―were not able to 
find complementary resources and competencies in a national capital goods industry that 
can appropriate on the knowledge development. This means that the Swedish structure has 
a hole not only in the form of a lack of an advanced institute (working on the fluidised bed 
trajectory), but also in the form of capital goods suppliers.  
The development in Finland resembles Germany more than Austria and Sweden. However, it 
differs on one important point: the renewal of the incumbent industries (capital goods and 
pulp and paper) has, to an even greater extent than in Germany, taken place with an 
established network of actors, working within the design space of fluidised bed 
combustion.296 This network of actors has, with the support of the government, 
experimented with biomass gasification in common development projects for various 
applications and various types of biomass feed-stocks since the 1970s. Thus, it has been able 
to set up common development projects for renewing industry by extending the design 
                                                      
295 Metso Power has activities also in Sweden such as sales, production, service and administration. However, 
most of the research and development is located in Finland, where it also has its head-quarters. Source: 
www.metso.com, accessed 2010-11-05. 
296 Except for Carbona, which was formed when Vattenfall pulled out of Enviropower in the mid-1990s, the 
industrial renewal has not taken place through the creation of new actors (such as Repotec, Choren, Chemrec and 
TPS).  
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space to also include biomass gasification, just as it had previously done for the 
development of innovative paper machines and for the fluidised bed combustion technology 
(Chapter VIII).  
As the Swedish case has illustrated, for succeeding with this type of development project, a 
strong national-based capital goods sector is pivotal. Institutes, as well as small and 
innovative firms, are dependent on creating alliances with the incumbent industry for 
supporting projects with financial resources and complementary competencies. On the 
other hand, the incumbents appear to be locked into established businesses and seem to be 
dependent on institutes, universities and start-up firms to actually take on the role of 
developing and exploring new opportunities.  
10.5 Policymakers 
From an evolutionary perspective, policymakers should concern themselves with two main 
intervention alternatives. The first alternative concerns stimulating knowledge development 
and strengthening the innovative capabilities along existing and dominant knowledge 
trajectories. Along these relatively stable trajectories, knowledge is accumulated through 
incremental innovation and continuous improvements (Dosi, 1982). It has been argued that 
supporting the continuous improvements along well-established trajectories is what 
industrial policies often end up doing (Lundvall, 1992; Lundvall and Johnson, 1994).  
The second alternative involves the more demanding task in which policymakers actively 
stimulate the creation of variety and knowledge development outside the dominant 
trajectories. This involves making it easier for agents to shift from one trajectory to another, 
thereby stimulating the creation of new industries (Lundvall, 1992; Malerba, 1996; Metcalfe, 
2004).  
In the formulation of industrial policy, policymakers are prescribed the important role of “re-
formulating the rules of the game”, thereby taking on the role of a “midwife” in the creation 
of new knowledge fields and industries (Edquist, 2002). In addition, it has been emphasised 
that policymakers―acting as “midwives”―should focus on creating winners and not 
“picking” them (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1996; Lundvall, 2007). 
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This is, however, not to say that policymakers in the four countries have succeeded in acting 
as midwives with respect to biomass gasification, although attempts have been made to play 
that role in all of the case study countries. In Austria, with the help of Professor Hofbauer, 
policymakers could identify biomass gasification as an innovative technology, which had the 
potential to contribute to realising Austria’s ambitious environmental targets. Consequently, 
a competence centre, RENET, was created. It provided long-term financial support, which 
allowed Professor Hofbauer to build a larger research group, as well as international 
collaborations to perform research. RENET also supported the collaborative research of 
Repotec/AE&E, the plant operators and the researchers at the Güssing facility, which 
resulted in a rapid technology development. Finally, the construction of the demonstration 
and research facility in Güssing would not have been possible without the support 
framework for renewable electricity (EEG). 
During the time when AE&E experienced a down-turn in its market for combustion 
technology, the incentives provided by policy were sufficient for them to engage in the 
technology development of the gasification alternative. However, just a few years later the 
EEG was changed and AE&E experienced a booming business for conventional boilers. These 
changes weakened direction of search and legitimation. The incentives provided by the 
government were, by then, no longer sufficient to make the incumbent industry interested 
in participating in the knowledge development taking place at Güssing, and for potential 
customers in Austria to build similar types of plants. As a result, the actor structure was 
weakened and there are currently limited possibilities for Austrian-based actors to 
appropriate on the technology development taking place. Arguably, the policymakers in 
Austria had excellent opportunities to act as a midwife, but they missed out when changes 
were made to the EEG without providing exceptions for innovative technologies. In addition 
to these changes, further incentives would probably have been necessary for attracting the 
incumbent industry to take part in the technology development, thereby strengthening the 
Austrian TIS (Chapter V).  
In Germany, on the other hand, the necessary industry structure is in place for appropriating 
the benefits of knowledge development. Policy has supported a wide range of experiments 
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in biomass gasification with both technology-neutral support programmes such as regional 
development funds and innovation programmes. Furthermore, it has supported more 
technology-specific instruments such as the EEG and investment support from FNR, BMELV 
and regional governments. In addition, targets provided by the German government have 
often been more ambitious than the targets at the EU level, providing a stronger direction of 
search to the firms than in the other countries included in the study. Arguably, policymakers 
in Germany have attempted to take on the role of midwives, as they have played out a wide 
range of instruments necessary for “creating winners” without “picking them”.   
However, policy has supported experimentation with biomass gasification only since the 
1990s. Consequently, only limited experience has accumulated in Germany based on 
experiments with less advanced applications, at least compared with the situation in Sweden 
and Finland. In addition, even if the support has been substantial, no special provision 
guaranteeing a market for second-generation fuel in Germany has been created. Hence, 
there is no policy framework in place that supports the construction of plants beyond the 
initial demonstration phase. 
Since the 1970s, Swedish policy has promoted and identified the use of biomass, peat and 
black liquor gasification as a strategically important knowledge field for reducing oil 
dependency, the dependency of nuclear power and for abating climate change. However, 
the support has exclusively been in the form of investment subsidies and research and 
development support. No programmes strengthening market formation have been initiated 
beyond the CO2 tax introduced in 1991 and the green certificate scheme in 2003. However, 
for biomass gasification, such market incentives have made no real difference and have not 
allowed the technology to develop its potential.  
In addition, from a national perspective, strategic mistakes were made when the municipal-
owned utility Sydkraft and the state-owned utility Vattenfall were “allowed” to strengthen 
the TIS in Finland instead of building on the knowledge developed by Studsvik and 
Götaverken in the 1970s and 1980s. Compared with the situation for Chemrec, resources 
spent on fluidised bed gasification were not used to strengthen an actor and technology 
structure that remained in Sweden, including actors that could learn from mistakes.  
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The lack of an actor structure in Sweden has forced the Energy Agency to take on a very 
active role, supporting the remains of a structure in fluidised bed and black liquor 
gasification. The lack of actor structure has made it difficult to pursue a policy in which 
winners are created. Instead, policy has tried to pick winners by allocating significant 
resources to Chemrec and Värnamo. Without these actions, it is likely that Chemrec would 
have been forced to exit the TIS, and a new and vital structure for biomass gasification 
would not have been under development in the northern part of Sweden.  
Similar actions were undertaken by the Swedish Energy Agency to save the Värnamo plant 
and create an industry structure for commercialising FB gasification for the production of 
transportation fuels. However, it proved too difficult mainly since Vattenfall and Sydkraft 
had not supported the development of a national industry capable of commercialising the 
technology in the 1990s. The hole in the industry structure made later rescue actions next to 
impossible (Chapter VII). 
Hence, Swedish policy has failed on two accounts. First, it has failed to create niche markets 
for the technology to mature, which would have been of particular importance after the 
successful demonstration of the Värnamo plant. Second, it has failed to support the 
development of an actor structure that can learn from its mistakes. However, by having the 
courage to actually “pick winners”, this weakness may have been successfully addressed in 
the case of black liquor gasification.  
The role of policy in Finland has been dominated by a set of long-term research and 
development programmes that were initiated in the mid-1980s. The purpose of these 
programmes was to increase the level of knowledge and the competitiveness of the national 
industry for using peat and biomass in electricity production. A strategic goal was set for 
industry to develop its exports of power generating equipment to equal the value of the 
imported energy to Finland by 2000. In addition, policy has supported continuous 
experimentation with biomass gasification for various applications on demonstration and 
commercial scales. With funding provided by the government, the institute VTT has been 
able to participate in nearly all of the development projects, learn from its experiences, and 
develop a role as the system memory and node for future developments.  
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By the end of the 1990s, the actor and technology structure in Finland for pursuing BIGCC 
were probably the best in the world, but further technology development was necessary. 
For overcoming technical uncertainties, a market creation programme complemented with 
substantial investment subsidies exceeding the existing would have been necessary. Such 
incentives were, however, not provided. 
Policy in Finland has, just as in Sweden, never supported new technology development with 
market creation programmes, beyond a few demonstration plants and investments 
subsidies. Hence, policy has not attempted to take on the role of the midwife in the creation 
of new industries. Policy in Finland has instead primarily taken on the role of stimulating 
experimentation and knowledge development along given trajectories. It has also been 
conservative with incentives that would risk increasing the price of electricity and reduce the 
competitiveness of dominant industries.  
As previously mentioned, the main role of policy is that of a midwife in the creation of new 
industries, and their main task is to help build an environment that supports the creation of 
future winners. In so doing, it is of pivotal importance that a rich and heterogeneous 
technological, organisational and institutional structure is stimulated. Such a structure is 
central for the emergence of system builders and for them to draw resources, create 
alliances and develop new opportunities across various technological fields. 
Industrial policy formulated with the intention of stimulating the creation of variety and 
knowledge development outside the dominant trajectories is an inherently uncertain 
process in which failure is an important and inevitable part. It has, therefore, been argued 
that industrial policy should leave some room for experimentation and “calculated failures” 
(Smits and Kuhlmann, 2004). As, Lundvall (2007, p. 38) states:  
“...losers will become winners later on because they learn from the experience.” 
The outcome and value of such failed experiments is in turn highly unpredictable, but can 
form a base on which valuable lessons can be drawn for policymakers, entrepreneurs and 
other actors involved. Therefore, it is not necessarily a contradiction between effective 
policymaking and failed experiments. 
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To support the emergence of a rich and heterogeneous structure, it is therefore suggested 
that policymaking should shift from having a short terms focus of succeeding with individual 
projects (which of-course is also important) to focus on strengthening an emerging actor and 
technology structure. Hence, before policy finances projects in a new knowledge field, it is 
necessary to identify (see Chapter VII):  
a) what type of science and technology infrastructure is created. Is it useful beyond a 
single experiment or demonstration and, if so, who can continue to learn from it? 
b) who has the ability to appropriate the benefits of the knowledge development, even 
if the project itself fails? 
In order to ensure that there are firms that can appropriate the benefits of knowledge 
development, policy must tend to the survival of the capital goods industry as it strongly 
contributes to maintaining a rich and heterogeneous structure, which the system builder can 
draw upon. Without a prosperous capital goods industry, universities, institutes and 
technology-based venture firms will have limited opportunity to leverage technology 
developed in the market. In addition, national funding agencies will have limited prospects 
of finding that their efforts actually lead to the creation of new growth industries. It is, 
therefore, argued that the EU may have a particularly important role in identifying and 
supporting system builders that are embedded in weak national industry structures, 
enabling them to build alliances with international actors with complementary resources 
and competencies.  
For system builders to be able to create alliances with an existing capital goods industry, it 
was emphasised that incumbent industries often need strong incentives to explore new 
areas outside their current business scope, especially when they are doing well in 
established areas. Incentives to experiment and explore radically new areas are often given 
in terms of investment, research and development subsidies. However, since it was 
demonstrated that the system builders are limited in their capacity to strengthen market 
formation through institutional alignment (Chapter IX), programmes must be designed to 
create, at least temporary, markets for immature technologies. The combination of 
investment, research and development support with programmes designed to create 
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markets should be constituted so that some of the technical and market risks involved are 
alleviated and allow the technology to mature (cf. Kline and Rosenberg (1986)). 
For such incentives and programmes to be effective, they must consider the specific 
contextual conditions required for a new technology to emerge, mature and have a chance 
to realise their long-term potential. Hence, for industrial policy to be meaningful it must 
include significant technology-specific elements. From this perspective, generating the actual 
“content” of an effective industrial policy involves analysing who the potential system 
builders are in various important technological fields, the structure in which they are 
embedded, as well as the nature, extent and limits to their transformative capacity.  
10.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, the contributions of demonstration plants, universities and institutes, and 
industry and policy to system dynamics have been discussed.  
The discussion started with identifying demonstration plants as the primary tool for the 
system builders in realising their intentions. These plants are used for aligning various 
interests, drawing resources from the structure, creating alliances, experimenting with 
technology options, creating an initial market, etc. Indeed, the fundamental task of the 
system builder is to align the technology to the specific context in which he/she is 
embedded. This means that the technology pursued and the plants constructed are not a 
matter of what is primarily perceived as optimal from a technical or environmental 
perspective, but rather what is possible to pursue from the perspective of the system 
builders in relation to their backgrounds and the contexts in which they are embedded.  
Individuals at universities and institutes contribute to system dynamics by taking on the role 
of system builder, but they also contribute in other ways. It was shown that some of the 
German institutes have institutionalised the system building role, and act as “catch-up 
learners”―translating technological opportunities from one context to another. In Finland, 
the institute VTT did not act as a system builder but took on the role of a “system memory”, 
having participated in and gained experience from almost all major gasification projects in 
Finland, and some in Sweden, since the early-1970s. Having that type of experience enables 
them to also become an important node for setting up future collaborative projects within 
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the field. The institutes and universities also contribute to system dynamics by hosting a 
science and technology infrastructure, conducting basic research and system studies, and 
educating the engineers and experts necessary for the TIS to expand in the future.  
In the case of biomass gasification, most of the entrepreneurial experiments have taken 
place at universities, institutes and in small entrepreneurial firms. However, for 
commercialising the knowledge field, these actors are dependent on the resources and 
complementary competencies of the incumbent capital goods industries and other large 
actors along the entire value chain. Without the participation of an established industry 
structure, the entrepreneurial activities undertaken at the universities, institutes, and start-
up companies will not be leveraged into commercial opportunities. Since the system builders 
primarily draw resources from the local contexts, countries with a rich and heterogeneous 
industrial structure will have a competitive advantage over countries with a poor and 
homogenous industry structure.  
In contributing to system dynamics, the primary role of policy is to act as a “midwife” for an 
emerging TIS. Taking on that role involves tending to a structure that supports the creation 
of future winners. For supporting such a structure, it was concluded that policy should focus 
on what type of science and technology infrastructure that is created, if it is useful beyond a 
single experiment or demonstration and, if so, who can continue to learn from it. Clearly, 
policy needs to identify who has the ability to appropriate the benefits of the knowledge 
development even if the project itself fails. 
For policy incentives and programmes to be effective, it was further suggested that the 
specific contextual conditions must be considered and reflected upon. Such policymaking 
departs from the potential system builders in important technological fields and analyses the 
structure in which they are embedded, as well as the nature, extent and limits to their 
transformative capacity.  
As of yet, and as was specified in Chapter IX, the system builder have been limited in their 
capacity to turn the current “system building” motor into a “market motor” by aligning the 
institutional framework (Suurs, 2009). Consequently, in none of the case study countries 
have policymakers taken on the role of the midwife by supporting market formation beyond 
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the first demonstration plants, thereby, facilitating the large-scale diffusion of second-
generation fuels. In Chapter XI, the main policy options for shifting the field from the 
formative phase to a growth phase will be outlined.  
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Chapter XI                                                                                      
Policy challenges for completing the formative phase 
 
 
In Chapter I, the overall purpose of the thesis was formulated as to  
“ ... analyse the role of the system builders in the emergence of an industry with the capacity 
to realise the potential of gasified biomass for the production of second-generation 
transportation fuels and other chemicals within the European Union.” 
Four research questions centred on the system builders were formulated and were 
answered in Chapter IX. Chapter X provided reflections on the contributions to system 
dynamics by actors and elements of the structure other than the system builder. Based on 
the previous analysis it is now possible to provide a short answer to the fundamental 
question formulated in Chapter III: “ ... have the past 200 years of fossil fuel gasification, and 
the recent decades of experiments with biomass as a feed-stock for less advanced 
applications, created the industrial capacity necessary for commercialising the production of 
second-generation fuels based on biomass gasification?” 
The short answer to that question is: no, at least not yet. For such an industrial capacity to 
develop, two main system weaknesses at an EU level must be addressed by policymakers 
and system builders alike.  
In Chapter IX, the system weaknesses were formulated as: 
1) “ ... insufficient actor and technology structures in support of the development and 
diffusion of second-generation fuels.”  
2) “ ...  the lack of joint political network(s), advocating an alignment of institutions and 
technology.” 
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Since no second-generation fuel is produced from biomass, the actor and technology 
structure is―for different reasons―not sufficiently strong in any of the case study countries.  
Addressing the first system weakness is of particular importance in Austria and Sweden (with 
respect to fluidised bed gasification), as system builders in these countries have difficulties 
forming alliances with incumbent capital goods suppliers, with complementary resources 
and competencies―which can appropriate the benefits of knowledge development. With 
regard to the second weakness, it was argued that political networks are of particular 
importance in Sweden and Finland, as there is a lack of an institutional framework that 
recognises the need for creating market preconditions in support of emerging technologies. 
Resolving the first system weakness involves reducing the remaining technical uncertainties 
by building demonstration plants at a sub-optimal scale, as well as a few full-scale 
demonstration plants for each trajectory and taking them into operation. However, it also 
involves coordinating investments along the entire value chain and developing a wide range 
of complementary technologies. What these complementary technologies are depends on 
which of the three trajectories the system builders have chosen and which end product they 
intend to market. Therefore, completing the value chain involves resolving remaining 
organisational uncertainties as well. Hence, addressing the first system weakness involves 
resolving not only technical but also organisational uncertainties that currently discourage 
further investors from entering the TIS (see Chapter II).  
For enabling the system builders to address the first system weakness and begin large-scale 
diffusion of the technology by 2020, the function of market formation must already be 
strengthened now. It involves aligning the institutional frameworks to the technology, 
thereby reducing institutional and market uncertainties that discourage investors to enter 
the TIS (see Chapter II). It is only after these four uncertainties are resolved that the 
formative phase of the TIS can be finalised and shifted to a growth phase.297 So far, the 
system builders have been limited in their capacity with respect to achieving an institutional 
alignment, and if no further actions are taken in such a direction, it is likely that the TIS will 
remain in the formative phase well beyond 2020. 
                                                      
297 Below, it will be argued that it is highly unlikely that a growth phase can begin before 2020. 
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Policymakers willing to take on the role of “midwives” must, therefore, act to reduce the 
structural constrains of the system builders by strengthening market formation through 
institutional alignment. If such an alignment can be accomplished, the market uncertainties 
associated with the second system weakness can be reduced.298 In turn, this will provide 
incentives for actors with complementary competencies and resources to enter the TIS along 
the entire value chain, thereby reducing the organisational uncertainties.  
The entry of further actors is necessary but not a sufficient pre-condition for shifting the TIS 
into a growth phase. The technical uncertainties associated with the first system weakness 
and in scaling up the technology from pilot/demonstration plants to the first semi-
commercial and commercial-scale plants must also be addressed by policy.299 Hence, to 
ensure that the TIS moves into a growth phase by 2020, the main task of policy is to address 
market uncertainties and remaining technical uncertainties facing potential investors. 
Based on the previous chapters (mainly Chapters I and III), the technical uncertainties facing 
investors will be revisited in the following section. In the second section, an analysis will be 
presented of different policy instruments for reducing market uncertainties for investors, 
shifting them to society at large. A set of criteria for assessing policy instruments are 
developed and these are applied to a number of policy options. The third and final section 
concludes the discussion on policy.300  
11.1 Technical uncertainties 
The nine main projects are all in the process of moving from the pilot stage to constructing 
the first demonstration units (see Chapter III and Chapters V-VIII).301 The cost of these first 
demonstration plants ranges from €1-100 million. However, not all of these first 
                                                      
298 If market uncertainties are addressed by institutional alignment, the institutional uncertainties are thereby also 
addressed. The remaining discussion will thus focus on reducing market uncertainties as a key task for policy. 
299 Organisational uncertainties are assumed to be sufficiently reduced if the technical and market uncertainties 
are handled. The lack of an actor structure and other context-specific weaknesses that have been pointed at will 
not be handled here.    
300 Further implications for policymakers and system builders will be specified in Chapter XII.   
301 The exception is UPM and Andriz/Carbona, who plan to go from pilot to semi-commercial demonstration 
directly. Their pilot plant is, therefore, seen as their demonstration plant. The reconstruction of the Värnamo 
plant is currently on hold but there are still hopes to form an alliance with actors willing to take some of the 
required investment costs.  
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demonstration plants include the demonstration of the synthesis process, and they will be 
operated at a sub-optimal scale (see Table 11.1).  
Table 11.1: Estimates of cost and time plan for the major development projects. 
Sources: Representatives from the different projects, as well as (Atrax Energi, 2002; Zwart et al., 
2006a; Zwart et al., 2006b; Leible et al., 2007; Zwart, 2007; McKeough and Kurkela, 2008; RENEW, 
2008; Thunman et al., 2008).302 
 
The subsequent shift to pre-commercial demonstration plants and full commercial plants 
involves dramatic up-scaling of the size and cost of the plants. For instance, for the Chemrec 
plant (HT-EF gasification of black liquor in Sweden) this will involve an increase in output 
from 1.5ktoe in a demonstration plant that will be built by 2010 to 100ktoe in a pre-
commercial plant (possibly constructed by 2012-2013) and to 210ktoe in a commercial plant 
to be ready to take into operation no earlier than 2015 (Rudberg, 2008; Domsjö, 2009). The 
investment costs would typically be between €400-800 million for commercial plants with a 
production capacity in the range of 0.2Mtoe (Thunman et al., 2008).303 
As pointed out in Chapter III, there are substantial technical challenges and uncertainties 
facing investors. Throughout the up-scaling process, uncertainties of a technical nature are 
likely to remain although they are expected to be smaller as the up-scaling process proceeds. 
On the other hand, the sums involved are much larger, so technical uncertainties still 
constitute a serious obstacle to investment. Conventionally, demonstration plants receive 
investment subsidies from governments; however, risk absorption schemes may also be 
applied such as in the case of the Güssing plant in Austria (Hellsmark and Jacobsson, 2009). 
                                                      
302 This is the same as Figure 3.4.1 in Chapter III. The intentions and time frames of the representatives of the 
different projects change quite frequently and the figures in Table 11.1 are often updated.  
303 The large differences concerning the investment costs in Table 11.1 are influenced by the large uncertainties 
involved, but they also depend on technological trajectory, end-product and possibilities to integrate and share 
costs with existing industry infrastructure. 
Cost
Year Cost (M€) Year Size Cost (M€) Year Size Cost (M€) Year Size Cost (M€) €/lde
TU-Vienna/Repotec 1995 2002 8+1MW 10 2013 160GWh 75 2015< 0.07Mtoe 150 0,7
Chalmers/Metso 2008 1.1 2008 6MW 1.1 2015< 0.07Mtoe 150 0,7
ZSW/EVF 2002 2.4 2010 10MW 18 2013< 10MW 2015< 0.07Mtoe 150 0,7
Chemrec 2005 7 2010 5MW/1.5kt 28 2012/13 0.1Mtoe 300 2015< 0.2Mtoe 400 0,5
Värnamo 18MW 45 2015< 0.2Mtoe 400 0,7
Carbona/UPM 2005 10 2011/12 0.2Mtoe 400 2015< 0.2Mtoe 500 0,5
FW/SE/Nesté 2009 12/5MW 40 2011/12 0.1Mtoe 400 2015< 0.2Mtoe 500 0,5
Choren 1998 NA 2008 45MW/15kt 100 2015< 0.2Mtoe 800 0,85
FZK/Lurgi 2005 2008 5MW 4 2011 5MW 70 2015< 0.2Mtoe 900 1
Total 245 1245 1.41Mtoe 3950
Pilot Pre-Commercial Demo Commercial demoDemo
373 
 
In these schemes, funders absorb the risks by taking the loss if the project fails. This also 
means that banks don’t have to add a risk premium. 
Given the sums involved, any government programme must be very large, at least set in 
relation to other renewable energy technologies (with the exception of off-shore wind 
power). In the Swedish case, for instance, a new funding scheme for the demonstration and 
commercialisation of second-generation fuels and other energy technologies came into 
place in 2008 involving about SEK 875 million (€87 million)304 over a period of three to four 
years (Swedish Energy Agency, 2008). This scheme represented a major increase in the 
availability of such funding. Through the above-mentioned scheme, Chemrec was granted 
SEK 500 million (€50 million) and Göteborg Energy (acting to realise the TU Vienna/Repotec 
technology) SEK 222 million (€22 million) to complete the pre-commercial demonstration 
phase (in Table 11.1).  
Continuing with the case of Sweden, assuming that one plant from each of the three 
trajectories will be constructed in the next phase of commercial-sized demonstrations, an 
additional €1,000 million would have to be raised. To cover, say, 20 percent of the total 
investment, a demonstration funding scheme of an additional €200 million would therefore 
have to be made available. An obvious policy challenge is, thus, to devise policy instruments 
that can induce investors to face the technical uncertainties in moving to the first 
commercial plants. 
Such a programme must have a long duration in order to be effective. Currently, almost all 
of the alliances are constructing, or attempting, to get their demonstration plant into 
operation. Table 11.1 indicates when the various alliances predict that their projects will 
pass through the different phases. The year refers to when they expect the various plants to 
be constructed and not when they will be taken into operation. 
Based on the history of the field, these time plans are likely to be optimistic. For the 
Värnamo BIGCC demonstration plant, which was built in Sweden in the 1990s, it took 
approximately three years after its construction before it was operating with satisfaction and 
                                                      
304 1 SEK is approximately 0.1 EUR. 
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an additional three years to complete the demonstration programme (see Chapter VII). To 
produce synthetic fuels from biomass is a considerably more complex process than BIGCC. It 
may therefore be reasonable to assume that it will take at least three years, probably more, 
from when a pre-commercial demonstration plant has been constructed until any investor is 
willing to commit to a full-scale, semi-commercial demonstration plant.305  
Hence, it is likely that no continuous production of synthetic fuel will be sufficiently 
demonstrated and technical uncertainties resolved before 2013-14 in the demonstration 
plants currently being constructed on a sub-optimal-scale. Hence, investors will be expected 
to decide on constructing the first pre-commercial demonstration no earlier than 2014. It 
may then take perhaps three to four years to construct and demonstrate the larger plants. 
The associated technical uncertainties may not be expected to have been resolved, allowing 
for an investment decision for the first commercial-scale plant in 2017-18. The first 
commercially and continuously produced synthetic fuel from biomass gasification can to be 
expected be available no earlier than about 2020.  
Although perhaps unrealistic, assume that all of the projects in Table 11.1 are realised and at 
least one commercial-scale plant will be built for each project. The combined production 
capacity of these plants would then be approximately 1.4Mtoe. This amounts to less than 
0.5 percent of the EU transport fuel market. Hence, whilst second-generation fuels may be 
available by 2020, one cannot expect the volumes to be significant by then. 
In sum, the complexity and large-scale character of the technology for producing second-
generation transportation fuels from biomass dictates that, from an investor’s perspective, it 
is vital that policies involve not only substantial sums but also have a long-term horizon. The 
expected time scale involved in shifting from the current demonstration phase to a situation 
where second-generation fuels may have a significant impact on the market may also have 
to be adjusted (cf. IEA (2008), EC (2009a)), underlining the need to have a very long-term 
view of this process of transformation by policymakers. 
                                                      
305 In the case of Repotec and Metso Power, the pre-commercial demo is the first demonstration of the 
production of BioSNG. The previous demonstration concerns electricity production. 
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11.2 Market uncertainties 
There are very substantial uncertainties facing investors with respect to market formation, 
uncertainties that need to be handled if the potential of gasified biomass is to be realised. 
Two of these, the size of the potential supply capacity and the threat from substitutes, will 
now be discussed. 
11.2.1 The size of the potential supply capacity 
The current EU Directive, 2009/28/EC, mandates a 10 percent share of biofuels by 2020 for 
each and every member state (EC, 2009a). It translates into approximately 30Mtoe of the 
current fuel consumption.306 With a maximum of 1.4Mtoe in 2020, the contribution of 
second-generation fuels to this goal cannot, as above-mentioned, be expected to be more 
than marginal. 
Looking ahead and assuming that second-generation fuels capture a market of, say, 30Mtoe 
(approximately 10 percent of the current fuel market) by 2030, it would involve building 150 
plants, each supplying 0.2Mtoe of fuel. The total value of the fuel supplied would be in the 
order of €15-30 billion per year and the total investment for building these one hundred fifty 
plants would be in the magnitude of €60-120 billion (see Chapter III). 
Looking even further ahead to 2050, if gasified biomass “only” captures 25 percent of the 
current fuel market (77Mtoe), some 300-400 plants would have to be built at a total value of 
€150-300 billion.307 Thus, a large-scale transformation of the fuel market would entail huge 
market opportunities for both fuel and capital goods suppliers.  
However, and as was discussed in Chapter III, estimating the potential market for a new 
technology is always fraught with difficulties. Unlike many other technologies, a main factor 
is the long-term supply capacity. For three main reasons, it is difficult to assess how much 
                                                      
306 In 2006, the use of biofuel amounted to 5.4 Mtoe, or 1.8 percent of the market (Eurostat, 2009). 
307 Since the figures are highly uncertain, potential learning effects were not considered. Some learning that 
would result in lower investment cost could, however, be expected for every doubling of installed cumulative 
capacity. However, in an overview by Neij (1997), large-scale power plants experience very little learning. In 
some cases, the cost may even increase with installed capacity, which was the case for nuclear and coal 
electricity plants. For smaller power plants, the investment cost was reduced with an average of 13 percent for 
each time the cumulative installed capacity was doubled (Neij, 1997). If learning will take place, one may 
assume that it will be at most 13 percent.  
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renewable transportation fuels can be produced through gasifying domestic biomass 
resources in Europe. First, it depends on how much additional biomass can be produced and 
if/when lower grade biomass and waste sources can also be used for fuel production. Social 
and environmental aspects associated with increasing the production of biomass are difficult 
to assess but need to be carefully considered.308 
Second, it depends on what is perceived as a desirable allocation of the biomass potential to 
fuel production, as opposed to other uses of the biomass (e.g., supply of heat and power or 
bioplastics). Third, it depends on the thermal energy efficiency, for example the thermal 
energy ratio of turning biomass into fuel.  
In Chapter I, a simple calculation was made to illustrate the impact of these three factors on 
the potential to substitute fossil fuel with renewable fuel based on gasified biomass. The 
main message is that this potential is highly uncertain, as the substitution potential varies 
between 6 and 56 percent. In terms of potential market size, the range translates to as low 
as 18 and as high as 173Mtoe. 
11.2.2 Threat from substitutes 
A second source of uncertainty stems from threats from substitutes. Investors that may 
eventually deliver second-generation fuels face a great deal of competition. They must 
compete not only with the lower cost first-generation biofuels (biodiesel and ethanol, etc.) 
but also with fossil-based alternatives309 and conventional fuels (DENA, 2006; IES JRC, 2007). 
With respect to conventional fossil based fuels, potential investors would, in the absence of 
a deployment policy, face very substantial market uncertainties for both the initial nine 
plants and for the subsequent 100 and more plants. These uncertainties are illustrated in 
Figure 11.2 (also found in Chapter III, Figure 3.4.6). In the Figure, three cost levels for 
                                                      
308 On the other hand, the biomass potential would be expected to increase with increased use of biomass, as 
actors discover biomass resources to explore that previously had been unknown, underdeveloped and difficult to 
measure (Kåberger, 2009). 
309 Alternative fossil-based fuels, with the exception of oil shale, require a much lower oil price to break even 
than second-generation fuels from biomass. A higher oil price would, therefore, primarily induce a search for 
these fossil-based fuels rather than biomass based alternatives. A clear case in point is the massive interest for 
coal gasification in China, which attracts capital goods firms and others at the expense of developing biomass 
based solutions. 
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second-generation transportation fuels are distinguished: US$ 82, 140 and 165 per barrel. 
These cost levels were provided by advocates of the different projects and were explained in 
Chapter III. 
They refer to estimated cost levels for the production of second-generation transportation 
fuels from biomass, taking into consideration the availability and cost of the domestic 
biomass supply, the production method, end product, and possible integration into existing 
industry infrastructures. 
These cost levels can be set against past, present and predicted price levels for oil. The 
average world oil price from 1970 to 2009 was $35.59 in 2008 dollars.310 In the World Energy 
Outlook, IEA (2009) predicts the real oil price by 2030 in two main scenarios. In the first, the 
reference scenario, it is set at $115 per barrel, and in the second, the high price scenario, it is 
raised to $150 per barrel (constant 2008 prices). 
Figure 11.2 provides a base for assessing the financial magnitude of uncertainties caused by 
unknown future oil prices. It points to the hypothetic annual losses (or gains) for investors if 
a 10 percent BtL market (30Mtoe) is realised sometime in the future. Investors would lose 
almost $30 billion if that market was realised at a production cost of BtL of $165 per barrel 
and with an oil price at an historic average of $35 per barrel. On the other hand, with 
production costs of $82 per barrel of BtL and with the oil price at the predicted $150 per 
barrel, investors would gain substantial sums.  
                                                      
310 Calculated by wtgr.com Accessed 2010-05-05 
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 Figure 11.2: A tentative assessment of financial risk for commercial-sized plants―Annual cost of 
realising a BtL market (10 percent second-generation fuels from biomass) (M$). 
 
In sum, there are substantial technical and market related uncertainties for all actors 
necessary to realise the potential of second-generation transportation fuels, including those 
in the capital goods industry, the refinery industry and among the transport equipment 
manufacturers. Moreover, these uncertainties are not of a short-term character but are 
expected to exist for many years ahead. Therefore, only very powerful and durable 
incentives may induce the necessary investments―including continued coordination 
between investors―to take the industry into a pre-commercial demonstration phase and, 
eventually, form significant markets for synthetic biomass-based fuels. These incentives not 
only have to induce investors to face technical uncertainties for a prolonged time period, but 
they also balance the cost differentials with first-generation biofuels311 and manage the large 
market uncertainties with respect to conventional fuels. In the subsequent section, various 
policy options will be discussed. 
                                                      
311 A source of added complexity comes from alternative fossil fuels, the use of which leads to huge emissions as 
mentioned in the Introduction. Yet, many capital goods firms are attracted by markets for such fuels, for example 
in China, at the expense of developing the technology to gasify biomass. 
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11.2 Realising the opportunities of gasified biomass―an analysis of policy 
options312 
Reducing technical and market uncertainties is the main challenge ahead for policymakers, 
and in this section various means of doing so in an effective manner will be discussed. The 
focus will be on market uncertainties since investment subsidies or risk absorption schemes 
(managing technical uncertainties) alone may not be enough to stimulate investments 
(about €4 billion) even in the first set of nine commercial-scale plants (see Table 11.1) due to 
the very large market uncertainties. Yet, the technical uncertainties must be handled as well, 
which will be returned to in the concluding discussion. Before discussing the usefulness of 
various policy instruments for forming markets, it is, however, necessary to specify the 
assessment criteria, in particular what “effectiveness” entails.  
11.2.1 Criteria for assessing policy instruments 
Effectiveness, efficiency and equity are three commonly used criteria for assessing policy 
options (Verbruggen, 2008; Jacobsson et al., 2009). The effectiveness of an instrument is 
assessed by its ability to meet a certain target, for example ten percent biofuel by 2020.  
Efficiency, or cost effectiveness, often involves focusing on selecting the currently most cost-
efficient technologies (see for instance the “Tradable Green Certificate Systems” in the UK, 
Sweden and Flanders (Jacobsson et al., 2009). There are two problems with this criterion. 
First, efficiency without effectiveness is meaningless: it makes sense to assess the efficiency 
of instruments only if they are expected to lead to the achievement of a certain target. To 
the extent that this requires the development and diffusion of second-generation 
transportation fuels, the effectiveness of any policy instrument must be assessed, as is 
evident from the sections above, by its ability to influence the strategic decisions of actors to 
explore and develop alternative technical solutions, fill the whole value chain and coordinate 
actions. This process of “putting gasified biomass on the shelf” (Sandén and Azar, 2005) has 
hitherto taken decades and we have still only reached the stage of smaller scale 
demonstration plants for more advanced applications. Unless it can be convincingly argued 
that all instruments are equally likely to be effective, the potential impact of these on the 
                                                      
312 This chapter draws heavily on Hellsmark and Jacobsson (2010). 
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behaviour of the capital goods industry (and other actors in the value chain) and the 
associated impact on technical change must be scrutinised. 
Second, minimising costs over several decades means that there is a need to focus on what 
policy instruments can be expected to generate the lowest cost solution over the whole 
period, again taking technical change into account. This rests, to a large extent, on the 
innovative capabilities in the capital goods industry. Hence, both effectiveness and cost 
effectiveness rests on the ability of various instruments to influence the capital goods sector 
and its ability to drive technical change. 
The third criterion is equity, which is a crucial factor in creating social legitimacy for policies 
supporting new technology. Excess profits threaten legitimacy and must be avoided (e.g. 
European Commission (1999); Verbruggen (2008); Jacobsson et al., (2009); Bergek and 
Jacobsson (2010)).  
In order to assess the effectiveness, as well as the cost-effectiveness of a policy instrument, 
a goal of the intervention must be specified. In broad terms, this goal is related to the need 
to greatly reduce GHG emissions over the next four decades. Of course, a diffusion of 
second-generation fuels is only one element in such a change, and a specific goal of diffusing 
second-generation fuels has not been set in the individual countries, nor at the EU level.  
However, as mentioned earlier, a general biofuel goal of 10 percent of the European land 
transport fuel by 2020 has been set by the EU Commission, which would involve about 
30Mtoe, up from 5.5Mtoe in 2006 (IEA, 2008, Table 7.2). Going beyond 2020, an aggressive 
strategy to cut emissions would involve a major increase in the supply of second-generation 
transportation fuels from biomass (IEA, 2008, p.473). 
What goal should the “effectiveness” criterion be related to? Arguably, for the period from 
now until 2020, an initial goal would be to move from smaller demonstration plants to 
having full commercial-sized plants from the different trajectories up and running. In 
addition, whole value chains need to be formed. Hence, a first goal is to “put the various 
technologies on the shelf”. Of course, given the range of uncertainties, it is possible that 
some of the experiments fail and that a specific technology turns out to be unviable. A broad 
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set of experiments ensures, though, that not all will be failures. Having the various 
technologies “on the shelf” is likely to be achieved no earlier than 2020. This means that we 
expect it to take at least 10 years to move from the current small-scale demonstration plants 
to the first commercial-sized plants that can continuously produce a range of second-
generation transportation fuels. As mentioned above, in terms of market share, these first 
plants would supply less than 0.5 percent of the EU land transport fuel market.  
In the next stage, a goal for 2030 could, for instance, be set at 20 percent biofuel, out of 
which half could be second-generation. This would amount to about 30Mtoe.313 As 
previously mentioned, this would involve building about 150 plants, which subsequently will 
be used as a second goal. 
This means that policies must be assessed with respect to their ability to meet these two 
goals within the specified time frame. To be effective, we will argue that several alternative 
technologies need to be developed. This is, of course, inherent in the first goal but also, 
arguably, a necessity if the second goal is to be reached. 
In contrast to many other industries―such as the automobile and consumer goods 
industries―the different technological trajectories do not represent conventional 
“competing designs”, that is design configurations that can substitute one for the other 
(Utterback, 1994). The applications of the technologies in the three trajectories to specific 
contexts are more or less constrained in their potential. For instance, feed-stocks vary in 
their availability, for example the use of HT-EF with black liquor as a feed-stock is 
constrained by the number of paper and pulp mills with chemical process technology (in 
contrast to mechanical). Moreover, there are joint production opportunities in the paper 
and pulp, petro-chemical and district heating industries, but, of course, the opportunities for 
economies of scope are limited by the size of these industries.  
The lowest cost level for producing BtL in Europe based on domestic biomass resources can 
be expected to be found in Sweden and Finland due to large volumes of forestry residues in 
connection with the pulp and paper industry, as well as large district heating networks in 
                                                      
313 This is broadly in line with the 450 Policy Scenario in IEA (2008) if the EU maintains its share of the global 
biofuel market. 
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which the technologies (all three trajectories) can be integrated (Ekbom et al., 2003; 
McKeough and Kurkela, 2008; RENEW, 2008). The potential in a European market 
perspective is, however, quite limited. Ekbom et al., (2003, Table 7.1) show that the 
potential for FT diesel production using black liquor is about 2Mtoe for Sweden and Finland 
together. This would substitute for about 20 percent of the petrol/diesel consumption in 
these two countries. Even if production were to be doubled by the inclusion of fuel 
production in mechanical paper mills and district heating systems, meeting a goal of 30Mtoe 
by 2030, and going beyond it, would certainly require that the higher cost technologies and 
biomass resources would also need to be deployed.  
With the long time axis of going from small demonstrations to full commercial plants―in 
other words putting the technologies on the “shelf” and the extension of that time axis in 
their subsequent diffusion―effectiveness involves creating markets for all the three 
trajectories which then will develop in parallel rather than sequentially, jointly up-scaling the 
technologies and gaining market shares from fossil alternatives and not from each other. 
Therefore, from a climate change perspective, the competition to focus on is between fossil-
based (conventional and alternative) and biomass-based alternatives rather than between 
the three design approaches for using biomass as a feed-stock.  
11.2.2 An analysis of policy instruments for reducing market uncertainties 
for investors 
Having established a key criterion for assessing the effectiveness of various policy 
instruments, a number of such instruments that are either in operation or have been 
proposed to foster a market for second-generation transportation fuels will now be 
discussed. It will be assumed that the policy instruments operate at the EU level. The 
instruments are a general quota for biofuel (including first- and second-generation), 
separate quotas for first and second-generations and feed-in tariffs. Before turning to these, 
two other instruments will be mentioned briefly: tradable green certificates and the 
inclusion of the transport sector in the European Emission Trading System (ETS).  
Tradable green certificates (TGC) are an instrument that has been heavily favoured by the EU 
Commission and other actors as a deployment policy in the field of renewable power 
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(Jacobsson et al., 2009). The core of this policy is, however, to select the currently most cost-
efficient technology and only in a step-wise manner introduce more costly technologies. It is 
a policy instrument that deliberately abstains from creating a market for less developed, and 
higher cost technologies (Bergek and Jacobsson, 2010). Hence, it cannot be expected to fulfil 
the effectiveness criterion.314 As for the inclusion of the transport sector in the ETS, it is 
obvious that the volatility of the price for emission permits and the highly uncertain future of 
the size of the cap create very large uncertainties for investors who have to estimate income 
streams over two or more decades. Hence, in terms of Figure 11.2, the market uncertainty is 
very high indeed which strongly discourages investments. 
A quota for biofuels is currently operating in, for example, Germany. However, a general 
quota induces an expansion of the least cost options first, that is first-generation biofuels. 
Whereas the desirability of first-generation biofuels is questionable (in terms of both their 
ability to reduce emissions and their use of food crops and arable land), the potential is 
large, especially considering import opportunities from Latin America and Africa. A general 
quota would, therefore, not be a strong inducement mechanism for firms to invest in up-
scaling and further developing second-generation biofuels.315 
To stimulate such development, the European Commission has decided that the “ ... 
contribution made by biofuels produced from waste, residues, non-food cellulosic material, 
and lingo-cellulosic material shall be considered twice that made by other biofuels ... ” (EC, 
2009a, Article 21:2). In addition, the EC proposes that when Member States design their 
support systems they may give “ ... additional benefits to ... biofuels made from waste, 
residues, non-food cellulosic material, lingo-cellulosic material and algae, as well as non-
irrigated plants grown in arid areas to fight desertification ... ” (EC, 2009a, p.26). Hence, the 
Commission recognises that second-generation fuels will be considerably more expensive 
than first-generation and need additional support in order to develop. 
                                                      
314 For a discussion of this point with respect to renewable power technologies, see Jacobsson et al., (2009). In 
that paper, there is also a lengthy discussion on the equity criterion and TGCs fail also on that account. 
315 The EU directive states that by 2017 biofuels must reduce CO2 emissions by 70 percent, which may reduce 
the demand for first-generation biofuels and may open up for second-generation fuels.  
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A double counting would provide an added incentive to investors in second-generation fuels 
that better reflects its performance in terms of CO2 emissions. Market uncertainty remains 
high, however, and is magnified by the interdependency with the price of conventional fuel. 
Assuming that both first and second-generation transportation fuels are blended into diesel, 
the competitiveness of second-generation vis-à-vis first-generation will depend on the price 
of conventional fuel. If that price increases, first-generation biofuels gains a competitive 
edge simply because it, in terms of volume, replaces about twice as much diesel as the 
second-generation fuels from biomass (Choren, 2007b). Thus, potential investors must 
consider the future prices (over decades) of not only first and second-generation biofuels 
but also of conventional fuels. This adds uncertainty to any investment analysis. 
The effectiveness criterion, thus, excludes not only TGCs and CO2 trade but, arguably, also a 
general quota. At best, a double counting of second-generation transportation fuels from 
biomass may be expected to induce a sequential development of the three technological 
trajectories, starting with the lowest cost alternative. 
A separate blending quota designed for second-generation fuels would alleviate the problem 
of interdependency with the price of conventional fuel and take away the market 
uncertainty with respect to first-generation biofuel. As and when the first larger plants are 
constructed, a predetermined quota could be applied. In order to stimulate a supply capacity 
in the Nordic countries, a unified EU separate blending quota for second-generation fuels 
would, of course, have to be coupled with trading opportunities, in other words an export 
from Sweden and Finland to other countries (as is specified in Directive 2009/28/EC). 
However, integrating the Nordic and German markets may lead to equity problems. As 
argued in Chapter III, the estimated cost levels of second-generation fuels differ a great deal, 
to the advantage of Swedish and Finnish suppliers. With an integration of the markets, price 
levels are expected to be equalised, with potentially huge excess profits gained by the 
Nordic suppliers.316  
                                                      
316 A (less likely) risk is that the Nordic suppliers would expand so rapidly that they could fill the whole German 
quota and out-compete emerging German competitors. A low quota would, therefore, lead to market uncertainty 
in the sense that a supplier of a higher cost alternative would always face an uncertainty with respect to whether 
there will be a market or not. This may lead to a sequential development and jeopardise the effectiveness 
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An additional problem with a quota is the very substantial information requirements for a 
central planner in setting the quota, both its initial level and its escalation. Basically, today 
nobody can say with certainty when the first commercial plant will be operational. It is even 
more difficult to judge how quickly the supply capacity in the capital goods industry can 
grow, as it depends not only on the strategic choice of a number of capital goods firms but 
also on the access to specialised skills in a range of areas, including gasification and catalysis. 
A recurrent theme in interviews with capital goods suppliers and other firms was the lack of 
specialised competencies in the field. 
Feed-in with cost covering payment that differs between technologies is a well proven 
regulatory framework to stimulate the diffusion and further development of a range of 
technologies in parallel, that is a feed-in tariff is expected to score high on the effectiveness 
criterion. Just as double counting in a quota system, a feed-in tariff may stimulate more 
expensive, but higher performing alternatives through setting higher prices. In principle, 
excess profits may be avoided by a careful price-setting routine. Such prices, which are 
normally set for a period of 15-20 years, would, however, need to be adjusted for fluctuating 
feed-stock prices.  
However, there are two major problems with this instrument, at least at this stage. First, 
effectiveness necessitates that one tariff is set for each technological trajectory. It is, 
however, not possible to calculate costs with the required precision without the experience 
of full-sized commercial plants. Second, there is, as yet, no competition in the capital goods 
sector within each trajectory, which means that setting a feed-in price would involve 
negotiations between government and monopolistic suppliers with access to superior 
information. This opens up for problems with the equity criterion.  
Hence, a dedicated BtL quota appears to be a more attractive option, as a price does not 
need to be set for 15-20 years but may evolve as experience is gained. Yet, as explained 
above, there are very considerable information problems for a central authority to set a 
quota over a longer period of time. Moreover, it remains doubtful if a promise by current 
                                                                                                                                                                         
criterion. Setting a relatively high quota would reduce this risk but at the expense of high consumer costs 
(equity).  
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politicians of a quota by, say, 2020 would be enough to convince firms that a market will 
eventually materialise with prices that will cover costs.  
In sum, none of the currently discussed policy options are a strong candidate, at least not at 
this stage of development of the industry. Tradable green certificates, inclusion of the 
transport sector in the ETS and a general biofuel quota would be expected to fail on the 
effectiveness criterion. Double counting second-generation fuels would, at best, lead to a 
sequential development of the three technological trajectories and, hence, fail on the 
effectiveness criterion too (but less so than the prior alternatives). If high enough, a 
dedicated quota for second-generation fuels would promote a broad development of 
gasified biomass, but setting the quota level is currently fraught with extreme difficulties. 
Equity issues would also arise. Finally, problems with information access (and equity issues) 
may rule out a feed-in law. 
An option would be to implement a “bridging policy” that reduces the information needs 
among policymakers while taking away the market uncertainties for the first set of plants. 
One such alternative would be to implement plant-specific tax exemptions (increasing the 
price competitiveness of second-generation fuels) coupled with guaranteed market and off-
take price from public sector customers, or, possibly, traders or oil companies. In effect, such 
a price would be a miniaturised plant specific feed-in law. With regard to relative price level 
vis-à-vis conventional fuel, the customer would absorb the market uncertainty, but the tax 
exemption would reduce the size of the potential losses. At the same time, as argued above, 
some of the technical risks would need to be absorbed by society at large. This temporary 
construction would take the capital goods industry through to the stage where the first 
commercial sized plants are built, reducing the technical uncertainties and completing the 
respective value chains.317 It would also give the added benefit of generating a pool of 
experience and competencies on which a long-term policy can be based, be it a dedicated 
quota for second-generation fuels or a feed-in policy. 
                                                      
317 This refers, in particular, to the supply of bioslurries and torrefied biomass (HT-EF trajectory), downstream in 
the SNG value chain, for example truck engines and infrastructure for using DME.  
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11.3 Concluding discussion 
For close to four decades, efforts have been made to develop biomass gasification, initially 
aiming for oil replacement in paper and pulp mills, alternative transportation fuels and for 
electricity production. More recently, the focus has shifted back to the supply of second-
generation transportation fuels, which are expected to become a major substitute to 
conventional fuels, fossil-based alternatives and first-generation biofuels, contributing to a 
reduction in GHG emissions while increasing security of supply.  
In the EU, three main technological trajectories are explored to gasify biomass. Nine 
alliances of firms, institutes and universities each centre on pilot and demonstration plants 
in which one of these trajectories is applied to a specific context. These alliances plan to use 
different production processes, different feed-stocks (e.g., black liquor, straw, forest 
thinning, etc.), and supply different types of second-generation fuels (DME, Fischer Tropsch 
diesel and SNG). For these alliances, the challenge is to finish building the demonstration 
plants, to radically upscale these and to supply second-generation transportation fuels from 
the first commercial sized plants by about 2020.  
It is, however, not until subsequent plants are built that second-generation transportation 
fuels may make significant inroads into the market. Expectations that this will take place 
before 2020 are probably too optimistic. As with other large-scale technological 
transformations, the time axis extends into multiple decades. The long-term (2030–2050) 
market potential for both capital goods and fuel is, however, probably very large but very 
uncertain. This potential rests on the ability to secure an enlarged supply of biomass, to 
ensure the allocation of a substantial share of it to biofuel and to reach a high efficiency in 
transforming that biomass to fuel. Hence, the potential market is large but uncertain and 
very distant.  
These features meet potential investors throughout the whole value chain, from agriculture 
to transport equipment. Uncertainties in terms of the regulatory framework governing the 
outcome of investments abound. This needs to be recognised by policymakers who, in turn, 
must demonstrate a long-term commitment to the field by addressing the two remaining 
system weaknesses (specified in Chapter IX).  
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These weaknesses can be addressed by policy instruments that reduce the remaining 
technical and market uncertainties, thereby securing that industry continues to develop the 
technology in all its aspects.  
From an investor’s perspective, a commitment to second-generation biofuels involves facing 
a number of technical uncertainties that can only be reduced through building 
demonstration plants. Moving towards commercial-scale plants involves, however, a 
dramatic up-scaling and an increase in costs. As the Swedish case demonstrated, the sums 
involved are so large that current demonstration programmes, or schemes for risk 
absorption, need to be significantly enlarged to ensure that plants in all three 
trajectories―using different feed-stocks and supplying different second-generation 
fuels―are up-scaled. However, such large-scale schemes risk creating a phenomenon in 
which other technologies are crowded out.  
It may well be argued that such large-scale demonstration plants should mainly be funded at 
the EU level, developing technology that would satisfy quotas set by the Commission and 
generating benefits for the whole of the EU. Indeed, as all projects progress, they will 
depend on inter-European alliances since no country (possibly with the exception of 
Germany) has firms covering the necessary knowledge for commercialising the gasification 
for advanced chemicals and transportation fuels. The industry is likely to evolve into a 
European one and not a national one. Therefore, it is unrealistic that local or national 
governments should fully fund costly and risky large scale demonstrations.    
Demonstration programmes that absorb technical uncertainties are not sufficient for 
addressing the first system weakness. Market formation programmes are also critical due to 
large uncertainties caused by unknown future prices for conventional fuel and other 
substitutes. Without reducing these uncertainties and providing an income stream to 
investors, we cannot expect the key firms in the alliances to go ahead with the very 
expensive up-scaling of the technologies to commercial-scale sizes. Nor can it be expected 
that actors with complementary competencies and resources enter the system, reducing 
organisational and technical uncertainties along the entire value chain. Thus, it is pivotal that 
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policy address the second system weakness, and thereby strengthen market formation 
through institutional alignment. 
There is an abundance of different public policy instruments to form markets and assessing 
the usefulness of each of them requires that clear criteria are developed. The effectiveness 
of an instrument is assessed by its ability to meet a certain target, whereas efficiency, or cost 
effectiveness, refers to meeting this target at its lowest cost. As efficiency is meaningless 
without effectiveness, the latter takes priority. Equity is the third criterion. 
Discussing the effectiveness of an instrument requires a specified goal. It was suggested that 
a goal for 2030 could be set at 20 percent biofuel, out of which half could be second-
generation. This would amount to about 30Mtoe, involving about 150 plants. Subsequently, 
the market share may be increased to perhaps 25 percent. This would require not only a 
maximum deployment of different technologies in the Nordic countries (using local heat 
sinks and joint production opportunities in the paper and pulp industry) but also those 
higher cost alternatives under development. Reaching this goal thus necessitates the 
coexistence of a range of technologies with quite different cost levels. With the inherently 
long time axis in moving towards the first commercial-scale plants and the subsequent 
multiplication of these, effectiveness, therefore, involves creating markets for all of the three 
trajectories which then will develop in parallel rather than sequentially. 
Most of the currently discussed policy instruments fail on this criterion. This refers to 
tradable green certificates, inclusion of the transport sector in the ETS and a general biofuel 
quota. Double counting second-generation fuels would be expected to fail on the 
effectiveness criterion too, but less so. A dedicated quota for second-generation fuels would, 
if high enough, promote a broad development of gasified biomass but setting the quota level 
is currently fraught with extreme difficulties in terms of information access for policymakers. 
Equity issues would also arise. These problems may also rule out a feed-in law.  
A way forward is a “bridging policy” that takes away market uncertainties for the first plants 
whilst reducing the information needs among policymakers. This bridge could be built by 
implementing plant-specific tax exemptions coupled with a guaranteed market and off-take 
price. The market uncertainty is absorbed by the customer but the tax exemption would 
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reduce the size of the potential losses. This bridge would a) ensure a market; b) demonstrate 
a strong commitment to the technology; c) take the capital goods industry through to the 
stage where the first commercial-sized plants are built, reducing the technical uncertainties 
and populating the respective value chains; and d) generate a pool of experience and 
competencies on which a long-term policy can be based. Whereas it was argued above that 
the EU should fund the bulk of the demonstration programmes, the tax exemptions and the 
guaranteed market/off-take price may be set at the national levels in order to demonstrate 
the commitment from local actors―including policymakers―strengthening the alliances. 
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Chapter XII                                                                                     
Contributions and implications for policymakers,                                    
system builders and future research  
 
 
In Chapter I, the purpose of this thesis was specified as to “ ... analyse the role of the system 
builders in the emergence of an industry with the capacity to realise the potential of gasified 
biomass for the production of second-generation transportation fuels and other chemicals 
within the European Union.”  
The analysis has focused on nine projects in four European countries―Austria, Germany, 
Sweden and Finland―where the main technology development within the field is currently 
taking place. In this thesis, the analysis has been divided into three parts and twelve 
chapters. 
In Chapter II, the analytical framework was laid down and four research questions were 
formulated, addressing (1) who act as system builders; (2) the nature and extent of their 
transformative capacity; (3) the limits to their transformative capacity and how these can be 
explained; and (4) given these limits, which system weaknesses remain to be resolved by 
system builders and policymakers?  
In Chapter III, the history of fossil and biomass gasification was outlined. Three main 
technological trajectories in the production of second-generation fuels and other chemicals 
were described, as were the characteristics of nine major projects in Europe pursued by 
various alliances. The methods used were described in Chapter IV which marked the end of 
Part I―Setting the scene.  
In Part II, the four case studies―Austria (Chapter V), Germany (Chapter VI), Sweden (Chapter 
VII), and Finland (Chapter VIII)―were presented. For each of these, the history of biomass 
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gasification was described along the three main technological trajectories, leading up to the 
current projects (as of 2009). The four research questions were answered for each country.  
In Part III, “Back to the future”, a cross-country analysis of the four research questions was 
presented (Chapter IX). Whilst the focus of the thesis has been on the system builders, the 
case studies made clear that also other actors and elements contributed to system 
dynamics. These contributions were analysed in Chapter X. In Chapter XI, policy options for 
addressing the remaining system weaknesses were specified. 
The purpose of this final chapter of the thesis, Chapter XII, is to present the main analytical 
and empirical contributions, and discuss implications for system builders, policymakers as 
well as for future research. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section 
presents analytical and empirical contributions; the second section discusses implications for 
system builders and policymakers; and the third section points to some implications for 
future research. 
12.1 Analytical and empirical contributions 
Schumpeter (1934), Hughes (1979), Summerton (1994) and Carlson and Jacobsson (1997) 
have previously described entrepreneurs, system builders and prime movers as key actors in 
the formation of new industries and innovation systems. On some occasions, the innovation 
system literature has described system builders and prime movers as a constellation of 
actors, networks or alliances (cf. Jacobsson and Johnson (2000)). However, following in the 
Schumpeterian tradition, evolutionary and innovation system literature has primarily 
portrayed the firm, and not the individual, as the key actor (Nelson, 1995b).  
In this thesis, a systematic analysis has been undertaken, identifying a wide range of actors 
taking on the system building role. With research question one (RQ1, Chapter IX), it was 
demonstrated that such a role can be taken by a wide range of actors such as individuals, 
institutes, policymakers, established networks, as well as private and public firms.  
In common for all these system builders is that they do act to form alliances (and networks) 
with other actors, along the value chain, with the required complementary resources and 
competencies for commercialising the knowledge field. After successfully having created 
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such alliances (and networks), these take over the system building role, even if certain 
individuals may remain very influential in the networks. Hence, empirically this thesis 
contributes with: 
a) a systematic analysis of who act as system builders in various contexts. 
Hellsmark and Jacobsson (2009), as well as this thesis, presented an improved 
conceptualisation of the role of system builders in realising the potential of an emerging 
technological field. This was done by including Giddens’ (1984a) concept of “transformative 
capacity” into the TIS framework, as a means of analysing the extent and limits of the system 
builders in creating and strengthening the embryonic structure and various functions of a TIS 
in a formative phase. Hence, this thesis contributes with:  
b) an improved conceptualisation of system builders for analysing the extent and limits 
of their transformative capacity as they act to form and strengthen the embryonic 
structure and functions of the TIS. 
In Chapter IX, it was argued that the transformative capacity of the system builders is 
conditioned but not determined by the general structure in which they are embedded. By 
using this general (NSI, RSI, SSI) structure (see Figure 2.1 in Chapter II), the system builders 
have been able to strengthen three sets of functions—“know how”, “know about” and 
“enablers”—as well as creating or strengthening the TIS-specific structure directly. In 
Chapters II and IX, the “know how” and “know about” functions were identified as 
epistemologically distinct from each other, since strengthening these processes result in 
building different types of knowledge in the TIS.  
The first set―the “know how” functions―is made-up of the functions knowledge 
development and diffusion, entrepreneurial experimentation and materialisation. The system 
builders strengthen these by conducting basic research, experimenting and testing new 
ideas, and by constructing various types of technology related structural elements such as 
patents, plants, components, and instruments. These elements then become part of the 
science and technology infrastructure of the TIS, on the basis of which further experiments 
and knowledge development can be made.  
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When the “know how” functions are strengthened, the system builders develop an 
embryonic industrial capacity, necessary for exploring various types of applications and feed-
stocks, and moving from the construction of pilot and demonstration plants to commercial-
scale facilities. However, strengthening the “know how” functions and developing an 
industrial capacity sufficient for finalising the formative phase, thereby beginning to realise 
the potential of the emerging TIS, requires that the “know about” functions, “enablers” and 
all of the structural elements of the TIS are also strengthened. 
The second set of functions was labelled “know about” functions―legitimation and direction 
of search. These functions are strengthened, for example, as the system builders conduct 
system studies and build plants, both of which demonstrate the opportunities of the 
technology. More fundamentally, the system builders strengthen these functions by aligning 
the technology to the structure in which they are embedded, including various incumbents. 
Hence, strengthening these “know about” functions is essential for attracting actors and for 
formation of networks.  
The third set of functions was called the “enabling” functions―resource mobilisation, market 
formation and positive externalities. The system builders were able to strengthen the 
enablers by a) mobilising resources from the general structure, in which they are embedded, 
as well as by inducing entry of firms to the TIS and creating networks (resource mobilisation), 
and b) creatively identifying market opportunities (market formation). In combination with 
positive externalities that arise from actions undertaken by the system builders themselves, 
as well as by other actors in the TIS, the system builders are capable of further strengthening 
the “know how” and “know about” functions of the TIS. 
Through strengthening the functions, the system builders are able to create or strengthen 
the structural elements of the TIS. These may also be strengthened directly. For example, 
the system builders can create actors by starting new firms and technology by constructing 
new plants, etc.  
The contributions made to system dynamics by pilot and demonstration plants were 
emphasised, as these are used by the system builders as their primary “tool” or instrument 
for aligning the technology to the interest of incumbents in the structure and to attract new 
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actors with complementary competencies and resources, thereby creating alliances and 
networks. Hence, this thesis contributes by:  
c) an improved conceptualisation of how the system builders interact with the structure 
in which they are embedded. 
d) illustrating how the system builders align the technology to the structure, thereby 
strengthening the “know about” functions, attracting actors and creating networks 
and alliances. The new actors, networks and alliances strengthen the enablers which, 
in turn, positively influence the “know how” functions of the TIS.  
e) illustrating how the system builders use pilot and demonstration plants as a tool in 
the alignment process. 
As mentioned in Chapter II, a range of authors have argued that system weaknesses 
constitute a guide for policymakers who aim to stimulate innovation, the creation of new 
industries and economic growth (Lundvall, 1992; Lundvall and Johnson, 1994; Malerba, 
1996; Smith, 1996; Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997; Metcalfe and Georghiou, 1997; Smith, 
2000b; Edquist, 2002; Metcalfe, 2004; Smits and Kuhlmann, 2004; Klein Woolthuis et al., 
2005; Lundvall, 2007; Foray, 2009; Bergek et al., 2010b). However, it has also been argued 
that system builders may very well act upon system weaknesses in their own self-interest 
(Smits and Kuhlmann, 2004; Bergek et al., 2010a). The capacity of system builders to do so 
was also illustrated throughout Chapters V-VIII.  
From a policy perspective, knowing who the system builders are and what they are (not) 
capable of is of crucial importance for two main reasons. First, this type of knowledge is 
necessary for enabling policymakers to set realistic targets. Second, it is necessary for 
policymakers to tailor appropriate and effective measures for achieving such targets, taking 
into account limitations in the transformative capacities of the system builders. Hence, this 
thesis contributes with,  
f) a rationale for identifying system builders in the formative phase of TIS. 
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g) strengthening the TIS framework with respect to its ability to aid analysts in 
identifying which system weakness that system builders may address themselves and 
those that need to be further addressed by policymakers, thereby providing 
i. an analytical link between the micro and macro level, which makes it possible 
for policymakers to set more realistic long-term goals for new technologies.  
ii. a general and useful method that can be used by policymakers for formulating 
appropriate policy interventions tailored to the needs of an emerging TIS of 
strategic importance. 
The innovation processes that these system builders take part in, have been described as 
highly contextual and path dependent (Rosenberg, 1976; Dosi, 1982; Nelson and Winter, 
1982). From such a perspective, actors make decisions based on their individual contexts 
rather than freely from previous constraints.  
In Chapter IV, it was argued that for research to matter for policymaking, context-specific 
analysis is pivotal, as it allows us to gain an understanding of how and why different actors 
decide to learn and develop a new knowledge field, as well as which uncertainties must be 
reduced in order for these actors to continue making choices that, over the long-term, may 
progress the field to complete the formative phase and shift it into a phase marked by rapid 
market growth. 
The value of this thesis is, thus, not in making predictions about the future. Rather, it is to 
provide a highly context-dependent analysis on what it takes for a range of actors, from both 
public and private sectors within the European Union, to realise an emerging TIS with 
potential to contribute to abating climate change. Hence, from an empirical perspective, this 
thesis contributes with: 
h) a rich and contextual description of the history and development of biomass 
gasification in Europe starting in the 1970s in Sweden and Finland, and from the early 
1990s in Austria and Germany.  
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In this specific case, virtuous circles between the functions and the structure have been 
created. However, from the perspective of completing the formative phase and shifting the 
TIS into a growth phase, it was argued in Chapter IX that system builders have been limited 
in their capacity to strengthen the “know how” functions, which has resulted in an 
insufficiently strong technology and actor structure, and the current demonstration plants 
are, therefore, not yet in operation.  
It was also argued that the system builders have been limited in their capacity to create joint 
political network(s), advocating alignment of institutions and technology, thereby 
strengthening the enabling function market formation.  
Without such an alignment, it will be difficult to attract actors with the required 
complementary resources to the field and to resolve the remaining technical problems. 
Based on the limits of the system builders’ transformative capacity, it was thus possible to 
identify two main system weaknesses of the TIS:  
1) the first system weakness identified on an EU level is insufficient actor and technology 
structures in support of the development and diffusion of second-generation fuels.  
2) the second system weakness identified on an EU level is the lack of joint political 
network(s) advocating for an alignment of institutions and technology. 
In Chapter XI, policy options for addressing these system weaknesses were outlined and it 
was concluded that policy needs to commit substantial resources to reduce the remaining 
technical uncertainties. In addition, policy must address the very large market uncertainties. 
If these are not addressed, actors with required complementary competencies and 
resources may not enter the TIS, and the system builders may not to be able to find 
investors willing to commit the amount of capital necessary for the construction of the first 
commercial-scale demonstration plants. 
It was also concluded that it is too early to introduce general policy instruments for reducing 
market uncertainties. Instead a “bridging policy” was suggested, in which the market 
uncertainties are reduced for the first plants by implementing a tax exemption coupled with 
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a guaranteed market and off-take price. Hence, in the case of biomass gasification, an 
empirical contribution of this thesis is: 
j) identification of the main system weaknesses and an analysis of policy options 
addressing these weaknesses.   
The focus on the extent and limits of the system builders’ transformative capacity has made 
visible contributions to system dynamics by other actors and elements. In Chapter X, the 
main contributions of demonstration plants, universities, institutes, industry, and policy 
were specified. Apart from demonstration plants, it is of course among these actors that we 
find the system builders. For example, some of Germany’s institutes appeared to have 
institutionalised the system building role acting as “catching-up learners” (cf. Dalum et al., 
(1992) and Lundvall and Johnson (1994)), as well as “system memory” and “node” (see VTT, 
Chapter VIII).  
In the Finnish and German case in particular, there appears to be extensive collaborations 
between institutes and universities, but also strong competition over resources and 
contracts with industry. In these cases, the institutes seem to take on the role of conducting 
research on process development and hosting the required large-scale experimental science 
and technology infrastructure,318 while universities appear to focus more on basic science 
and on educating the future human capital base. In a best case scenario, the institutes and 
universities should be able to find a relationship in which they strengthen, rather than 
cannibalise, each other.   
The contributions of established industry to system dynamics is particularly important within 
the field of biomass gasification since these firms possess many resources, both up-stream 
and down-stream to gasification, that small entrepreneurial firms cannot develop. However, 
even if the emerging technology may provide an interesting opportunity to revitalise their 
current businesses (and not only a threat), encouraging them to participate and contribute 
to the TIS may prove very difficult. In particular, it has been possible to observe that rapidly 
                                                      
318 This is, of course, something that the industry also does and on a much larger scale. 
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growing markets for conventional biomass CHP and coal gasification have influenced the 
direction of search of incumbents away from biomass gasification. 
Policy can contribute to system dynamics by taking on the role of the “midwife” and re-
formulating the rules of the game (Edquist, 2002). They can do so by acting upon the system 
weaknesses specified in this thesis, thereby reducing the structural constraints faccing the 
system builders. This may reduce technical and market uncertainties to an acceptable level 
for further firms to enter the field, thereby creating the conditions necessary for finalising 
the formative phase and shifting the TIS into a growth phase by 2020. Hence, this thesis 
contributes with: 
k) a deep understanding of the interplay between various actors in the formation of a 
TIS.  
The following chapter will summarise the main implication for system builders and 
policymakers. 
12.2 Implications for system builders and policymakers 
In this thesis, it has been illustrated that developing the necessary industrial capacity for 
realising the potential of second-generation fuels take decades. Even if actors involved can 
draw upon a 200 years of experience in fossil gasification, as well as on different 
experiments with biomass gasification since the 1970s, industry has not developed the 
necessary capacity for completing the formative phase, shifting it into a growth phase. 
Hence, the first implication for policy is that: 
a) it takes many decades to develop technology options, such as the production of 
second-generation fuels from biomass, to abate climate change.   
For putting various technology options on the “shelf” (Sandén and Azar, 2005), an industrial 
capacity for these must develop through the accumulation of knowledge over an extended 
period of time. It is, therefore, essential that industry has the opportunity to experiment 
with various types of applications, feed-stock and on different scales over long periods of 
time.  
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The construction of pilot-, demonstration- and commercial-scale plants is an essential part of 
such experiments. The importance of demonstration plants that carry their own operating 
costs for less advanced applications, while experiments are made on more advanced, was 
emphasised as these enable actors to quickly explore new ideas and test various types of 
concepts. These experiments, in combination with the construction of less advanced (but 
still commercial-scale) plants are necessary for increasing the level of knowledge to an 
expert level and for gaining commercial experience with novel technologies.  
When continuous experimentation is undertaken, a science and technology infrastructure is 
created. Based on such an infrastructure, further experiments can be conducted and the 
knowledge field can advance in new and on beforehand unknown directions. Hence, for 
policy to support the development of an industrial capacity, it must support: 
b) many types of experiments, including a wide range of applications and configurations 
at pilot, demonstration and commercial scales over an extended period of time.  
In Chapter XI, it was argued that it is necessary to support experiments with all three 
technological trajectories under development. The various trajectories do not represent 
conventional “competing designs” that fully substitute for one another (Utterback, 1994), 
and there are still technical uncertainties that may prove too difficult to solve along their 
entire value chains. Prioritising one trajectory over another is, therefore, at this stage not 
advisable and may seriously hamper the possibility to realise the potential of producing 
second-generation fuels from biomass. Hence, it is concluded that it will be necessary for 
policy to: 
c) support the demonstration of all three trajectories, including all complementary 
knowledge fields along the entire value chain.  
Already in Chapter III, it was emphasised that although most of the bits and pieces of 
knowledge necessary for creating complete systems for turning biomass into usable 
transportation fuels already exists today, these have never before been combined into 
complete value chains. As these existing knowledge fields have developed independently of 
each other—by firms with no tradition of cooperating―these knowledge fields must be 
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adapted to each other and new knowledge concerning their integration must be developed. 
In addition, new and complementary products, services and distribution channels may have 
to be developed.  
For succeeding with the demonstration plants, system builders depend on the participation 
of incumbent actors with access to complementary resources and competencies. For 
example, to develop DME or SNG as an alternative fuel, new engines and new fuel 
infrastructures have to be developed. For actors interested in FT diesel, only two catalyst 
developers have commercial plants operating, and they do not participate in the current 
technology development. Hence, for developing an industrial capacity and successfully 
demonstrating the technology: 
d) system builders are dependent on the creation of strong alliances with incumbents 
with complementary resources and competencies along the entire value chains.  
For the system builders to be able to create such alliances with incumbents, both nationally 
and internationally, they depend on a being embedded in a rich and heterogeneous 
structure. Such a structure consists of a wide range of technology specific and neutral 
instruments, incumbent industries and networks from which they can draw resources as well 
as create initial markets.319  
In Chapter X, it was argued that the primary role of policy is to tend to the creation and 
maintenance of such a structure. Policymakers then take on the role of a “midwife” (Edquist, 
2002) in the creation of new industries without actually trying to “pick” winners (Carlsson 
and Jacobsson, 1997; Lundvall, 2007). However, as the example of Sweden illustrates 
(Chapter VII), without a rich and heterogeneous structure, policymakers with an interest in 
developing the knowledge field were forced into a policy of picking winners. 
Creating such structures implies that policymakers at EU, national and regional levels shift 
from having a short-term focus on succeeding with individual projects to focusing on 
                                                      
319 Since markets in the emerging TIS may not generate any substantial income streams for a decade or so. As 
mentioned above, the institutional framework must, therefore, provide strong incentives for incumbents to 
allocate resources from existing and growing markets (such as biomass combustion or coal gasification) to 
develop the emerging TIS.  
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strengthening emerging actor and technology structures. In Chapters VII and X, it was argued 
that the primary focus of policy when funding research, development, pilot and 
demonstration projects should be to identify:  
i. what type of science and technology infrastructure is created. Is it useful 
beyond a single experiment or demonstration and, if so, who can continue to 
learn from it? 
ii. who has the ability to appropriate the benefits of the knowledge development, 
even if the project itself fails?  
A key implication for policy is that it should:      
e) not focus on succeeding with individual projects, since failure of such projects is more 
certain then their success. Instead it should,   
f) tend to the creation of a rich and heterogeneous structure from which both new 
system builders and strong industrial alliances can emerge.  
For completing the formative phase and shifting the TIS into a growth phase, system builders 
and policymakers must, as mentioned above, address the two main system weaknesses by 
reducing existing technical and market uncertainties. These uncertainties discourage actors 
with complementary competencies and resources from entering the TIS, and investors from 
committing substantial resources for scaling-up the technology to a commercial size (see 
Chapters IX and XI).320 For strengthening market formation and thereby reducing market 
uncertainties, an institutional alignment is necessary.   
However, fierce competition between system builders causes conflicts and makes it difficult 
to form political networks and speak with a common voice for an alignment of institutions. 
Hence, a key task for system builders is to:  
g) overcome internal conflicts, create political networks and advocate for an aligned 
institutional framework that would benefit the development of a wide range of 
solutions for the production of second-generation fuels. 
                                                      
320 The two system weaknesses were discussed in the previous subsection and will not be repeated here. 
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Meanwhile, policy will need to take responsibility for reducing technical and market 
uncertainties. The implications for policy were specified in Chapter XI, where it was argued 
that completing the formative phase of the TIS would take at least an additional 10 years 
and involve investments in the range of €5 billion to get all trajectories up and running.321  
Even if only 20 percent is covered through government budgets, €1 billion is still a 
substantial investment in demonstration programmes, which risk crowding out investments 
in other technological fields. As illustrated with the examples of BIGCC in Värnamo and the 
current example of Choren, making demonstration plants operational takes considerably 
longer than most system builders and investors willingly admit. It is, therefore, unlikely that 
10 years will be sufficient to complete the formative phase. Hence, for policy this implies 
that they should:  
h) focus on providing substantial resources and “patient capital” that allows for the 
remaining technical uncertainties to be reduced, at best, in the following decade.  
From an investor’s perspective, the technical risks of pursuing commercial-scale gasification 
projects may appear great. Nevertheless, these are small in relation to the market risk of 
investing in full-scale plants. Depending on the future price of biomass (which is very 
uncertain), the production cost of second-generation fuels in a plant with a capacity of 
approximately 0.2Mtoe of fuels per year will be in the range of $80-165 per barrel of oil 
equivalent (Chapter III).  
For reducing market risk for investors, the European Commission has decided that “ ... 
contribution made by biofuels produced from waste, residues, non food cellulosic material, 
and lingo-cellulosic material shall be considered twice that made by other biofuels ... ” to the 
10 percent target (EC, 2009a, Article 21:2).  
Even if the new directive provides some additional incentives for investors, it was argued in 
Chapter XI that these will not be sufficient for reducing the market risk in relation to fossil 
                                                      
321 This sum would include the construction of the pre-commercial demonstrations and all of the nine 
commercial-scale demonstration plants described in Table 11.1, Chapter XI. It excludes costs of forming 
markets. 
404 
 
fuels and first-generation biofuels. Hence, in addition to reducing the technical risks policy 
should:  
i) focus on providing incentives that reduce the market risk to acceptable levels for 
investors.    
In Chapter XI, two main policy alternatives for reducing the market risk were examined―a 
separate quota for second-generation fuels and a feed-in law. However, none of the 
alternatives came out as a strong candidate, as it was argued to be too early for introducing 
general policy instruments. Instead it was suggested that a “bridging policy” could be 
introduced, implementing tax exemption for the first commercial-sized plants coupled with a 
guaranteed market and off-take price granted by public sector customers with an interest in 
securing supplies of renewable fuels at a fixed price.   
12.3 Implications for future research 
Based on the results presented in this thesis, it is suggested that future research may take 
two main directions. 
First, in the creation of a new TIS, various elements contribute to system dynamics without 
necessarily taking on a system building role. In Chapter X, contributions to system dynamics 
were elaborated on from the perspectives of demonstration plants, institutes, universities, 
industries, and policymakers. Each of these can contribute to system dynamics in many 
different ways, and how they contribute differ between different contexts and situations. 
Nevertheless, it may be possible to define a fixed set of roles that different actors may take 
in the formation of a TIS but where one actor can take more than one role. Each of these 
roles should be defined by what type of structure and functions that are directly built, or 
strengthened, by the actor who takes on the specific role.  
Based on such taxonomy, it should be possible to visualise the different roles various actors 
take in a given TIS, how they compete or complement each other in different contexts (if 
some roles are not taken at all), and if some are taken by one actor in one context but not in 
another. Such a conceptualisation should be useful for analysing the interaction between 
various actors, and how these actors contribute to the development of the TIS in the various 
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phases. In addition, it should be possible to use the taxonomy when assessing the 
“usefulness” of, for example, academia or institutes. Such assessments are of interest to 
policymakers when spending money on various research and development programmes 
(Perez Vico, 2010). 
If one can, in a systematic way, categorise what types of roles that, say, academia may take 
in relation to other actors, it should improve the validity of such assessments. For example, 
there is little value in assessing the “usefulness” of an academic department based on its 
ability to start firms and conduct research on process development, if that is not the role it 
has taken in a given TIS. That is to say that using the same criteria for assessing the work 
undertaken by Professor Hofbauer at TU Vienna in Austria and Professor Huppa at Åbo 
Akedemi in Finland, or for the institute VTT in Finland compared to the institutes in Germany 
(FZK, ZSW and CUTEC), would be gravely misleading, since the contexts in which they 
operate are very different from each other (see Chapter X).  
Hence, once it is established what type of role a specific actor takes in the system, it is easier 
to determine what variables one should use to measure how well this actor performs. 
Obviously, such an assessment should not only be based on a set of end-variables—such as 
number of patents, publications or firms started—but also on a qualitative assessment of 
how well actors make use of the structure, in which they are embedded to create and 
strengthen the various structural elements and functions associated with that specific role. 
The first step towards creating such a taxonomy has already been taken in a Master’s thesis 
(Andersson and Vargas, 2010), but it should be further developed. 
Second, it would be interesting to further explore how policy can prioritise between various 
emerging TIS. From an evolutionary perspective, it has been argued that the main role of 
policy is to maintain and stimulate the creation of variety. This is of particular importance in 
a time of climate change, since accomplishing a shift towards a CO2-neutral society requires 
the development of an industrial capacity for a wide range of technologies, and that these 
are diffused on a large-scale within a relatively short time frame. 
However, as emphasised in Chapter XI, off-loading the technical and market risk for 
investors in technologies such as biomass gasification and taking these beyond the formative 
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phase will require substantial funding from the government. Similar and large-scale 
investments are likely to be required in other areas such as off-shore wind power, 
concentrated solar power, carbon capture and storage, but also in high speed railways, 
electrification of vehicles, etc. 
All governments taking climate change seriously face an extremely challenging predicament: 
they must invest substantial sums in one area and risk crowding out technologies in others. 
At the same time, there are no guarantees that investments in immature technologies will 
be successful. A central question to further explore is, therefore, on which base priorities 
should be made for government investments that can result in both CO2 reductions and the 
creation of an industrial capacity necessary for developing and diffusing these technologies 
on a large-scale.  
From this a perspective, to give priority to technologies with the lowest CO2 abatement costs 
is not necessarily a very good idea. If technologies with the lowest cost are given a high 
priority by introducing “technology neutral” incentives such as green certificates, it will be 
difficult for the immature alternatives, with a high potential in the long-term, to complete 
the formative phase and for an industrial capacity to develop (Bergek and Jacobsson, 2010). 
The alternative is to pursue a long-term industrial policy with technology-specific elements. 
However, with such a policy the risk of failure is always present and such failures must be 
planned for. From a national policy perspective, investing in projects that “fail” should at 
least result in the creation of a science and technology infrastructure that can be used for 
further experiments. It is, therefore, necessary that investments made should benefit a 
primarily national-based actor structure that can learn from such failures.  
Since the actor (industry) structure is different from one country to another, each country 
will have unevenly distributed opportunities to appropriate on investments made to realise 
the potential of various technical options. This means that current industry structure must 
be allowed to influence the priorities made between various emerging TIS. However, this 
path dependency should not be construed as inertia that prevents the exploration and 
development of new opportunities. Hence, partial answers to the question have already 
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been provided in this thesis, but a framework that would allow policymakers to give priority 
to one area over another could be further developed. 
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List of Abbreviations 
 
AER Absorption enhanced reforming 
BFB Bubbling fluidised bed  
BioSNG Synthetic natural gas from biomass 
BLG Black liquor gasification 
Boe  Barrels of oil equivalent 
BtL  Biomass-to-liquid 
CCS Carbon capture and storage 
CFB Circulating fluidised bed 
CtL Coal-to-liquid 
de diesel equivalent 
DME Dimethyl ether 
EC European Commission 
EEG Erneubare-Energien-Gesetz 
EF Entrained flow 
el electricity 
FB Fluidised bed 
FICFB Fast Internal Circulating Fluidised Bed 
FT Fischer–Tropsch 
GHG Green house gases 
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GtL Gas-to-liquid 
HT High temperature 
IGCC Integrated gasification combined cycle 
LT Low temperature 
NSI National systems of innovation 
RDF Refuse-derived fuel  
RSI Regional systems of innovation 
SNG Synthetic natural gas from fossil resources 
SRC Short rotation coppice  
SSI Sectoral systems of innovations 
t/d Tonnes per day 
tbd Tonnes of black liquor solids per day 
th thermal 
TIS Technological innovation systems 
Toe  Tonnes of oil equivalent 
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